NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 03 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
RANDALL C. STEWART, No. 15-35208
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 4:13-cv-00105-BMM
v.
MEMORANDUM*
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Commissioner
of Social Security Administration,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Montana
Brian M. Morris, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 29, 2016**
Before: PREGERSON, LEAVY, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
Randall C. Stewart appeals the district court’s judgment affirming the
Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of his application for disability insurance
benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. We have jurisdiction under 28
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th
Cir. 2012), and affirm.
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) reasonably concluded, after reviewing
the medical evidence, that Stewart failed to meet the requirements of a per se
disabling impairment as set forth in Listing 1.04A. On appeal, Stewart fails to
point to any evidence demonstrating the requisite spinal impairments or the
positive straight-leg raise test required under the Listing. Accordingly, Stewart has
failed to carry his burden of establishing that he met all the criteria for Listing
1.04A. See Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 530 (1990) (“[T]o show that [an]
impairment matches a listing, it must meet all of the specified medical criteria. An
impairment that manifests only some of those criteria, no matter how
severely, does not qualify.”), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in
Kennedy v. Colvin,738 F.3d 1172, 1174 (9th Cir. 2013); Bowen v. Yuckert, 482
U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987) (holding that the claimant has the burden of proving that
the impairments meet the criteria of the Listings).
The ALJ provided specific and legitimate reasons for giving little weight to
the 2012 opinion of Dr. Galvas, Stewart’s treating physician, regarding Stewart’s
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functional limitations.1 First, the ALJ noted that Dr. Galvas’s opinion was
inconsistent with the medical evidence and the treatment notes. See Valentine v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 692–93 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that a
conflict with treatment notes is a specific and legitimate reason to reject treating
physician’s opinion). Dr. Galvas reported that epidural injections had successfully
kept Stewart’s low back pain under control, that there were no motor or sensory
deficits, that Stewart had a full range of motion in his extremities, full motor
strength in his upper extremities, and that at his most recent appointment before the
hearing, Stewart had reported that he was getting along well and not taking any
routine medications.
The ALJ also reasonably gave little weight to Dr. Galvas’s opinion on the
ground that it was inconsistent with Stewart’s own testimony regarding his daily
activities. Stewart testified that he was able to garden for two hours straight, do
household chores such as vacuuming, ride a bike, and cut firewood with a
chainsaw for up to three hours in a day, with rests. Given the medical record and
Stewart’s testimony, substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s decision to give
little weight to Dr. Galvas’s opinion regarding Stewart’s functional limitations.
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The ALJ acknowledged that Dr. Galvas provided several opinions, and
reasonably gave more weight to the 2012 opinion, which was more recent and
which set forth more restrictive limitations than the March 2009 opinion.
3
The ALJ provided specific, clear and convincing reasons supported by
substantial evidence in the record to discredit Stewart’s subjective complaints
regarding the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of his symptoms. The ALJ
specifically noted the medical evidence, including Stewart’s improvement
following his epidural injections, his positive physical therapy treatment and
Stewart’s testimony regarding his daily activities. See Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533
F.3d 1035, 1040 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding that claimant’s response to conservative
treatment undermined his reports regarding the disabling nature of his pain); Curry
v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 1991) (concluding that claimant’s
testimony about her daily activities, including taking care of personal needs,
preparing easy meals, doing light housework and shopping for groceries, may be
seen as inconsistent with the presence of a disabling condition).
Finally, the ALJ reasonably incorporated all the limitations he found credible
into his hypothetical to the vocational expert. Although Stewart argues for a
different reading of the record, the ALJ’s interpretation of the evidence was rational
and should be upheld. See Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1038 (“The court will uphold
the ALJs conclusion when the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational
interpretation.”); see also Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 756–57 (9th Cir.
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1989) (finding that a proper hypothetical need only include those restrictions that
are supported by substantial evidence).
AFFIRMED.
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