NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 22 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
REUBEN JAMES THOMPSON, No. 14-17160
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:13-cv-01342-NVW
v.
MEMORANDUM**
ERIC FANNING,* Secretary of the Army,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Neil V. Wake, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 14, 2016***
Before: WALLACE, LEAVY, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.
Reuben James Thompson appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
in his employment action alleging constitutional claims and discrimination in
*
Eric Fanning is substituted for his predecessor, John M. McHugh, as
Secretary of the Army under Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2).
**
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
***
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
violation of Title VII. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review
de novo. Arrington v. Wong, 237 F.3d 1066, 1069 (9th Cir. 2001) (dismissals
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)); Moran v. Selig, 447 F.3d 748, 753 (9th Cir. 2006)
(summary judgment). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Thompson’s constitutional claims
because Title VII “provides the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of
discrimination in federal employment.” See Brown v. General Servs. Admin.,
425 U.S. 820, 835 (1976).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Thompson’s Title
VII race discrimination claim because Thompson failed to establish a prima facie
case of race discrimination and, even assuming that Thompson had established a
prima facie case, Thompson failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to
whether defendant’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating his
employment were pretextual. See Moran, 447 F.3d at 753-58 (affirming summary
judgment on Title VII claim because plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie case
and, alternatively, failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to pretext).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Thompson’s
motion for reconsideration because Thompson failed to demonstrate any basis for
2 14-17160
relief. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255,
1262-63 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and grounds for relief
from judgment under Rules 59(e) and 60(b)).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
We reject as unsupported by the record Thompson’s contention that the
district court improperly held private meetings with defendant.
We treat Thompson’s request that case law be established, set forth in his
reply brief, as a request for publication of the memorandum disposition, and deny
his request.
AFFIRMED.
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