IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 16-0971
Filed February 8, 2017
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF SUMMER NADINE MARTIN
AND BLAINE DEAN MARTIN
Upon the Petition of
SUMMER NADINE MARTIN,
Petitioner-Appellee,
And Concerning
BLAINE DEAN MARTIN,
Respondent-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Van Buren County, Randy S.
DeGeest, Judge.
The husband appeals from the economic and physical-care provisions of
the decree dissolving his marriage. AFFIRMED AND REMANDED.
Michael D. Clark of Clark & Schroeder, P.L.L.C., North Liberty, for
appellant.
Curtis R. Dial, Keokuk, for appellee.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Potterfield and Bower, JJ.
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POTTERFIELD, Judge.
Blaine Martin appeals from the decree dissolving his marriage to Summer
Martin. He maintains the district court should have granted him physical care of
the parties’ minor child rather than ordering the parties to share joint physical
care. He also maintains the district court’s division of the marital assets and
liabilities was not equitable.1
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
The parties were married in 1991. They raised two sons who reached the
age of majority before Summer filed the petition for dissolution in 2014. The
parties’ third child, J.K.M., was born in 2005.
At the time of the dissolution hearing, in March 2016, one adult son
continued to live with Blaine and the other continued to live with Summer. Each
son helped care for J.K.M. when she was in the care of the respective parent.
Blaine was working full-time first shift—Monday through Friday from 7:00 a.m. to
3:00 p.m. There were times he was required to work overtime, and he often did
not have warning before it was required. Summer worked for the same company
and also faced mandatory overtime. She worked full-time second shift,
weekdays from 1:30 p.m. until 10:00 p.m. She hoped to switch to first shift when
there was an opening, but it could be a number of years before that opportunity
arose.
Pursuant to the ruling on temporary matters, filed in September 2014, the
parties shared temporary joint legal custody of the child. Summer was granted
1
Summer waived her option to file a brief in this matter. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.903(3)
(“The appellee shall file a brief or a statement waiving the appellee’s brief.”).
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temporary physical care of J.K.M., with Blaine getting parenting time every other
weekend and otherwise as the parties could agree.2 During the following
months, Summer rarely—if ever—agreed for Blaine to have extra time with the
child. However, in April 2015, Summer and Blaine reached an agreement
whereby they consented to the modification of the ruling on temporary matters to
a temporary shared care arrangement. The new arrangement provided the
parties alternating weeks with the minor child, with the exchange occurring on
Sunday evenings.
Both Summer and Blaine testified that J.K.M. was doing well; she was
enjoying activities such as soccer and softball, and she was excelling at school.
There had been a few issues with “unpleasant exchanges” when the parties were
transferring J.K.M., but for the most part, Blaine and Summer had been able to
successfully co-parent during the pendency of the proceedings. They were able
to discuss and reach agreements about what activities J.K.M. would participate
in; her schoolwork; any medical needs; how to discipline J.K.M., if necessary;
and more. Even Blaine, who asked the court for physical care of J.K.M., testified
that he and Summer had been doing well at co-parenting and J.K.M. was
excelling in spite of the change in family dynamics. Additionally, both parties
agreed that it was best for J.K.M. to spend as much time with each parent as
2
The court originally ordered the parties to attend mediation before the hearing set for
temporary matters on September 26, 2014. On September 25, Summer filed an
application to waive mediation, claiming Blaine had refused to attend. At the same time,
Summer filed an affidavit requesting physical care of the minor child. Blaine took no
action regarding temporary matters, and on September 26, the court granted Summer
physical care of the child. Blaine’s initial attorney filed a motion for reconsideration,
claiming the attorney was unaware of any proceedings regarding temporary matters.
The court set a hearing on the motion, and Blaine’s attorney failed to appear. The court
then overruled the motion.
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possible, so each agreed Summer could spend mornings with J.K.M. when
Blaine had to work, and Blaine could spend afternoons with J.K.M. when
Summer had to work—even if it was not technically their respective times to
spend with her.
The parties stipulated to the division of most of their assets. At the time of
the hearing, the parties had not reached an agreement regarding how to divide
their fifty percent ownership in “grandpa’s farm,”—a farm with approximately 107
acres that was jointly owned with Blaine’s brother and his brother’s wife, and
which contained the homestead where Blaine was currently residing.
Additionally, Blaine testified he and his brother had an outstanding mortgage of
approximately $60,000 for the various parcels of farmland and they had a
$10,000 farm operating loan. Blaine’s share of the monthly payment for the
$60,000 was less than $400, and there was no monthly payment on the
operating loan. Blaine also testified about a debt of $2898 to his sister, $20,315
to the estate of his mother, and $50,000 owed to his brother and his brother’s
wife for “how much more they’ve paid on these farms than” he and Summer had.
Summer also testified about the money borrowed from Blaine’s sister and
Blaine’s mother; she agreed the money had been used to pay various debts
during the parties’ marriage. She was unaware that $50,000 allegedly was owed
to Blaine’s brother.
The court issued the dissolution decree in April 2016. The court granted
the parties joint legal custody and joint physical care of J.K.M. The schedule
remained the same—alternating weeks with each parent, with the exchanges
occurring on Sunday evening. Additionally, the decree provided, “During periods
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of time that the other parent is at work, the non-working parent shall have the first
opportunity to have the child in their care.” Because Blaine and Summer earned
similar salaries—but with Blaine earning slightly more—the court did not order
either party to pay child support. Blaine was to provide medical insurance for
J.K.M. until she “has attained age 18 or is still a full-time high school student or a
full-time college student and has not yet attained age 26”;3 he was also ordered
to pay the first $250 in uninsured medical or dental fees each year.
Blaine appeals.
II. Standard of Review.
“We review claimed error in dissolution-of-marriage decrees de novo.” In
re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 773 (Iowa 2003). We decide the issues
raised on appeal anew, but we give weight to the factual findings of the district
court. Id.
III. Discussion.
A. Physical Care.
Blaine asked the court to give him physical care of J.K.M., and Summer
asked the court to award the parties joint physical care of the child. Because one
of the parties requested joint physical care, we consider whether that option is in
J.K.M’s best interests. See Iowa Code § 598.41(5)(a) (2014); see also In re
Marriage of Fennelly, 737 N.W.2d 97, 101 (Iowa 2007). Where, as here, we
have two capable, suitable parents, “[t]he critical question in deciding whether
joint care is appropriate is whether the parties can communicate effectively on
3
Technically, Blaine was originally ordered to provide medical insurance until J.K.M.
reached age twenty-six. After he filed a motion to reconsider, the court amended the
decree to read as stated above.
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the myriad of issues that arise daily in the routine care of a child.” In re Marriage
of Hynick, 727 N.W.2d 575, 580 (Iowa 2007). Additionally, we also consider the
following factors: (1) continuity, stability, and approximation; (2) “the ability of the
spouses to communicate and show mutual respect”; (3) “the degree of conflict
between parents”; and (4) “the degree to which the parents are in general
agreement about their approach to daily matters.” In re Marriage of Hansen, 733
N.W.2d 683, 697–99 (Iowa 2007).
Based on both Blaine and Summer’s testimony, the parties have been
largely successful in working together to co-parent J.K.M. since their separation.
We acknowledge there were a few instances where Blaine spoke inappropriately
to Summer, and there were times early in the proceedings when Summer was
stubborn about allowing Blaine extra time with J.K.M. Otherwise, the parties
have been able to come to agreements on how to divide holidays, how to
discipline J.K.M. when needed, how to help the child improve her math grade,
and many other daily parenting concerns. Additionally, both parents recognize
the importance of the other in J.K.M.’s life.
Blaine maintains that “approximation” and “stability” weigh in his favor; he
claims that he has been J.K.M’s primary caregiver since Summer began working
second shift, around the same time that J.K.M. entered school. We agree that
Blaine has cared for J.K.M. more after school—he has made sure she gets to
activities, is fed, and has completed her homework. He also makes sure she
gets to bed on time. But Summer has historically spent an hour or two with
J.K.M. each morning; she was the parent in charge of making sure J.K.M. was
up, fed, and to school as needed. Both parents cared for and spent time with
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J.K.M. on the weekends. Because these parents worked different shifts at their
employment, they also tended to parent in shifts, and while Blaine tends to spend
more time with J.K.M. each day, he and Summer have both cared for J.K.M. on a
daily basis. Additionally, we note that the parents alternated weeks with J.K.M.
for approximately one year before the decree was entered, and both parties
agreed that J.K.M. thrived during this period.
Blaine’s only other concern is that Summer has not or will not in the future
foster his relationship with J.K.M. His real complaint seems to be that, before the
parties agreed to share physical care, J.K.M. was often with one of her older
brothers in the evening while Summer was at work rather than with him. We
believe the decree provides a solution to this concern, as it contains a “first-
refusal” provision, which allows Blaine to have J.K.M. any time Summer is
working and unable to care for her. Joint physical care, in conjunction with the
first-refusal provision, is in J.K.M.’s best interests; she is able to continue with a
schedule in which she has thrived and which maximizes her time with each
parent.
B. Economic Provisions.
Blaine appeals a number of economic provisions in the decree.
1. Deductible for Medical Expenses. Blaine maintains the court erred in
ordering him to pay the first $250 of uncovered medical expenses. Iowa Court
Rule 9.12(5) states, in pertinent part, “’Uncovered medical expenses’ means all
medical expenses for the child(ren) not paid by insurance. In cases of joint
physical care, the parents shall share all uncovered medical expenses in
proportion to their respective net incomes.”
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Here, the court found that Blaine earned $42,879 annually while Summer
earned $37,000. Because the parties agreed their incomes were sufficiently
similar that no award of child support was necessary, we presume the court
intended to take into account Blaine’s higher income in ordering him to be
responsible for out-of-pocket medical expenses. Since Blaine appeals from that
provision, we remand for the filing of child support worksheets and an award of
child support, including provision for health insurance and responsibility for out-
of-pocket medical expenses.
2. Duration of Insurance. Blaine maintains the district court erred with
respect to the duration which he was ordered to provide medical insurance for
J.K.M. Blaine is required to provide insurance for J.K.M. until she “has attained
age 18 or is still a full-time high school student or a full-time college student and
has not yet attained age 26.”
Pursuant to Iowa Code section 252E.6(1), “A child is eligible for medical
support for the duration of the obligor’s child support obligation.” The duration of
a child-support obligation is limited by section 598.1(9), which states, in part:
The [child support] obligations shall include support for a child who
is between the ages of eighteen and nineteen years who is
engaged full-time in completing high school graduation or
equivalency requirements in a manner which is reasonably
expected to result in completion of the requirements prior to the
person reaching nineteen years of age; and may include support for
a child of any age who is dependent on the parties to the
dissolution proceedings because of physical or mental disability.
Blaine maintains the court exceeded its authority when it ordered him to provide
medical insurance to J.K.M. while she attends college before reaching the age of
twenty-six. We agree. Here, there was no evidence J.K.M. had a physical or
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mental disability, and the statute otherwise limits the duration for which the court
may order continued support.
3. Division of Debts. Last, Blaine maintains the district court’s division of
the marital debts was inequitable. Blaine maintains the court was wrong to
determine some of the debts were not marital. He also maintains the court
should have split all of the debts and ordered each party to pay half. He relies on
the long duration of the parties’ marriage and the fact that he is “significantly
older than Summer and likely has fewer years left in the workforce.”
In particular, Blaine maintains the court was wrong to make him entirely
responsible for the all of the following marital debt: $30,000 on the farm note;
$5000 for the farm operating loan; $2898 for the loan from his sister; $20,315 for
the loan from his mother—now apparently owed to the estate; and $50,000 for
the loan from his brother.
Like the district court, we do not believe there is a marital debt of $50,000
owed to Blaine’s brother. Blaine mentioned this loan for the first time during his
testimony; it was not included in previously submitted documents concerning the
parties’ debts and assets, and Summer testified she had no knowledge of such a
debt. Similarly, although Blaine claimed he was responsible for $5000 of the
$10,000 farm operating loan, Blaine testified that he was no longer taking an
active part in the family farming and that it was his brother who owns and
operates the cattle operation. The district court removed the $5000 from the
marital debt, and we do likewise.
That leaves $30,000 on the farm note, $2898 to Blaine’s sister, and
$20,315 to Blaine’s mother’s estate. While the parties were ordered to share the
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benefit of the farmland—with each party receiving one quarter ownership of the
land—the court noted that Blaine got the added benefit of living on the
homestead. The court stated, “At the time of the trial Blaine was living in the
homestead on the farm and it was clear that he would continue to live in the farm.
His monthly rent payment on the farm debt of less than $400 is very affordable.”
Meanwhile, Summer was paying rent for another home. We do not believe it is
inequitable to order Blaine to make the minimal payment on the note in exchange
for the added benefit of living on the farm.
Finally, Blaine maintains he should not have been responsible for the
entire balance of the loans borrowed from his family members—$2898 to his
sister and $20,315 to his mother’s estate. Summer testified about the two loans
in question, and she agreed the parties had borrowed those amounts in order to
cover marital bills. We acknowledge Blaine testified he believed the money was
borrowed in good faith and should be returned in good faith. That being said, it
was unclear if the loans were ever going to be repaid; it had been a number of
years since the money was borrowed, and the parties had not made any
payments on the debt in the meantime. Moreover, there was no plan of how or
when the debt would be repaid in the future. Additionally, as the court noted,
Blaine is currently a beneficiary of his mother’s estate, so even if that loan is
repaid, he will receive one-third of that money back as one of three heirs of the
estate.
Even if Blaine repays the approximately $16,500 he owes family members
in likely unenforceable debt, the court considered the $17,852.35 Blaine received
in his 401k and his undisturbed monthly pension, and found that overall the
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division of assets and debts was equitable. We agree. See Hansen, 733
N.W.2d at 702 (“An equitable division is not necessarily an equal division.”).
Blaine now complains that he would rather have his pension divided than
have received so much of the debt; he claims the district court’s offset “offers him
little comfort” because he cannot yet access the funds he was awarded. Blaine
could have asked the court to divide his pension and 401k; instead, he and
Summer provided the court a stipulated agreement that provided he would
receive those accounts in their entirety. We will not now entertain his complaints
about getting what he asked for.
IV. Conclusion.
We affirm the district court’s order of shared physical care and the division
of debts. We remand to the district court for an award of child support, payment
for health insurance for the child, and a determination of the parties’
responsibilities for and division of the uncovered medical expenses for J.K.M.
AFFIRMED AND REMANDED.