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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
BAYVIEW LOAN SERVICING, LLC IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
v.
JOY M. HILL AND FREDRICK HILL
Appellants No. 740 WDA 2016
Appeal from the Order May 20, 2016
in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Civil Division
at No(s): MG 15 1146
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., OTT, J., and FITZGERALD,* J.
MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED DECEMBER 29, 2016
Pro se Appellants, Joy M. Hill and Fredrick Hill, appeal from the order
entered in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas granting summary
judgment in favor of Appellee, Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC. We affirm.
We glean the relevant facts from the trial court opinion and the
certified record. The property at issue in this case is located at 33 Climax
Street, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Appellants executed a mortgage (“the
Mortgage”) on this property in favor of Progressive Home Federal Savings
and Loan Association (“Progressive”) on September 1, 1999. The Mortgage
served as security for a note executed on that same day by Appellants (“the
Note”) in exchange for a loan of $32,000.00, plus interest extended by
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S78040-16
Progressive. On December 19, 2006, Progressive assigned the Mortgage to
Appellee.
Appellants filed for bankruptcy on November 30, 2009, in the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. On April
30, 2010, the bankruptcy court issued a final decree discharging Appellants’
unsecured debts (“bankruptcy decree”). Appellants stopped making
payments on the Note after February 2015. Accordingly, in August 2015,
Appellee initiated a foreclosure action based upon the Mortgage. Appellee
filed a motion for summary judgment on January 4, 2016, and Appellants
filed an answer. However, Appellants’ answer did not comply with Pa.R.C.P.
1029(a) and (b) and was deemed an admission of default by the trial court.
Appellee filed two supplemental memorandums of law regarding, inter alia,
the effect of the bankruptcy decree on the foreclosure action.
The trial court heard argument on February 16, 2016. On April 21,
2016, the court issued an order granting Appellee’s summary judgment
motion and directed “in rem judgment shall be entered in favor of [Appellee]
and against [Appellants] in the amount of $30,218.92, together with interest
. . . .” Order 4/21/16. The trial court’s order also indicated, via handwritten
note, “I am satisfied that a prior bankruptcy by [Appellants] did not
discharge this claim.” Id.
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Appellants filed the instant timely appeal. The trial court did not order
the filing of a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, but did file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)
opinion.
Appellants raise the following issues for review:
1. Was there sufficient explanations in the applicable laws
of [Appellee’s] Memoranda of Law referencing the
Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, [82-83]
[1991] regarding the Chapter 7 petition process stating
that “a debtor is protected from personal liability by
obtaining a discharge in a Chapter 7 liquidation,” though
“the creditor’s right to foreclose survives or passes through
bankruptcy,” made clear by the Supreme Court, to confirm
Appellees’ “relative position” to proceed with foreclosure
against the Appellant[s]?
2. Can Appellee[] provide “valid” and “accurate”
documentation that can attest to their true “vested
interest” in the Real Property located on 33 Climax St.,
Pittsburgh, Pa, of . . . Appellant[s] and the accounting of
all accepted payment transactions made from 2010 until
the default in February 2015 under Appellant[s’] Chapter 7
bankruptcy?
Appellants’ Brief at 8.
Appellants’ first argument is difficult to discern.1 It appears that
Appellants are arguing that the Mortgage was effectively discharged via their
prior bankruptcy and, therefore, the trial court erred by allowing an action
for foreclosure of the Mortgage. To this end, Appellants unfortunately
provide a substantial amount of extraneous authority, much from other
jurisdictions, that has no bearing upon their argument. Moreover,
1
We note that Appellants’ brief was authored by a “non-bar volunteer
advocate” from Forest Park, Georgia.
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Appellants provide only two sentences of argument regarding their second
issue concerning the alleged failure to recognize their past payments on the
Mortgage and they do not cite to any legal authority.
We begin by noting that Appellants’ pro se status does not relieve
them of their obligation to raise and develop their appellate claims properly.
Smathers v. Smathers, 670 A.2d 1159, 1160 (Pa. Super. 1996). This
Court has emphasized:
While this court is willing to liberally construe
materials filed by a pro se litigant, we note that
[petitioner] is not entitled to any particular
advantage because she lacks legal training. As our
supreme court has explained, any layperson
choosing to represent [herself] in a legal proceeding
must, to some reasonable extent, assume the risk
that [her] lack of expertise and legal training will
prove [her] undoing.
Id. (citation omitted).
Petitioners who have elected to proceed pro se cannot expect this
Court to act as their attorney. Id. (citation omitted). Indeed, claims that
are not sufficiently developed and are not supported by citation to legal
authority will be deemed waived by this Court. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(b);
Commonwealth v. B.D.G., 959 A.2d 362, 371 (Pa. Super. 2008) (holding
petitioner’s claim waived when he failed to cite to any authority supporting
his contentions).
Regarding summary judgment, our review is guided by the following
principles:
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The standards which govern summary judgment are well
settled. When a party seeks summary judgment, a court
shall enter judgment whenever there is no genuine issue of
any material fact as to a necessary element of the cause of
action or defense that could be established by additional
discovery. A motion for summary judgment is based on an
evidentiary record that entitles the moving party to a
judgment as a matter of law. In considering the merits of
a motion for summary judgment, a court views the record
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and
all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of
material fact must be resolved against the moving party.
Finally, the court may grant summary judgment only when
the right to such a judgment is clear and free from doubt.
An appellate court may reverse the granting of a motion
for summary judgment if there has been an error of law or
an abuse of discretion. . . .
Varner-Mort v. Kapfhammer, 109 A.3d 244, 246-47 (Pa. Super. 2015)
(citation omitted).
We note that a discharge under the Bankruptcy Code “voids any
judgment at any time obtained, to the extent that such judgment is a
determination of the personal liability of the debtor with respect to any debt
discharged . . . .” 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(1). However, “a bankruptcy discharge
extinguishes only one mode of enforcing a claim—namely, an action against
the debtor in personam while leaving intact another—namely, an action
against the debtor in rem.” Johnson, 501 U.S. at 84. Therefore, “the
[Bankruptcy] Code provides that a creditor’s right to foreclose on the
mortgage survives or passes through the bankruptcy.” Id. at 83; See 11
U.S.C. § 522(c). Indeed, it is well settled that a mortgage lien survives the
discharge of personal liability. See Estate of Lellock v. Prudential Ins.
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Co. of America, 811 F.2d 186, 189 (3d. Cir. 1987); PNC Bank, Nat. Ass’n
v. Balsamo, 634 A.2d 645, 653 (Pa. Super. 1993) (stating petitioner’s valid
lien on residential proper was not affected by general bankruptcy discharge.)
In the instant case, Appellants’ bankruptcy discharge did not preclude
Appellee’s in rem action in foreclosure. See Johnson, 501 U.S. at 83-84;
Estate of Lellock, 811 F.2d at 189. Therefore, we hold that the trial court
did not err by declining to prohibit Appellee’s mortgage foreclosure action
against Appellants.
Appellants also include various other claims seemingly regarding
Appellee’s purported lack of “ownership” of the property in question.
Appellants’ Brief at 17. We conclude that Appellants fail to present any
cogent and pertinent argument in this regard. As a result, to the extent
Appellants present additional arguments within their first issue, we hold that
such arguments are insufficiently developed and are, therefore, waived.
See B.D.G., 959 A.2d at 371; Smathers, 670 A.2d at 1160. Thus,
Appellants’ first issue merits no relief.
Likewise, in their second issue, Appellants present only the bald
allegation that all of their past payments on the mortgage were not properly
accounted for by Appellee. Appellants’ Brief at 20. Appellants do not claim
to have made any payments past the default date of February 2015, nor do
they provide any citation to the record or to legal authority in support of
their claim. Thus, we conclude that Appellants’ second issue is waived
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because they once again fail to sufficiently develop their argument or cite to
any pertinent legal authority. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(b); B.D.G., 959 A.2d at
371; Smathers, 670 A.2d at 1160.
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court properly determined that the
property at issue remained subject to the Mortgage and, thus, properly
granted summary judgment in favor of Appellee. Because Appellants fail to
establish an error of law or abuse of discretion by the trial court, we affirm
the order granting Appellee’s motion for summary judgment. See Varner-
Mort, 109 A.3d at 246-47.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/29/2016
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