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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
ERIC DELVONNE SMITH, :
:
Appellant : No. 377 MDA 2016
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence February 22, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland County
Criminal Division at No.: CP-49-CR-0000883-2014
BEFORE: OTT, DUBOW, AND PLATT, JJ.*
MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED JANUARY 10, 2017
Appellant, Eric Delvonne Smith, appeals from the Judgment of
Sentence of 12 to 36 months’ incarceration entered by the Northumberland
County Court of Common Pleas following his conviction by a jury of one
count of Terroristic Threats and two counts of Disorderly Conduct. 1 After
careful review, we affirm.
The trial court stated the relevant facts in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)
Opinion as follows:
At trial, the Complainant, Glenn Snyder, testified that on July 31,
2014 at approximately 10:00 p.m. he heard an adult and child
screaming outside of his home. Mr. Snyder walked onto his
porch and saw [Appellant] holding a dog down in the middle of
*
Retired Senior Judge Assigned to the Superior Court.
1
18 Pa.C.S. § 2706(a)(1), 18 Pa.C.S. § 5503(a)(1), and 18 Pa.C.S. §
5503(a)(4), respectively.
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the street. He further stated that [Appellant] was yelling at
passing cars telling them to run over the dog. The dog was
owned by Megan Catalinas, [Appellant’s] girlfriend at the time of
the incident. Megan’s daughter, a young child, was screaming
and crying as her dog was being held down. Multiple neighbors
came out of their houses and told [Appellant] to let go of the
dog. Mr. Snyder also told [Appellant] to release the dog to no
avail. Mr. Snyder stated he came off of his porch when
[Appellant] pushed Megan Catalinas as she attempted to free her
dog. At this point [Appellant] turned his aggression towards Mr.
Snyder and was “going up and down the street punching cars,
screaming at everybody[.”] A verbal altercation occurred
between Mr. Snyder and [Appellant,] and [Appellant] told Mr.
Snyder to “go back in the house you fat piece of crap and I’ll F
your wife in the A.” [Appellant] screamed at Mr. Snyder and told
him he was “going to light up [his] house like a light bulb.” At
that point Mr. Snyder called police because he felt threatened by
[Appellant’s] remarks as he believed [Appellant] was going to
light his house on fire.
Judy Snyder, the wife of Glenn Snyder, also testified at trial.
She told a similar story as Mr. Snyder and stated [Appellant]
threatened to “light our house up like a Christmas tree[.”] Mrs.
Snyder believed [Appellant] was going to set her house on fire.
Megan Catalinas and a neighbor also testified at [trial] and
corroborated the testimony of Mr. and Mrs. Snyder.
[Appellant] in his own defense at trial admitted he told Mr.
Snyder he was going to “light his house up” but stated he did
not mean it as a threat. The jury considered and ultimately
rejected his testimony.
Trial Court Opinion, filed 6/23/16, at 2-3.
On August 27, 2015, the jury convicted Appellant of Terroristic Threats
and two counts of Disorderly Conduct. On February 22, 2016, the trial court
sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of 12 to 36 months’ incarceration.
Appellant filed a timely Notice of Appeal. Both Appellant and the trial
court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
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Appellant presents one issue for our review:
Did not the Commonwealth fail to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant committed the offense of terroristic
threats on July 31, 2014?
Appellant’s Brief at 4.
We review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence by considering
whether, “viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most
favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable the
fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Commonwealth v. Melvin, 103 A.3d 1, 39 (Pa. Super. 2014).
The trier of fact—while passing on the credibility of the witnesses and
the weight of the evidence—is free to believe all, part, or none of the
evidence. Id. at 40. Moreover, the trier of fact may base a conviction solely
on circumstantial evidence. Id. In conducting this review, the appellate
court may not weigh the evidence and substitute its judgment for that of the
fact-finder. Id. at 39-40.
The Crimes Code defines Terroristic Threats, in relevant part, as
follows:
§ 2706. Terroristic Threats
(a) Offense defined.—A person commits the crime of
terroristic threats if the person communicates, either directly or
indirectly, a threat to:
(1) commit any crime of violence with intent to terrorize
another[.]
18 Pa.C.S. § 2706(a)(1).
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This Court has previously explained the contours of a Terroristic Threat
as follows:
The purpose of [S]ection 2706 is to impose criminal liability on
persons who make threats which seriously impair personal
security or public convenience. It is not intended by this section
to penalize mere spur-of-the-moment threats which result from
anger. As this Court has stated, “the real issue is whether the
Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to establish the
required mens rea, not whether Appellant made the statements
in the context of a heated discussion. Being angry does not
render a person incapable of forming the intent to terrorize.”
Commonwealth v. Walls, 144 A.3d 926, 936 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citations
omitted).
The trial court summarily rejected Appellant’s sufficiency challenge in
its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion. See Trial Court Opinion, filed 6/23/16, at 3
(“It is clear that, in viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
verdict winner, there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s
determination.”). We agree.
Appellant threatened to commit several crimes, including arson or a
shooting and sexual assault. When the police arrived, Appellant said “he
didn’t care who he got a citation from because he would just play the system
like [he] always [does] and [he’ll] admit [himself] to the nut house and [he]
won’t have to pay fines.” N.T. Trial, 8/27/15, at 27. Appellant later
returned and hit Mr. Snyder after the police left, confirming his settled
intent. Id. at 30.
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Appellant’s actions under the totality of the circumstances
demonstrated a settled intent to terrorize rather than a spur-of-the-moment
threat falling outside the ambit of Section 2706(a)(1). Appellant’s
arguments to the contrary are unavailing.
Viewing the totality of the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth as the verdict winner, it is clear that the Commonwealth
proved each element of the offense. Appellant’s sufficiency challenge, thus,
fails.
Judgment of Sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 1/10/2017
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