FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION DEC 23 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CAMERON SCOTT GRIFFIN, No. 15-35731
Petitioner-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:14-cv-00199-BLW
v.
MEMORANDUM*
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Idaho
B. Lynn Winmill, Chief Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 14, 2016**
Before: WALLACE, LEAVY, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.
Federal prisoner Cameron Scott Griffin appeals pro se from the district
court’s judgment dismissing his request for “Return of Illegally Forfeited
Property.” We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo.
United States v. Marshall, 338 F.3d 990, 993 (9th Cir. 2003) (denial of a motion
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
for return of property); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998)
(order) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Griffin’s request because Fed. R. Crim.
P. 41(g) does not apply to property subject to forfeiture. See United States v.
Fitzen, 80 F.3d 387, 389 (9th Cir. 1996) (motion for return of property may be
defeated by demonstrating that the property is subject to forfeiture). Contrary to
Griffin’s contentions, Griffin cannot bring his request under 5 U.S.C. §§ 702 and
704, or 28 U.S.C. §§ 1491 and 1495.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to exercise its
equitable jurisdiction because the forfeiture was part of Griffin’s conviction and
sentence, and Griffin had adequate remedies at law. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 853(a)(1),
(2); Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29, 39-41 (1995) (recognizing criminal
forfeiture as an aspect of punishment); Ramsden v. United States, 2 F.3d 322, 324
(9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2255;
Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 381 (1992) (“It is a basic
doctrine of equity jurisprudence that courts of equity should not act . . . when the
moving party has an adequate remedy at law and will not suffer irreparable injury
if denied equitable relief.” (alteration in original) (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted)).
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The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Griffin’s motion to
reconsider because Griffin failed to demonstrate any basis for relief. See Sch. Dist.
No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1993)
(setting forth standard of review and grounds for reconsideration under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 59(e)).
Griffin’s motion for determination of status, filed on October 20, 2015, is
denied as unnecessary.
AFFIRMED.
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