UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-4408
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DEBRA M. MOSES,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of West Virginia, at Martinsburg. Gina M. Groh, Chief
District Judge. (3:16-cr-00006-GMG-RWT-1)
Submitted: December 15, 2016 Decided: December 19, 2016
Before SHEDD, DUNCAN, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Nicholas J. Compton, Assistant Federal Public Defender,
Martinsburg, West Virginia, for Appellant. Paul Thomas
Camilletti, Assistant United States Attorney, Martinsburg, West
Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Debra M. Moses appeals the 24–month sentence imposed
following her guilty plea to mail fraud, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1341 (2012). On appeal, counsel has filed a brief
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating
that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal but questioning
the substantive reasonableness of the selected sentence. Moses
filed a pro se supplemental brief in which she asserts that
counsel was ineffective at sentencing. * We affirm.
When reviewing a sentence for reasonableness, we apply “an
abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.
38, 51 (2007). We first examine the sentence for “significant
procedural error.” Id. If there is none, we “then consider the
substantive reasonableness of the sentence . . . , tak[ing] into
account the totality of the circumstances.” Id. We presume on
appeal that a sentence within the Sentencing Guidelines range
established by the district court is substantively reasonable.
United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir. 2014).
An appellant rebuts that presumption only “by showing that the
* Although Moses points to several ways in which she asserts
counsel’s performance at sentencing was constitutionally
deficient, ineffective assistance does not conclusively appear
on this record. Thus, Moses’ argument is more appropriately
raised, if at all, in a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion. See
United States v. Baldovinos, 434 F.3d 233, 239 & n.4 (4th Cir.
2006).
2
sentence is unreasonable when measured against the 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) [(2012)] factors.” Id.
We conclude that Moses has not rebutted the presumption of
reasonableness accorded to her within-Guidelines sentence. The
transcript of the sentencing hearing reveals that the district
court evaluated the totality of the circumstances—including the
specific factors emphasized by Moses on appeal—prior to imposing
sentence. The court nonetheless concluded that, in light of the
seriousness of the offense conduct underlying Moses’ conviction,
a 24-month sentence was appropriate. We will not reweigh these
factors on appeal. See United States v. Jeffery, 631 F.3d 669,
679 (4th Cir. 2011) (recognizing that “district courts have
extremely broad discretion when determining the weight to be
given each of the § 3553(a) factors”).
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record in
this case and have found no meritorious grounds for appeal. We
therefore affirm the district court’s second amended criminal
judgment. This court requires that counsel inform Moses, in
writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the
United States for further review. If Moses requests that a
petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition
would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for
leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must
state that a copy thereof was served on Moses. We dispense with
3
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
4