United States v. Jonathan Long

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-4335

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

JONATHAN C. LONG,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Newport News. Rebecca Beach Smith,
Chief District Judge. (4:10-cr-00067-RBS-TEM-1)

Submitted: December 15, 2016 Decided: December 20, 2016

Before WILKINSON and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Geremy C. Kamens, Federal Public Defender, Patrick L. Bryant,
Appellate Attorney, Suzanne V. Katchmar, Assistant Federal
Public Defender, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Amy
Elizabeth Cross, Special Assistant United States Attorney,
Newport News, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:

Jonathan C. Long appeals the district court’s order

revoking supervised release and imposing 18 months’ imprisonment

and 42 months’ supervised release. Long’s counsel has filed a

brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),

stating that there are no meritorious issues for appeal, but

questioning the reasonableness of the sentence and whether the

district court erred by determining that Long had a Grade B

violation. Long filed a pro se supplemental brief claiming that

the sentence was unreasonable. The Government did not file a

brief. We affirm.

“A district court has broad discretion when imposing a

sentence upon revocation of supervised release.” United

States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013). We will

affirm a revocation sentence that “is within the prescribed

statutory range and is not plainly unreasonable.” United

States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 440 (4th Cir. 2006). We first

consider whether the sentence imposed is procedurally and

substantively unreasonable, applying the same general

considerations employed in our review of original criminal

sentences. Id. at 438. Only if we find the sentence

unreasonable will we consider whether it is “plainly” so. Id.

at 439.

2
A supervised release revocation sentence is procedurally

reasonable if the district court considered the policy

statements contained in Chapter Seven of the Sentencing

Guidelines and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors applicable

to revocation sentences. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438-39; see also

18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (2012).

The district court must also provide a statement of reasons

for the sentence imposed. United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d

544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010). “Regardless of whether the district

court imposes an above, below, or within-Guidelines sentence, it

must place on the record an ‘individualized assessment’ based on

the particular facts of the case before it.” United States v.

Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Gall v.

United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007)). “A court need not be as

detailed or specific when imposing a revocation sentence as it

must be when imposing a post-conviction sentence, but it still

must provide a statement of reasons for the sentence imposed.”

Thompson, 595 F.3d at 547 (internal quotation marks omitted).

We find no error with the district court’s determination

that Long had at least one Grade B violation. See United

States v. Wynn, 786 F.3d 339, 343 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 136

S. Ct. 276 (2015). We further conclude that the sentence was

both procedurally and substantively reasonable.

3
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire

record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for

appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s order. This

court requires that counsel inform Long, in writing, of the

right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for

further review. If Long requests that a petition be filed, but

counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then

counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from

representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof

was served on Long. We dispense with oral argument because the

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the

materials before this court and argument would not aid the

decisional process.

AFFIRMED