IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
JOHN J. LONGFELLOW, §
§ No. 352, 2016
Defendant Below, §
Appellant, § Court Below—Superior Court of the
§ State of Delaware
v. §
§ Cr. ID No. 1102013113
STATE OF DELAWARE, §
§
Plaintiff Below, §
Appellee. §
Submitted: September 29, 2016
Decided: December 21, 2016
Before VALIHURA, VAUGHN, and SEITZ, Justices.
ORDER
This 21st day of December 2016, upon consideration of the appellant’s
opening brief, the appellee’s motion to affirm, and the Superior Court record, it
appears it appears to the Court that:
(1) The appellant, John J. Longfellow, filed this appeal from his
conviction and sentence on his third violation of probation (VOP). The appellee,
State of Delaware, has filed a motion to affirm the Superior Court judgment on the
ground that it is manifest on the face of Longfellow’s opening brief that the appeal
is without merit.1 We agree and affirm.
1
Del. Supr. Ct. R. 25(a).
(2) On May 25, 2011, Longfellow pled guilty to Rape in the Third Degree
and was sentenced, as a Tier 3 Sex Offender, to eight years of Level V
incarceration suspended after four years for two years of Level III probation. In
2014, the Superior Court modified the sentence to add the condition that
Longfellow was to have “no contact with any minor under the age of eighteen
years.”
(3) On February 20, 2015 and again on April 24, 2015, Longfellow was
convicted of VOP and resentenced. On the second VOP conviction, the Superior
Court sentenced Longfellow to four years of Level V incarceration suspended after
one year for eighteen months of Level III probation.
(4) Longfellow was released from Level V incarceration on March 21,
2016. Approximately two months later, on May 25, 2016, Longfellow’s probation
officer filed an administrative warrant alleging that Longfellow was having contact
with a minor child. Following Longfellow’s arrest, the Superior Court, on May 26,
set a cash bail of $9,000.00 and scheduled a VOP hearing for June 10, 2016.
(5) At a contested VOP hearing on June 15, 2016, Longfellow was found
guilty of VOP and was resentenced to three years of Level V incarceration
suspended after eighteen months, followed by two years of Level III probation.
This appeal followed.
2
(6) On appeal, Longfellow asked the Superior Court to prepare a
transcript of the June 15 VOP hearing at State expense. In response to the request,
the Prothonotary sent Longfellow a notice explaining that he must submit “an
Application to proceed In Forma Pauperis, with certified inmate account statement
attached, and a Motion for Transcript detailing the particularized need for same.”
It does not appear that Longfellow submitted the required application and motion
to the Superior Court. Consequently, the transcript was not prepared for the
appeal.
(7) On appeal, Longfellow claims that his due process rights were
violated because he “received no bail hearing or no preliminary hearing.” The
claim is not supported by the record, which reflects that the Superior Court set
Longfellow’s bail on May 26, 2016.
(8) Longfellow next claims that his due process rights were violated
because he did not receive written notice of the alleged VOP or disclosure of the
evidence against him. Without a transcript of the June 15 VOP hearing, the Court
has no idea if Longfellow raised the claim in the Superior Court. A claim not
raised in the trial court is reviewed only in the interests of justice and for plain
error.2 Under the plain error standard, “the error complained of must be so clearly
2
Del. Supr. Ct. R. 8. Cassidy v. Cassidy, 689 A.2d 1182, 1184 (Del. 1997) (claims not raised in
the trial court are reviewed only in the interests of justice under Supreme Court Rule 8 and for
plain error).
3
prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the
trial process.”3
(9) In this case, Longfellow does not contend that he did not have actual
notice of the alleged VOP or that his counsel was unprepared to address the alleged
VOP at the June 15 hearing. Also, Longfellow does not contend that he was not in
the presence of a minor child on May 25, 2016. Under these circumstances,
Longfellow has not demonstrated that he was prejudiced as a result of the alleged
lack of written notice of the VOP or the alleged lack of disclosure of the evidence
against him.4
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the motion to affirm is
GRANTED. The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ James T. Vaughn, Jr.
Justice
3
Trago v. State, 2015 WL 3885889, at *2 (Del. June 22, 2015) (quoting Wainwright v. State, 504
A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del.1986)).
4
Mitchell v. State, 2015 WL 1306914 (Mar. 23, 2015) (citing Jenkins v. State, 8 A.3d 1147,
1153-54 (Del. 2010) (holding that defendant having actual notice of alleged violation of
probation could not complain that he did not receive written notice); Knight v. State, 2006 WL
1805865 (Del. June 28, 2006) (concluding that due process claim for lack of written notice was
without merit in the absence of any indication that the probationer or his counsel was unaware of
or unprepared to address the alleged violation of probation).
4