In re the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of R.N. (Minor Child), and R.S. (Mother) and A.N. (Father) v. Indiana Department of Child Services (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Jan 30 2017, 9:29 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK
court except for the purpose of establishing Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
the defense of res judicata, collateral and Tax Court

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Jeremy K. Nix Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Matheny, Hahn, Denman & Nix, LLP Attorney General of Indiana
Huntington, Indiana Robert J. Henke
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In re the Termination of the January 30, 2017
Parent-Child Relationship of Court of Appeals Case No.
R.N. (Minor Child), 90A02-1606-JT-1459
and Appeal from the Wells Circuit
Court
R.S. (Mother) and A.N. (Father),
The Honorable Kenton W.
Appellants-Respondents, Kiracofe, Judge

v. Trial Court Cause No.
90C01-1507-JT-41

Indiana Department of Child
Services,
Appellee-Petitioner.

Mathias, Judge.

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[1] R.S. (“Mother”) and A.N. (“Father”) (collectively “the Parents”) appeal the

order of the Wells Circuit Court terminating their parental rights to their minor

child, R.N. (“Daughter”). On appeal, the Parents claim that the evidence was

insufficient to support the trial court’s conclusions that (1) there was a

reasonable probability that the conditions which resulted in Child’s removal

from their custody would not be remedied, and (2) that termination of the

parent-child relationship was in the best interests of Daughter.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Daughter was born to Mother and Father in January 2013. On March 29, 2014,

the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) received a report that

Mother and Father had been using heroin and driving under the influence of

heroin while Daughter and another child, Father’s sister, were in the vehicle.

The report also stated that Mother and Father were trading their food stamps

for drugs. DCS personnel attempted to find Mother and Father to investigate

this report but were unable to contact them after repeated attempts.

[4] On April 3, 2014, DCS went to an apartment in Decatur, Indiana, looking for

Mother and Father. The person who answered the door denied that Mother and

Father were at the apartment, but when DCS and law enforcement officers

entered the apartment, they found Mother and Father. Mother and Father

denied hiding from DCS and denied using drugs. They also submitted to oral

swab drug tests. The police found alcohol, marijuana, and drug paraphernalia

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 at the apartment. The results from the oral swab drug tests came back on April

7, 2014, and showed that Mother tested positive for methadone and heroin and

that Father tested positive for methadone. Accordingly, a DCS family case

manager met with Mother and Father, who agreed to an informal adjustment

and to work with DCS without the formal intervention of the courts. They also

agreed to submit to further drug tests.

[5] On April 9, 2014, DCS filed an action with the trial court alleging that

Daughter was a child in need of services (“CHINS”) when the Parents again

tested positive for drug use.1 Daughter was removed from the Parents’ care, and

on April 10, 2014, the Parents admitted that Daughter needed services. After a

subsequent dispositional hearing, the trial court ordered both Parents to

participate in various services, which included home-based case management,

supervised visitations with Daughter, substance abuse assessments and

following any recommendations based on that assessment, and random drug

testing. Mother was additionally ordered to obtain her high school diploma or

GED. The Parents were further ordered to maintain weekly contact with DCS,

accept announced and unannounced home visits by DCS personnel, and

provide DCS with verification of income and paternity.

1
Father tested positive for use of methamphetamine, hydromorphone, morphine, methadone, and heroin
and also had trace amounts of amphetamine in his system. Mother tested positive for morphine and had trace
amounts of heroin in her system.

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[6] At a six-month review hearing held on November 7, 2014, the trial court found

that Father had not been participating in the ordered services. Some of this was

attributable to Father’s incarceration in June and July of that year following his

arrest for driving while suspended. Father had been referred to group therapy

for his substance abuse issues, but had yet to start it due to his incarceration.

However, even when he was not incarcerated, Father frequently failed to

participate in homebased services. Father was also unemployed and lacked

stable housing. For her part, Mother had partially complied with the offered

services but had missed several scheduled appointments with various service

providers. Mother, too, was unemployed and lacked stable housing. She also

admitted to taking pain medication for which she did not have a prescription,

which was reflected in the results of three drugs screens that tested positive for

low amounts of methadone, hydrocodone, and oxycodone.

[7] The trial court held a permanency hearing on January 7, 2015. At the hearing,

Daughter’s guardian ad litem (“GAL”) asked the court to change Daughter’s

permanency plan from reunification with Parents to termination of their

parental rights. The trial court found that Mother had recently tested positive

for methamphetamine use and had failed to attend her therapy sessions,

resulting in the therapy being cancelled. Although she had made some effort in

the weeks leading to the hearing, Mother was still unemployed and had no

source of income. Father had been released on probation, but a petition to

revoke his probation had already been filed. Although Father completed his

substance abuse assessment, he did not attend his group therapy sessions. He,

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 too, was still unemployed and had no source of income. Still, the trial court

denied the GAL’s request and continued with the permanency plan of

reunification.

[8] On May 28, 2015, the trial court held another permanency hearing, again

finding that the Parents had not fully complied with services or cooperated with

DCS. Daughter was placed with Mother’s aunt, and the permanency plan

remained reunification.

[9] After another permanency hearing held on September 8, 2015, the trial court

changed the permanency plan from reunification with Parents to termination of

their parental rights. The court found that daughter was doing well in her

placement with Mother’s aunt. The trial court noted that Mother had not been

fully compliant with the ordered services, although she had been attending

visitation regularly. However, her compliance with drug testing was sporadic,

and she tested positive in July for methamphetamine, amphetamine, and THC.2

Moreover, Mother’s substance abuse counseling had been canceled because of

her failure to attend. Father had visited Daughter only once between January

and April of 2015. After April, he had again been incarcerated following the

revocation of his probation. After being released from incarceration at the end

of June 2015, Father attended four of five scheduled visitations with Daughter.

However, his outpatient substance abuse treatment had been terminated due to

2
THC is the abbreviated name for tetrahydrocannabinol, the main active chemical in marijuana.

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 noncompliance. He also had not submitted to all the required drug screens and

had recently tested positive for THC.

[10] On July 27, 2015, DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother and Father’s

parental rights. A termination hearing was held on December 29, 2015. On

April 28, 2016, the trial court terminated the Parents’ parental rights to

Daughter by issuing findings of fact and conclusions of law which provided in

relevant part as follows:

2. [Daughter] has been removed from the care of [Mother] and
[Father] for over 15 of the most recent 22 months. The child was
detained by the Department of Child Services on April 9, 2014.

3. [Daughter] has not returned home on a trial home visit to
neither [Mother] nor [Father] since April 9, 2014.

4. [Daughter] has been under a Dispositional Order from a
hearing on April 22, 2014 with an order date of May 22, 2014.

5. [Mother] has demonstrated an inability to adequately meet
the basic needs of her children for food, clothing, and shelter for
one and a half years. She has been incarcerated for portions of
the case, is presently on home detention for the crime of dealing
in a lookalike substance, lives in her grandfather’s house free of
rent and obligation, and was close to obtaining unsupervised time
with her daughter when she again tested positive for substances.
While she was able to find employment during some portions of
the case, she could not maintain a source of income to provide
housing, transportation, or work on budgeting.

6. [Mother] has demonstrated a pattern of not completing
services she was ordered to participate in, including attending not

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 participating consistently in home-based services meant to
address employment, housing, budgeting, parenting, and housing
and transportation. She did submit to random drug screens when
she could be located, but consistently tested positive for
substances she had no prescription for and for all types of illegal
drugs. She completed an evaluation at Park Center, initiated
services with Park Center, but was discharged from Park Center
for failing to attend and complete services meant for substance
abuse recovery and for treatment of Post Traumatic Stress
Disorder.

7. [Mother] has demonstrated a pattern of an inability to
adequately parent her children. [Mother] admitted that she has
struggled with mental health since she was diagnosed with Post
Traumatic Stress Disorder and could no longer afford the
medication for its treatment and has no future plan for how to
parent [Daughter] except to say that she will do what she has to.

8. There is a reasonable probability that because of [Mother]’s
inability to adequately meet the basic needs of her children and
her pattern of not completing services she was ordered to
participate in, that the conditions that resulted in the child’s
removal from the home have not been and will not be remedied.

9. There is a reasonable probability that because of [Mother]’s
struggle with mental illness and substance abuse that the reasons
for the child’s placement outside of the home will not be
remedied.

10. [Father] has demonstrated an inability to adequately meet
the basic needs of his children for food, clothing, and shelter for
one and one half years. He has not had housing suitable for the
child during that time, has been underemployed, and has been
incarcerated for approximately one-third of the child in need of

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 services case. He has consistently tested positive for substances
he has no prescription for and also for illegal substances.

11. [Father] has demonstrated a pattern of not completing
services he was ordered to participate in. He participated in
visitation and home-based services at times when he was not
incarcerated during the case. He did complete two assessments at
Park Center for substance abuse treatment. It was recommended
that he complete treatment. He did not complete treatment, so
the second assessment was necessary for him to be accepted into
Park Center again.

12. There is a reasonable probability that because of [Father]’s
inability to adequately meet the basic needs of his child and his
pattern of not completing services he was ordered to participate
in, that the conditions that resulted in the child’s removal from
the home have not been and will not be remedied.

13. There is a reasonable probability that because of [Father]’s
struggle with substance dependency that the reasons for the
child’s placement outside of the home will not be remedied.

14. Termination of the parent-child relationship is in the best
interest of the child.

15. [Daughter] has been adjudicated [a] child[] in need of
services, has a current need for placement, has been in placement
for over fifteen months of the last twenty-two months, and the
she has not been reunified with either her mother or father.

16. There is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the
child. She is in a proposed adoptive home in licensed foster care.

Appellant’s App. pp. 45-46. Mother and Father now appeal.

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 Termination of Parental Rights

[11] The purpose of terminating parental rights is not to punish parents but instead

to protect their children. In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d 874, 880 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).

Although parental rights have a constitutional dimension, the law allows for

their termination when the parties are unable or unwilling to meet their

responsibilities as parents. Id. Indeed, parental interests must be subordinated to

the child’s interests in determining the proper disposition of a petition to

terminate parental rights. In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1259 (Ind. 2009).

[12] Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2) provides that a petition to terminate

parental rights must allege:

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions
that resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for
placement outside the home of the parents will not be
remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the
continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat
to the well-being of the child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been
adjudicated a child in need of services;

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

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 (D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment
of the child.

[13] DCS must prove each element by clear and convincing evidence. Ind. Code §

31-37-14-2; G.Y., 904 N.E.2d at 1261. Because Section 4(b)(2)(B) is written in

the disjunctive, the trial court is required to find that only one prong of

subsection (b)(2)(B) has been established by clear and convincing evidence. In re

A.K., 924 N.E.3d 212, 220 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).

[14] Clear and convincing evidence need not establish that the continued custody of

the parent is wholly inadequate for the child’s very survival. Bester v. Lake Cnty.

Office of Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). It is instead

sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that the child’s emotional

and physical development are put at risk by the parent’s custody. Id. If the court

finds the allegations in a petition are true, the court shall terminate the parent-

child relationship. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8(a).

[15] We have long had a highly deferential standard of review in cases involving the

termination of parental rights. In re D.B., 942 N.E.2d 867, 871 (Ind. Ct. App.

2011). We neither reweigh the evidence nor assess witness credibility. Id. We

consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences favorable to the trial

court’s judgment. Id. In deference to the trial court’s unique position to assess

the evidence, we will set aside a judgment terminating a parent-child

relationship only if it is clearly erroneous. Id. Clear error is that which leaves us

with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. J.M. v. Marion

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 Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 802 N.E.2d 40, 44 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans.

denied.

I. Conditions Resulting in Child’s Removal

[16] Mother and Father attack the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial

court’s decision to terminate their parental rights. First, they claim that the trial

court erred in determining that there was a reasonable probability that the

conditions which led to Daughter’s removal from the Parents would not be

remedied.

[17] When deciding whether there is a reasonable probability that the conditions

resulting in a child’s removal or continued placement outside of a parent’s care

will not be remedied, the trial court must determine a parent’s fitness to care for

the child at the time of the termination hearing while also taking into

consideration evidence of changed circumstances. A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child

Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1156-57 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). However, the trial court

may disregard efforts made only shortly before termination and weigh more

heavily a parent’s history of conduct prior to those efforts. In re K.T.K., 989

N.E.2d 1225, 1234 (Ind. 2013).

[18] Both Parents’ argument on this issue consists of attacking several of the

conclusions set forth in the trial court’s termination order. When the trial court

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 enters findings of fact and conclusions thereon,3 we apply a two-tiered standard

of review: we first determine whether the evidence supports the findings and

then determine whether the findings support the judgment. In re D.B., 942

N.E.2d at 871.

[19] Mother first attacks the trial court’s conclusion that she “ha[d] been

incarcerated for portions of the case.” Appellant’s App. p. 45. Mother argues

that the trial court made no finding that she was incarcerated for a portion of

the case and instead found only that she was convicted and sentenced to one

year on probation and placed on home detention monitoring for 180 days.

Mother, however, does not deny that she was arrested and charged with the

crime of dealing in a look-alike substance. Indeed, she testified at the hearing

that she spent four days in jail because of this charge. Tr. p. 44.

[20] To the extent that Mother’s argument is that the trial court never made a

specific “finding” regarding her stay in jail, this is not dispositive. If a trial court

mischaracterizes a factual finding as a conclusion, or vice versa, we look past

such labels to the substance of the trial court’s judgment. Fraley v. Minger, 829

N.E.2d 476, 482 (Ind. 2005). Here, the trial court made a factual statement

regarding Mother’s incarceration, and this statement is supported by evidence

3
See Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8(c) (amended effective July 1, 2012 to require the court to enter findings of fact
when terminating parental rights or dismissing a petition to terminate parental rights).

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 in the record. Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court’s determination

that Mother was incarcerated for a portion of the case.

[21] Mother next argues that the trial court wrongly concluded that she “could not

maintain a source of income to provide housing, transportation, or work on

budgeting,” Appellant’s App. p. 45, because she was employed at the time of

the termination hearing. However, at the hearing, Mother testified that she had

been employed only sporadically. Specifically, she testified that she worked at

Pretzel’s in January and February of 2015, then worked for “a couple of days”

at CBS before quitting because she “wasn’t comfortable with the job or the

people.” Tr. pp. 35-36. At the time of the December 29, 2015 termination

hearing, Mother had been employed at Inventure since the end of November of

that year. Given Mother’s sporadic employment history, we cannot say that the

trial court clearly erred in concluding that Mother had been unable to maintain

a source of income.4

[22] Mother next attacks the trial court’s conclusion 6, quoted above, that she failed

to complete services and tested positive for drug use. She claims that had “good

attendance” in her group therapy sessions and had negative drug screens during

the spring and early summer of 2015 and again immediately before the

4
Mother also complains that the trial court erred in concluding that she had no source of income to provide
for housing. Mother notes that she had been living with her grandfather rent-free. However, this lasted only
six months. Tr. p. 35. Mother testified that she and Father had moved in with Father’s father only a week
before the termination hearing. None of this contradicts the trial court’s conclusion that Mother herself had
insufficient income to afford housing.

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 termination hearing. However, the trial court was well within its discretion to

disregard any improvements Mother made immediately before the termination

hearing and instead weigh more heavily her history of conduct. In re K.T.K.,

989 N.E.2d at 1234. Moreover, Mother does not actually claim that any part of

conclusion 6 is factually incorrect. The evidence before the trial court clearly

supported the trial court’s conclusion that Mother had a pattern of not

completing the ordered services, consistently tested positive for drug use, and

failed to complete the services intended to treat her substance abuse and mental

health issues.

[23] Mother next attacks the trial court’s conclusion 7, in which the court

determined that Mother had “demonstrated a pattern of an inability to

adequately parent her children,” struggled with mental health issues, and had

no future plan to parent Daughter. Mother’s entire argument on this matter

consists of the following: “However, Mother had been consistent in her

parenting time with the R.N. throughout the CHINS case. Mother had been

participating in reunification services and was benefiting from them.” This bald

assertion of error falls short of making a cogent appellate argument. See Ind.

Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) (requiring appellate arguments to be supported by

cogent reasoning); Sumbry v. Pera, 795 N.E.2d 470, 473 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003)

(noting that arguments not supported by cogent reasoning are waived).

[24] Furthermore, we note that ample evidence was before the trial court that

Mother demonstrated an inability to address her substance abuse issues. She

was arrested for dealing just two months before the termination hearing, and

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 she tested positive for oxycodone the week prior to the termination hearing.

Clearly, Mother was not benefitting from the services of which she did take

advantage. It is true that the trial court found, at the May 28, 2015 review

hearing, that Mother had been participating in and benefitting from

reunification services. However, this fact alone does not negate the other

serious, unresolved substance abuse issues Mother still had that demonstrated

her inability to adequately parent her daughter. Mother also does not deny that

there was evidence before the court that she suffered from post-traumatic stress

disorder. Thus, we cannot say that the trial court’s conclusions regarding

Mother’s mental health and substance abuse is clearly erroneous.

[25] Father also attacks the trial court’s conclusions, specifically conclusions 10 and

11 quoted above, regarding his inability to meet Daughter’s basic needs, his

substance abuse, his employment, and failure to complete services. Father

claims that he has been employed throughout the CHINS case, except for when

he was incarcerated, and worked for several employers. However, the trial court

did not state that Father had been unemployed; it found that Father had been

incarcerated for almost one-third of the CHINS case and was underemployed

when he was not incarcerated. This, combined with Father’s continued abuse of

drugs, supports the trial court’s conclusion that Father had demonstrated an

inability to meet Daughter’s basic needs. Nor are we persuaded that Father had

adequate housing simply because he was living with Mother’s grandfather or

his own father. In short, Father had not completed the ordered services,

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 continued to test positive for drug use, did not have stable housing, and was

either incarcerated or underemployed when not incarcerated.

[26] The condition which led to Daughter’s removal was the Parents’ drug use.

During the CHINS case, neither parent successfully completed substance abuse

treatment, both parents repeatedly missed drug screens or tested positive for

drug use, and Mother was twice convicted for drug offenses. Clearly, both

parents have continuing substance abuse issues that have hampered their ability

to adequately parent their daughter. Considering only the evidence that favors

the trial court’s termination order, we conclude that there was sufficient

evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion that there was a reasonable

probability that the conditions which led to Daughter’s removal from the

Parent’s care would not be remedied. See In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d 994, 1005 (Ind.

Ct. App. 2014) (concluding that evidence supported trial court’s finding that the

conditions that led to children’s removal, specifically parents’ substance abuse,

would not be remedied, where mother’s substance abuse worsened, mother

failed to participate in substance abuse treatment, and father abused drugs when

the children were placed with him and failed to complete substance abuse

treatment), trans. denied.

II. The Best Interests of the Child

[27] We also reject the Parents’ argument that the evidence was insufficient to

support the trial court’s conclusion that termination of the parent-child

relationship was in Daughter’s best interest. In determining what is in the best

interests of the child, the trial court must look beyond the factors identified by
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 DCS and look to the totality of the evidence. A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d at 1158. The

trial court must subordinate the interests of the parent to those of the child, and

the court need not wait until the child are irreversibly harmed before

terminating the parent-child relationship. Id. Moreover, the recommendation by

the case manager or child advocate to terminate parental rights, in addition to

evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, is

sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the

child’s best interests. Id.

[28] Here, the GAL testified that, based on her twenty years of experience, it was

her opinion that termination of the parent-child relationship was in Daughter’s

best interests. The GAL’s testimony on why she believed this adequately

summarizes this case:

In this situation, the parents haven’t stopped abusing substances.
We have 30 dirty drug screens through November that I’m aware
without looking through the pile of drug screens that have been
submitted into evidence. [Father] hasn’t even done substance
abuse treatment to try to deal with his substance abuse issue and
there are numerous different drugs that he has tested positive for.
[Mother] has at least tried. She was working on the issue but
unfortunately she started using again at the end of when she was
finishing her group treatment and continued using through
November we had some positive drug screens and now we have
another one from just last week with [Mother]. The substance use
and abuse with both of the parents is pervasive and its affecting
every aspect of their lives which ultimately affects the way that
they could maintain any kind of stability or try to possibly parent
a child especially a toddler child who rel[ie]s on parents for
everything still at this point and time.

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 They are very young. They haven’t been able to maintain any
kind of employment history. [Mother] even testified that she
hasn’t been able to maintain a job for more than a month. I think
with [Father] it was a couple of months that he maintained a job.
They’ve been living off of other people in friends[’] and
relatives[’] homes so they don’t they have any means of
transportation. They have no way to provide for themselves and
care for themselves let alone care for their child. Without jobs,
without stable income, without stable housing, without any kind
of transportation, without having driver’s license and having lots
of bills for [Father] to be able to even get a driver’s license, they
don’t have any way to properly care for themselves, let alone this
child whose every need depends on a parent and that’s not even
addressing the real issue that got us here which is the substance
abuse.

They have not been able to adequately deal with the fact that
they have real substance abuse problems. They’re not short term
problems; they’re long term problems and again the myriad of
substances that they test positive for it’s not just prescription
drugs, its illegal substances. There’s been cocaine and
methamphetamines and heroin. Several of the drug tests have
morphine, they have heroin in a couple of the drug tests too, the
metabolite from heroin, but morphine is a metabolite for heroin.
There are prescription drugs that at times one or the other has
tested positive for so we haven’t been able to remedy anything
that got us involved in this case to begin with.

They are no close[r] to getting housing or maintaining a job than
they were when this child was removed. They have to start
substance abuse treatment. [Father] hasn’t even done it. [Mother]
truthfully has to start almost back at the beginning because she’s
been using since July of this year and she was finishing up her
treatment in July and August of this year. There’s been no benefit
from the services. They can’t talk about a reasonable plan or

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 work on budgeting or housing because they haven’t even been
able to maintain stable employment so we don’t have an option.

This child has been removed from her parents’ care for 20
months and in a week, it will be 21 months that she will have
been removed. Friday this child turns 3. At that point and time,
she will have been removed 21 out of 36 months of her life. So
she has spent more of her life in licensed foster care, a short
period of time in relative placement, than she has living in the
home with either of her two parents and so it’s time. We’ve given
them ample opportunity because they were young, the
Department gave them a longer opportunity to try and fix the
problems and they just haven’t been able to do it. As sad as it is,
it’s the best thing for this child. She needs to have stability. She
needs to know where that stability is going to come from and her
parents cannot provide that now and haven’t been able to show
in the last 20 months that they could provide it ever so that’s
where we are today. Its best for her to be able to move on and
have a forever family and be adopted.

Tr. pp. 106-07 (paragraph breaks added). Given this testimony, we cannot say

that the trial court erred in determining that termination of the parent-child

relationship was in the best interests of Daughter.

Conclusion

[29] DCS presented sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion that

there was a reasonable probability that the reason for the child’s removal from

her parents — their use and abuse of drugs — would not be remedied. Instead,

ample evidence suggested that the Parents still struggled with their substance

abuse problems. The evidence was also sufficient to support the trial court’s

conclusion that termination of the parent-child relationship was in the best

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 interests of Daughter, who had been in foster care for over a year and a half,

because the Parents still had not demonstrated that they could overcome their

substance abuse problems and adequately provide for their child. Accordingly,

we affirm the order of the trial court terminating Mother and Father’s parental

rights to their daughter.

[30] Affirmed.

Baker, J., and Pyle, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 90A02-1606-JT-1459 | January 30, 2017 Page 20 of 20