FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JAN 23 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Nos. 15-10400
15-10511
Plaintiff-Appellee,
D.C. No. 3:10-cr-00068-WHA
v.
JOHN BROSNAN, MEMORANDUM*
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
William Alsup, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 18, 2017**
Before: TROTT, TASHIMA, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
In these consolidated appeals, John Brosnan appeals pro se (1) the district
court’s order denying his second motion to modify a condition of supervised
release requiring him to obtain approval from the district judge before filing any
civil action, and (2) the district court’s order denying him permission to file a
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
lawsuit pursuant to the challenged condition. We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.
Brosnan’s second motion to modify the supervised release condition
repeated the arguments contained in his first motion, namely that the supervised
release condition is overbroad and impermissibly infringes on his First
Amendment rights. The district court, treating Brosnan’s second motion as a
motion to reconsider, properly denied relief. Brosnan’s motion contained no new
evidence or legal argument, and the initial denial was not “manifestly unjust.” See
Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th
Cir. 1993). To the contrary, the court acted within its discretion in imposing the
contested condition. See United States v. Stoterau, 524 F.3d 988, 1002 (9th Cir.
2008). The challenged condition is reasonably related to the goals of deterrence
and rehabilitation in light of Brosnan’s previous abuse of the judicial system. See
18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(1); Stoterau, 524 F.3d at 1002. Moreover, given the three-
year duration of the condition and the fact that Brosnan retains the right to file non-
frivolous lawsuits,1 we conclude the condition involves no greater deprivation of
liberty than is reasonably necessary. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2). Finally, the
1
The district court docket reflects that the district court has permitted
Brosnan to file some lawsuits during the course of his supervised release term.
2 15-10400 & 15-10511
condition does not violate Brosnan’s due process rights because Brosnan had
adequate notice of the condition and an opportunity to be heard. See United States
v. Hamilton, 208 F.3d 1165, 1169 (9th Cir. 2000).
Brosnan also challenges the district court’s rejection of his proposed
complaint seeking a declaratory judgment against the United States, on the ground
that the supervised release condition pursuant to which it was rejected is improper.
We have rejected Brosnan’s challenge to the supervised release condition, and we
agree with the district court that the rejected complaint was frivolous.
AFFIRMED.
3 15-10400 & 15-10511