J-A27038-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
VIRGINIA HUMPHREYS AND BRIAN IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
HUMPHREYS PENNSYLVANIA
v.
WELLS FARGO BANK N.A.
APPEAL OF: BRIAN HUMPHREYS
No. 2786 EDA 2015
Appeal from the Order Entered August 13, 2015
in the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County Civil Division
at No(s): C-48-CV-2014-12252
WELLS FARGO BANK N.A. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
v.
VIRGINIA L. HUMPHREYS AND BRIAN C.
HUMPHREYS
APPEAL OF: BRIAN HUMPHREYS
No. 2787 EDA 2015
Appeal from the Order Entered August 13, 2015
in the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County Civil Division
at No(s): C-48-CV-2011-3134
BEFORE: PANELLA, LAZARUS, FITZGERALD,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED JANUARY 25, 2017
Pro se Appellant, Brian Humphreys, appeals from two separate orders
entered in the Northampton County Court of Common Pleas respectively
granting summary judgment in favor of Appellee, Wells Fargo Bank, in a
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A27038-16
foreclosure action and dismissing Appellant’s second amended complaint
against Appellee in a quiet title action.1 Appellant contends, in this
consolidated appeal, that Appellee was not the proper “note holder” in
connection with the mortgage at issue and therefore did not have the
authority to pursue a foreclosure action against him. We affirm.
We adopt the facts and procedural history set forth in the trial court’s
opinion. See Trial Ct. Op., 3/31/16, at 1-4. On April 6, 2011, Appellee2
filed a mortgage foreclosure action (“foreclosure action”) against the parties
because Appellee had not received the required monthly payments after
November 2010. On August 25, 2011, the parties filed an answer consisting
of general denials and three paragraphs of affirmative defenses. Thereafter,
on October 17, 2011, the parties filed a motion for summary judgment,
which the trial court denied on December 7, 2011. Appellee filed its own
motion for summary judgment on April 27, 2015, which the trial court
granted via an order and opinion dated August 13, 2015 (“Foreclosure
Opinion”). Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on September 10, 2015
and a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement on October 1, 2015. The
1
Initially, Appellant and his Mother, Virginia L. Humphreys (collectively the
“parties”) were jointly involved in both actions in this consolidated case.
After Virginia Humphreys passed away in March 2015, Appellant continued
to pursue this appeal individually.
2
We note that Appellee is the successor in interest, by way of merger, to
Wachovia Bank.
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trial court filed a responsive Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) statement, referencing the
court’s Foreclosure Opinion.
Meanwhile, on December 30, 2014, the parties initiated a quiet title
action against Appellee regarding the same property that is the subject of
the foreclosure action. Appellee filed timely preliminary objections, and the
parties filed an amended complaint on February 9, 2015. Appellee filed
additional preliminary objections on March 2, 2015, and the parties filed a
second amended complaint. On April 8, 2015, Appellee filed preliminary
objections in response to the second amended complaint. After the trial
court conducted oral argument on May 26, 2015, the court ultimately
sustained Appellee’s objections and dismissed the parties’ second amended
complaint by order and opinion, also dated August 13, 2015 (“Quiet Title
Opinion”). Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on September 10, 2015
and a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement on October 1, 2015. The
trial court filed a responsive Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) statement, referencing the
court’s Quiet Title Opinion.
On November 9, 2015, this Court consolidated the two above-
referenced appeals. Appellant filed a single brief incorporating his issues
regarding both cases.
Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
On its own accord, should the Court have claimed that the
argument put forth in PHH Mortgage Corp. v. Powell,
100 A.3d 611, 619 (Pa. Super. 2014), was
“indistinguishable” from that presented in the instant case?
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The Appellant’s 2011 Answer to Wells Fargo’s Foreclosure
Complaint contained general denials; most of which were
argued in great detail in later pleadings. Did the Court
unjustly presume that [Appellant’s] Answer was dishonest?
Appellant’s Brief at 3-4.3
The crux of Appellant’s issues is his contention that Appellee was not
legally permitted to pursue a foreclosure action against him because
Appellee was not the legal “note holder” in connection with the mortgage at
issue. No relief is due.
Regarding summary judgment, our review is guided by the following
principles:
The standards which govern summary judgment are well
settled. When a party seeks summary judgment, a court
shall enter judgment whenever there is no genuine issue of
any material fact as to a necessary element of the cause of
action or defense that could be established by additional
discovery. A motion for summary judgment is based on an
evidentiary record that entitles the moving party to a
3
Appellant initially raised seventeen issues. Appellant’s Brief at 2-9.
However, in his reply brief, Appellant indicated his intention to abandon all
but two issues for purposes of appellate review. Appellant’s Reply Brief at 1.
As set forth by Appellant, his “core issues” are encapsulated within his two
remaining issues. Id. We note that on December 14, 2015, Appellee filed a
motion to quash Appellant’s appeal based upon the many “material” defects
within Appellant’s Brief. We note that Appellant’s pro se arguments are
difficult to discern. We remind Appellant that his pro se status does not
relieve him of his obligation to raise and develop his appellate claims
properly and this court will not act as appellate counsel. Smathers v.
Smathers, 670 A.2d 1159, 1160 (Pa. Super. 1996). However, Appellant’s
brief does provide argument and citation to legal authority regarding his two
remaining issues. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119. Therefore, we decline to quash his
appeal.
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judgment as a matter of law. In considering the merits of
a motion for summary judgment, a court views the record
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and
all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of
material fact must be resolved against the moving party.
Finally, the court may grant summary judgment only when
the right to such a judgment is clear and free from doubt.
An appellate court may reverse the granting of a motion
for summary judgment if there has been an error of law or
an abuse of discretion. . . .
Varner-Mort v. Kapfhammer, 109 A.3d 244, 246-47 (Pa. Super. 2015)
(citation omitted).
This Court’s standard of review of orders sustaining preliminary
objections in the nature of a demurrer is well-settled:
In determining whether the trial court properly sustained
preliminary objections, the appellate court must examine
the averments in the complaint, together with the
documents and exhibits attached thereto, in order to
evaluate the sufficiency of the facts averred. The impetus
of our inquiry is to determine the legal sufficiency of the
complaint and whether the pleading would permit recovery
if ultimately proven. This Court will reverse the trial
court's decision regarding preliminary objections only
where there has been an error of law or abuse of
discretion. When sustaining the trial court's ruling will
result in the denial of claim or dismissal of suit, preliminary
objections will be sustained only where the case is free and
clear of doubt.
Donaldson v. Davidson Bros., Inc., 144 A.3d 93, 100 (Pa. Super. 2016)
(citation omitted). The trial court’s decision to grant or deny a demurrer
involves a matter of law; therefore, “our scope of review is plenary, allowing
us to review the whole record.” Mistick, Inc. v. Northwestern Nat. Cas.
Co., 806 A.2d 39, 42 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citation omitted).
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Integral to this case is the legal precept that “[o]wnership of [a] Note
is irrelevant to the determination of whether [an entity] is entitled to enforce
the Note.” PHH Mort. Corp. v. Powell, 100 A.3d 611, 621 (Pa. Super.
2014) (quotation marks and citation omitted) (holding that holder of
promissory note had standing to enforce the attendant mortgage regardless
of petitioner’s claim that another entity, Fannie Mae, owned the note).
After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the
applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinions of the Honorable Anthony S.
Beltrami, we conclude Appellant’s issues merit no relief. The trial court’s
opinions comprehensively discuss and properly dispose of the questions
presented. See Foreclosure Opinion at 6-14; Quiet Title Opinion at 3-6;
(finding that Appellee had proper standing to pursue a foreclosure action
against Appellant and, accordingly, Appellant’s quiet title action was legally
insufficient). Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the trial court’s opinions.
Orders affirmed. Motion to quash denied.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 1/25/2017
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IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF •• • T ......- -· ~
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NORTHAMPTON COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA .
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CIVIL ACTION • ...!..")
VIRGINIA L. HUMPHREYS and )
BRIAN C. HUMPHREYS, ) No.C-48-CV-2014-12252
Plaintiffs )
)
v. )
)
WEL'-S FARGO BANK, N.A., )
Defendant )
OPINION OF THE COURT
This matter is before the Court on "Defendant's Preliminary Objections
to Plaintiffs1 Second Amended Cornplalnt." Plaintiffs initiated this action to
quiet title against Defendant by filing a Complaint on December 30, 2014.
The Complaint was met with "Defendant's Preliminary Objections to
Plaintiff's Complaint," which were filed on January 20, 2015. Rather than
respond to those objections, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint on
February 9, 2015. Defendant filed Preliminary Objections to the Amended
Complaint on March 2, 2015. Again, rather than rebut the objections,
1
Iu
Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint on March 19, 2015.1 On April 8,
2015, Defendant filed the instant Preliminary Objections. On April 28, 2015,
Defendant filed a Brief in support of its Preliminary Objections. On May 20,
2015, Plaintiffs filed a Brief in opposition to the same. Oral argument was
heard on May 26, 2015, and the matter is now ready for disposition.
Defendant's first objection is a demurrer in which Defendant argues
that Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint fails to state a valid action to
quiet title. In the Second Amended Complaint, Pia intiffs aver that Plaintiff
Virginia L. Humphreys owned real estate located at 2253 Linden Street, in
Bethlehem, Northampton County, Pennsylvania (the "Property"). (Second
Am. Campi. ,i 2.) Plaintiffs further aver that although "Defendant claims a
lien against said [P]roperty adverse to Plaintiff[s,] Defendant's claim is
without any right whatsoever, and Defendant has no estate, right, title, lien,
or interest whatsoever in or to said [P] roperty." (Id. ,i 3.) Plaintiffs allege
that Defendant's claimed interest in the Property is based on two mortgages
executed by Plaintiffs on April 16, 2007. (Id. ,i 4.) Plaintiffs go on to aver,
in their own pleading, that the first mortgage was recorded on May 8, 2007,
in the Northampton County Recorder of Deeds Office at Book 2007-1, page
170260 and that the second mortgage was recorded on the same date in the
same book at page 170279. (Id. ,i 4(a)-(b).) Plaintiffs then claim that the
The Second Amended Complaint states that Plaintiff Virginia L. Humphreys passed
away on March 61 2015. (Second Arn. Cornpl. at 1.) The Court will continue to refer to
"Plaintiffs" in the plural, in accordance with the caption.
2
mortgages are invalid because "Defendant transferred its enforcement rights
to others ... and has since acted only in the capacity of servicer of the"
mortgage accounts. (Id. 11 5.) In their Second Amended Complaint,
Plaintiffs attempt to establish an action to quiet title by alleging that
"Defendant is in a position neither to perform its eventual obligation to clear
the Plaintiff's title to her property, nor to enforce the applicable mortgages."
(Id. at 1-2.) The Second Amended Complaint spans thirty pages and
suggests myriad reasons why, in Plaintiffs' opinion, Defendant is not the
proper entity to enforce the aforementioned mortgages.
The question presented by a demurrer is whether, on the facts
pleaded, the law says, with certainty, that no recovery is possible. Orange
Stones Co. v. City of Reading, 87 A.3d 1014, 1021 n.7 (Pa. Commw. 2014).
The Court must resolve a demurrer solely on the basis of the pleadings,
without reference to testimony or other outside evidence. Hill v. Ofalt, 85
A.3d 540, 546 (Pa. Super. 2014). However, in a case such as this, the Court
can take judicial notice of public documents, such as recorded mortgages,
when ruling on a demurrer. See Solomon v. U.S. Healthcare Sys. of Pa.,
Inc., 797 A.2d 346, 352 (Pa. Super. 2002). When considering a demurrer,
the Court must accept, as true, all material facts averred in the challenged
pleading, as well as all inferences that can be reasonably deduced
therefrom. Schemberg v. Smicherko, 85 A.3d 1071, 1073 (Pa. Super.
2014).
3
Preliminary objections which seek the dismissal of a cause of
action should be sustained only in cases in which it is clear and
free from doubt that the pleader will be unable to prove facts
legally sufficient to establish the right to relief. If any doubt
exists as to whether a demurrer should be sustained, it should
be resolved in favor of overruling the preliminary objections.
Id.
An action to quiet title may be brought, inter alia, "to determine any
right, lien, title or interest in the land or determine the validity or discharge
of any document, obligation or deed affecting any right, lien, title or interest
in land" or "to compel an adverse party to flle, record, cancel, surrender or
satisfy of record, or admit the validity, invalidity or discharge of, any
document, obligation or deed affecting any right, lien, title or interest in
land." Pa.R.C.P. No. 1061(b)(2)-(3). "The purpose of an action to quiet title
is to resolve a conflict over an interest in property." Nat'/ Christian
Conference Ctr. v. Schuylkill Twp., 597 A.2d 248, 250 (Pa. Commw. 1991).
"In Pennsylvania[,] a mortgage duly executed will be presumed to be valid
until the contrary is shown, and the burden is on the party attacking the
mortgage to prove its invalidity.'' Pitti v. Pocono Bus. Furniture, Inc., 859
A.2d 523, 526 n.3 (Pa. Commw. 2004). A mortgage is valid, on its face, if it
dearly states that it is a mortgage, describes the property to be mortgaged,
is signed by the mortgagor, is notarized, and is duly recorded within six
months of execution. See In re Berry, 11 B.R. 886, 891 (W.D. Pa. 1981);
21 P.S. § 621.
4
In their Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs specifically identify the
two mortgages that were executed in Defendant's favor, and Defendant has
attached copies of the same to its Preliminary Objections. (Second Am.
Compl. 11 4(a)-(b); Prelim. Objections Exs. E, G.) The mortgages were
originally executed in favor of Wachovia Bank, National Association, to which
Defendant is the successor in interest by way of merger, a succession
Plaintiffs concede. (Second Am. Compl. ,1 8; Prelim. Objections Exs. E, G,
H .) Upon inspection, the mortgages are plainly valid, as they clearly state
that they are mortgages, describe the Property mortgaged, bear Plaintiffs'
signatures, which are notarized, and were duly recorded within six months of
execution in a manner consistent with that described in the Second
Amended Complaint. Moreover, there are no facts pleaded in the Second
Amended Complaint that can be fairly characterized as an attack on the
validity of the mortgages. In fact, Plaintiffs do not really dispute the validity
of the mortgages. Rather, Plaintiffs' allegations primarily concern
Defendant's purported lack of authority and/or standing to enforce the
mortgages. For a discussion of why this argument has no merit, see Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A, s/i/i/t/ Wachovia Bank v. Humphreys, No. C-48-CV-2011-
3134, slip op. (C.P. of Northampton Cnty. Aug. *, 2015), an opinion that is
being filed contemporaneously with this Opinion and that grants summary
judgment in the related mortgage foreclosure action involving the same
parties and the first mortgage described above.
5
Because Plaintiffs have pleaded no facts to rebut the presumptively
valid mortgages, the Second Amended Complaint creates no "conflict over
an interest in property." Nat'/ Christian, 597 A.2d at 250. Thus, the action
to quiet title is legally insufficient, and Defendant's demurrer will be
sustained.2 Finally, because the Court cannot discern any way in which an
additional pleading in this matter will vault Plaintiff's purported claims into a
place of legal sufficiency, and in light of the Court's opinion granting
summary judgment in the related mortgage foreclosure action, the Court will
dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint with prejudice and will not
grant leave to file any further amended complaints.3 See Hill, 85 A.3d at
557 (leave to amend following sustaining of demurrer may be refused where
there is no reasonable probability that amendment will cure defect).
WHEREFORE, the Court enters the following:
2
For this reason, the Court need not reach Defendant's second objection asserting the
pendency of a prior action.
3
It should be noted that Plaintiffs filed an almost identical action at docket number C-
48-CV-2014-1703. In an Order filed on October 22, 2014, in response to preliminary
objections, the Honorable Stephen G. Baratta, President Judge, dismissed Plaintiffs'
Complaint without prejudice. Plaintiffs did not file an amended complaint within twenty
days in that action, as required by Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1028(e). Rather,
Plaintiffs filed the instant action. Thus, Plaintiffs may not file an amended complaint at
either docket number.
6
IN THE COURT OF COM MON PLEAS OF
NORTHAMPTON COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
CIVIL ACTION
VIRGINIA L. HUMPHREYS and )
BRIAN C. HUMPHREYS, )
Plaintiffs )
)
v. )
)
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., )
Defendant )
ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW, this 13th day of August, 2015, "Defendant's Preliminary
Objections to Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint," filed on April 8, 2015,
are hereby SUSTAINED. Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, filed on
March 19, 2015, is hereby DISMISSED, with prejudice.
BY THE COURT:
J.
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IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF .
NORTHAMPTON COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA ~· .: .: •. ~. ",
,:.:.·i
CIVIL ACTION
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. s/i/i/t/ )
WACHOVIA BANK, N.A., ) No. C-48-CV-2011-3134
Plaintiff )
)
v. )
)
BRIAN C. HUMPHREYS and )
VIRGINIA L. HUMPHREYS, )
Defendants )
OPINION OF THE COURT
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Judgment. Briefs have been filed, oral argument was heard on May 26,
2015, and the matter is ready for disposition. For the reasons that follow,
Plaintiff's Motion will be granted.
On April 6, 2011, Plaintiff filed a Mortgage Foreclosure Complaint that
alleges the following facts. On April 16, 2007, Defendants executed and
delivered a mortgage ("Mortgage") to Wachovia Bank, N .A.1 on property
located at 2253 Linden Street, in Bethlehem, Northampton County,
As discussed infra, Wachovia Bank, N.A. merged into Plaintiff and no longer exists.
1
Pennsylvania. (Comp!.
)
BRIAN C. HUMPHltEYS and )
VIRGINIA L. HUMPHREYS, )
Defendants )
ORDER OF COURT
Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED. An in rem judgment is hereby
entered in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendants in the amount of
$137,770.28, plus costs and interest, at the per diem rate of $17.67, from
December 8, 2014, and for foreclosure and sale of the mortgaged premises.
BY THE COURT:
],
1
Humphreys v. v. Wells Fargo Bank
Combined Opinion