2016 IL App (1st) 153517
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December 29, 2016
SECOND DIVISION
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
BETTY WING, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Cook County.
)
v. ) No. 14 M1 301945
)
CHICAGO TRANSIT AUTHORITY, ) Honorable
) Mary R. Minella,
Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge Presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE NEVILLE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Presiding Justice Hyman specially concurred, with opinion.
Justice Mason specially concurred, with opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Plaintiff Betty Wing filed a complaint against the Chicago Transit Authority (CTA)
alleging that she was a passenger on a CTA bus on September 21, 2013, when the bus driver
“[f]ailed to keep the bus’s wheelchair lift under proper control,” resulting in injuries to her foot.
Wing was represented by counsel in the trial court, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of the
CTA. In this pro se appeal, Wing contends, “The jury voted in favor of the defense after all the
shady conspiracy took place,” and she objects to a variety of incidents related to the two-day
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trial. Wing takes issue with the jury selection, the lengthy amount of time the bus driver spent in
the hallway after testifying, the court’s rulings during Wing’s testimony, defense counsel’s
closing argument, and defense counsel’s failure to obey the court’s instruction to remain in the
courtroom until the jury was fully dismissed. We affirm because Wing did not preserve any
issues for review by filing a posttrial motion, and we cannot conduct a meaningful review of her
contentions without a transcript of the trial proceeding.
¶2 Wing’s opening brief contains two letters, which are dated more than two weeks prior to
the notice of appeal, but are addressed to this court. In the letters, Wing narrates some of the
events of the trial. Wing’s opening brief also includes an unaddressed letter dated September 23,
2013, which describes the incident; a deposition transcript from doctor Thomas Albert;
documents from the Chicago police and fire departments relating to the incident; medical bills
and records; and a complaint Wing filed against her trial attorney with the Attorney Registration
and Disciplinary Commission on January 4, 2016. The record on appeal does not contain these
documents, a transcript of the trial, or the video shown to the jury.
¶3 After the verdict in favor of the CTA, Wing timely filed her notice of appeal pro se.
¶4 On appeal, Wing states, “I am asking that everything should be reviewed and an upright
decision to [sic] made, because it did not happen that day, and I feel that the judge and shady
action of the defense attorneys played a major part in it.” Wing questions the court’s “motive for
allowing this,” and asks why the court did “not say anything at all to this defense attorney and
allow him so much leeway and allow him to go into the hall,” over the court’s express order.
¶5 The CTA maintains that appellate review on the merits of Wing’s claim would be
improper for three reasons which are subsequently discussed. In the alternative, if we review the
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merits, the CTA contends that Wing did not provide any substantive basis for reversal of the
jury’s verdict.
¶6 First, the CTA argues that Wing did not preserve any matters for appellate review
because she did not file a posttrial motion in the trial court. We agree. Illinois Supreme Court
Rule 366(b)(2) (eff. Feb. 1, 1994) governs appeals after a civil jury trial. Under Rule
366(b)(2)(iii), a party may “not urge as error on review of the ruling on the party’s post-trial
motion any point, ground, or relief not specified” in the party’s posttrial motion. See Arient v.
Shaik, 2015 IL App (1st) 133969, ¶ 32. Where a party does not file a posttrial motion in a jury
case, this court has held that the party fails to preserve any “point, ground, or relief” for review
on appeal. See id.; see also In re Parentage of Kimble, 204 Ill. App. 3d 914, 916-17 (1990).
Here, Wing timely filed her notice of appeal, but she did not file a posttrial motion after the court
entered the judgment on the jury verdict in favor of the CTA. Therefore, Wing did not preserve
any matters for appellate review (see In re Parentage of Kimble, 204 Ill. App. 3d at 916-17), and
we affirm the judgment of the trial court. See Arient, 2015 IL App (1st) 133969, ¶¶ 34, 41.
¶7 Second, the CTA contends that the record is insufficient for us to conduct a meaningful
review of the judgment below because it does not contain a transcript of the trial proceedings.
Again, we agree. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 608(a)(8) (eff. Apr. 8, 2013) provides that the
record on appeal must contain the report of proceedings. Where the issue on appeal relates to the
conduct of a proceeding, a court cannot review the issue without a report or record of the
relevant proceeding. Webster v. Hartman, 195 Ill. 2d 426, 432 (2001) (citing Foutch v. O’Bryant,
99 Ill. 2d 389, 391-92 (1984)). The burden falls on the appellant, as the party seeking relief from
the judgment below, to present a sufficient record. Corral v. Mervis Industries, Inc., 217 Ill. 2d
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144, 156 (2005). An appellant’s pro se status does not alleviate the duty to comply with our
supreme court’s rules governing appellate procedure. Twardowski v. Holiday Hospitality
Franchising, Inc., 321 Ill. App. 3d 509, 511 (2001); Rock Island County v. Boalbey, 242 Ill. App.
3d 461, 462 (1993).
¶8 In her letters to this court, Wing describes incidents that allegedly took place during the
pendency of the trial. However, without a record of the proceedings, we cannot determine what
happened and if it would amount to legal error. Although Wing attached her treating physician’s
deposition transcript to her opening brief, it is not in the record on appeal, and we have no way
of knowing what his testimony was at trial. Therefore, Wing has not met her burden of providing
a sufficient record to review her contentions of error.
¶9 Absent a sufficient record, a reviewing court presumes that the trial court’s order
conformed to the law and had a sufficient factual basis. Foutch, 99 Ill. 2d at 392. Doubts arising
from an incomplete record are resolved against the appellant. Corral, 217 Ill. 2d at 157. Without
any basis to evaluate the merits of the claimed error, Wing cannot overcome the presumption that
the court’s orders at trial complied with the law and that a sufficient factual basis supported the
judgment on the verdict. Therefore, we must affirm the judgment of the circuit court. See id.
(affirming where the deficient factual record was insufficient to overcome the presumption that
the trial court’s order complied with the law and had a sufficient factual basis).
¶ 10 Third, the CTA points out procedural deficiencies in Wing’s opening brief under Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 341(h) (eff. Feb. 6, 2013), and requests that we strike her brief and dismiss
the appeal. The CTA is correct that Wing’s brief is deficient because it lacks a statement of the
issue presented for review, a statement of jurisdiction, and a statement of facts with citations to
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the record as required by Rule 341(h)(3), (4), (6). Further, as the CTA notes, Wing’s argument
does not pass muster under Rule 341(h)(7), which provides that an appellant’s brief must contain
contentions and the reasons therefor, with citation to the authorities upon which the appellant
relies. Although we agree with the substance of the CTA’s argument, we find that the
appropriate remedy is to affirm the judgment, not to dismiss the appeal.
¶ 11 A reviewing court is entitled to the benefit of clearly defined issues with pertinent
authority cited and a cohesive legal argument. Walters v. Rodriguez, 2011 IL App (1st) 103488,
¶ 5. The appellate court is not a depository in which an appellant may dump the entire matter of
argument and research. Thrall Car Manufacturing Co. v. Lindquist, 145 Ill. App. 3d 712, 719
(1986). Arguments that are not supported by citations to authority do not meet the requirements
of Rule 341(h)(7) and are procedurally defaulted. Lewis v. Heartland Food Corp., 2014 IL App
(1st) 123303, ¶ 5. Although a pro se appellant’s deficient brief does not affect our jurisdiction to
consider the appeal (Twardowski, 321 Ill. App. 3d at 511), “the rules of procedure for appellate
briefs are rules, not mere suggestions.” Longo Realty v. Menard, Inc., 2016 IL App (1st) 151231,
¶ 18. When the procedural violations interfere with our review of the issue, we may exercise our
discretion and strike a brief for failure to comply with the rules. Parkway Bank & Trust Co. v.
Korzen, 2013 IL App (1st) 130380, ¶ 10.
¶ 12 Here, the lack of a cohesive legal argument, a reasoned basis for Wing’s contentions, or
any citation to the record or supporting authority, combined with the deficient record discussed
above, interferes with our review. Thus, the opening brief’s procedural deficiencies under Rule
341(h) provide an additional basis to disregard the unsupported facts and consider the arguments
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in this appeal waived. See Walters, 2011 IL App (1st) 103488, ¶ 8 (disregarding the facts and
arguments in the plaintiff’s opening brief due to procedural deficiencies under Rule 341(h)).
¶ 13 In sum, Wing forfeited appellate review of any issues because she did not file a posttrial
motion. See Arient, 2015 IL App (1st) 133969, ¶ 32. Based on this record, we cannot determine
whether Wing’s factual assertions have any merit, and we must presume that the trial court’s
orders were consistent with the law and supported by sufficient facts. See Corral, 217 Ill. 2d at
157. The procedural deficiencies in her opening brief combined with the insufficient record
further support our conclusion that we cannot review Wing’s claims on the merits. See Walters,
2011 IL App (1st) 103488, ¶ 8. Therefore, we need not address the CTA’s alternative argument
that Wing did not provide any substantive basis for reversal of the jury’s verdict.
¶ 14 Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.
¶ 15 Affirmed.
¶ 16 PRESIDING JUSTICE HYMAN, specially concurring.
¶ 17 I fully concur in the reasoning and result. That said, Wing’s sincere impression of what
happened at the trial deserves closer scrutiny. After waiting more than two years to present her
case before a jury, Wing writes, “I was not treated fairly.” Her pro se appellate brief reveals a
possible reason for her feeling this way. Although represented by counsel throughout the case,
Wing has hardly any understanding of how a trial works. When people do not understand
something, they tend to take a negative view of it and assume the worst. Thus, Wing’s “I was not
treated fairly” is a natural response to a lack of understanding of what transpired at the trial.
¶ 18 Among Wing’s complaints are these:
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• “The jurors were chosen rather quickly, which was very unfair. During the questioning of
the jurors, especially when it came to the kind of work they did and a brief of their
history [ ], a few should have automatically been excluded…”
• “The attorneys and the judge went to the back through a door behind the judge’s chair
and trial began shortly after the completion of jury selection.”
• “As my testimony was going forth, the judge stopped my attorney from asking me
questions that were relevant to my case.”
• “[T]he defense attorney was given the opportunity to question me [and h]e began
badgering me while the judge said nothing. The defense attorney continued repeating
[sic] trying to get me to say what he wanted me to.”
¶ 19 What Wing describes may be strange and unsettling to her but are familiar and common
occurrences for lawyers on trial.
¶ 20 One incident troubled Wing more than the others. According to Wing, before the judge
excused the jury at the end of the first day, the judge “gave direct orders to me and my attorney,
as well as the defense attorney not to leave the courtroom for any reasons until all the jurors were
completely dismissed. And she would inform us when to leave.” According to Wing,
“immediately” after this order, “the defense attorney fled into the hall, while the jury was still in
the process of being dismissed.” Wing “looked at the judge and told my attorney that the judge is
not even saying anything.” After “a few minutes” the defense attorney “returned to the
courtroom as [if] nothing [ ] happened.” A couple minutes later, the defense attorney went back
into the hallway, then returned to the courtroom, got his coat, and left. Wing wanted her attorney
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to bring to the judge’s attention that the defense attorney had twice gone into the hall without
permission, but he refused to say anything.
¶ 21 Again, Wing felt confused by her counsel’s inaction which, by its nature, is not a part of
the record but which exacerbated her belief that she was not treated fairly. It does not appear that
her counsel took the time to account to Wing for his having stood mute despite the defense
attorney’s apparent violations of the judge’s instruction.
¶ 22 How clients perceive “fairness” depends on more than a trial’s outcome. It depends on
the process, and if a client does not understand the trial process, fairness gets the blame. Litigants
whose counsel keeps them informed and educated will place greater confidence in the outcome.
See Clark D. Cunningham, What Do Clients Want From Their Lawyers?, 2013 J. Disp. Resol.
143, 146, 149 (2013) (stating that most frequent problems in attorney-client relationship were not
related to outcome but to attorney’s failure to listen to client, ask appropriate questions, and
explain relevant aspects of case and “how the system works”); Greg Berman & Emily Gold,
Procedural Justice From the Bench, Judges’ J., Spring 2012, at 20 (explaining that judge’s
management of the courtroom promotes perceptions of fairness).
¶ 23 If some good is to emerge from this appeal, it is this—lawyers must keep their clients
informed about what is taking place at every step of a trial. This means communicating with
clients in nontechnical terms about strategy and objectives, and the trial process itself, court
procedures, Rules of Evidence, and judicial pronouncements and rulings. And it means listening
to and understanding the client’s prospective. While communications in the midst of a trial may
not always be practicable, the lawyer must nonetheless act reasonably to inform the client of
actions the lawyer has taken on the client’s behalf. See Ill. R. Prof’l Conduct (2010) R. 1.4 cmt. 3
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(eff. Jan. 1, 2016). Well-informed clients are in a better position to assess the trial’s progress,
measure risks, and make choices. Clients also will be less inclined to feel they were treated
unfairly, which usually leaves the clients satisfied with their representation.
¶ 24 We cannot say whether Wing’s attorney ever discussed these issues with her because
discussions between attorney and client are, of course, confidential. Moreover, it is not for us to
decide whether his conduct met the standards set forth in the Rules of Professional Conduct. (For
that reason, I opted not to mention Wing’s complaint with the Attorney Registration and
Disciplinary Commission.) But the concerns Wing raises in her brief illustrate how a lack of
understanding shapes many participants’ view of the legal system. Although Justice Mason
asserts that this case is an “inappropriate vehicle” for addressing these issues (infra ¶ 30), I
would contend that Wing’s pro se status is more, not less, of a reason to address her complaints.
We should be sensitive to the reality of a pro se appellant who, having lost a case she thought she
should have won, cannot afford or attract an attorney to represent her on appeal. To ignore the
intangibles and merely offer a legal analysis of the issues is more likely to further her belief that
she has not been treated fairly. A short explanation addressing her concerns and assuring her that
nothing appears, on its face, to be improper, and reminding lawyers of the importance of
communicating with their clients throughout a case, might avoid other litigants from feeling that
they did not get a fair shake from the legal system.
¶ 25 In the words of a lawyer who abandoned law for a career as a writer, Johann Wolfgang
von Goethe: “And what we understand we cannot blame.” Johann Wolfgang von Goethe,
Torquato Tasso, act 2, sc. 1.
¶ 26 JUSTICE MASON, specially concurring.
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¶ 27 I fully concur with the reasoning and result in this case. Having provided us with no
record of the proceedings below, and a brief on appeal consisting of a series of letters addressed
to this court and various documents not certified by the clerk, it is impossible to address the
merits of any issues raised by Wing. Further, we do know from this limited record that Wing
failed to file a posttrial motion and thus has forfeited all issues on appeal. See Garcia v. Seneca
Nursing Home, 2011 IL App (1st) 103085, ¶ 17 (quoting Thornton v. Garcini, 237 Ill. 2d 100,
106 (2009)) (“Ordinarily, an appealing party forfeits review of an issue unless the party both
‘object[ed] to an error at trial and includ[ed] it in a written posttrial motion.’ ”).
¶ 28 I write separately to address Justice Hyman’s special concurrence in which he opines that
matters raised by Wing in her letters to the court deserve “closer scrutiny.” They do not. We
routinely refuse to consider matters outside the record (see Bank of New York Mellon v.
Karbowski, 2014 IL App (1st) 130112, ¶ 24), and we do not relax that rule in cases involving
self-represented litigants. Wing’s unsupported complaints range from the speed with which the
jury was selected (“very unfair,” according to Wing) to the trial judge sustaining objections to
questions that (again, in Wing’s view) “were relevant to my case.”
¶ 29 In particular, Justice Hyman addresses Wing’s claim regarding an instruction by the trial
court at the end of the first day of trial that the litigants and their attorneys were to remain in the
courtroom until after all jurors left. In one of her letters, Wing claims that defense counsel
disobeyed the court’s order and neither the trial court nor Wing’s counsel did or said anything.
Justice Hyman observes that Wing “felt confused” by her lawyer’s inaction, which, in turn,
contributed to her belief that “she was not treated fairly.” He states: “It does not appear that
[Wing’s] counsel took the time to account to Wing for his having stood mute despite the defense
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attorney’s apparent violation of the judge’s instruction.” Supra ¶ 21. Justice Hyman then goes on
to exhort lawyers to “keep their clients informed about what is taking place at every step of a
trial.” Supra ¶ 23.
¶ 30 This case is a singularly inappropriate vehicle for these observations and assumptions
given the lack of any record supporting them. And using this case as an opportunity to criticize a
lawyer for failing to communicate with his client as he is obligated to do (see Ill. R. Prof’l
Conduct (2010) R. 1.4 (eff. Jan. 1, 2010)) does a disservice to trial counsel who is not here to
defend himself and against whom Wing has filed a complaint with the Attorney Registration and
Disciplinary Commission (also attached to her brief).
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