J-S88042-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37
: IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : PENNSYLVANIA
:
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
BRANDON LANG, :
:
Appellant : No. 2548 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence August 7, 2014
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division, at No(s): CP-51-CR-0013616-2012
BEFORE: OLSON, RANSOM, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 07, 2017
Brandon Lang (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence of
two to five years of incarceration entered following the revocation of his
probation. We vacate Appellant’s judgment of sentence and remand this
case for resentencing.
In February 2014, Appellant entered a negotiated guilty plea to counts
of receiving stolen property and unauthorized use of automobiles and other
vehicles, and received respective concurrent sentences of five and two years
of county probation. The trial court explained:
[A]t the time of imposition of the negotiated period of probation,
all parties acknowledged that the computed [] sentencing
guidelines calculated the lead offense with an offense gravity
score of “5” and that [Appellant’s] prior record score [was] 1.
Thus, the recommended range of sentence was incarceration of
a length between one and twelve months with a possible
*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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deviation of three months. [Appellant’s] criminal record included
multiple misdemeanor convictions for theft from motor vehicles
as well as an illegal narcotics possession and a summary
conviction for contempt of court. [Appellant] had violated the
terms of his previously imposed periods of probation or parole
for those offenses. Th[e trial c]ourt was also aware that
[Appellant] had previously failed to appear as scheduled for
court on multiple occasions. Given all of the circumstances and
facts of the underlying charges, the negotiated sentence of
another period of probations was generously below the
recommended guidelines.
As a minimal condition of [Appellant’s] supervision
probation, [Appellant] had been directed by th[e trial c]ourt to
report to his assigned probation officer, obtain a G.E.D., and pay
restitution to the owner of the stolen automobile in the amount
of $700.00 for the damages he had caused and pay mandatory
court fines and costs throughout the period of probation. Upon
entry of the guilty plea, [Appellant] waived his right to have any
presentence investigative report completed. At the time of
sentencing, [Appellant] was given credit for the county time he
previously served while awaiting trial.
Sentencing Court Opinion, 2/5/2016, at 2 (unnecessary capitalization
omitted).
Appellant reported to his probation officer upon his release from
custody, but thereafter failed to report or attend the ordered G.E.D. classes.
Consequently, a bench warrant was issued on May 20, 2014.
On August 7, 2014, after sufficient basis for revocation of
[Appellant’s] parole and probation was presented, all parties
agreed to proceed immediately to sentencing without any
request for any presentence investigation evaluations. Although
presentence reports were not formally waived, th[e trial c]ourt
deemed it waived from the prior waiver and the insistence of the
parties to proceed immediately to sentencing following the
revocation.
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After hearing argument, th[e trial c]ourt sentenced
[Appellant] to a [] state term of minimum confinement of two to
five years, and directed [Appellant] to pay the remaining court
costs and fees, and pay owed amount of restitution. [Appellant]
was given credit for any time served. Th[e trial c]ourt
specifically recommended and directed that [Appellant] be
eligible for the early release opportunity afforded in the state
boot camp program. If accepted into the boot camp program,
[Appellant] would have been released after a mere six months of
confinement. …
On August 11, 2014, [Appellant] filed a request for
reconsideration of sentence. This was denied without hearing on
August 15, 2014. On September 4, 2014, a notice of appeal was
filed on behalf of [Appellant]. On September 16, 2014 this Court
directed [Appellant] to file a 1925(b) statement. The statement
was timely filed on October 3, 2014….
Id. at 3-4 (citations and unnecessary capitalization omitted). The
sentencing court eventually filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion, offering therein
reasons for the sentence imposed, on February 5, 2016, and this case is now
ripe for our review.
Appellant presents this Court with a multi-faceted challenge to the
discretionary aspects of his sentence, including the claim that the sentencing
court failed to place on the record the reasons for the sentence imposed.1
Appellant’s Brief at 4.
An appellant is not entitled to the review of challenges to the
discretionary aspects of a sentence as of right. Rather, an
appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence
must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction. We determine whether the
appellant has invoked our jurisdiction by considering the
following four factors:
1
Because we determine that resentencing is necessary based upon this
aspect of Appellant’s claim, we need not address his remaining arguments.
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(1) whether appellant has filed a timely notice of
appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the
issue was properly preserved at sentencing or in a
motion to reconsider and modify sentence, see
Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether appellant’s brief has a
fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether
there is a substantial question that the sentence
appealed from is not appropriate under the
Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).
Commonwealth v. Samuel, 102 A.3d 1001, 1006-07 (Pa. Super. 2014)
(some citations omitted).
Here, Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal after filing a motion to
modify sentence which included the claim at issue, and his brief contains a
statement pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). We thus consider whether
Appellant has presented a substantial question for our review.
This Court has held that an allegation that the sentencing court failed
to offer a contemporaneous statement on the record of the reasons for the
sentence imposed raises a substantial question. Commonwealth v.
Johnson, 541 A.2d 332, 341 n.4 (Pa. Super. 1988). Accordingly, we review
the merits of Appellant’s claim.
Regarding prison sentences imposed following the revocation of
probation, the Sentencing Code provides as follows:
The court shall not impose a sentence of total confinement upon
revocation unless it finds that:
(1) the defendant has been convicted of another
crime; or
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(2) the conduct of the defendant indicates that it is
likely that he will commit another crime if he is not
imprisoned; or
(3) such a sentence is essential to vindicate the
authority of the court.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9771(c). Further, “[i]n every case in which the court …
resentences an offender following revocation of probation, … the court shall
make as a part of the record, and disclose in open court at the time of
sentencing, a statement of the reason or reasons for the sentence
imposed.” 42 Pa. C. S. § 9721(b) (emphasis added).
“Such a statement is mandatory.” Johnson, 541 A.2d at 340.
Offering the reasons at a later time, such as in ruling upon a motion for
reconsideration of sentence or in authoring a Rule 1925(a) opinion, does not
cure noncompliance with subsection 9721(b). See, e.g., Commonwealth
v. Holmes, 500 A.2d 890, 891 (Pa. Super. 1985); Commonwealth v.
Giles, 449 A.2d 641, 642 (Pa. Super. 1982).
Here, the transcript of the sentencing hearing reveals that the
sentencing court detailed the history of the case, N.T., 8/7/2014, at 4-6;
Appellant’s counsel explained Appellant’s reasons for failing to comply with
the terms of probation and requested that the sentencing court “give him
either a short jail sentence with parole or allow him to have another period
of probation,” id. at 6-8; and the Commonwealth recommended “a short jail
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sentence,” id. at 8. After Appellant briefly exercised his right to allocution,
id. at 9, the sentencing transcript reads as follows:
THE COURT: Okay.
All right.
Sir, you may stand. This [c]ourt finds that you violated
the period of probation presented to you on February 7th.
I resentence you [on] the receiving stolen property, 2-to-5
years’ state incarceration. You are Boot Camp [eli]gible.
[APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: Your Honor, would you
consider a county sentence?
THE COURT: No.
[APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: He’s never been in jail.
THE COURT: No.
As to the unauthorized use, I’m suspending your sentence.
A condition of your parole is the payment of $700.00 restitution
and any mandatory fines and cost.
You may advise him.
Id. at 9-10. Appellant’s counsel then explained Appellant’s post-sentence
rights, and the hearing concluded. Id. at 10-11.
The record thus confirms Appellant’s contention that the sentencing
court failed to state on the record any reasons for its sentence, let alone
findings required under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9771(c) for imposition of a period of
total confinement following revocation of probation. Accordingly, we must
vacate Appellant’s sentence and remand for resentencing. See, e.g.,
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Commonwealth v. Riggins, 377 A.2d 140, 151 (Pa. 1977) (vacating
sentence and remanding “to afford the trial court an opportunity to
resentence appellant and to include a statement of reasons for the sentence
imposed”); Commonwealth v. Harris, 457 A.2d 572, 574 (Pa. Super.
1983) (vacating sentence and remanding for resentencing where “[a]lthough
the judge did later write an opinion in which he discussed the sentence and
his reasons for imposing it, … the sentencing transcript indicates that he did
not disclose those reasons at the time of sentencing”).
Judgment of sentence vacated. Case remanded for resentencing.
Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/7/2017
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