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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 16-11783
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 3:15-cv-01832-AKK
PAMELA E. MCCLURE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
OASIS OUTSOURCING II, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
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(December 29, 2016)
Before HULL, MARCUS and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Pamela McClure appeals the district court’s dismissal of her complaint
alleging a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) against her
employer, Oasis Outsourcing II (“Oasis”). On appeal, McClure argues that: (1) the
district court erred in concluding that she had failed to demonstrate that she
exhausted administrative requirements; and (2) the district court erred in
considering matters outside the pleadings in granting the motion to dismiss
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). After thorough review, we affirm.
We review de novo the grant of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for
failure to state a claim, accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and
construing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Randall v. Scott, 610
F.3d 701, 705 (11th Cir. 2010). In reviewing a motion to dismiss, we consider
whether the pleadings contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2007) (quotation omitted). A claim is facially plausible when we can “draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
First, we are unpersuaded by McClure’s claim that the district court erred in
concluding that she had failed to demonstrate that she had exhausted the
administrative requirements of the ADA. The ADA prohibits private employers
from discriminating against a qualified individual with a disability in regard to job
application issues; the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees; employee
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compensation; job training; and other terms, conditions, and privileges of
employment. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a); Earl v. Mervyns, Inc., 207 F.3d 1361, 1365
(11th Cir. 2000). Plaintiffs proceeding under the ADA must comply with the same
procedural requirements articulated in Title VII, and this includes the duty to
exhaust administrative remedies. 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. “A
plaintiff’s judicial complaint is limited by the scope of the [Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”)] investigation which can reasonably be
expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination.” Mulhall v. Advance
Security, Inc., 19 F.3d 586, 589 n.8 (11th Cir. 1994).
Ordinarily, a party not named in the EEOC charge cannot be sued in a
subsequent civil action. Virgo v. Riveria Beach Assocs., 30 F.3d 1350, 1358 (11th
Cir. 1994). This naming requirement serves to notify the charged party of the
allegations against it and affords the party the opportunity to participate in
conciliation. Id. However, courts liberally construe the naming requirement and
may permit a party unnamed in the EEOC charge to be subjected to the jurisdiction
of federal courts if the purposes of the act are fulfilled. Id. at 1358-59. In order to
determine if the purposes of the act are fulfilled, courts do not apply a rigid test,
but look to several factors, including:
(1) the similarity of interest between the named party and unnamed party;
(2) whether the plaintiff could have ascertained the identity of the unnamed
party at the time the EEOC charge was filed; (3) whether the unnamed
parties received adequate notice of the charges; (4) whether the unnamed
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parties had an adequate opportunity to participate in the reconciliation
process; and (5) whether the unnamed party actually was prejudiced by its
exclusion from the EEOC proceedings.
Id. at 1359.
Here, the district court did not err in granting the motion to dismiss because
the record did not demonstrate that McClure exhausted the administrative
requirements. For starters, defendant Oasis, McClure’s alleged employer, was not
named in her EEOC charge of discrimination. Instead, McClure’s EEOC charge
named “Holiday Inn Express” as her employer and made no factual allegations
concerning the conduct of Oasis or its employees in relation to the claim. In fact,
the word “Oasis” appeared nowhere in the charge. Thus, Oasis was not afforded
an opportunity to participate in the reconciliation process because nothing in the
charge would notify the EEOC of the need to investigate any conduct of Oasis or
attempt reconciliation efforts with Oasis.
Moreover, Oasis did not receive adequate notice of the charge, since the
notice of right to sue letter was not addressed to Oasis, but was sent to a law firm
that did not represent Oasis. The record demonstrates that McClure could have
ascertained the identity of Oasis; she acknowledged that she had payroll documents
identifying Oasis as her employer prior to filing her EEOC charge, and that she
relied upon those documents in filing her worker’s compensation claim in 2012. In
addition, we have no reason to believe that the district court erred in concluding
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that “there is nothing in the complaint [McClure] filed in this court or in Holiday
Inn’s response to the EEOC charge to establish that Holiday Inn transmitted [the]
EEOC charge to Oasis.” On this record, McClure has failed to demonstrate that
she exhausted the administrative requirements of the ADA or that the purposes of
the act were fulfilled. See Virgo, 30 F.3d at 1359.
We also find no merit to McClure’s claim that the district court erred in
considering matters outside the pleadings in granting the motion to dismiss. Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(d) provides that “[i]f, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) . . .
matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the
motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.” There is,
however, an exception to this rule. SFM Holdings, Ltd. v. Banc of Am. Sec., LLC,
600 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2010). “In ruling upon a motion to dismiss, the
district court may consider an extrinsic document if it is (1) central to the plaintiff's
claim, and (2) its authenticity is not challenged.” Id.
It is a cardinal rule of appellate review that a party may not challenge as
error a ruling or other trial proceeding invited by that party. Crockett v. Uniroyal,
Inc., 772 F.2d 1524, 1530 n.4 (11th Cir. 1985). “The doctrine of invited error
stems from the common sense view that where a party invites the trial court to
commit error, he cannot later cry foul on appeal.” Yellow Pages Photos, Inc. v.
Ziplocal, LP, 795 F.3d 1255, 1283 (11th Cir. 2015) (quotation omitted).
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In this case, the district court did not err in considering materials outside the
complaint in granting the motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). The court’s order
cited to three exhibits that McClure attached to her amended complaint and motion
to dismiss, each of which she incorporated into and referenced in her pleadings.
These included Holiday Inn’s position statement, the EEOC charge of
discrimination, and the notice of right to sue letter. Each of these documents were
central to McClure’s claim, since she provided them to the court in order to
demonstrate that she satisfied the administrative requirements of the ADA and to
support her allegation that no one informed her that the employer was
misidentified throughout her EEOC proceedings. She also relies upon these
documents in her brief to this Court. Moreover, their authenticity was not
challenged. For these reasons, the court did not err in granting the motion to
dismiss. See SFM Holdings, 600 F.3d at 1337 (court did not err in considering
materials outside the complaint in ruling on a motion to dismiss because the
plaintiff referred to the document in the complaint). But in any event, even if the
court did err, that error would have been harmless because it was invited by
McClure. Crockett, 772 F.2d at 1530 n.4.
AFFIRMED.
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