Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed January 18, 2017.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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Nos. 3D15-194 & 3D15-183
Lower Tribunal Nos. 13-19660 & 11-62
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In re: The Estate of Jorge Luis Arroyo, Jr.;
Delia Reyes, an incapacitated person, by and through Marta Reyes,
her natural mother and court-appointed guardian, and Marta
Reyes, as court-appointed guardian of Ignacio Reyes, a minor, and
Isabella de Armas, a minor,
Appellants,
vs.
Infinity Indemnity Insurance Company, a foreign corporation, et
al.,
Appellees.
Appeals from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Michael A.
Genden and Bronwyn C. Miller, Judges.
Ross & Girten, and Lauri Waldman Ross and Theresa L. Girten; DeMahy,
Labrador, Drake, and Pete L. DeMahy and Frank L. Labrador, for appellants.
White & Case LLP, and Raoul G. Cantero and Christopher W. Swift-Perez;
GrayRobinson, P.A., and Charles T. Wells (Orlando), for appellee Infinity
Indemnity Insurance Company.
Before ROTHENBERG, LAGOA, and SALTER, JJ.
ROTHENBERG, J.
Delia Reyes (“Reyes”) appeals: (1) the probate court’s order granting
Infinity Indemnity Insurance Company’s (“Infinity”) motion to intervene in the
probate proceedings in the Estate of Jorge Luis Arroyo, Jr. (“the Estate”); (2) the
probate court’s subsequent order finding that the personal representatives of the
Estate did not have the authority to settle Reyes’s lawsuit against the Estate by
entering into a Coblentz agreement1; and (3) the circuit court’s final judgment
incorporating its order granting summary judgment in favor of Infinity on Reyes’s
bad-faith claim against Infinity.
We reverse the probate court’s orders granting Infinity’s motion to intervene
and its subsequent determination regarding the authority of the personal
representatives to settle Reyes’s lawsuit because Infinity’s alleged interest was not
at issue in the probate proceedings at the time Infinity moved to intervene. We also
conclude that even if intervention was properly granted, the probate court erred by
determining the authority of the personal representatives to settle Reyes’s lawsuit
because when Reyes filed the lawsuit against the Estate, and the Estate tendered its
defense to Infinity, its insurer, Infinity declined to defend the claim. Thus, the
defenses Infinity subsequently raised in the probate court were barred and Infinity
1 See Coblentz v. Am. Surety Co. of New York, 416 F.2d 1059 (5th Cir. 1969).
2
was prohibited from raising these defenses as a matter of law. We similarly find
that the circuit court erred by considering and then granting Infinity’s motion for
summary judgment based on these barred defenses in the bad-faith lawsuit against
Infinity. Accordingly, we reverse all three orders on appeal.
BACKGROUND
As the result of a car accident on October 9, 2009, Jorge Luis Arroyo, Jr.
(“Arroyo”) died and Reyes suffered severe incapacitating injuries. Arroyo’s
parents petitioned the probate court to open the Estate and to act as the Estate’s
personal representatives, which the probate court granted in January 2011.
On February 11, 2011, Reyes filed a personal injury negligence lawsuit (“the
negligence lawsuit”) in the circuit court against the Estate, but never filed a written
claim in the probate court. Although the Estate tendered the defense of the
negligence claim to Infinity, Infinity declined to defend the claim. In January 2013,
the Estate settled the negligence lawsuit by entering into a Coblentz agreement
with Reyes, in which Reyes and the Estate agreed to the entry of a consent
judgment, Reyes agreed not to execute the judgment against the Estate, and the
Estate assigned any rights it had against Infinity to Reyes. After Reyes and the
Estate entered into the Coblentz agreement and obtained the consent judgment,
Reyes sued Infinity in circuit court pursuant to the assignment of rights provision
3
in the Coblentz agreement, alleging in part that Infinity had demonstrated bad faith
by failing to defend the Estate in the negligence lawsuit (“the bad-faith lawsuit”).2
Infinity attacked the bad-faith claim on two fronts. First, Infinity moved for
entry of summary judgment in the circuit court’s bad-faith lawsuit, arguing that,
because Reyes failed to file a statement of claim in the probate court regarding the
negligence lawsuit, she could no longer do so because the negligence lawsuit was
barred by the statute of limitations, § 733.702, Fla. Stat. (2011), and the statute of
repose, § 733.710, Fla. Stat. (2011), set forth in the probate code. Accordingly,
Infinity claimed that: (1) the Estate was immune from Reyes’s negligence suit at
the time the personal representatives of the Estate settled the lawsuit; (2) the
Coblentz agreement and the subsequent consent judgment were therefore
unenforceable against the Estate; (3) the Estate was not exposed to an excess
judgment because neither the Coblentz agreement nor the consent judgment were
enforceable against the Estate; and (4) in order for Reyes to succeed in its bad-faith
claim against Infinity, the Estate would need to be exposed to an excess judgment.
Thus, Infinity contended that Reyes’s bad-faith claim against Infinity failed
because Reyes, standing as the assignee of the Estate, could not prove that the
Estate was exposed to an excess judgment.
2 Reyes also sued Insurance USA & Associates, Inc. and Nicole Marie Antini, but
those claims were later voluntarily dismissed without prejudice and are not at issue
in this appeal.
4
Infinity’s second front for attacking the bad-faith claim was waged in the
probate court. Infinity filed a motion for leave to intervene in the Estate
proceedings pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.230 for the purpose of
determining whether the Estate’s personal representatives had the authority to
settle the negligence lawsuit in the circuit court by entering into the Coblentz
agreement. When Infinity moved to intervene, the Estate’s proceedings in probate
court were uncontested, with no adversarial motions pending before it and minimal
record activity. The probate court granted Infinity’s motion to intervene after
concluding that Infinity was an interested party regarding the Coblentz agreement,
but limited Infinity’s intervention to the issue of “the applicability of Part VI of
Florida Statute Chapter 733 to the Personal Representative’s execution of the
Settlement Agreement.” Infinity then filed a motion to determine the personal
representatives’ right to enter into the Coblentz agreement (“motion to
determine”), and Reyes was also permitted to intervene to oppose this motion.
After allowing Infinity to intervene, the probate court ruled on Infinity’s
motion to determine and entered an order finding that section 733.710 of the
Florida Statutes protects an estate from any claim filed more than two years after
the death of the decedent, and that Reyes failed to file a claim against the Estate
within two years of Arroyo’s death. Accordingly, the probate court concluded that
the personal representatives did not have the authority to enter into the Coblentz
5
agreement in the negligence lawsuit because at the time the personal
representatives entered into the Coblentz agreement, the Estate enjoyed absolute
immunity from Reyes’s claim, and thus, the consent judgment was unenforceable
against the Estate.3 Reyes has appealed this order and the order granting Infinity’s
motion to intervene.
Meanwhile, although the original circuit court judge denied Infinity’s
motion for summary judgment, a successor circuit court judge reconsidered
Infinity’s motion and entered a written order granting Infinity’s motion for
summary judgment. The successor circuit court judge concluded that “Reyes’s
bad[-]faith claim against Infinity was dependent upon the Estate being liable for
the consent judgment in excess of any policy limits,” and thus, “Reyes’s failure to
timely file a claim against Arroyo’s Estate relieved the Estate of any liability for
the consent judgment.” The circuit court’s order concluded that a bad-faith claim
requires the insured to be exposed to an excess judgment,4 and, because the
consent judgment could not be the source of an excess judgment against the Estate,
Reyes’s bad-faith claim against Infinity failed as a matter of law.
3 The probate court’s conclusion that the consent judgment was unenforceable
against the Estate was redundant because the clear terms of the Coblentz
agreement had already rendered the consent judgment unenforceable against the
Estate.
4 Although we need not address this issue in reaching our decision, we note that
there are many types of bad-faith causes of action that do not require the insured to
be exposed to an excess judgment at the time a bad-faith claim is filed. See Perera
v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 35 So. 3d 893, 899-901 (Fla. 2010).
6
Reyes and Infinity entered into a stipulation pending this appeal voluntarily
dismissing the breach of contract claim in the complaint without prejudice.
Thereafter, the circuit court entered a final judgment, and Reyes timely appealed.
We have consolidated the two appeals from the circuit court and probate court
orders.
ANALYSIS
1. The Probate Court’s Orders
Infinity moved to intervene pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure
1.230. Rule 1.230, however, does not apply to the probate proceedings in this case
because Florida Probate Rule 5.010 precludes the application of the Florida Rules
of Civil Procedure unless provided for within the Florida Probate Rules. The only
Florida Probate Rule incorporating rule 1.230 is rule 5.025(d)(2), which states that
in an adversary probate proceeding, “[t]he Florida Rules of Civil Procedure
govern, except for rule 1.525.” There is no equivalent probate rule that would
allow the application of rule 1.230 in non-adversary probate proceedings. It is,
therefore, clear that in a non-adversary proceeding in probate court, rule 1.230 does
not govern, and because the Estate’s probate proceedings were dormant and non-
adversarial when Infinity moved to intervene, Infinity could not rely on rule 1.230
to intervene in the probate proceedings. Accordingly, it was reversible error for the
probate court to grant Infinity’s motion to intervene pursuant to rule 1.230. See
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Zayas-Hood v. Jusino, 44 So. 3d 626 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (reversing the probate
court’s order suspending a prior order and holding that Florida Rule of Civil
Procedure 1.540 was not available in a non-adversary probate proceeding because
it was not provided for within the Florida Probate Rules).
Were it not for preservation and waiver issues, we would have reversed the
probate court’s order granting Infinity’s motion to intervene based on rule 5.010
alone.5 However, Reyes failed to properly preserve this error for appeal. Reyes
failed to raise this rule 5.010 argument before the probate court and also failed to
5 The dissent argues that, while a rule 1.230 motion to intervene is not typical in
probate court, Infinity only filed the motion because Reyes’s counsel and the
personal representatives failed to comply with the proper probate procedures by
failing to designate Infinity as an interested party and by failing to notify Infinity
(as an interested party) of Reyes’s negligence lawsuit and the Coblentz agreement.
Thus, the dissent opines that Infinity would not have needed to file a motion to
intervene to contest the bad-faith litigation had the proper procedures been
complied with because Infinity would have already known about the negligence
suit and settlement.
First, we note that there is no exception in rule 5.010 that would allow
Infinity to use the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure based upon the personal
representatives’ failure to comply with the proper procedures. Thus, the dissent’s
argument is legally irrelevant. Second, contrary to the dissent’s suggestion, there is
no indication in the record that Infinity was surprised by Reyes’s negligence
lawsuit. In fact, Infinity concedes in its answer brief that it received notice of
Reyes’s negligence lawsuit because it admits that the Estate tendered the defense
of the negligence lawsuit to Infinity, and Infinity refused to provide a defense prior
to the execution of the Coblentz agreement. If Infinity was concerned about its
exposure to a subsequent bad-faith suit, it should have defended the Estate. “While
an insurance company is within its rights in a thorough investigation to determine
whether the accident in question comes within coverage of its policy, the company
acts at its peril in refusing to defend its insured and will be held responsible for the
consequences.” Gallagher v. Dupont, 918 So. 2d 342, 347 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005).
8
raise it in her initial brief. Because Reyes failed to object to the applicability of rule
1.230 in the probate proceedings, we have evaluated the probate court’s order
granting intervention by examining the law relating to rule 1.230 and find that even
if rule 1.230 applied, the probate court erred by granting Infinity’s motion to
intervene where Infinity’s interest was not already at issue in the proceedings.
Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.230 grants courts broad discretion when
considering motions to intervene, and it provides as follows: “Anyone claiming an
interest in pending litigation may at any time be permitted to assert a right by
intervention, but the intervention shall be in subordination to, and in recognition of,
the propriety of the main proceeding, unless otherwise ordered by the court in its
discretion.” However, “the trial court’s discretion is not unbounded.” Grimes v.
Walton Cnty., 591 So. 2d 1091, 1093-94 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). Trial courts are
required to consider whether the prospective intervenor has an interest in the
proceedings. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Carlisle, 593 So. 2d 505, 507 (Fla. 1992).
“In order for a party to intervene, its interest must be in the matter in litigation, and
of such a direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose
by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment.” Omni Nat’l Bank v.
Georgia Banking Co., 951 So. 2d 1006, 1007 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (internal
quotation omitted).
9
Importantly, a party’s asserted interest must already be at issue in the
proceedings when the party seeks to intervene. Carlisle, 593 So. 2d at 507 (holding
that “the interest must be that created by a claim to the demand in suit or some part
thereof . . . which is the subject of litigation”) (quoting Morgareidge v. Howey, 78
So. 14, 15 (Fla. 1918); Y.H. v. F.L.H., 784 So. 2d 565, 568 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001));
84 Lumber Co. v. Cooper, 656 So. 2d 1297, 1299 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (stating that
“intervention under [rule 1.230] assumes an interest in pending litigation which
shall be in subordination to, and in recognition of, the propriety of the main
proceeding”) (internal quotation omitted). Additionally, a contingent interest in the
proceedings, as opposed to a direct and immediate interest, will not justify a
party’s intervention. Harbor Specialty Ins. Co. v. Schwartz, 932 So. 2d 383, 387
(Fla. 2d DCA 2006); Grimes, 592 So. 2d at 1094 (holding that the trial court
abused its discretion by granting a motion to intervene where the intervenors
“would not stand to gain or lose by direct legal operation and effect of the
judgment” in the action).
In the instant case, Infinity’s interest regarding the validity of the Coblentz
agreement was not already at issue before the probate court at the time Infinity
moved to intervene. Infinity alleged that it had an interest in the probate
proceedings because its rights in the bad-faith lawsuit would be affected by the
validity of the Coblentz agreement. However, as stated above, when Infinity
10
moved to intervene, there were no adversarial proceedings in the probate court, the
probate court was not considering the validity of the Coblentz agreement, and there
was no attempt to enforce the consent judgment in the probate court—nor could
there be based on the covenant in the Coblentz agreement not to enforce the
consent judgment against the Estate. Thus, when Infinity moved to intervene for
the purpose of attacking the personal representatives’ authority to enter into the
Coblentz agreement, Infinity was injecting a new issue into the proceedings. This it
could not do. See Envtl. Confederation of S.W. Fla., Inc. v. IMC Phosphates, Inc.,
857 So. 2d 207, 211 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (finding that an intervenor may not inject
a new issue into the case and must accept the record and pleadings as they exist in
the litigation).
We, therefore, find that under both Florida Probate Rule 5.010 and Florida
Rule of Civil Procedure 1.230, the probate court abused its discretion by granting
Infinity’s motion to intervene. We also recognize the rule that if “it was error to
allow intervention, it [will also be] error to allow the intervenors to file their
motion . . . and then grant the motion,” Grimes, 592 So. 2d at 1094-95. Thus,
because it was error to allow Infinity to intervene, it was also error to allow Infinity
to file its motion to determine and to subsequently adjudicate the motion.
However, even if we had found that Infinity’s motion to intervene was
properly before the probate court, we would have concluded that the probate court
11
erred by allowing Infinity to raise defenses that it could have raised if it had
defended the Estate from Reyes’s negligence lawsuit prior to the entry of the
Coblentz agreement and the consent judgment. As will be discussed more fully in
the next section, when an insurer refuses to defend its insured from a lawsuit, and
the insured later settles the suit by entering into a Coblentz agreement, the insurer
is precluded from relitigating the issue of its insured’s liability in subsequent
proceedings. Gallagher v. Dupont, 918 So. 2d 342, 348 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005);
Ahern v. Odyssey Re (London) Ltd., 788 So. 2d 369, 372 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001).
Accordingly, Infinity was absolutely prohibited from raising any defenses on
behalf of its insured in the probate court’s proceedings that it could have raised had
it chosen to defend the Estate from Reyes’s negligence lawsuit. Infinity’s
arguments to the probate court regarding the effect of the time-bars in the probate
code on the validity of Reyes’s lawsuit is a defense that should have properly been
raised when Reyes’s lawsuit against the Estate was still pending. Therefore, the
probate court erred by determining the authority of the personal representatives to
enter into the Coblentz agreement because its order was based upon defenses that
Infinity was barred from raising as a matter of law.6
6 Although we have reversed the probate court’s order granting Infinity’s motion to
intervene on procedural and waiver grounds, we briefly respond to an issue raised
in the dissent that was not raised by the probate court or any of the parties. The
dissent suggests that section 733.708, Florida Statutes (2011), governs a personal
representative’s authority to enter into a settlement agreement. Thus, the dissent
argues that pursuant to section 733.708, a personal representative is required to
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2. The Circuit Court’s Order
We review the trial court’s order granting Infinity’s motion for summary
judgment in the bad-faith lawsuit de novo. Geico Gen. Ins. Co. v. Rodriguez, 155
So. 3d 1163, 1167 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014). “Summary judgment is proper if there is
no genuine issue of material fact and if the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law.” Volusia Cnty. v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So. 2d
126, 130 (Fla. 2000).
As stated above, Reyes and the Estate entered into a consent judgment
pursuant to a Coblentz agreement. Reyes subsequently sought to enforce the
consent judgment against Infinity by filing a bad-faith action against Infinity.
Therefore, we analyze the order granting summary judgment to determine whether
the circuit court correctly applied the law pertaining to the enforcement of consent
judgments in the context of a Coblentz agreement.
In order to enforce a consent judgment entered pursuant to a Coblentz
agreement, the assignee must bring an action against the insurer and prove: (1)
obtain approval from the probate court prior to settling a claim. We disagree. The
dissent misapprehends the purpose and effect of section 733.708, which provides
that a personal representative may avoid personal liability when compromising a
claim against the estate if the personal representative obtains a court order
approving the compromise. “The failure to secure such an order does not
preclude a compromise however, the personal representative remains subject to
the possibility of liability.” Sec. Ins. Co. v. Estate of Stillson, 397 So. 2d 1206,
1207 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981) (emphasis added). Thus, in addition to the fact that this
argument was not raised by the parties either below or on appeal, this argument is
unavailing on the merits.
13
insurance coverage, (2) the insurance company wrongfully refused to defend its
insured, and (3) the settlement was reasonable and made in good faith. Mid-
Continent Cas. Co. v. Royal Crane, LLC, 169 So. 3d 174, 180 (Fla. 4th DCA
2015); Gallagher, 918 So. 2d at 348; Indep. Fire Ins. Co. v. Paulekas, 633 So. 2d
1111, 1114 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994).
It is axiomatic that a Coblentz agreement establishes the insured’s liability.
Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 169 So. 3d at 181-82 (“The notion is that the settlement
establishes the insured’s liability, but not the insurer’s obligation of coverage.”).
The subsequent entry of a consent judgment is conclusive against the insurer as to
all matters determined in the judgment. Gallagher, 918 So. 2d at 348. Thus, in the
proceedings to enforce the consent judgment, the insurer is not permitted to
assert any defense that it could have raised in the underlying lawsuit between
the assignee and the insured. Indep. Fire Ins. Co., 633 So. 2d at 1114 (“[The
insurer] was not permitted to assert all of the defenses which could have been
asserted in the underlying cause of action . . . .”); Gallagher, 918 So. 2d at 348
(holding that “the insured’s liability has been established by the settlement, and the
insurer may not later relitigate the issue”).
The circuit court’s order granting summary judgment was premised, as was
the probate court’s order to determine, on Infinity’s argument that Reyes’s
negligence lawsuit against the Estate was time-barred pursuant to the probate code.
14
The circuit court’s analysis, like the probate court’s analysis, however, overlooked
the fact that the Coblentz agreement and the consent judgment conclusively
established that the Estate was liable, and that Infinity was barred from raising any
of the defenses that it could have raised had it chosen to defend the Estate in the
negligence lawsuit. Because Infinity could have raised its arguments with regard to
the probate code if it had defended the Estate in the negligence lawsuit
proceedings, Infinity is barred from subsequently raising them as a defense in
order to contest the validity of the consent judgment in the probate court and in the
circuit court bad-faith lawsuit. We therefore find that the circuit court erred when it
granted summary judgment in favor of Infinity based on Infinity’s legally barred
probate code defenses.
In response to the abundant case law precluding insurers from raising
defenses in a subsequent proceeding, which it had the opportunity to raise, but
failed to raise in the prior proceeding because, after having received notice, the
insurer declined to defend the insured, the dissent seizes upon language in May v.
Illinois National Insurance Co., 771 So. 2d 1143 (Fla. 2000), to argue that as to this
particular defense, this well-developed body of law does not apply. However,
that is not what May holds.
Although the Florida Supreme Court in May held that section 733.702 “is a
statute of limitations that cannot be waived in a probate proceeding by failure to
15
object to a claim on timeliness grounds,” and section 733.710 “is a jurisdictional
statute of nonclaim that is not subject to waiver or extension in a probate
proceeding,” May, 771 So. 2d at 1145, the operative words in both findings are
“in a probate proceeding.” (emphasis added). As the Court clearly explained in
its footnote following these findings, its holding was limited to actions brought in
probate court against the estate:
As with section 733.702, we determine that an estate may waive the
time period set forth in section 733.710 in a separate action
outside of the probate proceedings. However, unlike section
733.702, a creditor that has obtained a judgment in a separate action
cannot recover against the estate unless the creditor has filed a claim
in the probate proceedings within two years of the decedent’s death.
This is so because the probate court lacks the authority to extend the
time period set forth in section 733.710.
Id. at n.12 (emphasis added). It is thus clear that the Estate in the instant case had
the authority to “waive the time period set forth in section 733.710 in a separate
action outside of the probate proceedings,” which was in the personal injury
lawsuit in the circuit court. However, any judgment obtained by the plaintiff
(Reyes) could not be levied against the Estate in the probate proceedings because
no claim had been filed in probate court during the limitations period. Reyes,
however, is not attempting to seek redress against the Estate in the probate court.
The Estate entered into a Coblentz agreement with Reyes wherein the parties
agreed to the entry of a consent judgment, Reyes agreed not to execute the
judgment against the Estate, and the Estate assigned its rights to Reyes to pursue a
16
bad-faith lawsuit against Infinity for failing to defend the Estate in the negligence
lawsuit.
Had Infinity elected to defend the Estate, as it was asked, it could have
objected to the entry of the Coblentz agreement and the consent judgment, raised
the failure of Reyes to timely file his claim in probate court, asserted defenses
including the statutory limitations bar to recovery against the Estate, and as counsel
for the Estate simply have refused to the entry of both. But, Infinity declined to
defend the Estate, the Estate waived the time period set forth in section 733.710 in
the circuit court negligence lawsuit, and assigned its rights to Reyes to pursue the
Estate’s bad-faith claim against Infinity in a totally separate circuit court action.
While there are many defenses which may be available to Infinity in the bad-faith
lawsuit, including its coverage defense, it is too late for Infinity to now appear in
the negligence lawsuit it declined to defend in order to raise defenses it could have
raised had it agreed to defend the Estate. And, as already addressed, under both
Florida Probate Rule 5.010 and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.230, the probate
court had no authority to allow Infinity to intervene for the purpose of raising these
defenses.
The dissent also relies on Wald v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co., 2013 WL 9636854 (M.D. Fla. July 25, 2013). This Court is not bound by a
decision rendered by the United States District Court, and Wald is distinguishable.
17
Wald is distinguishable because it did not involve a Coblentz agreement. It is also
unpersuasive because the United States District Court failed to consider footnote
12 in May.
In applying Florida law, the Fifth Circuit in Coblentz held that an insurer
that wrongfully declines to defend its insured is barred from challenging a
judgment entered against its insured absent a finding of fraud or collusion.
Where either an indemnitor or liability insurer has notice of a
proceeding against his indemnitee or insured, and is afforded an
opportunity to appear and defend, a judgment rendered against the
indemnitee or insured, in the absence of fraud or collusion, is
conclusive against the indemnitor or insurer as to all material matters
determined therein.
Coblentz, 416 F.2d at 1062-63. In Coblentz, the insurance company argued that
since the judgment did not legally obligate its insured to pay anything, it could not
obligate the insurance company to pay anything. In rejecting the insurer’s
argument, the Coblentz court held that the insurer had been afforded the
opportunity to defend the action; however, it had repudiated its obligation to
defend, and thus the judgment obtained, if obtained without fraud or collusion, was
conclusive against the insurer. Id. at 1063.
We conclude that although the consent judgment in the instant case is not
enforceable against the Estate based on the express terms of the Coblentz
agreement and because Reyes did not file a claim against the Estate in the probate
court within the two-year limitations period, it is enforceable against Infinity if
18
coverage is established and there was no fraud or collusion. Our conclusion is
fully supported by not only footnote 12 in May, but also by the Fourth District
Court of Appeal’s decision in Pezzi v. Brown, 697 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 4th DCA
1997).
In Pezzi, the Fourth District held that the plaintiff’s failure to comply with
sections 733.702 and 733.710 did not place limitations on the plaintiff’s ability to
recover against the decedent’s insurer. Id. at 886. Specifically, the Fourth District
held that the jurisdictional limitation under section 733.710 “is specific to the
decedent’s estate, the personal representative, and the beneficiaries; the limitation
does not extend to the decedent’s insurance policy.” Id. at 885 (emphasis
added).
In reaching this conclusion, the Fourth District was “guided by the principle
that statutes restricting access to the courts must be narrowly construed in a manner
favoring access.” Id. at 886 (citations omitted). Thus, the court held that while:
Section 733.10 represents a decision by the legislature that 2 years
from the date of death is the outside limit to which a decedent’s estate
in Florida should be exposed by claims on the decedent’s assets . . .
[t]here is no indication that section 733.10 represented a legislative
decision to undermine the rights of plaintiffs to recover under
tortfeasors’ insurance policies.
Id. at 886 (quotations, citations, and emphasis omitted). In support of its
interpretation of sections 733.702 and 733.710, the court noted that the purpose of
these time limitations is “to promote ‘the public policy of providing for the speedy
19
settlement of estates’ in order that ‘the payment of claims and the distribution to
beneficiaries [not] be substantially delayed or disrupted.’” Id. at 886 (quoting
Spohr v. Berryman, 589 So. 2d 225, 228 (Fla. 1991)).
In conclusion, the Fourth District in Pezzi held that, because the plaintiff
was not seeking recovery from the estate’s assets, the personal representative
individually, or the beneficiaries, “[n]either section 733.702 nor section 733.710
precludes plaintiffs from bringing this cause of action and recovering to the extent
that [the deceased tortfeasor] was covered by liability insurance.” Pezzi, 697 So.
2d at 886.
We note that May, which was decided by the Florida Supreme Court well
after the Fourth District Court of Appeal decided Pezzi, did not overrule Pezzi, and
in fact, based upon footnote 12 in May, the Florida Supreme Court apparently
agreed with the Pezzi court.
The Estate’s interests are protected twice over in this case. The Coblentz
agreement protects the assets of the Estate by preventing Reyes from recovering
against the Estate even without the application of section 733.710. A separate bad-
faith lawsuit against Infinity poses no threat to the Estate, its beneficiaries, or its
creditors. If Reyes ever attempts to recover from the Estate, then her claim will be
barred not only by the Coblentz agreement, but also by the effect of section
733.710.
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CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we reverse the probate court’s order permitting Infinity to
intervene in the Estate’s probate proceedings because Infinity’s interest was not at
issue before the probate court prior to the filing of the motion to intervene.
Because the probate court erred by permitting Infinity to intervene, we also reverse
the probate court’s subsequent order on Infinity’s motion to determine. We also
reverse the probate court’s order on Infinity’s motion to determine because it was
based on defenses that Infinity was prohibited from raising as a matter of law.
Lastly, we reverse the circuit court’s order granting Infinity’s motion for summary
judgment and the subsequently entered final judgment in the bad-faith lawsuit
because they were also premised on defenses that Infinity could have raised but
failed to raise in the underlying litigation that led to the Coblentz agreement.
Reversed and remanded.
LAGOA, J., concurs.
21
In re Estate of Jorge Luis Arroyo, Jr.; Reyes v. Infinity Indemnity Ins. Co.
Cases Nos. 3D15-194 & 3D15-183 (Consolidated)
SALTER, J. (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. The circuit court orders regarding the probate
proceeding and the final judgment in the bad faith insurance lawsuit were correct
and must be affirmed. Well-settled statutory and decisional rules governing claims
bar dates, and those governing the rights and duties of personal representatives in
the administration of estates, are controlling.
This is not the first time that a claimant has been exposed to a harsh outcome
in a tragic case because of the failure to comply with the procedural requirements
of the Florida Probate Code and Florida Probate Rules. Those time and procedural
requirements must be upheld, however, because they were enacted by the Florida
Legislature for the protection of decedents’ estates, personal representatives,
creditors, obligors, and beneficiaries.
I. The Statutes
22
The bad-faith insurance claim against Infinity Indemnity is founded on the
claim of Ms. Reyes7 against Infinity Indemnity’s insured, the decedent, Jorge
Arroyo. The insurer has properly conceded, and the applicable statutes provide,
that the claim against Mr. Arroyo’s estate could be settled without filing a timely
written claim in the probate court under a narrow exception: “[t]o the limits of
casualty insurance protection only, any proceeding to establish liability that is
protected by the casualty insurance.” § 733.702(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (2013).
That provision is eminently logical; a timely claim which seeks nothing from
the estate in excess of the coverage limits of an insurance policy covering the
decedent and the claim is in substance a claim against the policy, not a claim
against the decedent, the estate, or the personal representative. Because other
creditors of the estate having no recourse to the policy, and beneficiaries of the
estate, should not be adversely impacted by the net result, there is no necessity to
prohibit the claimant from prosecuting a proceeding to establish the liability of the
insurer “to the limits of casualty insurance protection.” Id.
The exception does not apply, however, to a claim against the deceased
insured in excess of the policy limits, because such a claim, if timely and allowed,
7 Delia Reyes sustained traumatic and incapacitating injuries in the vehicle
collision that is at the center of the case. In the litigation involved in this appeal,
she is represented as the plaintiff by her mother (Marta Reyes) as guardian, and by
a court-appointed guardian for her two children. We refer to the plaintiffs in the
cases below and the appellants in this appeal collectively as “Ms. Reyes.”
23
might diminish estate assets. Accordingly, a claim for more than policy proceeds
must be timely filed in the estate. Section II of this dissent addresses the Florida
and federal cases enforcing these statutory requirements.
And the narrow exception provided by section 733.702(4)(b) is followed by
section 733.702(5), reiterating that nothing in section 733.702 “shall extend the
limitations period set forth in s. 733.710.” Section 733.710, in turn, establishes an
absolute two-year time limitation, measured from the death of the decedent, for the
filing or establishment of a claim against the decedent’s estate or the personal
representative. The statutory deadline is jurisdictional and self-executing.
In the present case, there is no dispute that the date of Mr. Arroyo’s death
(and Ms. Reyes’ catastrophic injuries) was October 9, 2009. The lawsuit by Ms.
Reyes against the deceased insured’s estate was filed in 2011, but no written claim
against his estate was ever filed. The consent settlement agreement and
assignment entered into by Ms. Reyes and the Arroyo estate pursuant to Coblentz
v. American Surety Co. of New York, 416 F.2d 1059 (5th Cir. 1969), were signed
in January 2013, and the consent final judgment in favor of Ms. Reyes and against
the estate was docketed in April 2013. These occurrences took place over three
years after Mr. Arroyo died and without preliminary notice to interested persons or
consideration by the probate court in the estate proceedings. His estate attempted
24
to accept liability for a claim which was, as a matter of law, unenforceable against
the estate.
The narrow exception of section 733.702(4)(b) is inapplicable in this case
because the estate’s liability for $30,000,000.00 vastly exceeded “the limits of
casualty insurance protection” under the policy (a face amount of $10,000.00, if
the estate or Ms. Reyes prevailed regarding coverage). Under the unambiguous
statutory provisions governing the filing of claims against a decedent and the
decedent’s estate for an amount exceeding “the limits of casualty insurance
protection,” the Coblentz agreement was untimely and barred.
The probate statutes governing timeliness are not the only restrictions
applicable to the present case. Section 733.706 specifies that “[c]laims on all
judgments against a decedent shall be filed in the same manner as other claims
against estates of decedents.” The consent final judgment in the present case was
not filed as a claim in the estate and was not brought to the attention of the probate
court until Infinity Indemnity did so in its motion to invalidate Ms. Reyes’ claim
against the estate.
Finally, an “interested person” under the Florida Probate Code is
any person who may reasonably be expected to be affected by the
outcome of the particular proceeding involved. . . . The meaning, as it
relates to particular persons, may vary from time to time and must be
determined according to the particular purpose of, and matter involved
in, any proceedings.
25
§ 731.201(23), Fla. Stat. (2013). In the present case, the probate court correctly
determined that Infinity Indemnity was an interested person.
II. Applicable Case Law
Regarding the exception for claims against an insured decedent, section
733.702(4)(b), the Supreme Court of Florida has left no doubt that the exception
does not extend to extra-contractual bad faith claims above policy limits; an
unfiled claim by a plaintiff may be pursued “to establish liability of the decedent or
personal representative and recovering up to the limits of the applicable insurance
coverage.” Pezzi v. Brown, 697 So. 2d 883, 885 (Fla. 1997) (emphasis added); see
also Kent Insurance Co. v. Estate of Atwood, 481 So. 2d 1294, 1295 (Fla. 1st DCA
1986).
In May v. Illinois National Insurance Co., 771 So. 2d 1143 (Fla. 2000), the
Supreme Court of Florida addressed the application of two of the probate statutes,
sections 733.702 and 733.710, in the context of a bad faith insurance case.8 Mr.
May was the administrator ad litem—functionally equivalent to the personal
representative for Mr. Arroyo’s estate in the present case—for the estate of Mr.
Bradley. Mr. Bradley was the driver in a motor vehicle collision in which he died.
His insurer was Illinois National Insurance Company (INIC).
8 The opinion in May arose from a federal case. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit certified the controlling issues of Florida law (the
proper application of sections 733.702 and 733.710) to the Supreme Court of
Florida.
26
Mr. and Mrs. Prockup were in a vehicle involved in the collision with the
vehicle driven by Mr. Bradley. Mr. Prockup sustained non-fatal injuries in the
accident, but his wife died at the scene of the collision. Mr. Prockup, individually
and as personal representative for the estate of his wife, sued the owner of the
vehicle (Mr. Bradley’s niece) and Mr. May, as personal representative of Mr.
Bradley’s estate. Mr. Prockup requested that the Florida probate court appoint Mr.
May administrator ad litem of the Bradley estate, as it became clear that no
personal representative had been appointed and that there was uncertainty
regarding the existence of a will.
INIC did not provide a defense and disputed coverage as to the Prockups’
lawsuit against Mr. Bradley’s estate and Mr. May. Following a stipulation by the
estate and Mr. May to liability in that lawsuit, a trial on damages culminated in a
judgment against the vehicle owner and Mr. May (for the estate of Mr. Bradley)
for $1,106,522.70. Id. at 1145-46. Mr. Prockup later commenced a bad faith
action against INIC, which INIC removed to the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Florida.9 INIC asserted that the Bradley estate had no liability
to the Prockups because the Prockups had not filed timely claims in the estate
within the times specified in sections 733.702 and 733.710. “After considering the
parties’ arguments, the federal district court granted summary judgment in favor of
9 Before removing the case to federal court, INIC paid the policy limits plus
interest into the registry of the state circuit court.
27
INIC. In granting INIC’s motion, the trial court determined that Mr. Prockup had
failed to timely file a sufficient statement of claim in the Bradley Estate
proceedings in accordance with the Florida Probate Code.” Id. at 1149.
The judgment was appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals, which then
certified to the Supreme Court of Florida this question:
WHETHER SECTION 733.702 AND SECTION 733.710 OF THE
FLORIDA STATUTES CONSIDERED SEPARATELY AND/OR
TOGETHER OPERATE AS STATUTES OF NONCLAIM SO
THAT IF NO STATUTORY EXCEPTION EXISTS, CLAIMS NOT
FORMALLY PRESENTED WITHIN THE DESIGNATED TIME
PERIOD ARE NOT BINDING ON THE ESTATE, OR DO THEY
ACT AS STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS WHICH MUST BE
PLEADED AND PROVED AS AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES IN
ORDER TO AVOID WAIVER.
Id. at 1145.
The Supreme Court of Florida held that section 733.702 “is a statute of
limitations that cannot be waived in a probate proceeding by failure to object to a
claim on timeliness grounds,” while section 733.710 “is a jurisdictional statute of
nonclaim that is not subject to waiver or extension in a probate proceeding.” Id.10
May was carefully considered and applied in a more recent federal case in
Florida, Wald v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 3:11–cv–1112–J–32TEM, 2013
10 In May, the Court held that the third-party bad faith claimant had filed a
sufficient claim for purposes of section 733.703 by filing pleadings regarding the
wrongful death action against the estate in the probate case within two years of the
insured’s death. No such timely pleadings were filed by Ms. Reyes in the estate of
Mr. Arroyo in the present case.
28
WL 9636854 (M.D. Fla. July 25, 2013), aff’d, 556 F. App’x 933 (11th Cir. 2014).
The U.S. District Court granted the insurer’s motion for summary judgment,
concluding that “May’s reasoning applies to plaintiffs in third-party bad faith
actions like Wald.” Id. at *7. In Wald, as in the present case, the time-barred,
extinguished claim of the plaintiff against the deceased insured’s estate could not
be resuscitated by a Coblentz agreement and an assignment to a third-party,
because the claim exceeded the policy limits.
In the case at hand, the trial court correctly applied the statutes, the May and
Wald decisions, and numerous other authorities in a seventeen-page, carefully-
reasoned opinion granting Infinity Indemnity’s motion for summary judgment as to
Ms. Reyes’ bad faith claim.
III. The Majority’s Waiver Argument
A. Standard of Review
While the majority is correct that the trial court’s order granting Infinity
Indemnity’s motion for summary judgment is reviewed de novo, it has ignored the
jurisdictional effect of the nonclaim statute, section 733.710, as determined in
May. That jurisdictional infirmity, as to which there is no issue of material fact in
this case, entitled Infinity Indemnity to summary judgment as a matter of law
under the case cited by the majority. Volusia County v. Aberdeen at Ormond
Beach, L.P., 760 So. 2d 126, 130 (Fla. 2000).
29
B. The Extent of the Insurer’s Alleged Waiver
The majority maintains that Infinity Indemnity lost the right to raise not only
coverage issues under the policy, but also any defense under the nonclaim statute
and the Probate Code: “[W]hen an insurer refuses to defend its insured from a
lawsuit, and the insured later settles the suit by entering into a Coblentz agreement,
the insurer is precluded from relitigating the issue of its insured’s liability in
subsequent proceedings.”11 The cases cited for this proposition, however, do not
address a deceased insured’s estate’s purported settlement of an untimely,
preclusively barred claim against the estate.
In Gallagher v. Dupont, 918 So. 2d 342 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005), a third-party
claimant filed a lawsuit against a state employee. When the employee died, the
State refused to continue the defense of the lawsuit on behalf of the employee’s
estate. The third-party claimant then entered into a Coblentz agreement with the
estate and obtained a consent judgment against the State. But although the State
(through its risk management fund) “lost the chance to litigate the factual issues”
relating to the underlying lawsuit, these issues involved “duty, breach, and
proximate causation,” not the question of whether the State was under an
obligation to provide a defense to a deceased state employee’s estate. Id. at 348-
49. For that reason and others, the appellate court remanded the case to the trial
11 Majority op. at 12; accord Majority op. at 14.
30
court for further proceedings. Gallagher does not preclude an insurer from
defending itself on the grounds that the estate of its insured is immune from suit.
In Ahern v. Odyssey Re (London) Ltd., 788 So. 2d 369 (Fla. 4th DCA
2001), the insured was Medi-Trans, Inc., the insurer was Odyssey Re, and the
third-party claimant was the estate of a passenger who died in a collision while in a
van operated by Medi-Trans. Odyssey Re declined to defend Medi-Trans against
claims brought by the personal representative of the estate of the passenger. Medi-
Trans then entered into a Coblentz agreement with the personal representative, a
consent judgment, and an assignment of Medi-Trans’ rights against Odyssey Re to
the personal representative.
The Fourth District held that in refusing to provide a defense to Medi-Trans,
“Odyssey lost its chance to litigate the factual issues surrounding duty, breach and
proximate causation which were pivotal to the ultimate resolution of the legal
principles involved in [the deceased passenger’s] claims.” Id. at 373. The probate
two-year nonclaim statute, section 733.710, is not an issue relating to an insured’s
duty, breach, or proximate causation vis-à-vis a third-party claimant. Instead, it is
a statutory bar precluding a third-party claimant from pursuing such a claim at all,
if untimely, against an estate. In Ahern, the insured was a corporation, not an
estate, and the effect of the nonclaim statute was not at issue.
31
In another case cited by the majority, Independent Fire Insurance Co. v.
Paulekas, 633 So. 2d 1111 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994), the insured survived the accident
for which he was alleged to have been responsible. The opinion did not involve an
insured’s estate or the Florida Probate Code, much less a jurisdictionally time-
barred claim.
Finally, the majority’s reliance on Mid-Continent Casualty Co. v. Royal
Crane, LLC, 169 So. 3d 174 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015), is equally misplaced. The case
reversed a final judgment against an insurer following a Coblentz agreement and a
third-party assignee’s claim against the insurer for its refusal to defend. More
significantly, the case does not involve a claim against the estate of a deceased
insured or the effect of the nonclaim statute, section 733.710.
Simply stated, there is no Florida case, or decision by a federal court in
Florida applying Florida law, allowing an estate to consent to a judgment for an
alleged claim that was not filed in the estate within (a) the limitations period of
section 733.702, and (b) two years of the insured decedent’s death, the claims bar
period specified by section 733.710. As already noted, perhaps repeatedly for
emphasis, section 733.710 is a jurisdictional statute of nonclaim. The majority’s
attempt to supply jurisdiction contrary to a controlling statute and controlling
Florida case law cannot withstand careful scrutiny.
IV. The Insurer’s Motion in the Probate Case
32
Infinity Indemnity separately and successfully moved the probate court to
determine that the personal representative of the estate had no authority to enter
into the Coblentz agreement with Ms. Reyes. The probate judge correctly agreed
to hear the insurer’s objection to the time-barred consent judgment, finding that
“the Estate had absolute immunity from Reyes’s claim because Reyes failed to file
a claim against the Estate in this matter and, therefore, said claim was
extinguished.” The probate court also correctly held that the consent judgment
against the estate was not valid or enforceable against the estate because it “was
not filed in the Estate, violating section 733.706, Florida Statutes.”
Ms. Reyes argues, and the majority apparently agrees, that the probate
framework has no application here because Infinity Indemnity denied coverage and
thereby waived its rights to object to Ms. Reyes’ claim against the estate of Mr.
Arroyo. Ms. Reyes has also persuaded the majority that the probate court abused
its discretion when it allowed the insurer to file a motion in the probate
proceedings so late in the process, and by “injecting a new issue into the
proceedings,” based on a “contingent interest in the proceedings, as opposed to a
direct and immediate interest.”12 This latter assessment erroneously applies case
law applicable to intervention in non-probate civil cases under Florida Rule of
Civil Procedure 1.230.
12 Majority op. at 10-11.
33
Rule 1.230, “Interventions,” does not apply to a probate proceeding in the
same way it applies in a civil case outside the probate division. First, Florida
Probate Rule 5.010 specifies that “[t]he Florida Rules of Civil Procedure apply
only as provided herein.” One such incorporation of the Florida Rules of Civil
Procedure relates to adversary proceedings, as detailed in Florida Probate Rule
5.025. See Fla. Prob. R. 5.025(d)(2). Another group of civil rules (not including
Rule 1.230), regarding discovery and subpoenas, is specifically incorporated by
Florida Probate Rule 5.080(a).
Second, joinder and notice in an estate proceeding are quite different than in
a non-probate adversarial civil case. The overarching objective of the Florida
Probate Code, chapters 731-735, Florida Statutes (2013), is the orderly
administration of the assets and liabilities of an estate, such that creditors of the
decedent, claims and other property of the decedent, and beneficiaries of the
decedent are accorded their rights under Florida law, whether in intestacy or
pursuant to a valid last will and testament.
In furtherance of that objective, the Florida Probate Code obligates the
personal representative to provide notices to several categories of interested
parties, such as creditors, obligors of the decedent, and prospective beneficiaries.
This is accomplished through actual notice and via publication. See, e.g., §§
733.212, 733.2121, Fla. Stat. (2013). Interested persons who have not received
34
notice via these provisions, but become aware of the estate proceedings, may
request and obtain notice of further proceedings, and copies of pleadings, by filing
a written request and serving a copy on the attorney for the personal representative.
Fla. Prob. R. 5.060.
The Infinity Indemnity policy at issue in the present case was an asset of Mr.
Arroyo’s estate. The estate was still open and subject to further administration at
the time Infinity Indemnity filed its motion for determination of the personal
representatives’ right to enter into the 2013 settlement agreement. Under section
731.201(23), quoted in pertinent part in section I of this dissent, Infinity Indemnity
was an “interested person” entitled to be heard by the probate court with respect to
an alleged claim above policy limits. The majority incorrectly implies that the
parties’ references to Rule 1.230 and the term “intervention” somehow deprived
Infinity Indemnity of standing to be heard.
But in the present case, whether through inadvertence or design, Infinity
Indemnity was not designated as an interested party by the personal representatives
(Mr. Arroyo’s parents) following the filing of their petition for administration in
January 2011. The estate was the owner of the Infinity Indemnity policy and
successor to the insured, but any rights or obligations under that policy were not
listed in the petition or related filings.13 The petition alleged that the nature and
13An insurance policy that is an asset of the estate, as here, should be included in
the inventory or list of reported assets. In re Bernard’s Estate, 183 So. 2d 715 (Fla.
35
approximate value of the assets in the estate are “unknown at this time and consist
of a wrongful death action arising from the automobile accident in which decedent
died.”14
Nor did counsel for Ms. Reyes file a claim in the estate or, so far as the
record reflects, notify Indemnity Insurance that Ms. Reyes was filing a civil case
against the estate outside the probate proceeding without authorization from the
probate court.15 Further, the personal representatives did not comply with Florida
Probate Rule 5.065(a) by filing “a notice when a civil action has been instituted by
or against the personal representative.”
Ms. Reyes’ original lawsuit against the personal representatives was filed in
the civil division five days after the petition for administration of the Arroyo estate
was filed in the probate division, in 2011. Infinity Indemnity was not sued by Ms.
Reyes based on the Arroyo estate’s purportedly-assigned claim until June 2013,
over two years later. Ms. Reyes’ argument that Infinity Indemnity filed its motion
1st DCA 1966).
14 The estate initially asserted claims against Ms. Reyes as a passenger based on
her alleged interference with Mr. Arroyo’s driving. The petition and pleadings
filed before Infinity Indemnity’s motion never made reference to a claim by Ms.
Reyes against the decedent, the decedent’s insurance policy, or Infinity Indemnity.
15 Counsel for Ms. Reyes knew, based on correspondence in October and
December 2009, that Infinity Indemnity had disclosed prior coverage under a
policy allegedly cancelled before the date of the accident, and had denied coverage
as of the date of the accident due to the alleged nonpayment of premiums.
36
too late in the probate proceedings ignores the fact that nothing was done in the
probate proceeding from April 2011 through June 2013 to advise Infinity
Indemnity of a claim by the estate or its assignee against Infinity Indemnity.
Ms. Reyes argues, nonetheless, that Ms. Reyes had no obligation to notify
the probate court or interested parties in the estate proceeding, because others had
no interest in the Infinity Indemnity insurance policy, and because Ms. Reyes was
waiving any right to execute against the estate—in the Coblentz agreement—in
return for the estate’s assignment to Ms. Reyes of its rights against Infinity
Indemnity. This argument fails, because it completely ignores the transparency
and timing required by the Florida Probate Code. Other creditors, beneficiaries,
and interested persons, not to mention the probate court itself, should be given an
opportunity to understand the terms of an arrangement whereby the personal
representatives propose to allow the entry of an untimely $30,000,000.00 claim
against the estate and the assignment of the estate’s claim against an insurer to that
single claimant.
The majority argues that these requirements can be dispensed with because
there were no other creditors of the estate who might have made claims against the
estate and its insurance policy. Even if that is true in the present case, that
rationale is not a sound basis for ignoring the statutes and rules that control probate
administration.
37
The point of this recitation of facts and overview of probate proceedings is
that “intervention” requiring affirmative acts by Infinity Indemnity is a departure
from the norm contemplated by the Florida Probate Code and Florida Probate
Rules. In probate proceedings, the estate and personal representative ordinarily are
the initiators notifying known “interested persons” of everything from the opening
of the estate to the appointment of the personal representative, to lawsuits against
the estate, and to proposed settlements (among other developments affecting
administration). In an ordinary estate case, it is not even necessary for an
obviously-interested party like Infinity Indemnity to file a motion to intervene if
the personal representative and claimants have complied with their obligations.
And even if we were to assess the probate court’s order recognizing Infinity
Indemnity’s right to object to the 2013 settlement under the standards applicable to
Rule 1.230 in a general civil case, our standard of review would be for an abuse of
discretion, Barnhill v. Fla. Microsoft Anti-Trust Litig., 905 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 3d
DCA 2005), liberally construed in favor of permitting a person claiming an interest
in the proceeding to protect that person’s rights, Grimes v. Walton County, 591 So.
2d 1091, 1094 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). As detailed above, any delay in filing the
motion and objections in the present case was not attributable to Infinity
Indemnity, but rather (a) to the failure of the personal representatives to list the
Infinity Indemnity policy as an asset of the estate and Ms. Reyes’ lawsuit as a
38
potential liability of the estate, and (b) Ms. Reyes’ failure to file a notice of her
claim in the estate.
The probate court did not abuse its discretion in permitting Infinity
Indemnity to claim “interested party” status in the still-open probate administration
of Mr. Arroyo’s estate. That court properly exercised its jurisdiction in
determining that the estate had no authority to enter into the settlement agreement
with Ms. Reyes, and that at the time the estate did so, the estate had “absolute
immunity” from Ms. Reyes’ claim.
V. Conclusion
The trial judge in the civil division did not err in entering judgment against
Ms. Reyes in the bad faith case. Ms. Reyes’ original personal injury lawsuit
against the Arroyo estate, her Coblentz agreement with the personal representative
of that estate, the entry of the consent judgment in the lawsuit, and the estate’s
purported assignment to Ms. Reyes of the estate’s rights of action against Infinity
Indemnity were effected without compliance with the Florida Probate Code and
Florida Probate Rules. As a result, those steps collectively created an invalid
foundation upon which to base a bad faith action against Infinity Indemnity.
Similarly, the probate court did not abuse its discretion in granting Infinity
Indemnity’s motion for a determination regarding the estate’s purported settlement.
The court recognized that Infinity Indemnity was significantly affected by the
39
personal representatives’ missteps and Ms. Reyes’ circumvention of the probate
court in orchestrating the bad faith lawsuit. The probate court correctly held that
Ms. Reyes failed to file a timely claim against the Arroyo estate and that the
personal representative had no authority to enter into the Coblentz agreement and
to allow the entry of the consent judgment.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
40
Estate of Arroyo v. Infinity Indemnity Insurance Co.
Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida
Date filed: 2017-01-18
Citations: 211 So. 3d 240
Copy CitationsCombined Opinion