UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-4206
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
ROBERT WILLIAM SYKES, JR.,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Marvin J. Garbis, Senior District
Judge. (1:15-cr-00458-MJG-1)
Submitted: December 15, 2016 Decided: December 20, 2016
Before WILKINSON, KING, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James Wyda, Federal Public Defender, Meghan Skelton, OFFICE OF
THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellant.
Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, David Metcalf,
Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Robert William Sykes, Jr. pleaded guilty to two counts of
interference with commerce by robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1951(a) (2012) (Hobbs Act). The district court sentenced
Sykes to 72 months of imprisonment and he now appeals. Finding
no error, we affirm.
On appeal, Sykes first argues that the district court erred
in declining to reduce his offense level for the second count by
three levels under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
§ 2X1.1(b)(1) (2016). In reviewing the district court’s
calculations under the Guidelines, “we review the district
court’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for
clear error.” United States v. Manigan, 592 F.3d 621, 626 (4th
Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). Section
2X1.1(b)(1) of the Guidelines provides:
If an attempt, decrease by [three] levels, unless the
defendant completed all the acts the defendant
believed necessary for successful completion of the
substantive offense or the circumstances demonstrate
that the defendant was about to complete all such acts
but for apprehension or interruption by some similar
event beyond the defendant’s control.
“The commentary to § 2X1.1 explicitly states that the reduction
is intended for cases in which the defendant is arrested well
before he has completed the acts necessary to commit the
offense.” United States v. Shakur, 7 F. App’x 289, 290 (4th
Cir. 2001) (No. 00-4755).
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Section 1951(a) prohibits obstructing, delaying, or
affecting, in any way, the movement of any article or commodity
in commerce by robbery or extortion, attempt or conspiracy to
commit robbery or extortion, or threats of physical violence.
18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). “A Hobbs Act crime, then, has two
elements: (1) robbery or extortion, and (2) interference with
commerce.” United States v. Taylor, 754 F.3d 217, 222 (4th Cir.
2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The Hobbs Act
defines robbery as the unlawful taking or obtaining of personal
property from the person by means of actual or threatened force,
or violence, or fear of injury, to his person or property at the
time of the taking or obtaining.” United States v. Strayhorn,
743 F.3d 917, 922 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and
alterations omitted). We have thoroughly reviewed the record
and the relevant legal authorities and conclude that the
district court did not err in calculating the offense level
under the Guidelines.
Sykes also argues that the court erred in denying his
motion for a downward departure under USSG § 4A1.3(b) because
his criminal history category overrepresented the seriousness of
his criminal history. “We are unable, however, to review a
sentencing court’s decision not to depart unless the court
mistakenly believed that it lacked the authority to do so.”
United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir. 2014).
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Here, it is clear that the district court did not misapprehend
its authority to grant such a departure. Therefore, Sykes
“cannot contest on appeal the court’s failure to depart
downward.” Id. at 306.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid in the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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