J-A29027-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
JOAN M. BRESNEHAN IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
MARK W. BARNHART
Appellant No. 415 WDA 2016
Appeal from the Judgment Entered April 20, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Butler County
Civil Division at No(s): A.D. NO. 15-10022
BEFORE: DUBOW, J., MOULTON, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY MOULTON, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 02, 2017
Mark W. Barnhart appeals from the April 20, 2016 judgment entered in
favor of Joan M. Bresnehan in the Butler County Court of Common Pleas
following a non-jury trial.1 We affirm.
The trial court summarized the facts of this case as follows:
This case arises from [Bresnehan’s] claim for ownership
of a certain parcel of property by virtue of adverse
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1
Barnhart prematurely filed his appeal from the March 3, 2016 order
denying his post-trial motions, “which is generally interlocutory and not
appealable unless reduced to judgment.” Coughlin v. Massaquoi, 138
A.3d 638, 642 n.4 (Pa.Super.), app. granted, 144 A.3d 925 (Pa. 2016). The
trial court, however, subsequently entered judgment on April 20, 2016.
Thus, we will consider Barnhart’s appeal as filed after the entry of judgment
and have amended the caption accordingly. See id.; see also Johnston
the Florist, Inc. v. TEDCO Constr. Corp., 657 A.2d 511, 513 (Pa.Super.
1995) (en banc) (stating that “jurisdiction in [the] appellate courts may be
perfected after an appeal notice has been filed upon the docketing of a final
judgment”).
J-A29027-16
possession for a period of over twenty-one years. The
evidence presented at trial indicated that, in 1953,
[Bresnehan] and her now late husband purchased a parcel
of property that abutted a public road. The public road
was abandoned in 1955, and [Bresnehan] and her family
thereafter utilized the entire width of the portion of the
abandoned road, where it abutted their record property
line, for their own personal uses. [Bresnehan] and her
family also utilized the grassy area and wooded area on
the opposite side of the public road, in various ways, since
the road was abandoned. In 2014, [Barnhart] purchased
an adjoining tract of land, which included the grassy area,
wooded area, and one-half of the abandoned road. After
purchasing said property, [Barnhart] precluded
[Bresnehan] from using these areas, by placing stakes in
the middle of the abandoned road that [Bresnehan] used
as her driveway and by piling debris in the grassy and
wooded areas. [Bresnehan] filed a claim for adverse
possession of said property.
Trial Ct. 1925(a) Op., 4/18/16, at 1-2.2
After a two-day, non-jury trial, the trial court entered a verdict in favor
of Bresnehan, concluding that she had established title by adverse
possession of the entire width of the abandoned road as well as the adjacent
grassy and wooded areas. Barnhart timely filed post-sentence motions,
which the trial court denied on March 3, 2016. On March 22, 2016, Barnhart
appealed to this Court.3
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2
We also adopt and incorporate herein the trial court’s more detailed
factual findings in its January 6, 2016 opinion. See Findings of Fact,
Discussion, Conclusions of Law and Decision, 1/6/16, at 1-7 (“Trial Ct. Op.”).
3
Our standard of review on appeal from a non-jury verdict is limited
to determining whether the trial court’s factual findings are supported by
competent evidence and whether the trial court committed an error of law.
Stephan v. Waldron Elec. Heating and Cooling LLC, 100 A.3d 660, 664-
65 (Pa.Super. 2014).
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On appeal, Barnhart raises the following issues:
1. Whether the Trial Court’s decision that [Bresnehan]
established each element of adverse possession was
supported by competent evidence.
2. Whether [Bresnehan’s] admission that she did not own
the disputed property precluded her from prevailing on
her claim for adverse possession[.]
3. Whether the Trial Court erred when it found in favor of
[Bresnehan] and against [Barnhart] despite the fact
that [Bresnehan] failed to accurately describe the
property that she was claiming to own and the Trial
Court scheduled a view for the purpose of taking
additional evidence after the parties had rested.
4. Whether the Trial Court’s decision was supported by the
evidence when the evidence showed that parts of the
disputed area [were] overgrown with weeds and brush.
Further, there [were] voluminous amounts of trash and
debris scattered on the property as if one used it as a
dumping area, all contradicting [Bresnehan’s] claims of
ownership by adverse possession.
5. Whether the Trial Court erred as a matter of law when
[it] found that [Bresnehan] owned the disputed area by
adverse possession despite the fact that [Bresnehan],
and her son, repeatedly admitted that they did not
believe that she owned the disputed parcel.
Barnhart’s Br. at 7-8 (suggested answers omitted).4
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4
In the argument section of his brief, Barnhart does not separately
address each issue enumerated in his statement of questions involved.
Rather, Barnhart divides his argument section into two main issues:
(1) whether the trial court erred in concluding that Bresnehan proved the
elements of adverse possession; and (2) whether the trial court abused its
discretion in re-opening the record and taking additional evidence after trial.
See Barnhart’s Br. at 16-30. Barnhart’s discussion of questions 1, 2, 4, and
5 above are subsumed within the first section of his argument.
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J-A29027-16
To establish title by adverse possession, the claimant “must prove
actual, continuous, exclusive, visible, notorious, distinct and hostile
possession of the land for twenty-one years. Each of these elements must
exist; otherwise, the possession will not confer title.” Johnson v. Tele-
Media Co. of McKean Cty., 90 A.3d 736, 740-41 (Pa.Super. 2014)
(internal citations omitted). The claimant has the burden of proving adverse
possession “by credible, clear[,] and definitive proof.” Id. at 741.
First, Barnhart asserts that the trial court erred in concluding that
Bresnehan proved the elements of adverse possession by clear and
convincing evidence. In support of this claim, Barnhart contends that
Bresnehan and her son admitted at trial that Bresnehan did not own the
disputed property and that those admissions were sufficient to defeat
adverse possession. The trial court properly rejected this claim. The
evidence established, and the trial court found, that Bresnehan knew she
was not the record owner of the disputed property, but, despite that
knowledge, she and her family continuously treated the property as their
own for more than 21 years. See Trial Ct. Op., 1/6/16, at 6, 8-10; N.T.,
12/14/15, at 209.
With respect to Barnhart’s remaining adverse possession arguments,
the trial court cogently addressed them in its January 6, 2016 opinion. See
Trial Ct. Op., 1/6/16, at 7-15. We agree with and adopt the trial court’s
reasoning. Therefore, we conclude that the record supports the trial court’s
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determination that Bresnehan established title to the disputed property by
adverse possession.
Next, Barnhart asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in re-
opening the record and personally viewing the disputed property after trial.
In its March 3, 2016 order denying post-sentence motions, the trial court
explained its reason for the supplemental property viewing as follows:
[T]he only purpose of the Court’s revisiting the property
with the surveyor present was to place a stake
demarcation at the point that had been identified during
the trial as the northern most point of the dog pen area. It
was this Court’s purpose and intention to provide a
comprehensive opinion with a survey that accurately
located the lines that the Court found were encompassed
within the adverse possession ruling. The purpose of the
surveyor placing the survey line at the northern most point
of the [dog] pen area was to provide for a specific metes-
and-bounds description to avoid any further conflict
between the parties going forward . . . . The record was
not re-opened in order to identify the property adversely
possessed . . . . It was merely to provide a metes-and-
bounds description of that line.
Trial Ct. Order, 3/3/16, at 1-2.5 We find no abuse of discretion.
Judgment affirmed.
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5
The trial court viewed the property on January 20, 2016. See Trial
Ct. Supp. Decision, 2/2/16, ¶ 1. Before that viewing, the trial court notified
the parties that it intended to conduct “a further view of the property for
purposes of establishing the northern most point within the wooded area
where the dog pens and rabbit cages were located” and scheduled a pre-
viewing conference for January 19, 2016. Trial Ct. Op., 1/6/16, at 14.
Barnhart claims that he objected to the trial court’s supplemental property
viewing; however, he cites no place in the record where such an objection
was raised. In any event, we conclude that the trial court provided sufficient
notice of its intent to view the property and adequately explained its reason
for doing so.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/2/2017
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