IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 16-0258
Filed February 8, 2017
DES MOINES INDEPENDENT COMMUNITY
SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Petitioner-Appellant,
vs.
ANITA BABE,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Karen A. Romano,
Judge.
The school district challenges the district court’s dismissal of the appeal of
an adjudicator’s decision. AFFIRMED.
Andrew J. Bracken and Ann M. Smisek of Ahlers & Cooney, P.C., Des
Moines, for appellant.
Becky S. Knutson of Davis, Brown, Koehn, Shors & Roberts, P.C., Des
Moines, for appellee.
Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Vogel and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
2
DANILSON, Chief Judge.
The Des Moines Independent School District (District) challenges the
district court’s dismissal of its appeal of an adjudicator’s decision. Because the
District did not reject the arbitrator’s decision within the time provided by Iowa
Code section 279.17(7) (2014), the adjudicator’s decision was final and binding,
and the district court was without jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Summary
judgment was properly granted.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
These facts are not in dispute. Anita Babe is a teacher employed by the
District. In October 2014, the district superintendent recommended termination
of Babe’s contract. The District’s board of directors held a hearing concerning
the recommendation, after which it issued written findings of fact and conclusions
of law.
Babe appealed the board’s findings and conclusions to an adjudicator, as
authorized by Iowa Code section 279.17. Counsel for both parties consulted and
contacted the Public Employment Relations Board in order to obtain a list of
adjudicators to hear the appeal. Counsel for the parties selected and notified the
adjudicator, Ron Hoh; provided him with the record from the hearing before the
board; set the schedule for the proceedings; and filed written briefs.
Adjudicator Hoh issued his decision, dated November 17, 2015, and he
sent a copy of his decision on November 20, 2015, to the attorneys for the
teacher and the school board via ordinary mail.
The District electronically filed an appeal of the adjudicator’s decision with
the district court on December 15, 2015. Prior to filing the appeal, the board did
3
not reject the adjudicator’s decision in an open meeting, by roll call vote, or notify
the board secretary of its rejection of the decision, or notify the teacher of its
decision by certified mail.
On December 23, 2015, Babe filed her special appearance and motion to
dismiss or for summary judgment based upon the board’s failure to comply with
section 279.17(7). The District filed a resistance on December 31, asserting the
adjudicator had failed to give the decision to the board secretary as provided in
section 279.17(7), and therefore, its “performance under section 279.17(7) has
not begun yet.”
On January 6, the District filed an amended and substituted notice of
appeal and an affidavit by board secretary, Thomas Harper. Harper avowed, in
part, “On January 5, [2016,] the School Board rejected the decision of the
adjudicator. The Board’s rejection was by majority vote, by roll call, in open
session.” The district court allowed the amendment, making no determination as
to the effect, if any, of the amended pleading.
On January 29, a hearing was held at which the district court heard
arguments and granted summary judgment for Babe, concluding “there is no
dispute that the decision of the adjudicator was not rejected by the Board of
Directors of the District, as required by section 279.17(7), Code of Iowa, before
the instant appeal was filed.” Further, “[w]ithout the required rejection, the court
is without authority to proceed to consider the appeal over the timely objection of
Ms. Babe.”
The District appeals.
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II. Scope and Standards of review.
“We review summary judgment rulings for correction of errors at law.” Roll
v. Newhall, ___ N.W.2d ___, ___, 2016 WL 7421325, at *2 (Iowa 2016). We
determine whether the district court correctly applied the law. Id. The record is
viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id.
III. Discussion.
As noted in In re Bishop, 346 N.W.2d 500, 503 (Iowa 1984), chapter 279
of the Iowa Code governs teacher terminations and other matters. If a teacher is
dissatisfied with the board’s decision, the teacher may appeal to an adjudicator.
See Iowa Code § 279.17. The adjudicator may affirm, remand to the board for
further proceedings, reverse, modify, or grant other relief as provided in section
279.17(6). The adjudicator is to “make a decision” after a hearing and “give a
copy of the decision to the teacher and the secretary of the board.” Id.
§ 279.17(7). Section 279.17(7) then provides: “The decision of the adjudicator
shall become the final and binding decision of the board unless either party within
ten days notifies the secretary of the board that the decision is rejected.”
(Emphasis added.)
Section 279.18 provides for an appeal to the district court, stating in
relevant part: “If either party rejects the adjudicator’s decision, the rejecting party
shall, within thirty days of the initial filing of such decision, appeal to the district
court of the county in which the administrative office of the school district is
located.” Id. § 279.18(1).
In Wollenzien v. Board of Manson Community School District, 297 N.W.2d
215, 218 (Iowa 1980), the supreme court held compliance with section 279.17
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was a prerequisite to perfecting an appeal to district court under section 279.18;
without notification of rejection within ten days, an adjudicator’s ruling becomes
final and binding.
The means of rejecting an adjudicator’s decision is set forth in section
279.17(7):
The board may reject the decision by majority vote, by roll call, in
open meeting and entered into the minutes of the meeting. The
board shall immediately notify the teacher of its decision by certified
mail. The teacher may reject the adjudicator’s decision by notifying
the board’s secretary in writing within ten days of the filing of such
decision.
(Emphasis added.)
In Wollenzien, the teacher had failed to notify the board’s secretary of her
rejection of the adjudicator’s decision in writing before filing an appeal, and the
supreme court concluded the adjudicator’s decision was final and binding. 297
N.W.2d at 217-18.
In Bishop, the supreme court rejected a claim that substantial compliance
with section 279.17(7) was sufficient and held a teacher’s oral notice of rejection
of the adjudicator’s decision did not keep the adjudicator’s decision from
becoming final and binding. 346 N.W.2d at 504-05. The Bishop court confirmed1
what it had said earlier:
The plain wording of section 279.17 indicates the adjudicator’s
decision became final and binding when it was not rejected by the
plaintiff. We hold the statute means what it says and says what it
means. Because the adjudicator’s decision was final and binding it
was not subject to a later appeal.
1
Bishop, 346 N.W.2d at 505.
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Wollenzien, 297 N.W.2d at 218. Moreover, the court rejected the teacher’s due
process argument, stating:
In view of this scheme, the purpose behind the ten-day
rejection requirement is to shorten the time period in which parties
must decide whether to appeal an adverse decision. This advance
notice places a premium on time that is unique to and consistent
with the legislative attempt to fit the termination procedure within
the three-month hiatus between school terms. If advance notice is
not given, then the adjudicator’s decision becomes final earlier than
the normal period allowed for appeals. Given the timing of the
school term and the need to expedite and complete the process as
soon as possible so either the teacher or board can assess their
hiring or employment needs for the coming term, we conclude the
ten-day rejection requirement was not arbitrary and was rationally
related to a legitimate governmental purpose.
Bishop, 346 N.W.2d at 506.
Here, the District argues that because the adjudicator’s decision was not
given to the board secretary as stated in section 279.17(7) it was allowed to
reject the adjudicator’s decision by its actions in January 2015—several weeks
after the adjudicator’s ruling. The district court rejected the District’s position,
noting the board’s counsel had acted in the board secretary’s stead in numerous
instances throughout the proceeding and received a copy of the decision prior to
filing the appeal.
The supreme court has uniformly held there must be strict compliance with
procedural requirements under sections 279.17 and 279.18 by the teacher. See
Walthart v. Bd. of Dirs. of Edgewood-Colesburg Cmty. Sch. Dist., 667 N.W.2d
873, 875-76 (Iowa 2003); Bishop, 346 N.W.2d at 505; Wollenzien, 297 N.W.2d at
215. Moreover, strict compliance by the board with termination procedures is
required. See Kruse v. Bd. of Dirs. of Lamoni Cmty. Sch. Dist., 231 N.W.2d 626,
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631-33 (Iowa 1975) (holding the board’s “attempted termination of [the teacher’s]
teaching contract was null and void”).
The District argues, “The procedures of section 279.17(7) contemplate
that a teacher and a secretary of the board receive notifications directly from the
adjudicator and do not provide that notice to legal representatives is sufficient to
satisfy notice obligations under the statutes.” The District argues at length about
the failure of the adjudicator to strictly comply with the requirements of section
279.17(7), claiming the adjudicator did not “file” the decision until he sent the
decision to the board secretary. This argument might have some sway had the
District claimed it had not been notified of the adjudicator’s decision. But the
District did know of the adjudicator’s decision and failed to reject that decision as
required by section 279.17(7). “Because the adjudicator’s decision was final and
binding it was not subject to a later appeal.” Wollenzien, 297 N.W.2d at 218.
In any event, section 279.17(7) does not require the adjudicator’s “filing” of
a decision. Rather, the provision states the adjudicator is to “make a decision”
and “give a copy” of the decision to the teacher and the board secretary. To
“give” a copy of the decision to the teacher and the board secretary provides
notice to the parties that an appeal decision is to be made. Here, the
adjudicator’s decision was given to the board’s attorney, who had repeatedly
performed the secretary’s tasks during the process. See Iowa Code § 279.37
(allowing school corporation to employ an attorney for proper conduct of legal
affairs); see also id. § 279.5 (noting the board is to appoint a temporary secretary
in absence of regular officer).
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Moreover, we believe “give a copy” is analogous to “give notice” and, in
respect to the latter, our supreme court has stated,
The general rule is that when a statute or other provision does not
expressly authorize notice by publication, mail, or some other
specified method, but requires a person to notify in writing or to give
written notice, then the method of transmitting the writing to the
recipient is not important but receipt of the writing by the one to be
notified is essential—absent circumstances which we do not now
have.
Flaunders v. Waterloo Cmty. Sch. Dist., 217 N.W.2d 579, 582 (Iowa 1974)
(citations omitted). Thus, the method of transmitting the writing or copy to the
secretary, such as through counsel, is not important. Further, even if we
disregard when the board’s counsel received a copy of the adjudicator’s decision,
the board and secretary can hardly deny they had receipt of the adjudicator’s
decision by December 15, as on that date the notice of appeal was filed.2 Yet,
no vote by the board rejecting the adjudicator’s decision occurred until January 5.
We also find no merit in the District’s argument that the date of the “filing” of the
adjudicator’s decision as provided in section 279.17(7) should be distinguished
from the date of its receipt because, otherwise, the board could withhold “filing”
the decision whenever it so chose after its receipt. But if the filing date is
different, the board can hardly say it was not filed by the date of their notice of
appeal.
We will not allow the District to bypass the niceties of the statutory duties
of the secretary throughout the process and then rely on those niceties to excuse
its failure to abide by statutory requirements. See In re Devine’s Estate, 123
2
The notice of appeal states, in part, “On November 17, 2015, the adjudicator reversed
in part and modified the decision of the Board.”
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N.W.2d 898, 902 (Iowa 1963) (“One cannot usually have his cake and eat it
too.”).
It is undisputed the adjudicator mailed the decision to the board’s counsel
on November 20, counsel received the adjudicator’s decision at the latest by “the
first week of December,”3 and “promptly called the superintendent and
superintendent designee.” The board did not—within ten days—“notify the
secretary of the board that the decision was rejected,” did not “reject the decision
by majority vote, by roll call, in open meeting and entered into the minutes,” and
did not “immediately notify the teacher of its decision by certified mail.” Iowa
Code § 279.17(7). Having failed to reject the adjudicator’s decision as required
prior to filing an appeal, we agree with the district court the adjudicator’s decision
was final and binding and the district court was without jurisdiction to hear the
appeal.
AFFIRMED.
3
There is no reason given why counsel did not receive the November 20 mailing sooner.
Even assuming this early December receipt of the adjudicator’s decision, the board did
not reject the decision within ten days.