J-S81017-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: K.S.T., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: K.S.S., MOTHER :
:
:
:
: No. 758 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Decree February 10, 2016
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000031-2016,
FID: 51-FN-001509-2012
IN THE INTEREST OF: K.S.D., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: K.S.S., MOTHER :
:
:
:
: No. 759 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Decree February 10, 2016
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000063-2016,
FID: 51-FN-001509-2012
BEFORE: BOWES, MOULTON, JJ., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY MOULTON, J.: FILED JANUARY 10, 2017
K.S.S. (“Mother”) appeals from the decrees of the trial court dated
February 10, 2016, granting the petitions filed by the Philadelphia
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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S81017-16
Department of Human Services (“DHS”) to involuntarily terminate her
parental rights to her children, K.S.D., a female born in June 2004, and
K.S.T., a male born in September 2005, (collectively, “Children”), pursuant
to the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8) and (b), and
finding the adoption of Children may continue without further notice to or
consent of Mother, pursuant to the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351.1 We
affirm.
The trial court set forth the factual background and procedural history
of this appeal, as follows.
On May 7, 2012, DHS received a Child Protective Services
(CPS) report, which alleged that K.S.T. was physically
assaulted by his mother, K.S.S., on May 6, 2012. The
allegations indicated K.S.S. struck K.S.T. on the nose,
which caused his nose to bleed; that when K.S.T. arrived
to school, a noticeable blood stain was visible on the front
of his jacket; and that K.S.S. was the caregiver for K.S.T.
and his sibling, K.S.D. The report was substantiated.
Furthermore, on May 15, 2012, DHS received a General
Protective Services Report (GPS) report which alleged that
K.S.T. had been diagnosed with autism; that K.S.T. arrived
at school with physical signs of diarrhea on his person and
while his clothes were being changed, it was observed that
K.S.T. had sustained linear and circular bruises on the left
side of his back, his right forearm, his right thigh, and his
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1
In separate decrees dated and entered on February 10, 2016, the
trial court involuntarily terminated the parental rights of K.S.T.’s father,
A.O.T., a/k/a A.T., a/k/a U.T., and K.S.D.’s father, A.M.D., a/k/a T.D., a/k/a
A.D., as well as any unknown father(s), pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.
§ 2511(a)(1), (2), and (b). Neither of these named men, nor any unknown
father, has filed an appeal from the decree terminating his parental rights,
nor are they parties to the present appeal.
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knee; and that the injuries to K.S.T.’s back were red and
appeared to be fresh. It was further alleged that K.S.T.
denied being physically assaulted by anyone. There were
concerns that K.S.S. used corporal punishment as a form
of discipline. The report was substantiated.
Moreover, on May 15, 2012, DHS met with K.S.T. at school
to examine and interview him. DHS observed welts and
bruises on K.S.T.’s entire body and photographs were
taken of the injuries. Initially, K.S.T. refused to disclose
how he received the injuries. The same day, DHS went to
K.S.S.’s home and met with K.S.S., who was obstinate and
very emotional. K.S.S. appeared to find it challenging to
control her behavior. DHS advised K.S.S. that K.S.T. and
K.S.D. would have to be removed from the home until DHS
completed its investigation. K.S.S. was unable to identify
appropriate family resources that could care for the
children. Later, when K.S.T was alone with the DHS social
worker, K.S.T.[] confirmed that mother had hit him several
times. Further, both children reported to DHS that they
were fearful of remaining in the home with K.S.S.
Subsequently, on May 15, 2012, DHS obtained an Order of
Protective Custody (OPC) for K.S.T. and K.S.D. and placed
them in treatment foster care through Elwyn, an agency
contracted through DHS.
A shelter care hearing was held on May 17, 2012, before
the Honorable Vincent L. Johnson. Judge Johnson found
that sufficient evidence was presented to find that K.S.T.
and K.S.D’s continuation or return to K.S.S.’s home would
not be in the best interest of the children. Further, Judge
Johnson lifted the OPC and the temporary commitment to
DHS was ordered to stand.
On May 24, 2012, an adjudicatory hearing was held before
the Honorable Vincent L. Johnson. Judge Johnson
adjudicated K.S.T. and K.S.D. dependent and committed
them to the care and custody of DHS.
Shortly thereafter, DHS held a Family Service Plan (FSP)
meeting. The objectives identified for [M]other, K.S.S.,
were: 1) visitation; 2) housing; 3) employment; 4) to seek
out community supports for parenting; 5) therapy; 6)
psychiatric evaluation; 7) clearance of household
members; 8) home evaluation; 9) to fully comply with FSP
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objectives; and 10) drug and alcohol [evaluation and
tests].
On October [sic] 2012, K.S.S.’s weekly supervised visits at
Elwyn Treatment Foster Care ended due to K.S.S.’s
reportedly inappropriate behavior during her visits with
K.S.T. and K.S.D.
On March 13, 2013, K.S.S. participated in a Parenting
Capacity Evaluation at Assessment and Treatment
Alternatives (ATA). For reunification to occur, Dr. William
Russell, licensed psychologist and evaluator, recommended
that K.S.S. was to comply with the objectives set forth in
the initial FSP meeting held in the instant matter.
On July 16, 2013, a permanency review hearing for K.S.T.
and K.S.D. was held by the Honorable Vincent L.
Johnson[.] [T]he Court made a finding that K.S.T and
K.S.D. were victims of child abuse by their mother, K.S.S.
Moreover, Judge Johnson ordered a No Contact Order for
K.S.S. be put in place except at the therapists’
recommendation and the children’s discretion. From this
time on, the therapist never recommended visits with
K.S.S. and no visits occurred.
The matter was then listed on a regular basis before
judges of the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas - Family
Court Division - Juvenile Branch pursuant to section 6351
of the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §6351, and evaluated for
the purpose of . . . reviewing the permanency plan of the
child.
In subsequent hearings, the Dependency Revie[w] Orders
reflect the Court’s review and disposition as a result of
evidence presented, primarily with the goal of finalizing the
permanency plan.
On February 10, 2016, a Termination of Parental Rights
hearing for K.S.T. and K.S.D. was held on the matter. The
Court found by clear and convincing evidence that
[M]other’s parental rights of K.S.T. and K.S.D. should be
terminated . . . pursuant to the Pennsylvania Juvenile Act.
Furthermore, the Court held it was in the best interest of
[Children] that the goal be changed to adoption.
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Tr. Ct. Op., 3/28/16, at 1-4 (unpaginated).
At the hearing,2 the Child Advocate presented the testimony of Lauren
Griesser, the Children’s Crisis Treatment Center (“CCTC”) trauma therapist
for K.S.D. Id. at 23-24. The Child Advocate then presented the testimony
of Harry Allen, the director of outpatient services and specialized services at
Northeast Treatment Center (“NET”). Id. at 55. Mr. Allen testified that
K.S.T. was referred to NET for therapy regarding his diagnosis for autism.
Id. 59-60.
Mother testified on her own behalf. Id. at 97. She stated that she
loves Children with all her heart. Id. at 110. The trial court also admitted a
number of exhibits introduced by DHS and the Child Advocate. At the close
of the testimony at the February 10, 2016 hearing, the trial court
involuntarily terminated the parental rights of Mother and the named fathers
and found the adoption of Children may continue without further notice to or
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2
The trial court first addressed the termination of the parental rights
of K.S.D.’s father, A.M.D., a/k/a T.D., a/k/a A.D. N.T., 2/10/16, at 9-10.
He was not present at the hearing, but was represented by counsel. Id.
DHS presented the testimony of Wanda Ross, the DHS caseworker assigned
to the case. Id. at 10. The trial court terminated his parental rights on the
record. Id. at 15.
Further, K.S.T.’s father, A.O.T. a/k/a A.T., a/k/a U.T., was not present,
but was represented by counsel. Id. at 75-83. He was presently
incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution (“SCI”) Forest at
Marienville, Pennsylvania. Id. at 76-77, 83.
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consent of Mother or named and unnamed Fathers. Id. at 121-129. The
trial court entered its decrees that same date.
On March 4, 2016, Mother timely filed notices of appeal, along with
concise statements of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
1925(a)(2)(i) and (b), from the decrees. This Court, acting sua sponte,
consolidated the appeals on April 29, 2016. On appeal, Mother raises five
issues, as follows:
1. Whether the Trial Court erred by terminating the
parental rights of [Mother] under 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§2511(a)(1)?
2. Whether the Trial Court erred by terminating the
parental rights of [Mother] under 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§2511(a)(2)?
3. Whether the Trial Court erred by terminating the
parental rights of [Mother] under 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§2511(a)(5)?
4. Whether the Trial Court erred by terminating the
parental rights of [Mother] under 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§2511(a)(8)?
5. Whether the Trial Court erred by finding, under 23
Pa.C.S.A. §2511(b), that termination of [Mother’s]
parental rights best serve [sic] the children’s
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare?
Mother’s Br., at 5 (Statement of the Questions Involved - unpaginated).3
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3
Mother stated her issues somewhat differently in her concise
statements. As Mother challenged the trial court’s finding as to section
2511(b), we will not find that Mother waived her challenge to the trial court’s
section 2511(b) bond analysis for failure to specifically preserve such
challenge in the concise statements and Statement of Questions Involved
portion of her brief. See Mother’s Brief, at 16-17 (Issue 3 and Standard of
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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In reviewing an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, we
adhere to the following standard:
[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion
standard when considering a trial court's determination of
a petition for termination of parental rights. As in
dependency cases, our standard of review requires an
appellate court to accept the findings of fact and credibility
determinations of the trial court if they are supported by
the record. In re: R.J.T., 608 Pa. 9, 9 A.3d 1179, 1190
(2010). If the factual findings are supported, appellate
courts review to determine if the trial court made an error
of law or abused its discretion. Id.; [In re R.I.S., 36 A.3d
567, 572 (Pa. 2011)]. As has been often stated, an abuse
of discretion does not result merely because the reviewing
court might have reached a different conclusion. Id.; see
also Samuel–Bassett v. Kia Motors America, Inc.,
[613] Pa. [371], 34 A.3d 1, 51 (2011); Christianson v.
Ely, 575 Pa. 647, 838 A.2d 630, 634 (2003). Instead, a
decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only
upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness,
partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. Id.
As we discussed in R.J.T., there are clear reasons for
applying an abuse of discretion standard of review in these
cases. We observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate
courts are not equipped to make the fact-specific
determinations on a cold record, where the trial judges are
observing the parties during the relevant hearing and often
presiding over numerous other hearings regarding the
child and parents. R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 1190. Therefore,
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
Proof regarding Section 2511(b) - unpaginated), and 18 (Conclusion -
unpaginated). Cf. Krebs v. United Refining Company of Pennsylvania,
893 A.2d 776, 797 (Pa. Super. 2006) (holding that an appellant waives
issues that are not raised in both his concise statement of errors complained
of on appeal and the Statement of Questions Involved in her brief on
appeal). We find, however, that Mother waived any challenge to the change
in permanency goal to adoption by her failure to preserve that issue in her
concise statements and Statement of Questions Involved in her brief. See
id.
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even where the facts could support an opposite result, as
is often the case in dependency and termination cases, an
appellate court must resist the urge to second guess the
trial court and impose its own credibility determinations
and judgment; instead we must defer to the trial judges so
long as the factual findings are supported by the record
and the court's legal conclusions are not the result of an
error of law or an abuse of discretion. In re Adoption of
Atencio, 539 Pa. 161, 650 A.2d 1064, 1066 (1994).
In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-27 (Pa. 2012).
The burden is upon the petitioner “to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that its asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental
rights are valid.” In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009).
Moreover, we have explained:
The standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined
as testimony that is so “clear, direct, weighty and
convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear
conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise
facts in issue.”
Id. (quoting In re J.L.C., 837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2003)).
Mother argues that the trial court erred in finding that DHS presented
sufficient evidence to support the termination of her parental rights under
section 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8). See Mother’s Br., at 10 (Summary of
Argument - unpaginated).4 This Court may affirm the trial court’s decision
regarding the termination of parental rights with regard to any one
subsection of section 2511(a). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384
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4
Mother’s unpaginated page 10 reflects that it is page 8. It is the only
numbered page after page 3, and appears to be erroneously numbered.
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(Pa.Super. 2004) (en banc). We will focus on sections 2511(a)(1), (2), and
(b), which provide as follows:
§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination
(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a
child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the
following grounds:
(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at
least six months immediately preceding the filing of the
petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of
relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or
failed to perform parental duties.
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect
or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without
essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary
for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions
and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal
cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.
***
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the
rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare
of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated
solely on the basis of environmental factors such as
inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and
medical care if found to be beyond the control of the
parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to
subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider
any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions
described therein which are first initiated subsequent to
the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511.
With respect to subsection 2511(a)(1), our Supreme Court has held as
follows.
Once the evidence establishes a failure to perform parental
duties or a settled purpose of relinquishing parental rights,
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the court must engage in three lines of inquiry: (1) the
parent’s explanation for his or her conduct; (2) the post-
abandonment contact between parent and child; and (3)
consideration of the effect of termination of parental rights
on the child pursuant to Section 2511(b).
In re Adoption of Charles E.D.M., II, 708 A.2d 88, 92 (Pa. 1998).
Further, this Court has stated:
[T]he trial court must consider the whole history of a given
case and not mechanically apply the six-month statutory
provision. The court must examine the individual
circumstances of each case and consider all explanations
offered by the parent facing termination of his or her
parental rights, to determine if the evidence, in light of the
totality of the circumstances, clearly warrants the
involuntary termination.
In re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 854-855 (Pa.Super. 2004) (citations omitted).
With regard to section 2511(a)(1), the trial court found as follows:
It is clear from the record that for a period of six (6)
months leading up to the filing of the Petition for
Involuntary Termination, mother failed to perform parental
duties for [Children]. The Court found by clear and
convincing evidence that the mother refused or failed to
perform her parental duties.
In the instant case, during the FSP meeting held on July
28, 2015, for K.S.S., K.S.T. and K.S.D[.], it was noted that
K.S.S. had not progressed in her FSP permanency
objectives in a way that would foster reunification with her
children. Furthermore, reunification with K.S.S. is not a
viable permanency option for K.S.T. and K.S.D., as K.S.S.
has failed to improve the circumstances that led to the
K.S.T. and K.S.D.’s placement. (N.T. 2/10/2016, pp. 37,
41-43). Specifically, K.S.S. continues to minimize the
extent of her abuse on her children. (N.T. 2/10/2016, pp.
29, 31, 41, 42).
While, K.S.S. insists that the abuse only occurred
sometimes, K.S.T. recalls that the abuse occurred
consistently. (N.T. 2/10/2016, pp. 29, 31, 41, 42). Most
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vividly and repeatedly, K.S.T. recalls his mother choking
him. (N.T. 2/10/2016, pp. 52, 62). According to the
therapist, this discrepancy indicates that K.S.T. has
experienced a high level of trauma at the hands of K.S.S.
Furthermore, at K.S.T[.]’s intake at Children’s Crisis
Treatment Center (CCTC), it was observed that K.S.T. was
“jumpy when people raised their voices; always want[ed]
to be near K.S.D[.]; act[ed] afraid that he would be hit;
smear[ed] feces; [and exhibited a] history of withdrawal
from interaction with others.” (CCTC Center Based
Treatment Plan).
A parent has an affirmative duty to act in her children’s
best interest. “Parental duty requires that the parent not
yield to every problem, but must act affirmatively, with
good faith interest and effort, to maintain the parent -
child relationship to the best of his or her ability, even in
difficult circumstances.” In re Dale A.. II, 453 Pa. Super.
106, 683 A.2d 297, 302 (1996). In reference to the
parental contact, “to be legally significant, the contact
must be steady and consistent over a period of time,
contribute to the psychological health of the child, and
must demonstrate a serious intent on the part of the
parent to recultivate a parent - child relationship, and must
demonstrate a[] willingness and capacity to undertake the
parenting role”. In re D.J.S., 737 A2d 283, 286 (1999)
(quoting In re Adoption of Hamilton, 379 Pa. Super.
274, 549 A.2d 1291, 1295 (1988)).
In the instant case, the children have been in placement
for at least sixteen months. The testimony established
that both children are now in a positive environment.
(N.T. 2/10/2016, pp. 54, 67). K.S.T. has only seen K.S.S.
one time since he has been in placement, and although he
has asked about K.S.S., he has never expressed a desire
to see her. (N.T. 2/10/2016, pp. 54, 67). Moreover, due
to the unhealthy relationship K.S.S. formed with K.S.D.,
K.S.D. still suffers from a high level of trauma. (N.T.
2/10/2016, pp. 37. [sic] 39, 40, 42).
The record reflects that K.S.S. has not met her duty to
maintain a healthy parent-child relationship with her
children. (N.T. 2/10/2016, pp. 37, 41-43). Although[] a
no contact order was in place, K.S.S. still had therapeutic
sessions with the therapist who was working toward
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possible reunification with K.S.S. and her children, which in
part required K.S.S. to reach the level of acknowledgement
where she took full responsibility for her abuse of K.S.T
and K.S.D. (N.T. 2/10/2016, pp. 29-31). But, K.S.S.[]
never obtained that level of responsibility during the
almost four (4) years that K.S.T. and K.S.D. have been in
care. (N.T. 2/10/2016, p. 8).
Tr. Ct. Op., 3/28/16, at 5-6.
After a careful review of the record in this matter, we find the record
supports the trial court’s factual findings, and the court’s legal conclusions
are not the result of an error of law or an abuse of discretion. In re
Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 826-27. We affirm the termination of
Mother’s parental rights under section 2511(a)(1) on the basis of the
discussion in the trial court opinion.
Next, to satisfy the requirements of section 2511(a)(2), the moving
party must produce clear and convincing evidence regarding the following
elements: “(1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal;
(2) such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the child to be
without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his
physical or mental well-being; and (3) the causes of the incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied.” See In re Adoption of
M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa.Super. 2003). The grounds for
termination of parental rights under section 2511(a)(2), due to parental
incapacity that cannot be remedied, are not limited to affirmative
misconduct; to the contrary, those grounds may include acts of refusal and
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incapacity to perform parental duties. In re A.L.D. 797 A.2d 326, 337
(Pa.Super. 2002).
In its opinion, the trial court stated as follows:
As of the June 5, 2014, permanency review hearing, the
children had been in care for twenty four (24) months, and
K.S.S.’s visits were still suspended. (N.T. 2/10/2016, p.
30). Although[] it was noted that K.S.S. had engaged in
some mental health treatment and had begun parenting
classes, by the July 28, 2015 FSP meeting for K.S.T. and
K.S.D., K.S.S. had not progressed in her FSP permanency
objectives in a way that would permit reunification to
occur. (N.T. 2/10/2016, pp. 37, 41-42).
Tr. Ct. Op., 3/28/16, at 7 (unpaginated).
Again, after a careful review of the record in this matter, we find the
record supports the trial court’s factual findings, and the court’s legal
conclusions are not the result of an error of law or an abuse of discretion.
In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 826-27. We affirm the termination of
Mother’s parental rights under section 2511(a)(2) on the basis of the
discussion in the trial court opinion.
Additionally, in relation to her arguments concerning section 2511(a),
Mother asserts that Judge Johnson’s July 16, 2013 “no contact” order
precluded her from seeing Children, despite her completion of parenting
classes, an anger management course, and, consistent with her mental
health treatment, her acknowledgement of her role in Children’s trauma.
See Mother’s Br., at 13 (unpaginated). Mother argues that DHS failed to
provide reasonable efforts toward reunification between her and Children.
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We find the argument lacks merit. See In re D.C.D., 105 A.3d 662, 673,
675 (Pa. 2014) (holding trial court not required to consider reasonable
efforts in relation to decision to terminate parental rights).
Next, in reviewing the evidence in support of termination under section
2511(b), our Supreme Court recently stated as follows:
[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are
met, a court “shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare
of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). The emotional needs
and welfare of the child have been properly interpreted to
include “[i]ntangibles such as love, comfort, security, and
stability.” In re K.M., 53 A.3d 781, 791 (Pa. Super.
2012). In In re E.M., [620 A.2d 481, 485 (Pa. 1993)],
this Court held that the determination of the child’s “needs
and welfare” requires consideration of the emotional bonds
between the parent and child. The “utmost attention”
should be paid to discerning the effect on the child of
permanently severing the parental bond. In re K.M., 53
A.3d at 791.
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013).
When evaluating a parental bond, “the court is not required to use
expert testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as
well. Additionally, Section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding
evaluation.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa.Super. 2010) (internal
citations omitted). Although it is often wise to have a bonding evaluation
and make it part of the certified record, “[t]here are some instances . . .
where direct observation of the interaction between the parent and the child
is not necessary and may even be detrimental to the child.” In re K.Z.S.,
946 A.2d 753, 762 (Pa.Super. 2008).
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A parent’s abuse and neglect are a relevant part of the section
2511(b) analysis. This Court has found that:
[C]oncluding a child has a beneficial bond with a parent
simply because the child harbors affection for the parent is
not only dangerous, it is logically unsound. If a child’s
feelings were the dispositive factor in the bonding analysis,
the analysis would be reduced to an exercise in semantics
as it is the rare child who, after being subject to neglect
and abuse, is able to sift through the emotional wreckage
and completely disavow a parent. . . . Nor are we of the
opinion that the biological connection between [the parent]
and the children is sufficient in of itself, or when
considered in connection with a child’s feeling toward a
parent, to establish a de facto beneficial bond exists. The
psychological aspect of parenthood is more important in
terms of the development of the child and [his or her]
mental and emotional health than the coincidence of
biological or natural parenthood.
In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 535 (Pa.Super. 2008) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted). In fact, our Supreme Court has observed that the
mere existence of a bond or attachment of a child to a parent will not
necessarily result in the denial of a termination petition, and that “[e]ven the
most abused of children will often harbor some positive emotion towards the
abusive parent.” See In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267 (quoting In re K.K.R.-
S., 958 A.2d at 535). The Supreme Court instructed, “[t]he continued
attachment to the natural parents, despite serious parental rejection through
abuse and neglect, and failure to correct parenting and behavior disorders
which are harming the children cannot be misconstrued as bonding.” In re
T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267 (quoting In re Involuntary Termination of
C.W.S.M., 839 A.2d 410, 418 (Pa. Super. 2003) (Tamilia, J. dissenting)).
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Further, we have explained that a “parent’s own feelings of love and
affection for a child, alone, do not prevent termination of parental rights.”
In re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121. This Court has stated: “[A] parent’s basic
constitutional right to the custody and rearing of . . . her child is converted,
upon the failure to fulfill . . . her parental duties, to the child’s right to have
proper parenting and fulfillment of [the child’s] potential in a permanent,
healthy, safe environment.” In re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d at 856 (internal
citations omitted). Moreover, it is well-settled that “we will not toll the well-
being and permanency of [a child] indefinitely.” In re Adoption of C.L.G.,
956 A.2d at 1007 (citing In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 732 (Pa. Super. 2008)
(noting that a child’s life “simply cannot be put on hold in the hope that [a
parent] will summon the ability to handle the responsibilities of
parenting.”)).
In its opinion, the trial court stated as follows:
Pursuant to Section 2511(b), the trial court must take
[into] account whether a natural parental bond exists
between child and parent, and whether termination would
destroy an existing, necessary and beneficial relationship.
In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1202 (Pa. Super. 2000). In
the instant matter, the testimony established that the
children would not suffer irreparable emotional harm if the
mother’s parental rights were terminated. (N.T.
2/10/2016, pp. 53, 67, 68).
The testimony of the therapist established that the child
K.S.T., [sic] is in a foster home with a foster parent who is
able and capable of meeting his needs, i.e., dealing with
his trauma and the struggles that K.S.T. has with social
skills. (N.T. 2/10/2016, pp. 62, 67). The therapist also
noted that due to K.S.T.’s autism, it is important for him to
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have a physically stable home and to be in an environment
where there is consistency and predictability. (N.T.
2/10/2016, pp. 65, 66). According to the therapist, the
current foster parent is able to provide such an
environment and K.S.T. looks to the foster parent to
provide for his daily needs. (N.T. 2/10/2016, p. 67).
Accordingly, K.S.T. should be recommended for adoption,
as it is in his best interest. (N.T. 2/10/2016, p. 68).
In regards to K.S.D., the therapist testified that she is
forming a parent-child relationship with her current foster
mother and that K.S.D. looks to her foster mom to meet
her emotional needs. (N.T. 2/10/2016, p.38). Moreover,
although the K.S.D.’s foster mother works full time, she is
an excellent advocate for K.S.D., in that she makes
frequent trips to K.S.D.’s school to ensure that K.S.D.’s
needs are being met. Id. Further, K.S.D.’s foster mother
consistently brings her to therapy and positively engages
in therapy with K.S.D. Id.
The Trial Court found by clear and convincing evidence
that the Department of Human Services met their
statutory burden pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511 (a) &
(b)[,] and that it was in the best interest of the children to
change to goal to adoption. (N.T. 2/10/2016, pp. 124 -
126).
***
Furthermore, the court finds that its ruling will not cause
K.S.T. or K.S.D. to suffer irreparable harm and it is in the
best interest of the children[,] and[,] as a result of the
testimony regarding the children’s safety, protection,
mental, physical and moral welfare to terminate [M]other’s
parental rights.
Tr. Ct. Op., 3/28/16, at 8-9 (unpaginated).
Further, the trial court found that Children had been removed from
Mother’s care since May of 2012, approximately four years, at the time of
the hearing. This finding is sufficient upon which to base a conclusion that
there was no bond between Children and Mother. See In re K.Z.S., 946
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A.2d at 763-764 (affirming involuntary termination of mother’s parental
rights, despite existence of some bond, where placement with mother would
be contrary to child’s best interests, and any bond with mother would be
fairly attenuated when child was separated from her, almost constantly, for
four years).
After a careful review of the record in this matter, we find the record
supports the trial court’s factual findings, and the court’s legal conclusions
are not the result of an error of law or an abuse of discretion. In re
Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 826-27. We, therefore, affirm the trial court
decrees terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to section 2511(b).
Accordingly, we affirm the decrees terminating Mother’s parental rights
to K.S.D. and K.S.T. and finding that adoption can occur without further
notice to of consent of Mother.
Decrees and orders affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 1/10/2017
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