NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 22 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
STEVEN K. YOUNG; SUSAN KRPATA- No. 15-35202
YOUNG,
D.C. No. 2:14-cv-01807-MJP
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v. MEMORANDUM*
NORTHWEST TRUSTEE SERVICES
INC.,
Defendant,
and
GREEN TREE SERVICING, LLC; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Marsha J. Pechman, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 14, 2016**
Before: WALLACE, LEAVY, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Steven K. Young and Susan Krpata-Young appeal pro se from the district
court’s judgment dismissing their action alleging Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”)
claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the
district court’s dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Doe v.
Abbott Labs., 571 F.3d 930, 933 (9th Cir. 2009). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed as time-barred the Youngs’ TILA
claim for rescission because the Youngs failed to allege facts sufficient to show
that they delivered a timely notice of rescission. See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f) (a
borrower’s right to rescind a transaction expires three years after “the date of
consummation of the transaction”); Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.,
135 S. Ct. 790, 792 (2015) (a borrower exercises her right of rescission by
notifying the creditor of her intention to rescind, whether or not the borrower has
filed an action in court).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the Youngs’
action without leave to amend because amendment would be futile. See Cervantes
v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting
forth standard of review and explaining that a district court can dismiss without
leave to amend where amendment would be futile).
2 15-35202
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.
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