Supreme Court of Florida
____________
No. SC13-992
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LEON KOPEL,
Petitioner,
vs.
BERNARDO KOPEL, et al.,
Respondents.
[January 26, 2017]
QUINCE, J.
Respondents Bernardo and Enrique Kopel seek review of the decision of the
Third District Court of Appeal in Kopel v. Kopel, 117 So. 3d 1147 (Fla. 3d DCA
2013), on the ground that it expressly and directly conflicts with a decision of this
Court and other district courts of appeal on a question of law. We have
jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. For the reasons that follow, we
quash the decision of the Third District and approve the line of cases that follow
the exact language of rule 1.190(c), allowing an amended complaint to relate back
to the filing of the original, timely filed complaint as long as any new claims
within the amendment arise out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence as
in the original filing.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This case comes to us after twenty-one years of litigation involving claims
by Leon Kopel (Petitioner) against his brother, Enrique Kopel, and Enrique’s son,
Bernardo Kopel (Leon’s nephew),1 resulting from deteriorating business
relationships within the family. Kopel, 117 So. 3d at 1149. In 1994, Petitioner
filed this lawsuit after he was unsuccessful in demanding the repayment of $5
million from Respondents and payment of two promissory notes for $845,000 and
$1.45 million from Bernardo. At the 2008 trial, Petitioner, for the first time,
claimed that settlement conversations between him and Enrique were actually oral
agreements whereby Enrique was to pay $5 million to Petitioner in exchange for
Petitioner’s interest in certain business entities. Id. The trial resulted in a hung
jury, and after a mistrial was declared, the trial court ordered the parties to amend
their pleadings. Id. Petitioner’s amendments to his complaint culminated with a
fifth amended complaint filed in 2009, wherein he alleged that using a $15 million
loan (which he and Enrique obtained from the Royal Bank of Canada using two
companies they each owned individually), Petitioner loaned $5 million to Bernardo
1. Hereinafter, Enrique and Bernardo Kopel may be referred to collectively
as Respondents or individually according to their first names.
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(Count I); that Petitioner received oral promises from Respondents to repay the
loan and that in exchange for Respondents paying Petitioner $5 million, Petitioner
would release them from any interest or claims Petitioner had in companies the
parties owned together (Count II); and that Respondents were unjustly enriched
when Petitioner gave them $5 million (Count III). Id. Respondents moved to
dismiss the fifth amended complaint, arguing inter alia that the “breach of oral
promise” claim was time-barred by the four-year statute of limitations, but the trial
court denied the motion. Id. at 1150-51. Prior to trial, Respondents moved for
summary judgment on the same grounds, but the trial court also denied that
motion, and the case proceeded to trial. Id.
Finding in favor of Petitioner on all three counts, the jury found that
Petitioner loaned Bernardo $5 million and Bernardo orally agreed to repay $2
million, that Enrique orally agreed to pay $3 million, and that Respondents were
unjustly enriched by Petitioner for a total benefit conferred in the amount of $10
million. Id. After the verdict, Respondents filed a motion for a new trial or for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, alleging inter alia that there was no evidence
to prove any of Petitioner’s claims and the jury’s verdicts were inconsistent. The
trial court denied the motion and entered final judgment against Respondents,
jointly and severally, on the unjust enrichment claim only. Id. Although it reduced
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the jury award on this claim to $5 million, the trial court entered final judgment in
favor of Petitioner for $14,063,164.50, after adding prejudgment interest. Id.
Respondents appealed, and the Third District held that Respondents were
entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the evidence did not support any of
Petitioner’s claims. Id. at 1149, 1151. Specifically, the court found that there was
no unjust enrichment because the benefit of the loan was conferred upon corporate
entities rather than Respondents directly. Id. at 1152 (citing Peoples Nat’l Bank of
Commerce v. First Union Nat’l Bank of Fla., N.A., 667 So. 2d 876, 879 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1996), for principle that unjust enrichment requires a benefit conferred
directly to the litigant). The district court also reversed because Petitioner’s claims
were barred by the statute of limitations, as the fifth amended complaint did not
relate back to the original. Id. at 1153. The court stated to have relation back, an
amended pleading must not state a new cause of action. Id. at 1152. The court
found that the alleged oral promise by Enrique to repay the $5 million was “new,
different, and distinct” from that which was originally pled. Id. Thus, the Third
District concluded that the fifth amended complaint could not relate back as a
matter of law. Id. Petitioner now seeks review of the Third District’s decision.
ANALYSIS
A trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss is subject to de novo review.
Mender v. Kauderer, 143 So. 3d 1011, 1013 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014); Armiger v.
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Associated Outdoor Clubs, Inc., 48 So. 3d 864, 869 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010). The
determination of whether an amended complaint relates back to the filing of the
original complaint is a question of law, also reviewed de novo. Caduceus
Properties, LLC v. Graney, 137 So. 3d 987, 991 (Fla. 2014); Flores v. Riscomp
Indus., Inc., 35 So. 3d 146, 148 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010). An amended complaint
raising claims for which the statute of limitations has expired can survive a motion
to dismiss if the claims relate back to the timely filed initial pleading. Flores, 35
So. 3d at 147. Thus, the conflict issue here is whether Petitioner’s fifth amended
complaint, which added a new “breach of oral promise” claim not contained within
the original complaint, relates back to the filing of the original complaint under
rule 1.190(c). Rule 1.190 governs amended pleadings and defines the relation back
doctrine as follows: “When the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading
arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set
forth in the original pleading, the amendment shall relate back to the date of the
original pleading.” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.190(c) (emphasis added).
I. Relation Back
It is undisputed that Petitioner’s original complaint, filed in 1994, did not
specifically allege a breach of oral promise claim. Petitioner first asserted this
claim in his fourth amended complaint in 2008 against Enrique only, and against
both Respondents in his fifth amended complaint in 2009. The statute of
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limitations provides only a four-year period in which to raise such a claim.
§ 95.11(3)(k), Fla. Stat. (1993). Here, the fifth amended complaint alleges that the
oral promise was made “during the funding of the loan” to Bernardo, which
occurred in 1991. Respondents explain that Petitioner’s July 13, 2010, Answers to
Interrogatories state that the oral promise was made in 1991, 1992, and again in
1993. Even using 1993, the statute of limitations expired on Petitioner’s claim in
1997 at the latest. Thus, for the claim to survive dismissal, it must relate back to
the initial complaint. Flores, 35 So. 3d at 147.
There are two lines of district court cases interpreting the operation of the
relation back doctrine in Florida. The first holds that an amended pleading does
not relate back if it states a new, different, or distinct cause of action from the
original pleading. Trumbull Ins. Co. v. Wolentarski, 2 So. 3d 1050, 1055 (Fla. 3d
DCA 2009); Page v. McMullan, 849 So. 2d 15, 16 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (stating
that amendments “may not be used to avoid the statute of limitations if the
amendment sets forth a new and distinct cause of action”); Arnwine v. Huntington
Nat’l Bank, N.A., 818 So. 2d 621, 625 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (“[E]ntirely new and
separate causes of action will not relate back.”); W. Volusia Hosp. Auth. v. Jones,
668 So. 2d 635, 636 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996) (explaining that relation back is not
permitted where amendment states a new and distinct cause of action); Daniels v.
Weiss, 385 So. 2d 661, 663 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). For example, in Arnwine, the
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plaintiff’s original complaint alleged causes of action against the defendant bank
for reconstruction of lost instruments, conversion, accounting, fraud, and breach of
fiduciary duty. 818 So. 2d at 625. The amended complaint alleged the same
causes of action, but also included a new claim for civil conspiracy. Id. The
Second District found that the trial court did not err in dismissing this new claim
because “[w]hile the allegations of this count arise from the same set of operative
facts alleged in the original complaint, civil conspiracy is, in fact, an entirely new
cause of action” that does not relate back. Id. at 625-26.
The second line of cases instead follows the exact language of rule
1.190(c)—allowing relation back where the claims from the amended pleading
arise out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence as in the original, timely
filed complaint. Armiger, 48 So. 3d at 870; Flores, 35 So. 3d at 147. In other
words, as long as the initial complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the general
factual scenario or factual underpinning of the claim, amendments stating new
legal theories can relate back. Fabbiano v. Demings, 91 So. 3d 893, 895 (Fla. 5th
DCA 2012); Flores, 35 So. 3d at 148; Kiehl v. Brown, 546 So. 2d 18, 19 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1989). This is true even where the legal theory of recovery has changed2 or
2. Flores, 35 So. 3d at 147 (allowing relation back even though legal
theories of recovery in amended complaints were supplemented and modified).
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where the original and amended claims require the assertion of different elements.3
In Armiger, the plaintiff sued a company and its janitorial service provider
after he slipped and fell on the company’s property. 48 So. 3d at 866. The trial
court dismissed the plaintiff’s first amended complaint for failure to state a cause
of action as against the company because the complaint did not allege breach of a
nondelegable duty or vicarious liability and there was no basis for a negligence
claim against the company directly. Id. The plaintiff moved to amend his
complaint accordingly, but the court denied the motion, reasoning that the statute
of limitations had expired and the proposed amendment would not relate back. Id.
On appeal, the Second District found that even though it stated a new cause of
action, the proposed amendment would relate back because the claims alleged
therein were based on the same conduct, transaction or occurrence as those in the
first amended complaint. Id. at 872. The court explained that “[a]lthough the first
amended complaint does not plainly state the breach of a [nondelegable] duty, the
applicability of the doctrine of nondelegable duty under the facts alleged is
apparent.” Id.; see also Roden v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 145 So. 3d 183, 188
(Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (finding that wrongful death claim and personal injury claim
3. See, e.g., Fabbiano, 91 So. 3d at 896 (finding that battery claim related
back to negligence claim because both involved same plaintiff, same injuries, and
same damages and, therefore, “arose from the same occurrence”).
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arose out of same transaction because both were based on decedent’s claim of
injury due to smoking cigarettes); Mender, 143 So. 3d at 1014-15 (finding relation
back where “the characterization of the complaint as individual or derivative did
not alter the underlying facts, circumstances, or parties, and gave fair notice to all
parties of the general fact situation out of which the claims arose”).
Essentially, this second line of cases holds that the assertion of a new claim
in an amendment is not dispositive as to whether the amendment can relate back.
However, these cases recognize that a newly added claim could fail to meet the
relation back test if the new claim is so factually distinct that it does not arise out
of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence as the original. See Fabbiano, 91
So. 3d at 894-95 (explaining that cases such as West Volusia Hospital Authority do
not stand for the principle that “an amendment involving a new cause of action
never relates back” under rule 1.190 but instead “pertain to a narrow set of
circumstances wherein the proposed amendment, although emanating from the
same set of operative facts, involved a factually distinct claim”).4
4. See, e.g., Trumbull Ins. Co., 2 So. 3d at 1055 (finding that plaintiff’s PIP
claim did not relate back to original negligence and uninsured/underinsured claims
where original claims concerned collision of school bus with plaintiff’s vehicle and
PIP claim concerned insurer’s failure to pay medical providers certain contracted
benefits); W. Volusia Hosp. Auth., 668 So. 2d at 636 (finding father’s claim for
loss of filial consortium in death of son sufficiently different from mother’s claim
for loss of filial consortium such that father’s claim did not relate back). We cite
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In Caduceus Properties, LLC v. Graney, 137 So. 3d 987 (Fla. 2014), we had
before us the issue of “whether an amended complaint, naming a third-party
defendant as a party defendant, relates back to the filing of the third-party
complaint for statute of limitations purposes.” Id. at 989. We found that the
amended complaint related back because the third-party complaint put the third-
party defendant on notice of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence from which the
claims against that defendant arose. Id. at 992-93. We noted that our holding did
not “disturb the precedent that, generally, the relation back doctrine does not apply
when an amendment seeks to bring in an entirely new party defendant to the suit
after the statute of limitations has expired.” Id. at 993-94 (emphasis added). Nor
did it remove all discretion from the trial court, since that court must still determine
whether the claims arise from the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence and still
retains “discretion to deny the amendment if it is so late in the proceedings that the
opposing party would be unfairly prejudiced and other options, such as a
continuance, would be unfair to either party.” Id. at 994.
We cited three factors in support of our interpretation of rule 1.190(c) that
are equally applicable here. First, this interpretation is consistent with Florida’s
judicial policy of freely permitting amendments to pleadings, as long as they do
these two cases as examples of the analysis conducted by the courts therein without
passing judgment as to the correctness of either decision.
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not prejudice the opposing party, so that cases may be resolved on the merits. Id.
at 991-92. Second, “[p]ermitting relation back in this context is also consistent
with Florida case law holding that rule 1.190(c) is to be liberally construed and
applied.” Id. at 992. Last, this interpretation is consistent with the purpose of the
statute of limitations, which is “to protect defendants from unusually long delays in
the filing of lawsuits and to prevent prejudice to defendants from the unexpected
enforcement of stale claims”—a purpose that is not implicated where the new
claims concern the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence as the original. Id.
In accordance with rule 1.190 and our prior case law, we disapprove the first
line of cases to the extent that they establish a bright-line rule that amendments
asserting new claims cannot relate back under any circumstances. As established
in Fabbiano, Armiger, and even Caduceus, amendments asserting new claims can
relate back to the original pleading as long as they arise out of the same conduct,
transaction, or occurrence as the claims within the original. The proper focus of
the inquiry is not whether the amended pleading sets forth a new or different claim,
but whether the claims within the amended pleading are part of the same conduct,
transaction, or occurrence as in the original pleading. Accordingly, we approve the
second line of cases, which recognizes that while amendments with new claims do
not always relate back, they can do so if the claims are not factually distinct from
those within the original complaint.
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In the instant case, we reject the Third District’s holding that “because the
fifth amended complaint states a new cause of action, it cannot relate back as a
matter of law.” Kopel, 117 So. 3d at 1152. Although the two complaints allege
slightly different facts or different theories of recovery, such differences do not
preclude a finding of relation back. See, e.g., Fabbiano, 91 So. 3d at 896 (finding
that original negligence claim and amended claim of battery still “arose from the
same occurrence” and related back, although predicated on different legal
theories); Flores, 35 So. 3d at 147 (“Although additional allegations of fact were
inserted into the complaint as it progressed through its steps, and the legal theories
of recovery were supplemented and modified, the substantive factual situation
remained the same as that found in the original complaint.”); Dailey v. Leshin, 792
So. 2d 527, 532 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (“The proper relation back test is whether the
amended claims arose out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence
originally set forth, even if they raise a new legal theory.”).
Both the original and fifth amended complaints allege that (1) Petitioner and
Enrique borrowed $15 million, with Petitioner being liable for $5 million and
Enrique being liable for $10 million; (2) Petitioner loaned such amount to either
Bernardo individually or Respondents collectively; and (3) regardless of the
asserted theory of recovery, Respondents, individually and collectively, have failed
and refused to pay this amount. Accordingly, the new claim is not factually
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distinct, but arises out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence as that
established in the original pleading. Petitioner’s fifth amended complaint relates
back to his original complaint, and we quash the Third District’s decision reversing
the trial court’s denial of Respondents’ motion for summary judgment.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
We also disagree with the district court’s holding that Respondents were
entitled to judgment as a matter of law based on insufficient evidence. Kopel, 117
So. 3d at 1151.5 After trial, Respondents filed a motion for a new trial or for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict on grounds that, inter alia, no evidence
existed to prove Petitioner’s claims. The trial court denied that motion, but the
Third District reversed, holding that Respondents were entitled to judgment as a
matter of law because the evidence did not support any of Petitioner’s clams. Id.
Although the district court found insufficient evidence of all three counts asserted
in Petitioner’s fifth amended complaint, the court only discussed the evidence as to
the unjust enrichment claim, finding no evidence of unjust enrichment because
there was no evidence of a benefit being conferred directly to Respondents, rather
than indirectly to corporations owned by them. Id. at 1152-53.
5. We acknowledge that sufficiency is not the conflict issue in this case.
However, once we accept jurisdiction to resolve a conflict, we may, in our
discretion, consider other issues properly raised and argued before this Court.
Savoie v. State, 422 So. 2d 308, 310 (Fla. 1982).
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The Third District is correct that to prevail on an unjust enrichment claim,
the plaintiff must directly confer a benefit to the defendant. See Peoples Nat’l
Bank of Commerce v. First Union Nat’l Bank of Fla. N.A., 667 So. 2d 876, 879
(Fla. 3d DCA 1996). However, we disagree with the Third District’s ruling
regarding insufficient evidence because the record contains sufficient evidence to
support the jury’s verdict as to Count II for breach of an oral promise.
An order on a motion for directed verdict or for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict is reviewed de novo. See Christensen v. Bowen, 140 So. 3d 498, 501
(Fla. 2014); Jackson Cty. Hosp. Corp. v. Aldrich, 835 So. 2d 318, 326 (Fla. 1st
DCA 2002) (applying same standard of review to both). We must affirm the denial
of the motion “if any reasonable view of the evidence could sustain a verdict in
favor of the non-moving party.” Meruelo v. Mark Andrew of Palm Beaches, Ltd.,
12 So. 3d 247, 250 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009). In addition, we must view the evidence
and all inferences of fact in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Christensen, 140 So. 3d at 501.
As to Count II, alleging Respondents’ breach of an oral promise, we find
that sufficient evidence exists to sustain a verdict in Petitioner’s favor as to this
claim. Petitioner testified repeatedly that Respondents had promised multiple
times to repay him for the $5 million loan. Petitioner also testified that Enrique
had once promised repayment at a meeting with Petitioner’s and Enrique’s
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parents—a meeting about which their mother, Chana Kopel, testified confirming
Petitioner’s testimony. Enrique himself testified about this meeting, stating that a
verbal agreement was reached for Enrique to pay Petitioner $5 million in exchange
for a release from Petitioner as to any interests Petitioner had in companies the
parties owned together. However, Enrique testified that the parties had agreed to
put the oral agreement in writing. Although Enrique also testified that Petitioner
did not make any loans to Respondents and that Enrique did not promise to repay
any loans, the jury could have instead accepted Petitioner’s and his mother’s
testimony. Furthermore, the jury expressly rejected, by special verdict form,
Enrique’s testimony that the agreement was to be reduced to writing.
Viewing the evidence and inferences of fact in the light most favorable to
Petitioner, we find sufficient evidence to sustain the jury’s verdict on Count II for
breach of an oral promise. It matters not that the trial court entered judgment only
on the unjust enrichment count because the jury here awarded judgment to
Petitioner, by special verdict form, on each of three different theories of recovery
and was not asked to apportion the damages between each theory. See Southstar
Equity, LLC v. Lai Chau, 998 So. 2d 625, 631 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (“Where a
special verdict supports the same damage claim on two or more theories of
liability, if one of the theories of liability is not affected by harmful error, an error
with respect to another theory of liability that would be considered harmful if the
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affected theory of liability were viewed in isolation is rendered harmless because
the verdict is independently supported by another theory of liability.”); ISK
Biotech Corp. v. Douberly, 640 So.2d 85, 89 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Thomas v.
Wyatt, 405 So. 2d 1369, 1370 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981) (“Plaintiff proceeded to trial
and verdict upon three separate theories and prevailed upon all three. The judgment
for compensatory damages is supportable based upon [one] theory [of recovery]
even if error occurred in some other aspect of the case.”). Thus, any one of those
three theories individually can provide the basis for the jury’s verdict.
CONCLUSION
We hereby quash the Third District’s decision in Kopel v. Kopel, 117 So. 3d
1147 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013), and approve cases such as Caduceus Properties, LLC v.
Graney, 137 So. 3d 987, 989 (Fla. 2014), Fabbiano v. Demings, 91 So. 3d 893, 895
(Fla. 5th DCA 2012), and Armiger v. Associated Outdoor Clubs, Inc., 48 So. 3d
864, 870 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010), which make clear that an amendment asserting a
new cause of action can relate back to the original pleading where the claim arises
out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence as the original. We also quash
the Third District’s finding of insufficient evidence of Petitioner’s breach of oral
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promise claim and remand to the district court for proceedings consistent with this
opinion.6
It is so ordered.
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, and LEWIS, JJ., and PERRY, Senior Justice,
concur.
CANADY, J., dissents with an opinion, in which POLSTON, J., concurs.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
CANADY, J., dissenting.
I agree with the majority “that an amendment asserting a new cause of action
can relate back to the original pleading [when] the claim arises out of the same
conduct, transaction, or occurrence as the original.” Majority op. at 16. But I
disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the decision on review transgresses
this rule. Because the result reached by the Third District is consistent with the
rule in the supposed conflict cases on which the majority relies, I would discharge
this case. I therefore dissent.
The majority tellingly relates that—fourteen years after suit was first filed—
“[a]t the 2008 trial, Petitioner, for the first time, claimed that settlement
conversations between him and Enrique were actually oral agreements whereby
Enrique was to pay $5 million to Petitioner in exchange for Petitioner’s interest in
6. We decline to address any other issues raised by the parties.
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certain business entities.” Majority op. at 2. Following the declaration of a
mistrial, the Petitioner filed an amended complaint alleging a claim based on these
new facts. The district court correctly concluded that under Florida Rule of Civil
Procedure 1.190(c) this new claim did not relate back to the filing of the original
complaint and therefore was barred by the statute of limitations.
Under the relation-back rule, a plaintiff may plead new causes of action
based on the basic factual narrative previously alleged. But a plaintiff is not
entitled to allege new core facts. A plaintiff may supplement—with related facts
and new causes of action—the original narrative, but may not bring forth a new
narrative. A claim predicated on such a new narrative is not a claim that “arose out
of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in
the original pleading” and therefore does not relate back to the filing of the original
complaint. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.190(c).
To accept the Petitioner’s position requires that the rule’s reference to claims
arising from the “conduct, transaction, or occurrence” that was originally alleged
be understood to encompass every factual allegation related to the
contemporaneous business interactions of a plaintiff and defendant. Under this
view, a plaintiff who had originally claimed that the defendant had failed to pay for
an automobile purchased from the plaintiff would be permitted—after the statute of
limitations had run—to make a claim based on the alleged failure of the defendant
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to pay for a horse purchased from the plaintiff. This seriously distorts the rule and
would turn litigation into a quest by the plaintiff to find some new winning
narrative whenever the original narrative threatens to fail.
Here, the claims previously pleaded by the Petitioner related to unpaid
obligations arising from alleged loan transactions as well as harm suffered by the
Petitioner as an investor in certain business entities. The claim that the Third
District concluded was barred by the statute of limitations was based on allegations
that Enrique had breached an oral agreement to purchase the Petitioner’s interest in
certain business entities. A transaction involving a promise to purchase an interest
in business entities is entirely distinct from a loan transaction or an occurrence
involving harm to a claimant as an investor. The transaction involving the alleged
promise to purchase an interest in certain business entities thus did not arise from
the same “conduct, transaction, or occurrence” set forth in the original complaint.
So the result reached by the Third District was correct. Admittedly, the
Third District erred in making the unqualified statement that “[t]o relate back, the
[amended] pleading must not state a new cause of action.” Kopel v. Kopel, 117
So. 3d 1147, 1152 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013). But the court also emphasized the totally
distinct core factual allegations underlying the new cause of action in the amended
complaint. In these circumstances, the case should be discharged.
POLSTON, J., concurs.
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Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal – Direct
Conflict of Decisions
Third District - Case No. 3D11-536
(Miami-Dade County)
Raoul G. Cantero, III, David P. Draigh, and Jesse Luke Green of White & Case
LLP, Miami, Florida,
for Petitioner
Scott Jay Feder of Scott Jay Feder, P.A., Coral Gables, Florida,
for Respondents
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Leon Kopel v. Bernardo Kopel
Combined Opinion