In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 16‐1442
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff‐Appellee,
v.
SYLVIA HOLLINS,
Defendant‐Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Central District of Illinois.
No. 07‐CR‐20006 — Harold A. Baker, Judge.
____________________
ARGUED SEPTEMBER 12, 2016 — DECIDED FEBRUARY 1, 2017
____________________
Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and SYKES,
Circuit Judges.
WOOD, Chief Judge. This case comes to us for the second
time after a district court revoked Sylvia Hollins’s supervised
release stemming from her 2007 federal conviction. In the first
appeal, we granted a joint motion for summary reversal and
remand for resentencing. See United States v. Hollins, No.
15‐3750 (7th Cir. Jan. 27, 2016). The district court obliged with
a resentencing hearing held on February 25, 2016. Hollins has
2 No. 16‐1442
appealed from the new sentence, which she asserts is tainted
by several procedural flaws. We find no error, however, and
so we affirm the district court’s judgment.
I
Hollins has struggled for nearly 30 years against her ad‐
diction to crack cocaine. Unfortunately, but predictably, this
has led to a long string of criminal convictions involving in‐
carceration, stints in various treatment centers, and home con‐
finement. In the present case, she pleaded guilty in 2007 to
distributing five or more grams of cocaine base in violation of
21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B). She was sentenced to 92
months’ imprisonment and eight years of supervised release.
The Bureau of Prisons released her in November 2012.
Over the next year, Hollins tested positive for cocaine nu‐
merous times and was convicted of theft in the Champaign
County (Illinois) Circuit Court. She received a very light sen‐
tence—three days in jail—but this conviction prompted the
district court to modify her conditions of supervised release.
It required her to spend 120 days in community confinement
in a local jail, so that she could “get clean” and “regain focus
of her life.” The court’s hopes were unrealized. Following her
release from the jail in December 2013, Hollins again tested
positive for cocaine use on several different occasions. Once
again, the district court modified her supervised release and
gave her another 120 days of community confinement at the
Prairie Center, an addiction treatment facility. While at the
Center she tested positive for cocaine and was returned to the
county jail for the rest of her sentence.
In May 2014, still concerned about her drug use, the dis‐
trict court modified Hollins’s supervision conditions to add
No. 16‐1442 3
six months of in‐home confinement. Hollins began to serve
that sentence upon her release from the county jail in June
2014, but she failed again. She was arrested for retail theft in
Urbana, Illinois, in September 2014, during the term of her in‐
home confinement. The district court thereupon placed her in
community confinement for 120 days and stayed her in‐home
confinement. She completed the community confinement on
February 4, 2015, and resumed her in‐home confinement on
February 27, 2015.
On March 16, 2015, Hollins pleaded guilty in state court to
the retail theft charge stemming from her September 2014 ar‐
rest and was sentenced to one year’s imprisonment in the cus‐
tody of the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC)—a sen‐
tence that was to start on May 13, 2015. Between February and
May 2015, Hollins failed to report for drug testing on three
occasions. She attended outpatient substance abuse and men‐
tal health counseling sessions between February and May, but
she was discharged for failing to participate successfully in
the program; the discharge was dated May 13, 2015, the day
she reported for her Illinois sentence. At that point she had 31
days of her federal in‐home confinement remaining to be
served.
While Hollins was in IDOC’s custody, her probation officer
petitioned the district court to revoke her supervised release
based on her two retail theft convictions. The district court is‐
sued a warrant and Hollins was detained pending her revo‐
cation hearing after IDOC released her in November 2015.
The district court conducted the first revocation hearing on
December 7, 2015. On January 26, 2016, we granted the par‐
ties’ joint motion for summary reversal and remanded for re‐
sentencing in light of United States v. Boultinghouse, 784 F.3d
4 No. 16‐1442
1163, 1178 (7th Cir. 2015). The district court conducted the re‐
sentencing hearing on February 25, 2016. At that hearing, the
government recommended a 24‐month sentence, Hollins ar‐
gued in favor of a 12‐month sentence, and the district court
imposed a 28‐month sentence. The district court issued an or‐
der on February 26, 2015, clarifying the reasons behind its de‐
cision to revoke supervised release and impose the additional
prison time.
II
Hollins argues that the district court procedurally erred at
the resentencing hearing by failing adequately to address her
arguments in mitigation, relying on the probation officer’s
recommendation, and failing adequately to address the fac‐
tors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
We review challenges to the sentence imposed at a revoca‐
tion hearing under a highly deferential standard comparable
to that with which we review sanctions imposed by prison
disciplinary boards. Boultinghouse, 784 F.3d at 1177. We will
affirm the district court’s chosen sentence as long as it is not
“plainly unreasonable.” Id. When revoking supervised re‐
lease, a district judge must consider the Sentencing Guide‐
lines policy statements, which are found in U.S.S.G. Chapter
7, Part B. The judge must also consider the statutory sentenc‐
ing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), to the extent they
apply to revocations. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e).
The policy statements are intended to anchor the district
court’s considerations during revocation proceedings. They
have always been advisory, and so a judge is free to reject
them. The judge must, however, provide some explanation
No. 16‐1442 5
for her choice, in order to enable the appellate court to con‐
duct a meaningful review both for procedure and substance.
United States v. Robertson, 648 F.3d 858, 859–60 (7th Cir. 2011).
The further the sentence departs from the relevant Guideline
provisions, the more imperative it is for the court to detail its
justification. Boultinghouse, 784 F.3d at 1178.
A
Hollins contends that the district court failed to say
enough about her principal arguments in mitigation: her re‐
quest for a “discount” based on time she already had served
in connection with the same conduct; and her argument that
she finally had been undergoing successful outpatient drug
treatment and thus a lower sentence was suitable.
At a revocation hearing a defendant is entitled to “an op‐
portunity to make a statement and present any information in
mitigation.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1(b)(2)(E). We have cautioned
district judges “not to predetermine the appropriate punish‐
ment” and reminded them of their obligation to “approach
revocation and sentencing hearings with an open mind and
consider the evidence and arguments presented before im‐
posing punishment.” United States v. Dill, 799 F.3d 821, 825
(7th Cir. 2015). In the sentencing context we have held that a
district court must address all of a defendant’s principal argu‐
ments, as long as they are not so weak that they do not merit
discussion. United States v. Villegas‐Miranda, 579 F.3d 798, 801
(7th Cir. 2009).
The district court provided Hollins the opportunity to pre‐
sent her mitigation arguments at the hearing. She stated that
she was in the longest period of sobriety since she began using
drugs, and that for a great portion of this time she was out of
6 No. 16‐1442
custody and doing outpatient treatment. She also pointed out
that she had been in custody for multiple‐month periods for
the theft convictions that partly justified the revocation.
After prompting by the government, the district judge re‐
sponded to the argument about Hollins’s sobriety, contending
that he knew “too much about recidivism … and how it oc‐
curs.” He then asked Hollins if she wanted a more detailed
explanation in light of her arguments, at which point Hollins’s
counsel again noted the time she had already served and re‐
quested a discount on that basis. In response the judge
seemed to indicate that he at first understood Hollins to be
arguing for continued supervised release or to be put at lib‐
erty. Hollins’s counsel clarified that she was not asking for re‐
lease. When counsel started to say “What I’m asking for is,”
the district judge interjected “Is a reduction in the period
of … .” Hollins’s counsel then explained, “Because she’s al‐
ready been in custody on this exact same conduct and will re‐
ceive no credit for time served.”
Counsel for the government then weighed in, urging that
the court’s sentence should be considered a punishment for
violating the conditions of her supervised release rather than
for the underlying conduct and stating that the government
did not believe there had been any additional sanctions for
the felony theft committed while she was on supervised re‐
lease. Counsel for Hollins added, “I’m sure the Court also
knows that the Guidelines are advisory, specifically for the
purpose of–”. The district judge interjected, “I am thoroughly
aware of that.”
The record as a whole satisfies us that the judge consid‐
ered Hollins’s principal arguments in mitigation. The tran‐
No. 16‐1442 7
script indicates that he understood her to be asking for a sen‐
tence reduction and that he was aware of his discretion to
fashion an appropriate sentence. He also indicated that he un‐
derstood her to be making an argument related to her sobriety
and rejected it based on his concern (based on her track rec‐
ord) about recidivism. The judge did not, in short, pass over
Hollins’s arguments in mitigation in silence. Cf. Villegas‐Mi‐
randa, 579 F.3d at 802.
We are also persuaded that the judge did not impermissi‐
bly lengthen Hollins’s term of incarceration to promote reha‐
bilitation—a step that Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319
(2011), forecloses. His comments about the medical benefits of
incarceration and the programs available through the Bureau
of Prisons at most touched on matters of fact (the programs)
and the adequacy of the care she would receive while in
prison. Moreover, Hollins does not argue that the district
court actually relied on the rehabilitative programming to jus‐
tify her sentence, nor has she argued that this would consti‐
tute an independent ground for reversal. We are satisfied that
the district court did nothing inconsistent with Tapia, and so
we are not troubled by its reference to these programs.
B
Hollins also argues that the district court effectively dele‐
gated its authority and judgment by relying uncritically on
the probation officer’s sentencing recommendation. Proba‐
tion officers, we have said, are “professionals who play criti‐
cal roles in the federal justice system.” United States v. Crisp,
820 F.3d 910, 913 (7th Cir. 2016). Their duty, as relevant here,
is to conduct presentence investigations, compile infor‐
mation, and make a recommendation to the judge. FED. R.
CRIM. P. 32; United States v. Peterson, 711 F.3d 770, 775–76 (7th
8 No. 16‐1442
Cir. 2013). “But of course probation officers do not have the
power to revoke supervised release and return an offender to
prison. Every action the probation officer takes is subject to
review by the district court responsible for the supervisee.”
Crisp, 820 F.3d at 913. “[P]robation officers are employees of
the federal judiciary … yet they are not allowed to decide the
sentences of convicted defendants.” United States v. Thompson,
777 F.3d 368, 382 (7th Cir. 2015).
At the hearing the district judge told Hollins that he was
“absolutely required to rely on the advice of” and “[did] have
to rely on the recommendations of” the probation services. If
this were all the record showed, there might be a serious prob‐
lem. But it is not. After prompting by the government, the
judge clarified his comments: “I do not blindly follow what
Probation says. I don’t mean that at all. I rely on them to a
great extent because of their experience … but I don’t blindly
follow them.”
Naturally, it would not be enough for a judge merely to say
that he was not blindly following Probation and nevertheless
to do so. Hollins says that this is what happened, or at least
that it is impossible to rule it out. At oral argument, her coun‐
sel contended that there is no way of knowing what the district
court relied upon in fashioning a 28‐month sentence for her.
But that goes too far. First, the judge knew Hollins well, hav‐
ing adjusted her supervised release conditions on several oc‐
casions and having seen how hard compliance was for her.
Second, he relied on the reasoning of the probation office in
its presentencing report and recommendation—a proper, in‐
deed common, step. See, e.g., United States v. Speed, 811 F.3d
854, 856 (7th Cir. 2016) (noting the district judge had adopted
No. 16‐1442 9
the conditions and reasoning contained in probation’s presen‐
tence reports). The judge explained why he was comfortable
relying on the reasoning and recommendation from the pro‐
bation office. As he told Hollins, “They work with you. They
deal with you. They see you personally. All these things, I
don’t do.” Finally, as we already have noted, the judge con‐
sidered Hollins’s arguments in mitigation at the hearing—
points that did not appear in the probation office’s recommen‐
dations. We are therefore satisfied that the district court did
not abdicate its authority or rely unduly on the probation of‐
fice.
C
Hollins’s last point is a familiar one: that the district judge
did not adequately consider the statutory sentencing factors.
A district court may revoke supervised release after consider‐
ing several of the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a);
namely, those at sections 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C),
(a)(2)(D), (a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(6), and (a)(7). See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(e); see also Boultinghouse, 784 F.3d at 1177–78. But, just
as in the original sentencing proceeding, the court does not
need to discuss each factor in a checklist fashion. United States
v. Washington, 739 F.3d 1080, 1081 (7th Cir. 2014). When a sen‐
tence is within the range recommended by Chapter 7 of the
guidelines, the court need only provide a concise explanation
on the record that reflects that it considered the proper factors.
Boultinghouse, 784 F.3d at 1178.
Here the court referred to the presentence report’s calcula‐
tion of 21 to 27 months, which was based on Hollins’s criminal
history of VI and a Grade B violation. This is consistent with
the range set forth at U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4, which suggests 21 to 27
months for a person with those characteristics. The court also
10 No. 16‐1442
noted the addition of the 31 days of unserved home confine‐
ment and imposed a total sentence of 28 months.
While 28 months is a month higher than the top of the
range recommended in § 7B1.4, that is not the end of the anal‐
ysis. Section 7B1.3(d) specifies that “[a]ny … home detention
previously imposed in connection with the sentence for
which revocation is ordered that remains … unserved at the
time of revocation shall be ordered to be … served in addition
to the … § 7B1.4 [imprisonment term], and … may be con‐
verted to an equivalent period of imprisonment.” Further,
§ 7B1.3(f) specifies that any imprisonment term imposed
upon revocation of supervised release “shall be ordered to be
served consecutively to any sentence the defendant is serving,
whether or not [that] sentence … resulted from the conduct
that is the basis of the revocation … .” Taking those additional
recommendations into account, we see that the proposed
range for imprisonment in Hollins’s case went up to 28
months (27 months plus 31 days)—just what she got. There is
no anticipated discount for the time she served in IDOC cus‐
tody for her retail theft conviction.
At the revocation hearing the district court relied on Hol‐
lins’s criminal history, her repeated violations of the terms of
her supervised release, and the failure of supervised release
and graduated sanctions to deter Hollins’s criminal conduct.
These are pertinent under sections 3553(a)(1) (“the history
and characteristics of the defendant”) and (a)(2)(B) (“the need
for the sentence imposed to afford adequate deterrence to
criminal conduct”). The court also noted the range recom‐
mended by the Chapter 7 statements, which it found relevant
to section 3553(a)(4). While much of the rationale appears in
the probation officer’s report, which the court adopted, this
No. 16‐1442 11
was permissible. Taken as a whole, we find no procedural er‐
ror in the resentencing proceeding.
We find that the district court did not commit procedural
error in its resentencing of Hollins and therefore AFFIRM its
28‐month sentence.