FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JAN 26 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MORRIS L. MESTER, No. 14-56512
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:13-cv-00064-H-NLS
v.
MEMORANDUM*
DR. WALKER, C.M.E. at RJD; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Marilyn L. Huff, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 18, 2017**
Before: TROTT, TASHIMA, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
Morris L. Mester, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district
court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging deliberate
indifference to his serious medical needs and safety. We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
(9th Cir. 2004). We may affirm on any ground supported by the record. Johnson
v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment because Mester failed
to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants were
deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. See Toguchi, 391 F.3d at
1057-60 (a prison official acts with deliberate indifference only if he or she knows
of and disregards an excessive risk to the prisoner’s health; negligence and a mere
difference in medical opinion are insufficient to establish deliberate indifference).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mester’s motions to
reopen discovery after the deadline set forth in the pretrial scheduling order
because Mester failed to demonstrate good cause. See Johnson v. Mammoth
Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 607, 609-10 (9th Cir. 1992) (setting forth standard
of review and “good cause” requirement to modify a scheduling order).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mester’s request for
additional time to respond to defendants’ motion for summary judgment because
the district court granted two extensions of time, and Mester failed to demonstrate
good cause for any further extensions. See Ahanchian v. Xenon Pictures, Inc., 624
F.3d 1253, 1258-60 (9th Cir. 2010) (setting forth standard of review for denial of
extension of time and good cause requirement under Fed. R .Civ. P. 6(b)).
2 14-56512
To the extent Mester alleged that defendants were deliberately indifferent
regarding the placement of shower mats, dismissal of this claim was proper
because Mester failed to allege facts sufficient to show that defendants were
deliberately indifferent to his safety. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837
(1994) (a prison official is deliberately indifferent only if he “knows of and
disregards an excessive risk to inmate . . . safety”).
We reject as unsupported by the record Mester’s contentions that the district
court never responded to his motion to amend the judgment on the pleadings, was
biased toward him, and improperly screened out certain defendants.
AFFIRMED.
3 14-56512