[Cite as State v. Sanders, 2016-Ohio-8202.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF MEDINA )
STATE OF OHIO C.A. No. 15CA0064-M
Appellee
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN THE
RICKY J. SANDERS MEDINA MUNICIPAL COURT
COUNTY OF MEDINA, OHIO
Appellant CASE No. 15 TRD 03667
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: December 19, 2016
MOORE, Judge.
{¶1} The Defendant, Ricky J. Sanders, appeals from his conviction in the Medina
Municipal Court. This Court affirms.
I.
{¶2} In 2015, Officer Michael Wovna of the Medina City Police Department initiated
a traffic stop of Mr. Sanders for driving while under administrative license suspension. The
officer cited Mr. Sanders for a violation of R.C. 4510.14(A). Mr. Sanders pleaded not guilty to
that charge, and the case proceeded to a bench trial. In his opening statement and in a motion to
dismiss pursuant to Crim.R. 29, Mr. Sanders argued that a violation of R.C. 4510.14(A) requires
a predicate OVI conviction, and here, the State was not relying on a previous OVI conviction.
The State maintained that a conviction under R.C. 4510.14(A) does not require a previous OVI
conviction, and instead, required only that the defendant be driving while under a suspension
imposed by one of the four statutes listed in R.C. 4510.14(A), which included a suspension
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imposed under R.C. 4511.191. Here, the State indicated, and the defendant did not dispute, that
Mr. Sanders was driving while his license was suspended under R.C. 4511.191, due to a previous
chemical test refusal. The trial court agreed with the State’s interpretation of R.C. 4510.14(A).
Thereafter, the trial court found Mr. Sanders guilty and imposed sentence. Mr. Sanders timely
appealed, and he now presents one assignment of error for our review.
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
[MR.] SANDERS’ RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW, AS GUARANTEED
BY THE UNITED STATES AND OHIO CONSTITUTIONS, WAS DENIED
WHEN HE WAS CONVICTED OF AND SENTENCED FOR [A] VIOLATION
OF []R.C. 4510.14 ON EVIDENCE WHICH WAS INSUFFICIENT AS A
MATTER OF LAW.
{¶3} In his sole assignment of error, Mr. Sanders argues that the trial court erred in
convicting him for violating R.C. 4510.14 because a violation of that statute requires a prior
conviction for an OVI offense, and there was no evidence of a predicate OVI conviction
produced by the State. We disagree.
{¶4} Mr. Sanders’ argument pertaining to the sufficiency of the evidence turns upon a
question of statutory interpretation. Questions of statutory interpretation are questions of law,
which we review de novo. State v. Jackson, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 15CA010828, 2016-Ohio-
7637, ¶ 10.
{¶5} R.C. 4510.14(A) provides that:
No person whose driver’s or commercial driver’s license or permit or nonresident
operating privilege has been suspended under section 4511.19, 4511.191, or
4511.196 of the Revised Code or under section 4510.07 of the Revised Code for a
conviction of a violation of a municipal OVI ordinance shall operate any motor
vehicle upon the public roads or highways within this state during the period of
the suspension.
(Emphasis added.)
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{¶6} In his brief, Mr. Sanders maintains that “[t]he issue that was argued to the Trial
Court was that [Mr. Sanders] did not have ‘a conviction of a municipal OVI ordinance’ and that
was an element of the charge[.]” However, the statute is written in the disjunctive, and the plain
language provides four different statutory sections under which the predicate suspension may
have been imposed. See R.C. 4510.14(A). R.C. 4510.14(A) requires that the suspension have
been imposed for a “conviction of a violation of a municipal OVI ordinance” only with respect to
an underlying suspension issued under R.C. 4510.07. It is undisputed that Mr. Sanders’ license
was suspended under R.C. 4511.191, on which, according to the plain language of R.C.
4510.14(A), the underlying suspension may be based without limitation.
{¶7} Mr. Sanders develops no argument in his merit brief to support his contention that
a conviction of a municipal OVI ordinance is necessarily required to support a conviction under
R.C. 4510.14. See App.R. 16(A)(7). Given the disjunctive language used in the statute, and the
very limited argument presented by Mr. Sanders on appeal, his sole assignment of error lacks
merit and is overruled.
III.
{¶8} Mr. Sanders’ assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the trial court is
affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Medina Municipal
Court, County of Medina, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy
of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
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Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the
period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is
instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the
mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellant.
CARLA MOORE
FOR THE COURT
CARR, P. J.
SCHAFER, J.
CONCUR.
APPEARANCES:
TIMOTHY P. HAFFEY, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
GREGORY HUBER, J. MATTHEW LANIER, and JOHN G. QUILLIN, Prosecuting Attorneys,
for Appellee.