NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 25 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DANNY LEE WILLIAMS, No. 15-16842
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:14-cv-00640-RCJ-
WGC
v.
STATE OF NEVADA; et al., MEMORANDUM*
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Robert Clive Jones, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 18, 2017**
Before: TROTT, TASHIMA, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
Nevada state prisoner Danny Lee Williams appeals pro se from the district
court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging retaliation and
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court’s dismissal under 28 U.S.C.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
§ 1915A. Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Williams’ Eighth Amendment claims
because Williams failed to allege facts sufficient to show that defendants were
deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. See Toguchi v. Chung, 391
F.3d 1051, 1057-60 (9th Cir. 2004) (a prison official acts with deliberate
indifference only if he or she knows of and disregards an excessive risk to the
inmate’s health; negligence, medical malpractice, and a difference of opinion
concerning the course of treatment in diagnosing or treating a medical condition do
not amount to deliberate indifference).
The district court properly dismissed Williams’ First Amendment retaliation
claim because Williams failed to allege facts sufficient to show that defendants
acted with retaliatory intent to chill his exercise of protected conduct. See
Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 2009) (setting forth elements of
retaliation claim in prisoner context).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Williams leave to
amend his complaint because amendment would have been futile. See Lopez v.
Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (setting forth standard of
review and explaining that leave to amend can be denied if amendment would be
2 15-16842
futile).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Williams’ request
for appointment of counsel because Williams failed to demonstrate exceptional
circumstances. See Agyeman v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 390 F.3d 1101, 1103-04 (9th
Cir. 2004) (setting forth standard of review and describing the factors to be
considered before appointing counsel).
We reject as without merit Williams’ contention that the district court was
biased because it considered the arguments contained in defendants’ motions to
dismiss.
Williams’ request to enter default judgment against defendants-appellees
Sierra Surgery Center and Sierra Imaging, set forth in his reply brief, is denied.
AFFIRMED.
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