Filed
Washington State
Court of Appeals
Division Two
December 20, 2016
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 48169-3-II
Respondent,
v.
PATRICK E. LEWIS, UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant.
JOHANSON, J. — Patrick E. Lewis appeals his jury trial conviction for second degree
assault (domestic violence). Because Lewis fails to show that his counsel provided ineffective
assistance, we affirm Lewis’s conviction. We also decline to impose appellate costs.
FACTS
I. BACKGROUND
In March 2013, Ayesha Johnson called 911. She told the 911 operator that Lewis had
assaulted and strangled her while she was in Lewis’s car. Officer Scott Burnette reported to the
scene, interviewed Johnson, and photographed finger and thumb marks on her neck. Police
arrested Lewis, and the State charged him with second degree assault (domestic violence).
No. 48169-3-II
II. TRIAL
The trial court granted Lewis’s motion to exclude any “evidence, references to evidence,
testimony, or argument relating to [Lewis’s] prior criminal history.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 5.
Johnson testified at trial that she and Lewis had entered into a sexual relationship, which
Johnson described as “dating,” about eight years before trial. 1 Report of Proceedings (RP) at 77.
Johnson also said that she and Lewis started a “romantic relationship” about three years before
trial. 1 RP at 77. She later testified that they had a romantic relationship for a total of about one
year. On cross-examination, Lewis attempted to clarify whether the romantic relationship was for
eight years, as Johnson had earlier testified, or for one year. Johnson stated that “[Lewis] was
incarcerated so it was an on-and-off relationship.” 1 RP at 105. Lewis did not object to this
reference to his previous incarceration, despite the pretrial ruling that barred any evidence of
Lewis’s criminal history.
On the night of the assault, Johnson and Lewis were sitting in Lewis’s car, and Lewis
choked Johnson. Johnson recalled that her head was on the car’s armrest and that she was kicking
the windshield while Lewis choked her with both hands. After Lewis let Johnson go, she tried to
hit Lewis with her shoe. Johnson left Lewis’s car and called 911.
The trial court admitted into evidence photographs of Johnson’s neck taken the same day
as the assault that showed red thumb and finger marks around her throat. The State played a
recording of Johnson’s 911 call for the jury. In the recording, Johnson said that Lewis had grabbed
2
No. 48169-3-II
Johnson by her hair and struck her head against his car’s dashboard before he choked her.1 Johnson
was upset and sobbing in the recording.
The trial court also admitted screenshots of text messages between Lewis and Johnson after
the assault. Johnson texted Lewis that her throat hurt so much that she could not swallow, and
Lewis apologized and said that it was the “monster” in him. Ex. 6 at 20.
Officer Burnette testified that he interviewed Johnson the night of the assault. Johnson told
Officer Burnette that Lewis pushed Johnson’s head against the passenger window and then began
choking her with one hand.
Lewis testified that Johnson was never in Lewis’s car that night. Lewis claimed that
Johnson wanted Lewis’s assistance because she was fighting with someone and that Johnson
became irate when Lewis refused to get involved. Johnson hit Lewis in the face with her shoe,
and Lewis drove away. Lewis denied ever placing his hands on Johnson’s neck. Lewis testified
that he apologized by text message because he was sorry he was not able to help Johnson
financially.
III. CONVICTION AND SENTENCE
The jury found Lewis guilty of second degree assault and that the assault was a domestic
violence offense. The trial court sentenced Lewis to 47 months of confinement. Lewis requested
waiver of legal financial obligations (LFOs) because his criminal history made it difficult to find
employment—Lewis had not been employed for 13 years. The trial court found that Lewis was
1
Johnson’s trial testimony and statements to Officer Burnette conflicted with the 911 recording
regarding some minor details. On cross-examination, Johnson stated that Lewis pulled her hair
and that her head hit the passenger window.
3
No. 48169-3-II
indigent and not anticipated to be able to pay LFOs in the future. The trial court waived the
discretionary LFOs and entered an order of indigency.
ANALYSIS
Lewis claims that it was ineffective assistance for his counsel not to move for a mistrial
after Johnson said that her relationship with Lewis was “‘on-and-off’” because of Lewis’s
incarceration. Br. of Appellant at 7. Lewis argues that the incarceration reference violated the
trial court’s pretrial ruling that evidence of Lewis’s criminal history was inadmissible.2 We
disagree.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of fact and law that we
review de novo. State v. Jones, 183 Wn.2d 327, 338, 352 P.3d 776 (2015). To prevail on such a
claim, the defendant must show both that his counsel performed deficiently and that the defendant
suffered prejudice as a result. Jones, 183 Wn.2d at 339. If the defendant fails to establish either
element of the test, the inquiry ends. State v. Kyllo, 166 Wn.2d 856, 862, 215 P.3d 177 (2009).
II. NOT DEFICIENT PERFORMANCE
Lewis argues that defense counsel’s failure to move for a mistrial constituted deficient
performance because his counsel had no legitimate reason not to seek a mistrial and address the
incarceration reference outside the jury’s presence. We disagree.
2
Lewis assumes that the reference to “incarceration” violated the trial court’s ruling excluding
references to Lewis’s “criminal history.” Because no one argues that this comment falls outside
the trial court’s ruling, we consider Lewis’s argument.
4
No. 48169-3-II
Deficient performance is that which “‘falls below a minimum objective standard of
reasonable attorney conduct.’” Jones, 183 Wn.2d at 339 (quoting State v. Benn, 120 Wn.2d 631,
663, 845 P.2d 289 (1993)). Legitimate trial strategy cannot be the basis for an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim. In re Pers. Restraint of Cross, 180 Wn.2d 664, 694, 327 P.3d 660
(2014). We presume counsel was effective unless “there is no possible tactical explanation for
counsel’s action.” Cross, 180 Wn.2d at 694. And we have held that “[w]e can presume counsel
did not request limiting instructions to avoid reemphasizing damaging evidence.” State v. Dow,
162 Wn. App. 324, 335, 253 P.3d 476 (2011).
Here, Lewis did not move for a mistrial or object following Johnson’s reference to his prior
incarceration. But had Lewis moved for a mistrial, his motion would not have been successful.3
Defense counsel likely did not move for a mistrial following the incarceration reference because
counsel could reasonably have believed that the mistrial motion would be denied. And at most,
Lewis was likely to receive an instruction to the jury to disregard the incarceration reference.
Defense counsel reasonably could seek to avoid such an instruction that would have only served
to emphasize the reference. See Dow, 162 Wn. App. at 335.
Thus, defense counsel’s decision not to move for a mistrial or otherwise address the
incarceration reference was reasonably based on a legitimate trial strategy. Because defense
counsel’s failure to move for a mistrial did not fall below an objective standard of reasonable
3
The incarceration reference was not the type of irregularity that would require the trial court to
declare a mistrial because Lewis was not so prejudiced that nothing short of a new trial could
insure the fairness of his trial. See State v. Gamble, 168 Wn.2d 161, 177, 225 P.3d 973 (2010).
5
No. 48169-3-II
attorney conduct, we conclude that Lewis’s counsel’s performance was not deficient. And because
Lewis fails to establish deficient performance, our inquiry ends. See Kyllo, 166 Wn.2d at 862.
III. APPELLATE COSTS
Lewis requests that we either decline to impose appellate costs or remand to the superior
court to determine Lewis’s ability to pay. The State responds that it has yet to submit a cost bill
and that we should “wait until the cost issue is ripe, if it ever becomes so, before ruling on this
issue.”4 Br. of Resp’t at 12. We decline to impose costs.
We have broad discretion in deciding whether to grant or deny appellate costs to the
prevailing party. Former RCW 10.73.160(1) (1995); State v. Sinclair, 192 Wn. App. 380, 388,
367 P.3d 612, review denied, 185 Wn.2d 1034 (2016). The ability to pay is a factor in our exercise
of that discretion. Sinclair, 192 Wn. App. at 389. There is a presumption of continued indigency
throughout review. RAP 15.2; Sinclair, 192 Wn. App. at 393.
The trial court imposed a 47-month sentence, found that Lewis was indigent, and waived
all discretionary LFOs after Lewis explained that his criminal history had resulted in his being
unemployed for the last 13 years. Given this finding of indigency, the length of his sentence, and
his history of unemployment, it appears Lewis lacks the ability to pay his appellate costs. Thus,
we exercise our discretion to decline the imposition of Lewis’s appellate costs.
4
We exercise our discretion to limit the commissioner’s duty to impose costs in our decision
terminating review. RAP 14.2.
6
No. 48169-3-II
We affirm.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040,
it is so ordered.
JOHANSON, J.
We concur:
BJORGEN, C.J.
MELNICK, J.
7