NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 19 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 16-10151
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No. 2:10-cr-00104-GMN
v.
MEMORANDUM*
RONALD DUNMORE, a.k.a. RB,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Gloria M. Navarro, Chief Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 14, 2016**
Before: WALLACE, LEAVY, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.
Ronald Dunmore appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges
the 12-month-and-one-day sentence imposed upon revocation of supervised
release. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
Dunmore challenges his sentence on double jeopardy grounds. Specifically,
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
he claims that, because the district court relied on the same conduct to both modify
the terms of his supervised release and to impose a post-revocation term of
imprisonment, he was punished twice in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
This argument fails. The record reflects that the district court revoked supervised
release based on Dunmore’s new violations, including absconding from probation,
which occurred after the district court’s modification of his terms of supervised
release.
Dunmore next contends that the district court procedurally erred and
violated his due process rights by considering unadmitted and unproven allegations
in the revocation petition. Because Dunmore has not shown that these allegations
were demonstrably made the basis for the sentence, see United States v.
Vanderwerfhorst, 576 F.3d 929, 935-36 (9th Cir. 2009), or that any alleged error
affected his substantial rights, see United States v. Dallman, 533 F.3d 755, 761-62
(9th Cir. 2008), there was no reversible error.
Dunmore finally contends that his sentence is substantively unreasonable in
light of the mitigating factors. The district court did not abuse its discretion in
imposing Dunmore’s sentence. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).
The sentence is substantively reasonable in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)
2 16-10151
sentencing factors and the totality of the circumstances, including Dunmore’s
repeated breaches of the court’s trust. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51; United States v.
Miqbel, 444 F.3d 1173, 1182 (9th Cir. 2006).
AFFIRMED.
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