J-S89001-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: F.R.P., JR., A IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR, PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
APPEAL OF: F.R.P., FATHER
No. 1870 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Decree May 23, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000920-2015
BEFORE: SHOGAN, MOULTON, and FITZGERALD, JJ.*
MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED DECEMBER 30, 2016
Appellant, F.R.P. (“Father”), appeals from the decree entered on May
23, 2016, that terminated his parental rights to F.R.P., Jr. (“Child”), who
was born in June of 2013.1 We affirm.
In its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, the trial court set forth the relevant
history of this matter as follows:
On January 11, 2016, this Court held a bifurcated Goal
Change/Termination Hearing and heard testimony on [the
Department of Human Services’ (“DHS”)] Petition to terminate
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*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1
The parental rights of Child’s mother (“Mother”) were terminated in an
order that was filed on January 11, 2016. Based on the record before us, it
does not appear that Mother appealed the termination of her parental rights,
and she is not a party to the instant appeal.
J-S89001-16
Father’[s] rights as to [Child], and change the goal to Adoption.
Father was present and represented by his attorney.
The Assistant City Solicitor first presented the testimony of
Laquisha Henderson, DHS Social Worker. She testified [Child]
came into care in November 2013 because of housing issues that
prompted DHS to obtain an [Order of Protective Custody
(“OPC”)] for this family (Notes of Testimony 1/11/2(16, p.9 at
10-23; p.10 at 11-18).
Ms. Henderson testified that at the time DHS obtained the
OPC, Father and Mother were residing together in the same
home. The home was inappropriate and [Child] was removed
because of the structural damage and the house was infested
with roaches, and there was very little food. (Notes of Testimony
1/11/2016, p.11 at 19-23; p.12 at 1-5; p.13 at 2-5).
Father’s [Family Service Plan (“FSP”)] objectives at the
time were to fix the house he occupied and to exterminate the
roach infestation. DHS assisted the Father with exterminating
fees and had contractors come out to assess the home and
provide an estimate to fix it. The repairs were never completed
on the house, however, there were two treatments by
exterminators on the house. Ms. Henderson testified she paid for
those two treatments out of her own personal funds because it
would have taken a long time to retrieve the funds from DHS.
She also testified there were other issues involved, specifically,
Father’s brother moved into the home and DHS could not clear
him. (Notes of Testimony 1/11/2016, p.13 at 24-25; p.14 at 1-
25; p.15 at 1-4).
Ms. Henderson stated that from November 2013 through
February 2015, the house was never in a condition for
reunification, and that Father’s other objective to attend doctor’s
appointments for [Child] was something Father did complete at
the time. (Notes of Testimony 1/11/2016, p.15 at 11-22).
She testified Father’s visitation with [Child] began as
supervised because Mother was residing at the home and she
had a history of drug use. Then later the visits were changed to
unsupervised, which did not last long because there was an
incident where Father could not locate [Child] for over an hour
and police were called. The visits were then returned to
supervised. (Notes of Testimony 1/11/2016, p.17 at 1-16).
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Ms. Henderson testified Father had a psychiatric evaluation
and one of the recommendations was that Father have a
parenting capacity evaluation. During her tenure as Social
Worker, she noted that Father had complied with the first part of
that evaluation. (Notes of Testimony 1/11/2016, p.18 at 8-20).
She then referred Father to [the Clinical Evaluation Unit
(“CEU”)] because there were reports of some drug and alcohol
use. Father did report to CEU and no treatment was
recommended because his screens were negative. (Notes of
Testimony 1/11/2016, p.19 at 1-9).
Ms. Henderson testified she observed three interactions
between [Child] and Father, and noted they were positive and
they appeared to have a bond. (Notes of Testimony 1/11/2016,
p.19 at 13-24).
On cross-examination, Ms. Henderson stated she saw
Mother two times at the house. She also stated the main issue
with the house was an electrical problem and the contractor
believed it was a fire hazard. There was also structural damage
in the ceiling in the living room around the front door. (Notes of
Testimony 1/11/2016, p.22 at 5-9; p.25 at 4-16).
The next to testify was Crystal Adkins, the [Community
Umbrella Agency (“CUA”)] Case Manager at Tabor. She received
the case in February 2015 and is the current Case Manager for
the family. She stated Father’s Single Case Plan (SCP) was his
[Public Health Management Corporation (“PHMC”)] application
for his home, attend the visitations, to cooperate with CUA
services, have a parenting evaluation, and accommodate [sic]
the resource parent to [Child’s] doctor’s appointments. (Notes of
Testimony 1/11/2016, p.27 at 8-25; p.28. at 1-6).
Ms. Adkins stated that even if all the repairs were made in
the home, it would still not be appropriate for reunification
because of the people living in the home. She visited the home
on pop up visits each month from September 2015 through
December 2015, and the visits could not be scheduled because
the agency lost contact with Father for the month of October
2015. She went to the house and saw various people living in
the house, and they had not run clearances on these people. She
further stated she had not seen Father in the home since August
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2015. (Notes of Testimony 1/11/2016, p.29 at 12-25; p.30 at 1-
25; p.32 at 21-25; p.34 at 18-25).
Regarding visitation, Ms. Adkins testified Father made his
supervised visits during September and no contact with [Child]
in October 2015. (Notes of Testimony 1/11/2416, p.31 at 1-20).
Ms. Adkins testified Father had told her he had a stay-
away order against Mother because she was physically violent
towards him and he did not want her around the home. Father
reported during an unsupervised visit with [Child] he was
walking on an avenue and Mother had punched him in the face.
(Notes of Testimony 1/11/2016, p.37 at 1-25).
Ms. Adkins discussed [Child’s] medical issues, primarily an
ear surgery appointment in November 2015, when [Child
underwent ear surgery] to resolve his hearing issues. [Child] is
scheduled for a follow up in April 2016. She commented that
Father was not present to authorize that surgery. She further
stated Father was consistent with attending medical
appointments for [Child] in August 2015, however did not attend
appointments in September 2015. (Notes of Testimony
1/11/2016, p.38 at 1-25).
Ms. Adkins testified that Father first had unsupervised
visits with [Child] in February 2015, however, visits were
changed to unsupervised biweekly visits at the agency only
because there were safety concerns during Father’s visits. Father
was reported by the resource parent to be drinking, smoking
marijuana, and that one of the [m]others of his [c]hildren was
allowed into his house. (Notes of Testimony 1/11/2016, p.40 at
8-25; p.41 at 5-10).
Ms. Adkins stated that prior to September 2015 she would
have recommended reunification with [Child] for Father,
however, since that time Father has been inconsistent with his
parenting. Father always seems to need DHS assistance. (Notes
of Testimony 1/11/2016, p.43 at 4-15).
She testified [Child] identifies the resource parent as his
[parent]. [The resource parent and Child] are bonded because
[Child] responds to her directives regarding bathing, eating, and
embraces her during visits from the agency. Since the ear
operation, [Child] hears better and speaks better. The resource
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mother speaks Spanish to him and he runs to her and embraces
her. She keeps up with the Child’s medical [needs], keeps his
hair cut and well-groomed, and he has good hygiene. (Notes of
Testimony 1/11/2016, p.46 at 1-22; p.47 1-11).
Ms. Adkins’ [sic] stated the resource mother is willing to
adopt [Child] and she last saw [Child] on 12/26/2015, and he
was safe and his needs were being met. It is Ms. Adkins’ opinion
is [sic] that it is in the best interests of the Child to be adopted.
She further opines that [Child] would not suffer irreparable harm
if Father’s parental rights were terminated because she believes
[Child] is not bonded to the Father. (Notes of Testimony
1/11/2016, p.47 at 12-22; p.50 12-20).
On May 23, 2016, this Court continued the testimony in
the Goal Change/Termination Hearing and heard testimony on
DHS’s Petition to terminate Father’s rights as to [Child], and
change the goal to Adoption. Father was present and
represented by his attorney. (Notes of Testimony 5/23/2016, p.3
at 12).
The Assistant City Solicitor first presented the testimony of
Dr. Erica Williams, Forensic Mental Health Services, as an expert
in the field of Parenting Capacity Evaluations. Dr. Williams
testified she performed a parenting capacity evaluation on
Father in January 2016. She testified the parent is brought in to
complete their intake paperwork and an MMPI 2, the Minnesota
Multiphasic Personality Inventory, Second Edition, and the
parent is advised to provide any of their own materials they
would like reviewed. She met with the Father and received
updated information from the current management agency.
(Notes of Testimony 5/23/2016, p.18 at 12-25; p.19 at 4-25;
p.20 at 1-12).
Dr. Williams testified the result of her assessment of
Father was that he did not present with the capacity to provide
safety or permanency at the time for [Child]. She testified the
factors that led to her conclusion … included Father’s pattern of
not being able to meet [Child’s] needs. There were factors of
deplorable housing, and lack of food. And this was despite being
provided supportive services, financial services, and having
somebody coming to the home and help them to remedy the
conditions. Father violated safety plans to include bringing
[Child] to his home when he was not supposed to, allowing
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[Mother] around [Child] when he was not supposed to, and there
were multiple sources communicating that Father was abusing
substances. Although Father denied substance abuse, there was
a prior psychological evaluation completed where Father
reported alcohol abuse. Dr. Williams opined that Father’s
disconnect on the alcohol abuse was also concerning. (Notes of
Testimony 5/23/2016, p.21 14-25; p.22 at 9-25; p.23 at 1-13).
Dr. Williams also testified Father was able to describe the
reasons that [Child] had come to care, but he was not able to
identify or acknowledge a role that he played in [Child] coming
into care. He believed that each of the events were the result of
behaviors of others, and he identified more of a passive being to
[Child], rather than an active parent who could assert any
control over the situation, and that was a factor in the
assessment that he was not able to provide safety or
permanency. (Notes of Testimony 5/23/2016, p.24 at 1-16).
Dr. Williams further testified that Father reported to her
there was a restraining order against [Child’s] Mother, and that
she was present in his home, and because he allowed it to
happen and it violated the safety plan[, it] was a factor in the
assessment also. She stated Father has a pattern of passivity.
Things occur kind of around him and to him, rather than him
enacting things in his environment. There were concerns with
borderline intellectual functioning and a possible cognitive
limitation. (Notes of Testimony 5/23/2016, p.26 at 1-19).
Father provided two versions to Dr. Williams regarding
people living in his home. First he stated that he was living
alone, then later he stated there were other people living in his
home, but he did not identify them and stated they would be
leaving shortly. Father was unable to understand how that
impacted the reunification [with Child]. Dr. Williams opined that
there is a concern that those around Father may be taking
advantage of him, maybe doing things that are not in his best
interest, and he is not necessarily aware that this is happening
to him. It then becomes a larger concern that he does not have
an effective role in his life and really cannot effect a role in
[Child’s life] until he is able to have one on his own life. (Notes
of Testimony 5/23/2016, p.27 at 13-25; p.28 at 15-25).
Dr. Williams opined that although she recommended
Father get frequent and random drug tests, she noted that
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assuming Father did provide clean drug screens, the substance
abuse was an additional concern to those already addressed, and
more recommendations would need to be put in place and other
possible services arranged that could help Father gain the
capacity to be a parent. (Notes of Testimony 5/23/2016, p.29 at
18-25; p.30 at 1-2).
When questioned by the Child Advocate, Dr. Williams
noted that Father understood he had violated the safety plan by
allowing Mother to be in his home. Father violated the plan
despite knowing that [it was] in place to protect [Child]. That
feeds into the concern that Father is not able to affect safety for
[Child]. (Notes of Testimony 5/23/2(16, p.31 at 1-17).
On cross-examination by Father’s attorney, Dr. Williams
noted that the date of Father’s evaluation was January 8, 2016.
Father’s counsel noted that the diagnosis stated, ‘R/O intellectual
inability,’ which the Doctor explained that when diagnosing a
client, when there is sufficient information to know that it is
going in a direction but not enough to make a diagnosis, you
make a rule-out, with follow-up recommendations, to establish
whether it exists or not. So based on the I.Q. from Dr. Glick,
there is a likelihood that Father has a mild intellectual disability.
One of the recommendations was to pursue intellectual disability
services to rule out whether that was something that existed for
him. (Notes of Testimony 5/23/2016, p.31 19-25; p.32 at 1-4;
p.35 at 1-25; p.36 at 1).
Father was the final witness to testify during the hearing.
He stated he is currently living alone in his three bedroom
rowhome, and that he has a crib and other things ready to take
care of [Child]. (Notes of Testimony 5/23/2016, p.42 at 3-22).
Father stated he missed mental health appointments
because the counselor is on maternity leave and he has been
attempting to get in touch with her. (Notes of Testimony
5/23/2016. p.44 at 10-25).
Father testified that when the baby came home there were
no roaches, and stated he worked and it was Mother’s
responsibility to clean the house, but she did not want to do
that. Father admitted Mother appeared at his door when he was
barbequing and he called the police because she was violating
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the restraining order, but she left before the police arrived.
(Notes of Testimony 5/23/2016, p.49 at 1-18).
Father admitted his brother, who had a criminal record,
was living in his home, as well as two other individuals. These
people did not pay him rent, and they were to be there only 30
days, however, they stayed on until April 20th. Father admitted
Ms. Adkins had warned him that these people should not be
living in the home. (Notes of Testimony 5/23/2016, p.50 at 1-
14; p.52 at 2-25; p.52 at 1-10).
Trial Court Opinion, 8/15/16, at 11-19.
On May 23, 2016, the trial court terminated Father’s parental rights
under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8), and it concluded that
termination of Father’s parental rights serves Child’s best interests pursuant
to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). This timely appeal followed.
On appeal, Father raises the following issues for this Court’s
consideration:
A. Whether The Trial Court Erred In Involuntarily Terminating
The Father’s Parental Rights Where It Was Not Supported By
Clear And Convincing Evidence When The Father Completed A
Substantial Portion Of His FSP/SCP objectives?
B. Whether The Trial Court Erred In Involuntarily Terminating
The Father’s Parental Rights Where The Father Had Consistently
Visited [Child] and There Was A Bond Between The Father and
Child and the termination of parental rights would have a
negative effect on the developmental, physical and emotional
needs of [Child]?
C. Whether The Trial Court Erred in Finding the Bonding
Evaluation Credible Where the Evaluator did not have complete
information, and did not observe the father and [C]hild together?
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Father’s Brief at 5.2
In reviewing an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, we
adhere to the following standard:
[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion standard
when considering a trial court’s determination of a petition for
termination of parental rights. As in dependency cases, our
standard of review requires an appellate court to accept the
findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if
they are supported by the record. In re: R.J.T., 608 Pa. 9, 9
A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010). If the factual findings are
supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court
made an error of law or abused its discretion. Id.; R.I.S., 36
A.3d 567, 572 (Pa. 2011) (plurality opinion). As has been often
stated, an abuse of discretion does not result merely because
the reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion.
Id.; see also Samuel Bassett v. Kia Motors America, Inc.,
613 Pa. 371, 34 A.3d 1, 51 (Pa. 2011); Christianson v. Ely,
838 A.2d 630, 634 (Pa. 2003). Instead, a decision may be
reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of
manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.
Id.
As we discussed in R.J.T., there are clear reasons for
applying an abuse of discretion standard of review in these
cases. We observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate courts are
not equipped to make the fact-specific determinations on a cold
record, where the trial judges are observing the parties during
the relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other
hearings regarding the child and parents. R.J.T., 9 A.3d at
1190. Therefore, even where the facts could support an
opposite result, as is often the case in dependency and
termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to
second guess the trial court and impose its own credibility
determinations and judgment; instead we must defer to the trial
judges so long as the factual findings are supported by the
record and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an
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2
We have renumbered Father’s issues for purposes of our discussion.
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error of law or an abuse of discretion. In re Adoption of
Atencio, 650 A.2d 1064, 1066 (Pa. 1994).
In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-827 (Pa. 2012).
The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental
rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009).
Moreover, we have explained:
[t]he standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined as
testimony that is so “clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to
enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without
hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.”
Id. (quoting In re J.L.C., 837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2003)).
Father’s first issue challenges the trial court’s findings with respect to
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a). This Court may affirm the trial court’s decision
regarding the termination of parental rights with regard to any one
subsection of section 2511(a). In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super.
2004) (en banc). We focus our analysis on sections 2511(a)(2) and (b),
which provide as follows:
§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination
(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child
may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
* * *
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be
without essential parental care, control or subsistence
necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the
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conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or
refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.
* * *
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the
child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on
the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing,
furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be
beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition
filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not
consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions
described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the
giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2) and (b).
This Court has explained that the focus in terminating parental rights
under section 2511(a) is on the parent, but under section 2511(b), the focus
is on the child. In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1008 (Pa. Super.
2008) (en banc). For purposes of this appeal, we first analyze this case
under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), then under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b).
Our Supreme Court set forth the proper inquiry under section
2511(a)(2) as follows:
[Section] 2511(a)(2) provides [the] statutory ground[] for
termination of parental rights where it is demonstrated by clear
and convincing evidence that “[t]he repeated and continued
incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has caused
the child to be without essential parental care, control or
subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being and
the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or
refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.” . . .
[The Supreme Court] has addressed incapacity sufficient
for termination under § 2511(a)(2):
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A decision to terminate parental rights, never to be
made lightly or without a sense of compassion for
the parent, can seldom be more difficult than when
termination is based upon parental incapacity. The
legislature, however, in enacting the 1970 Adoption
Act, concluded that a parent who is incapable of
performing parental duties is just as parentally unfit
as one who refuses to perform the duties.
In re Adoption of J.J., 515 A.2d 883, 891 (Pa. 1986), quoting
In re: William L., 383 A.2d 1228, 1239 (Pa. 1978).
Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 827.
This Court has stated that a parent is required to make diligent efforts
toward the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental responsibilities.
In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002). A parent’s vow to
cooperate, after a long period of uncooperativeness regarding the necessity
or availability of services, may properly be rejected as untimely or
disingenuous. Id. at 340.
The trial court provided the following rationale:
After hearing the credible testimony of [Ms.] Laquisha
Henderson, DHS Social Worker, Crystal Adkins, CUA Tabor Social
Worker Service Manager, and Dr. Erica Williams, with Forensic
Mental Health Services, the Court found by clear and convincing
evidence, that their observations and conclusions regarding
Father’s lack of ability to fulfill his parental responsibilities were
persuasive.
Father has been unable to provide food, clothing and
housing that was free from roach infestations to assure the
safety of [Child]. Testimony showed that Father was unable to
exercise sound judgment in allowing [Mother] to enter into his
home when she was prohibited from contact with him because of
a safety plan and a restraining order. He also exercised poor
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judgment in allowing his brother and two strangers to live in his
house, knowing that they had questionable criminal backgrounds
and posed a safety threat to [Child].
Trial Court Opinion, 8/15/16, at 21.
Father argues that he “substantially completed” the goals set in the
FSP and the individual service plan objectives. Father’s Brief at 13. We
agree that Father initially made some strides towards compliance.
Nevertheless, Father’s housing situation remains inappropriate, and there
was evidence that Father’s efforts to remedy the conditions leading to Child’s
removal waned in tandem with Father’s increased substance abuse. N.T.,
5/23/16, at 23. Thus, we conclude that Father’s argument lacks merit, and
there was no error in terminating Father parental rights under section
2511(a)(2). Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 826-827.
In his remaining issues, Father challenges the trial court’s findings with
respect to the absence of a bond between Father and Child under 23 Pa.C.S.
§ 2511(b). Our Supreme Court has held:
[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are met, a
court “shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” 23
Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). The emotional needs and welfare of the child
have been properly interpreted to include “intangibles such as
love, comfort, security, and stability.” In re K.M., 53 A.3d 781,
791 (Pa. Super. 2012). In In re E.M., 620 A.2d [481,] 485
[(Pa. 1993)], this Court held that the determination of the child’s
“needs and welfare” requires consideration of the emotional
bonds between the parent and child. The “utmost attention”
should be paid to discerning the effect on the child of
permanently severing the parental bond. In re K.M., 53 A.3d at
791.
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In re: T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013).
We have stated that, in conducting a bond analysis, the court is not
required to use expert testimony, but may rely on the testimony of social
workers and caseworkers. In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. Super.
2010). This Court has also observed that no bond worth preserving is
formed between a child and a natural parent where the child has been in
foster care for most of the child’s life, and the resulting bond with the
natural parent is attenuated. In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 764 (Pa. Super.
2008). In addition, it is appropriate to consider a child’s bond with their
foster parents. T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 268.
Furthermore, in T.S.M., our Supreme Court set forth the process for
evaluation of the existing bond between a parent and a child, and the
necessity for the court to focus on concerns of an unhealthy attachment and
the availability of an adoptive home. The Supreme Court stated the
following:
[C]ontradictory considerations exist as to whether termination
will benefit the needs and welfare of a child who has a strong but
unhealthy bond to his biological parent, especially considering
the existence or lack thereof of bonds to a pre-adoptive family.
As with dependency determinations, we emphasize that the law
regarding termination of parental rights should not be applied
mechanically but instead always with an eye to the best interests
and the needs and welfare of the particular children involved.
See, e.g., [In the Interest of] R.J.T., 9 A.3d [1179,] 1190
[(Pa. 2010)] (holding that statutory criteria of whether child has
been in care for fifteen of the prior twenty-two months should
not be viewed as a “litmus test” but rather as merely one of
many factors in considering goal change). Obviously, attention
must be paid to the pain that inevitably results from breaking a
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child’s bond to a biological parent, even if that bond is
unhealthy, and we must weigh that injury against the damage
that bond may cause if left intact. Similarly, while termination of
parental rights generally should not be granted unless adoptive
parents are waiting to take a child into a safe and loving home,
termination may be necessary for the child’s needs and welfare
in cases where the child’s parental bond is impeding the search
and placement with a permanent adoptive home.
In weighing the difficult factors discussed above, courts
must keep the ticking clock of childhood ever in mind. Children
are young for a scant number of years, and we have an
obligation to see to their healthy development quickly. When
courts fail, as we have in this case, the result, all too often, is
catastrophically maladjusted children. In recognition of this
reality, over the past fifteen years, a substantial shift has
occurred in our society’s approach to dependent children,
requiring vigilance to the need to expedite children’s placement
in permanent, safe, stable, and loving homes. [The Adoption
and Safe Families Act of 1997, P.L. 105-89] ASFA[,] was enacted
to combat the problem of foster care drift, where children . . .
are shuttled from one foster home to another, waiting for their
parents to demonstrate their ability to care for the children. See
In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 1186; In re Adoption of S.E.G., 901
A.2d [1017,] 1019 [(Pa. 2006)]. This drift was the unfortunate
byproduct of the system’s focus on reuniting children with their
biological parents, even in situations where it was clear that the
parents would be unable to parent in any reasonable period of
time. Following ASFA, Pennsylvania adopted a dual focus of
reunification and adoption, with the goal of finding permanency
for children in less than two years, absent compelling reasons.
See, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6301(b)(1); 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(f)(9)
(requiring courts to determine whether an agency has filed a
termination of parental rights petition if the child has been in
placement for fifteen of the last twenty-two months).
T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 268-269.
Herein, the trial court considered the needs and welfare of Child and
concluded as follows:
The Court heard testimony that the resource mother is
willing to adopt [Child] and that [Child] was safe and his needs
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were being met in this home. Testimony was presented that
showed that it is in the best interests of [Child] for him to be
adopted. Further, credible testimony was presented that [Child]
would not suffer irreparable harm if Father’s parental rights were
terminated because [Child] is not bonded to Father.
Trial Court Opinion, 8/15/16, at 22. Since before his first birthday, Child has
been in the custody and care of the resource mother. N.T., 1/11/16, at 22.
Furthermore, to the extent Father suggests that there is some bond between
him and Child, we conclude that while Father had made some efforts to
remedy the situation that led to Child’s removal, any bond is tenuous at
best. Father is “unable to satisfy the irreducible minimum requirements of
parenthood.” See In re T.D., 949 A.2d 910, 920-923 (Pa. Super. 2008)
(affirming the termination of parental rights where “obvious emotional ties
exist between T.D. and Parents, but Parents are either unwilling or unable to
satisfy the irreducible minimum requirements of parenthood,” and where
preserving parental rights would only serve to prevent T.D. from being
adopted and attaining permanency).
In Z.P., we held that a child’s life “simply cannot be put on hold in the
hope that [a parent] will summon the ability to handle the responsibilities of
parenting.” Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1125. Rather, “a parent’s basic constitutional
right to the custody and rearing of his child is converted, upon the failure to
fulfill his or her parental duties, to the child’s right to have proper parenting
and fulfillment of his or her potential in a permanent, healthy, safe
environment.” In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 856 (Pa. Super. 2004).
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Again, as the trial court’s factual findings are supported by the record, and
the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an error of law or an abuse
of discretion, we affirm the trial court’s decision with regard to section
2511(b). Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 826-827. Accordingly, we affirm
the trial court’s order terminating Father’s parental rights.
The evidence reveals that the conditions which led to Child being
removed from the home, including allowing potentially dangerous and
prohibited persons inside the home, continue to exist. Father is either
unwilling or unable to appreciate the gravity of his failure, the issues this
situation creates, and the deleterious effects on Child. While Father
admittedly tried and had some early success with efforts to rehabilitate, the
factors that led to Child’s removal remain, and Father has failed to remedy
these conditions. We conclude that the record supports the trial court’s
factual findings, and those conclusions are not the result of an error of law
or an abuse of discretion. Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 826-827.
Accordingly, it was proper for the trial court to conclude that no bond exists
such that Child would suffer harm if Father’s parental rights were
terminated. This Court finds no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s
termination of Father’s parental rights to Child pursuant to section 2511(b).
For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that Father is entitled to
no relief. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s decree involuntarily
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terminating Father’s parental rights under section 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2)
and (b).
Decree affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/30/2016
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