J. S91014/16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
DAVID RAY SNYDER, : No. 921 MDA 2016
:
Appellant :
Appeal from the PCRA Order, April 29, 2016,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Clinton County
Criminal Division at No. CP-18-CR-0000367-2011
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., RANSOM, J. AND STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED DECEMBER 22, 2016
David Ray Snyder appeals pro se from the April 29, 2016 order
entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Clinton County which dismissed,
without a hearing, his second petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction
Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.
The PCRA court set forth the procedural history of this case, as
follows:
[Appellant] filed a Motion for Post-Conviction
Collateral Relief on November 17, 2015. This Court
entered an Order on December 3, 2015 appointing
[counsel] to represent [appellant], directing
[counsel] to file an Amended Petition before
January 31, 2016, directing the Commonwealth to
file an Answer to the Amended Petition on or before
February 28, 2016 and scheduling this matter for a
hearing on May 4, 2016.
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J. S91014/16
[PCRA counsel] requested additional time
which was granted by this Court to file an amended
petition and on February 29, [2016], [counsel] filed
a [Turner/Finley1 no-merit] [l]etter indicating that
all the [appellant’s] issues were meritless. The
Commonwealth filed a Letter with the Court on
March 31, 2016 requesting the Court to take action
on [counsel’s Turner/Finley no-merit] [l]etter. By
Order of Court dated April 5, 2016, this Court gave
notice to [appellant] that this Court intended to
dismiss the Motion for Post-Conviction Collateral
Relief within twenty (20) days.[2] [Appellant]
responded by Letter dated April 24, 2016, which this
Court accepted as timely. Said Letter complained
that [appellant] was not able to complete research at
the State Correctional Institution in the year 2015.
This Court by Order of April 29, 2016, dismissed the
Motion for Post-Conviction Collateral Relief filed by
[appellant] on November 17, 2015. [Appellant] filed
a Notice of Appeal on May 31, 2016 and this Court
by Order of June 1, 2016 directed [appellant] to file
a statement of matters complained of on appeal.
[Appellant] filed his Statement of Matters
Complained of on Appeal and indicated the issues
were [four claims of ineffective assistance of plea
counsel].
[Appellant] had filed a previous [PCRA]
[p]etition on September 25, 2012, with an Amended
Petition filed on November 21, 2012. This Court
issued an opinion and Order on January 15, 2013,
which the Court would request the Superior Court to
review. The Superior Court affirmed this Court’s
Order of January 15, 2013 by Memorandum Opinion
of December 13, 2013. [See] number 312 MDA
2013. It is clear that the issues concerning
1
Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth
v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa.Super. 1988) (en banc).
2
The record further reflects that on April 5, 2016, the trial court entered an
order granting PCRA counsel’s motion to withdraw.
-2-
J. S91014/16
[appellant’s] trial counsel were raised in the first
[PCRA] proceeding and were addressed by the
Superior Court [on appeal].
PCRA court opinion, 6/20/16 at 1-2.
Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
1. Whether trial counsel [] was ineffective for not
withdrawing [appellant’s] plea?
2. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for not
objecting to the sentence, which was outside
the plea bargain?
3. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing
to file a motion to modify?
4. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing
to file post-trial motions?
5. Whether [appellant] filed his petition late[] due
to interference by government officials with the
presentation of the claim, in violation of the
Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or
the Constitution or laws of the United States?
Appellant’s brief at 2 (capitalization omitted).
All PCRA petitions, including second and subsequent petitions, must be
filed within one year of when a defendant’s judgment of sentence becomes
final. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). “A judgment becomes final at the
conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme
Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the
expiration of the time for seeking the review.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3).
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that the PCRA’s time restriction is
constitutionally sound. Commonwealth v. Cruz, 852 A.2d 287, 292 (Pa.
-3-
J. S91014/16
2004). In addition, our supreme court has instructed that the timeliness of
a PCRA petition is jurisdictional. If a PCRA petition is untimely, a court lacks
jurisdiction over the petition. Commonwealth v. Callahan, 101 A.3d 118,
120-121 (Pa.Super. 2014) (courts do not have jurisdiction over an untimely
PCRA); see also Commonwealth v. Wharton, 886 A.2d 1120 (Pa. 2005).
Here, the trial court sentenced appellant on July 16, 2012. Appellant
failed to file a direct appeal to this court, and consequently, appellant’s
judgment of sentence became final on August 15, 2012, 30 days after
imposition of sentence and the time for filing a direct appeal expired. See
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3); Pa.R.A.P. 903; Commonwealth v. Cintora, 69
A.3d 759, 763 (Pa.Super. 2013). Therefore, appellant’s petition, filed
November 17, 2015, is facially untimely. As a result, the PCRA court lacked
jurisdiction to review appellant’s petition, unless appellant alleged and
proved one of the statutory exceptions to the time bar, as set forth in
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1).
Those three narrow exceptions to the one-year time bar are: when
the government has interfered with the appellant’s ability to present the
claim, when the appellant has recently discovered facts upon which his PCRA
claim is predicated, or when either the Pennsylvania Supreme Court or the
United States Supreme Court has recognized a new constitutional right and
made that right retroactive. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i-iii);
Commonwealth v. Brandon, 51 A.3d 231, 233-234 (Pa.Super. 2012).
-4-
J. S91014/16
The appellant bears the burden of pleading and proving the applicability of
any exception. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). If an appellant fails to invoke a
valid exception to the PCRA time bar, this court may not review the petition.
See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i-iii).
Here, appellant baldly asserts in the table of contents section of his
brief that he “filed his PCRA petition late due to interference by government
officials with the with the [sic] presentation of the claim in violation of the
constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the
United States.” (Appellant’s brief at i, capitalization deleted.) In the
argument section of his brief, however, appellant entirely fails to carry his
burden of pleading and proving that the government-interference exception
to the time bar applies because (i) he fails to set forth any facts to
demonstrate how the government interfered with his ability to present the
claim; and (ii) he fails to advance any argument whatsoever to support the
application of the government-interference exception. Therefore, the PCRA
court lacked jurisdiction to review appellant’s petition, and we may not
review the petition on appeal.
Order affirmed.
-5-
J. S91014/16
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/22/2016
-6-