In the Matter of the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of T.P., Mother, S.R., Father, and B.R., Minor Child, T.P. and S.R. v. Indiana Department of Child Services (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing Feb 09 2017, 8:24 am

the defense of res judicata, collateral CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
estoppel, or the law of the case. Court of Appeals
and Tax Court

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
FOR MOTHER Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Attorney General of Indiana
Erin L. Berger
Evansville, Indiana Robert J. Henke
James D. Boyer
FOR FATHER Deputy Attorneys General
Julianne L. Fox Indianapolis, Indiana
Vanderburgh County
Public Defender’s Office
Evansville, Indiana

IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of the Termination February 9, 2017
of the Parent-Child Relationship Court of Appeals Case No.
of T.P., Mother, S.R., Father, 82A01-1606-JT-1275
and B.R., Minor Child, Appeal from the
T.P. and S.R., Vanderburgh Superior Court
The Honorable
Appellants-Respondents, Brett J. Niemeier, Judge
v. Trial Court Cause No.
Indiana Department of 82D04-1601-JT-75
Child Services,
Appellee-Petitioner.

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 Kirsch, Judge.

[1] T.P. (“Mother”) and S.R. (“Father”) appeal following the involuntary

termination of their parental rights to their daughter, B.R. (“Child”). On

appeal, Mother and Father each contend that the Indiana Department of Child

Services (“DCS”) presented insufficient evidence to support the termination of

their parental rights.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History
[3] Mother and Father are the biological parents of Child, who was born on June

10, 2014. Both Mother and Father (together, “Parents”) are persons with

intellectual disabilities, and each suffers from mental or cognitive issues. At the

time of Child’s birth, a doctor at the hospital, who “had concerns regarding the

parents’ ability to be able to parent,” contacted DCS and requested an

evaluation as to whether it was safe to let Child go home with Parents. Tr. at

127. Child was initially removed from Parents care on June 12, 2014 and

placed in foster care, prompting DCS to file Cause No. 82D01-1406-JC-319,

DCS’s first petition alleging that Child was a child in need of services

(“CHINS”).1 At that time, Parents lived with Mother’s parents, Carolyn

1
During the evidentiary hearing on the termination, the juvenile court took judicial notice of the first CHINS
case. Tr. 126-27. Nevertheless, we are unable to locate in the record before us any documents pertaining to
that case.

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 (“Grandmother”) and Ed (“Grandfather”) (together, “Grandparents”), in

Grandparents’ home in Vanderburgh County, Indiana. On July 16, 2014,

Child was placed in Grandparents’ home under Grandmother’s care. There,

Parents’ interaction with Child had to be “supervised all the time.” Id. at 127.

[4] In mid-September 2014, citing safety concerns, DCS removed Child from

Grandparents’ home and filed a second CHINS petition, Cause No. 82D04-

1409-JC-608. DCS had concerns about Parents’ ability to safely care for Child

and about Child’s safety if she remained in Grandparents’ home. Subsequent to

Child’s initial placement in Grandparents’ home, DCS learned that

Grandfather was a registered sex offender and that Grandmother “had DCS

history concerning her own children.” Id. at 128. In light of the second CHINS

case, the juvenile court (“CHINS court”)2 granted DCS’s motion to dismiss the

first CHINS case.3 At that time, Child was placed back in foster care, where

she resided throughout the CHINS and the termination proceedings.

[5] At its November 12, 2014 initial hearing, the CHINS court adjudicated Child a

CHINS on Parents’ stipulation and denied Parents’ request that Child be placed

back in Grandmother’s care. In its November 2014 Order on Initial Detention

2
We use the term “CHINS court” when referring to CHINS proceedings, and we use the term “juvenile
court” when referring to termination proceedings.
3
During the evidentiary hearing on the termination, DCS requested that the juvenile court take judicial
notice of this second CHINS case, and DCS moved to admit DCS Exhibit 4, which included CHINS
documents such as DCS’s Report of Preliminary Inquiry. Tr. at 126-27. The juvenile court took that motion
under advisement, but did not rule on the admissibility of DCS Exhibit 4. The contents of that proposed
exhibit are not in the record before us.

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Hearing, the CHINS court found: (1) Parents lack the ability to care for Child’s

needs; (2) at the time of Child’s birth, doctor expressed concern about Mother’s

ability to care for Child; (3) Mother did not follow through with doctor’s basic

recommendations during pregnancy; (4) “doctor [was] concerned about

[M]other feeding [C]hild and stated that [C]hild would be at risk in [P]arents’

care”; (5) even with services, Parents continue to need constant assistance to

care for Child; (6) Parents reside with Grandfather, who was convicted of four

counts of child molesting in 2000, has substantiated DCS sex abuse history, and

has a “DCS history for neglect”; (7) as part of Grandfather’s probation, he

cannot be unsupervised around children, other than his own, who are under the

age of sixteen; (8) Grandmother “has substantiated DCS history for neglect” on

at least three occasions. DCS Ex. 3 at 21-22. The CHINS court noted that

Parents and Grandparents are unable to protect and supervise Child, “or to

provide appropriate safe environment” for Child, thereby placing Child “in

danger of physical or mental harm.” Id. at 22. Specifically, the CHINS court

stated:

[I]t is in the best interests of the child to be removed from the
home environment and remaining in the home would be
contrary to the health and welfare of the child because of the
allegations admitted, of an inability, refusal or neglect to provide
shelter, care, and/or supervision at the present time and the child
needs protection that cannot be provided in the home.

The Court finds that reasonable efforts were made by DCS to
prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the child. The
statements of reasonable efforts as set forth in the pleadings,

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 reports, and documents of DCS and/or all other service
providers filed herein are incorporated by reference.

Id.

[6] The CHINS court held a dispositional hearing on December 3, 2014 and

ordered Parents to participate in reunification services. In its dispositional

order, the CHINS court ordered Parents to: (1) cooperate with “parent aide

programs”; (2) attend outpatient therapy; (3) attend nurturing classes; (4)

submit to random drug screens; (5) participate in supervised visitation; and (6)

remain alcohol free. Id. at 12.

[7] About a year later, on January 11, 2016, DCS filed a petition with the juvenile

court to terminate Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to Child. Appellant’s

App. at 20-21. The two-day evidentiary hearing began on February 3, 2016 and,

on that first day, exhibits were introduced and admitted, but no testimony was

heard. The balance of the hearing was held on April 21, 2016, where Parents,

Grandparents, and six other witnesses testified. The first to testify was Marissa

Curry (“Curry”), a service provider for Ireland Home Based Services (“Ireland

Services”) who had been Parents’ “visit supervisor” since August 2015. Tr. at

14. Curry testified that she supervised visits between Parents and Child once a

week for two hours per visit, with visits being separate for each parent. Id.

During those visits, Curry worked with Parents on general parenting skills,

including, feeding, appropriate interactions, and engagement with Child. Id. at

15. Curry testified that Father is affectionate toward Child, says he loves and

misses her, and brings snacks to each visit. While Parents attended most of the
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 visits, Curry continued to have concerns about Child’s safety because Parents

were not aware of and did not pay attention to Child. For example, Parents

had to continually be alerted to choking hazards with Child’s food and toys and

reminded that Child could get hurt climbing on objects in the room. Id. Curry

noted that she had observed each parent continuing to feed Child, unaware that

Child still had food in her mouth. Id. at 30, 31. During visits, Parents

sometimes stared into space or would lie on the floor and sleep, and Curry had

to direct them to sit up and become engaged. Id. at 17, 27. Mother was

approved for a visit with Child in the community; however, no community visit

was held because Curry had safety concerns about Mother’s reaction to

additional distractions and other environmental stimuli. Id. at 17, 23. While

no community visit was ever requested for Father, Curry testified that she had

the same safety concerns, as with Mother, for visits with Father in the

community. Id. at 26. Curry had never seen Father verbally aggressive toward

Child, but on one occasion Father was rough putting on Child’s shoes, and

Curry had to intervene. Id. at 28. Curry testified that she was unsure how

much Parents comprehended when she redirected their behavior, and she was

concerned that Parents could not retain parenting information from one visit to

another. Id. at 30. Curry opined that Child would not be safe left alone with

either parent for an extended period of time. Id. at 17.

[8] Faye Goebel, Child’s court appointed special advocate (“the CASA”), testified

that she had attended “more than ten supervised visits,” with Child and

Parents, and she had also visited Child in her foster home. Id. at 35. The

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CASA stated that she had safety concerns about Parents’ ability to follow some

instructions. She had observed, “on multiple occasions,” Parents’ inability to

remember safety instructions and information from visit to visit, thus, requiring

the CASA to give the same instructions repeatedly. Id. at 36. While noting that

Parents regularly attended supervised visits and had a “fondness” for Child, the

CASA testified that Parents’, and especially Mother’s, relationship to Child was

more like that to “a favorite doll or a favorite toy.” Id. Initially, Parents visited

Child together. However, Parents did not get along with each other, and, after

their situation became “very volatile,” the visits were split. Id. at 40. The

CASA admitted that this is a difficult case because the Parents, “from their

heart,” would like to parent Child. Id. at 43. The CASA testified that Mother

was able to change Child’s diapers, provide a sippy cup, use bibs, and provide

food and activities for Child, but it was not clear how much Mother was able to

retain. Id. at 46-47. The CASA believed that Mother had “an inability to

comprehend ... on an emotional level” and that “cognitive impairment” and

Parents’ “own environment” were factors. Id. at 48-49. The CASA opined

that, of the two, Father seemed to do a better job of parenting and had a better

bond with Child than Mother. Id. at 53. Even so, the CASA concluded that,

based on what she had observed and the information she had gathered about

Child, it was in Child’s best interests that the parental rights of both Mother and

Father be terminated. Id. at 37. Child had been in the same foster home since

she was three months old, and the CASA reported that she was doing

“extremely well” and “progressing very well” in all aspects. Id. at 38.

Accordingly, the future plan was that foster parents would adopt Child. Id.
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[9] Marla Minton (“Minton”), a licensed clinical social worker and lead therapist

for ViewPointe Counseling, had been Mother’s therapist since December 2014.

Minton testified that Mother had an adjustment disorder, intermittent explosive

disorder with depression, and intellectual disabilities. Id. at 58. Mother, who

cannot attend to her own hygiene, attended counseling sessions without having

bathed; she had body odor, and her clothes were not clean. Id. at 59, 63.

Mother could not remember when she had last bathed. Id. at 63. Mother took

parenting classes, but could remember nothing other than, “To be a good parent

is to be good to the kid and not scream at her.” Id. at 60-61. Minton testified

that there is little improvement in Mother, who still does not know: (1) how to

bathe Child; (2) how to put Child on a schedule; (3) how often Child needs to

sleep; and (4) how much and how frequently Child needs to eat. Id. at 62.

Minton admitted that intellectual functioning alone does not disqualify Mother

from being able to care for Child. However, Mother has limited insight, she is

very immature, and her intermittent explosive disorder is not under control. Id.

Minton testified that the chaotic and argumentative home environment that

Mother has chosen to stay in will likely not change. Id.

[10] Amber Freels (“Freels”), a clinical social worker for ViewPointe Counseling,

had been Father’s outpatient therapist since August 2014. Freels testified that

Father suffers from intermittent explosive disorder and “flies off the handle for

the smallest things.” Id. at 69-70. Father also suffers from an adjustment

disorder with depression, in part due to Child’s removal from his care. Id. at

69. Father described his home-life with Grandparents as chaotic because

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 people in the home yell and fight, and the police have been called to

Grandparents’ home on many occasions. Id. at 70. Freels testified that

Father’s anger is exacerbated by others in the home. Id. at 71. She reports that

Father has a “below normal level of functioning.” Id. Father was resistant to

the idea of group home settings, and Freels testified that she was not aware that

Father had ever lived on his own. Id. at 75-76. Father spoke with Freels about

the parenting classes he was taking, and when asked whether he could describe

anything from the class, Father said he did not really need the class because “he

knew how to take care of his baby.” Id. at 78. Father was motivated to be a

father, had set money aside for his daughter, and never missed visits. Id. Freels

testified that Grandmother initially attended the counseling appointments with

Father; however, that stopped because Grandmother “appeared to be negative

toward [Father].” Id. at 80. Father remembered his appointments with Freels,

and if he cancelled, he had a valid reason. Id. at 80-81.

[11] Dr. Jessica Huett (“Dr. Huett”), a psychologist with Associates in Counseling

and Psychotherapy, completed a clinical psychological evaluation on Mother

and Father in November 2015. Dr. Huett testified at the evidentiary hearing

that Mother has “other specified impulse control disorder,” and a history of

anger outbursts. Id. at 90. Test results revealed that Mother has an IQ of 53,

which equated to “the 2nd grade level across the skill level.” Id. at 91-93. Dr.

Huett concluded that Mother “would need a very strong support system to be

able to be a primary custodian of a child due to her intellectual level and also

the anger and impulse control issues.” Id. at 91-92. Regarding Father, test

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 results revealed that he has an IQ of 59, “basically a 3rd grade academic level in

basic academic tests.” Id. at 92. Dr. Huett found Father to be cooperative, and

he “was easy to establish a rapport with.” Id. at 99. She stated that Father, like

Mother, gets angry easily, is immature when he communicates with others, has

limited impulse control, and would need a very strong support system to take

care of a child. Id. at 92-93. Dr. Huett testified that, while unable to provide an

“age of maturity,” Parents’ “functioning was in the [lowest] first percentile

compared to the general population and academically they are very limited.”

Id. at 93. On the basis of the evaluations, Dr. Huett indicated that Mother and

Father’s insight into parenting issues was “fairly limited.” Id. at 94.

[12] DCS Family Case Manager, Loussa Numa (“FCM Numa”), had been the

family’s caseworker since August 2014. It was FCM Numa’s responsibility to

see Child at least once every thirty days and to make sure that Child was

properly cared for. Originally, parents attended visitation together in

Grandparents’ home; however, at the end of June 2015, volatile arguments

between the parents prompted FCM Numa to split the visits. Id. at 109. Other

problems, including the “traffic” through Grandparents’ home, resulted in

visitation with Child being moved to Ireland Services. Id. at 120. FCM Numa

testified that, in addition to visitation, Parents were provided with services, such

as parent aides and counseling sessions, and were connected to vocational

rehabilitation through their parent aides. Id. at 109. DCS also provided funds

to allow Parents to each participate in a “psych evaluation.” Id. At the time

FCM Numa joined the case, in August 2014, Child was living with Parents in

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 Grandparents’ house. Id. at 110. FCM Numa testified that, at one point,

Grandfather and Father moved out of the home and lived together in an

Evansville motel; however, by the time of the termination hearing, both men

were again living in Grandparents’ home.

[13] FCM Numa testified that she “talk[ed] to the family on a regular basis” and,

when she got a call from Father or Mother, she would have to “talk to the

whole family.” Id. at 112. Sometimes during those calls, each member of the

family would scream and curse at her. Id. at 113. FCM Numa testified that

Parents argue with each other, yell and scream at each other, and if they “don’t

like what they are hearing, … they will storm out.” Id. at 114. FCM Numa

admitted that Parents are concerned about Child, and they would call FCM

Numa to ask what kind of sippy cup they should use or what food Child would

eat. Id. This desire to care for Child, however, did not remove FCM Numa’s

safety concerns. For example, during one visit, Child did not drink her milk,

and one of the Parents brought the same cup of milk back to the next visit. Id.

at 121. Another time, Child fell and was bleeding from her lip. Mother

“freaked out” and did not know what to do. Id.

[14] FCM Numa shared with Parents her concern about them living with

Grandparents. In addition to concerns about Grandfather’s criminal history

and Grandparents’ DCS history, FCM Numa was concerned about the living

arrangement since seven adults lived in the home, “there’s always people in and

out [of] the home,” Grandparents always have different tenants, the family

argues a lot and police are called, and the home has had issues with fleas,

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 roaches, and lice. Id. at 111-12. While Parents expressed a willingness to move

out, FCM Numa testified that Parents changed their minds about housing

constantly. FCM Numa had heard Mother say that “she has to stay with

[Grandmother],” because Mother “needs [Grandmother] to help her with her

daily things.” Id. at 110. For Father, the inconsistency is reflected by the fact

that, one day, Father claims that he is moving out with Grandfather, and the

next day, he is not moving out. Id. at 111. The parent aide tried to help

Parents find a new living arrangement, but Parents refused. Id. at 116.

[15] FCM Numa testified that Grandmother is the payee for Mother’s Supplemental

Security Income (“SSI”), and Mother has complained that Grandmother pays

the household bills with that money. Mother works two days a week and, even

though she does not work long hours, she gets tired. Id. at 119. It was FCM

Numa’s belief that Mother cannot handle working more hours. Id. at 118.

FCM Numa testified that the best permanency plan for Child, and the one that

would be in Child’s best interest, would be “termination” and for Child “to be

adopted.” Id. at 122.

[16] Father testified that he visited with Child and would take diapers, baby wipes,

and food, and he would use his own money to purchase toys for Child. Id. at

150. Father stated that he could live on his own and was in the process of

moving; however, Father did not yet know where he would move. Father said

that his SSI payments were made to Grandfather and that Grandfather was

going to help Father with his finances. Father also expressed his desire to

continue to be Child’s parent, saying he believed he could provide for Child and

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 that he would “keep her out of the chaos that is the [Grandparents’] house.” Id.

at 152.

[17] Mother testified that she had always lived with Grandmother, but she planned

to move out. Id. at 154. When asked if she had ever lived anywhere else,

Mother answered, “No. Besides me being in foster care when I was little.” Id.

Mother expressed the desire to move into a place where Child could live with

her. Id. at 155. Mother testified that she receives SSI on a monthly basis in

addition to her paycheck from her job, but she did not know whether she would

get her SSI check if she moved out, explaining, “That would be up to my

mom.” Id. Mother expressed a willingness to take more parenting classes, but

believed that she would not have any trouble taking care of Child. Id. at 156.

[18] Grandmother testified that Mother had not spoken to her about plans to move

out and find her own housing. Id. at 158. Grandmother conceded that

Grandfather had a conviction for child molestation, but stated that he was no

longer on probation. Id. at 163. Grandfather recognized that his convictions

for child molestation could have impacted Parents’ ability to have home visits

with Child, and therefore, he moved out for a number of months. Grandfather

stated that, when home visits did not materialize, he moved back into the

home. Id. at 165.

[19] On May 31, 2016, the juvenile court issued an order terminating both Mother’s

and Father’s parental rights. Mother and Father now appeal the termination of

their parental rights to Child.

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 Discussion and Decision
[20] “The traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children is

protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.” In

re J.W., Jr., 27 N.E.3d 1185, 1187-88 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied.

“However, a trial court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of

the child when evaluating the circumstances surrounding a termination.” Id. at

1188. Termination of a parent-child relationship is proper where a child’s

emotional and physical development is threatened. Id. “Although the right to

raise one’s own child should not be terminated solely because there is a better

home available for the child, parental rights may be terminated when a parent is

unable or unwilling to meet his or her parental responsibilities.” Id.

[21] Before an involuntary termination of parental rights may occur, DCS is

required to allege and prove, among other things:

(A) that one (1) of the following is true:

....

(iii) The child has been removed from the parent and has been
under the supervision of a local office or probation department
for at least fifteen (15) months of the most recent twenty-two (22)
months, beginning with the date the child is removed from the
home as a result of the child being alleged to be a child in need of
services or a delinquent child;

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

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 (i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that
resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for placement
outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the
parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the
child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been
adjudicated a child in need of services;

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of
the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). DCS’s burden of proof for establishing these

allegations in termination cases is one of clear and convincing evidence. K.T.K.

v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ind. 2013). If the court finds

that the allegations in a petition described in section 4 of this chapter are true,

the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8(a).

[22] When reviewing a termination of parental rights issue, our court will not

reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. In re R.S., 56

N.E.3d 625, 628 (Ind. 2016). We consider “only the evidence and any

reasonable inferences therefrom that support the judgment,” and give “‘due

regard’ to the trial court’s opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses

firsthand.” K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1229. Here, in terminating Parents’ parental

rights to Child, the juvenile court entered specific findings and conclusions.

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 When a trial court’s judgment contains specific findings of fact and conclusions

thereon, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. In re R.S., 56 N.E.3d at 628

(citation omitted). First, we determine whether the evidence supports the

findings, and second, we determine whether the findings support the judgment.

Id. (citation omitted). We will set aside the trial court’s judgment terminating a

parent-child relationship only if it is clearly erroneous. Id. Findings are clearly

erroneous only when the record contains no facts or inferences drawn therefrom

that support them. In re A.G., 6 N.E.3d 952, 957 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). A

judgment is clearly erroneous if the findings do not support the trial court’s

conclusions or the conclusions do not support the judgment. Id. If the evidence

and inferences support the trial court’s decision, we must affirm. A.D.S., 987

N.E.2d at 1156.

[23] We begin by noting that Mother devotes her entire brief to the contention that

she was entitled to accommodations under the Americans with Disabilities Act

(“ADA”), suggesting that failure to accommodate her intellectual disability is a

defense in this termination proceeding. Mother’s Br. at 11-14. While Mother

argues this on appeal, based on our review of the record before us, we find that

Mother did not raise this issue before the juvenile court. Because this issue was

raised for the first time on appeal, it is waived. See N.C. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child

Servs., 56 N.E.3d 65, 68-69 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied (issue of whether

ADA applied to father in termination context was waived where father failed to

raise that issue at termination hearing). Mother also contends that there is

insufficient evidence in the record before us to support the juvenile court’s

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 finding that “this is an impossible situation.” Mother’s Br. at 19. Again, we do

not address this issue since the juvenile court made no such finding. While

Mother has waived essentially all of the issues raised in her brief, because

Mother more broadly claims that there was insufficient evidence to support the

termination of her parental rights, we address that claim, where appropriate, as

part of our analysis regarding Father.

[24] In its May 31, 2016 order terminating Parents’ parental rights to Child,4 the

juvenile court entered the following pertinent findings of fact:

10. The parents are so limited intellectually that they would have
to be supervised 24/7 to be able to “parent the child.”

11. The best way to describe the parents’ affection for the child is
almost childlike.

12. The parents cannot stay focused on the child’s needs.

13. The parents do not understand or cannot anticipate basic
hazards to the child.

14. The mother has an impulse control disorder, overreacts with
anger and has an IQ of 63.5

4
While Mother and Father separately filed their respective notices of appeal, Mother’s on June 6, 2016 and
Father’s on June 15, 2016, the record before us reflects that the juvenile court terminated both Parents’ rights
by one order, dated May 31, 2016
5
Minton testified that Mother’s IQ was 63. However, Dr. Huett, the psychologist who performed the tests
on Mother, testified that Mother’s IQ was 53. Tr. at 62, 66, 91.

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 15. The father is easily angered, has anxiety and has an IQ of 59.

16. The parents live with the mother’s mother and father.

17. The grandfather is a convicted sex offender.

18. The grandparents’ home can be dirty, cluttered and has had
bugs and fleas in the past.

19. The mother has not been able to visit the child on occasion
due to having head lice.

20. The parents and grandparents argue by yelling, screaming
and cursing over the most basic things.

21. Police have had to be called to the residence.

Appellant’s App. at 14.

[25] From these facts, the juvenile court terminated Parents’ respective parental

rights, concluding:

4. The Child has been removed from the parent[s] and has been
under the supervision of the department for at least fifteen (15)
months of the most recent twenty-two (22) months; in cause
number 82D04-1409-JC-608, from September 16, 2014 to
January 11, 2016

a. There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that
resulted in the [Child]’s removal from, and continued placement
outside the care and custody of the parents, will not be remedied
as the mother and father does [sic] not have a home that is
suitable to raise a child and the parents simply are too limited in
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 their parenting skills and have too many mental health issues to
ever provide a safe, stable and loving environment for the child.

b. There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the
parent-child relationship between the mother, father and child
poses a threat to the [Child]’s well-being as the parents do not
understand the basic needs needed to raise a child until the child
becomes of age.

c. Termination of the parent-child relationship between the
mother, father and the child is in the best interests of the child as
the child needs to live in an environment that is happy, stable and
provides normal healthy relationships, so that the child can have
the same opportunities as most children receive.

d. The plan of the Department of Child Services for the care and
treatment of the child is an adoption, which is reasonable,
acceptable and satisfactory.

Id. at 14-15. The juvenile court also stated:

[T]his case is truly a sad case. The parents through no fault of
their own simply cannot provide for their child. The parents
have several very significant issues of their own and have to rely
on the mother’s family for assistance for their own well-being.
Unfortunately, this assistance does not rise to the level necessary
to also care for this baby.

Id. at 15.

[26] Mother and Father challenge none of the juvenile court’s findings. As a result,

Parents have waived any argument relating to whether these unchallenged

findings are clearly erroneous. See McMaster v. McMaster, 681 N.E.2d 744, 747

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 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (unchallenged trial court findings were accepted as true).

Parents also do not dispute that DCS presented sufficient evidence to support

the elements that: (1) Child was removed from Parents’ care and has been

under the supervision of DCS for at least fifteen of the most recent twenty-two

months under Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(A)(iii); and (2) there is a

satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of Child, i.e., adoption under

Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(D). Instead, Parents argue that DCS

failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that conditions that resulted in

the removal of Child will not be remedied, that the continuation of the parent-

child relationship with Parents poses a threat to Child, and that termination of

Mother’s and Father’s parental rights is in Child’s best interest.

Remediation of Conditions

[27] Parents first argue that DCS did not meet its burden of proving two of the

elements under Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B). It is well-settled that

because Indiana Code section 31-5-2-4(b)(2)(B) is written in the disjunctive, the

juvenile court need only find that (1) the conditions resulting in removal from

or continued placement outside the parent’s home will not be remedied, (2) the

continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the child, or (3)

the child has been adjudicated CHINS on two separate occasions. See In re

C.C., 788 N.E.2d 847, 854 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied. Therefore, where

the juvenile court determines one of the above-mentioned factors has been

proven and there is sufficient evidence in the record supporting the juvenile

court’s determination, it is not necessary for DCS to prove, or for the juvenile

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 court to find, any of the other factors listed in Indiana Code section 31-5-2-

4(b)(2)(B). In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d 874, 882 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).

Accordingly, we focus only on the element of whether the conditions that led to

removal and placement outside the Parents’ care will not be remedied.

[28] In determining whether the conditions that resulted in Child’s removal from or

continued placement outside Parents’ home will not be remedied, we engage in

a two-step analysis. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642-43 (Ind. 2014). First, we

identify the conditions that led to removal or continued placement of Child

outside the Parents’ care; and second, we determine whether there is a

reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied. Id. at 643.

“In the second step, the trial court must judge a parent’s fitness as of the time of

the termination proceeding, taking into consideration evidence of changed

conditions,” that is, balance a parent’s recent improvements against “habitual

pattern[s] of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of

future neglect or deprivation.” Id. (citation omitted). “We entrust that delicate

balance to the trial court, which has discretion to weigh a parent’s prior history

more heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination.” Id.

“Requiring trial courts to give due regard to changed conditions does not

preclude them from finding that parents' past behavior is the best predictor of

their future behavior.” Id.

[29] The evidence reveals that Child was first removed from Parents’ care two days

after she was born, when a doctor, noting Parents’ below normal intellectual

functioning, expressed concern that Parents might be unable to provide proper

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 care for Child. Child remained in foster care from mid-June to mid-July, when

the juvenile court placed Child in Grandparents’ home. At that time, Parents,

Grandparents, and others lived in the home; however, the juvenile court placed

Child in Grandmother’s care. Thereafter, DCS learned that Grandfather “is

registered as a sexual violent predator,” and that he was convicted of four

counts of child molesting in February 2000. DCS Ex. 3 at 21. Grandfather also

had “substantiated DCS sex abuse history as well as DCS history for neglect.”

Id. As part of Grandfather’s “probation he cannot be unsupervised around a

child, other than his own, under sixteen (16) years old.” Id. at 21-22. Further,

DCS learned that “[t]he custodian, [Grandmother], also has substantiated DCS

history for neglect on at least three (3) occasions.” Id. at 22. In September

2014, Child was removed from Grandparents’ home and placed in foster care,

where she remained throughout the duration of the case.

[30] While accepting the above facts, Father contends that Grandparents’ home is,

in fact, proper housing for Child. Father notes that, notwithstanding

Grandfather’s history, Grandparents’ fifteen-year-old son, Mother’s brother,

who had been the subject of a CHINS petition and previously been a ward of

the State, was recently returned to Grandparents’ home during a time when

Grandfather lived there. Father’s Br. at 11. Admitting that Grandfather was

deemed to be an inappropriate person with whom to leave Child, Father offers

that there were “two other adults and one teenager in the home to help provide

supervision of [Child] while in the care of [Parents].” Id. at 11-12. Father

argues that his testimony at the termination hearing supports his contention that

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 he was in the process of moving out of the house to live independently. Id. at

12 (citing Tr. at 150). He also asserts that the services provided to him did not

meet the needs of his family, but he was compliant and willing to participate in

additional services. From this, Father concludes that the juvenile court erred in

finding there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in

Child’s removal will not be remedied. We disagree.

[31] The juvenile court knew that Grandparents’ fifteen-year-old son had been

returned to the house and that other adults lived in Grandparents’ home. The

juvenile court also heard Father’s testimony that he planned to move from the

home. In judging the credibility of this evidence, the juvenile court also heard

and considered the following evidence: (1) Child is a toddler, tr. at 71, and the

child who was returned to Grandparents’ home was fifteen; (2) Parents are

limited intellectually and would have to be supervised “24/7 to be able to

‘parent the child,’” Appellants’ App. at 14; (3) Mother claims she has plans to

move out; however, Grandmother, who is the payee of Mother’s SSI, did not

know of Mother’s plans, tr. at 159; (4) Mother requires Grandmother’s help to

bathe, id. at 63; (5) Father, when not living in Grandparents’ home, has lived

with Grandfather, who is Father’s SSI payee, id. at 150; (6) Grandfather is a

convicted sex offender, whose parole terms prevented him from having contact

with a child, other than his own, under the age of sixteen, Appellants’ App. at 22;

(7) Grandparents have a history with DCS of neglect of dependents, and one of

their children was only recently returned to live in the home, id. at 14, tr. at 137;

(8) Grandparents have a history of different tenants living in the home, tr. at

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 111-12; (9) Grandparents’ home is chaotic with constant arguing and fighting,

id. at 70, 112; (10) the police have been called to the home on numerous

occasions, id. at 112; (11) the home has had issues with fleas, roaches, and lice,

id.; (12) Parents do not consistently engage with child; and (13) Parents would

need a strong support system to raise Child, tr. at 91-92. From this evidence, it

was reasonable for the juvenile court to conclude that the conditions that

resulted in the removal and continued placement of Child outside the home

would not be changed. Having found conditions will not be remedied, we need

not reach Parents’ claim that the continuation of the parent-child relationship

poses a threat to Child. In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 882.

Best Interests of Child

[32] Father asserts that DCS failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that

termination of Parents’ parental rights is in Child’s best interests. Specifically,

he argues that losing the parental bond affects a child for life and puts a child

“at risk for further problems later in life such as criminal justice involvement or

for running away.” Father’s Br. at 13-14. Father cites to no authority to support

these general statements, nor does he explain how the termination of parental

rights will specifically affect Child. Therefore, to the extent Father is

challenging the sufficiency of this conclusion, we find that failure to support his

general statements with cogent argument has resulted in waiver. A.D.S. v. Ind.

Dep’t of Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1156 n.4 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans.

denied.

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[33] Waiver notwithstanding, we find no error in the juvenile court’s determination

that termination of Parents’ parental rights was in Child’s best interests. In

determining what is in the best interests of a child, the trial court must look

beyond the factors identified by DCS to the totality of the evidence. A.D.S., 987

N.E.2d at 1158. In so doing, the court must subordinate the interests of the

parents to those of the child. Id. The court need not wait until the child is

irreversibly harmed before terminating the parent-child relationship. Id.

“Moreover, we have previously held that the recommendation by both the case

manager and child advocate to terminate parental rights, in addition to

evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, is

sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the

child’s best interests.” Id. at 1158-59.

[34] Here, DCS proved that there is a reasonable probability that the circumstances

leading to Child’s removal from or continued placement outside Parents’ care

will not be remedied. Further, FCM Numa and the CASA supported the

termination of Parents’ parental rights and the adoption of Child by the foster

parents, who had been caring for Child from the time she was three months old.

The CASA reported that Child was doing “extremely well” and “progressing

very well” in all aspects. Tr. at 38. FCM Numa testified that Child has bonded

with foster parents. Id. at 123. Both the CASA and FCM Numa stated that it

was in Child’s best interests that Parents’ parental rights be terminated and

Child be adopted by foster parents. Id. at 37-38, 122.

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[35] We will reverse a termination of parental rights only upon a showing of “clear

error” – that which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake

has been made. In re A.N.J., 690 N.E.2d 716, 722 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). Based

on the record before us, we cannot say that the juvenile court’s termination of

Parents’ parental rights to Child was clearly erroneous. We, therefore, affirm

the juvenile court’s judgment.

[36] Affirmed.

[37] Robb, J., and Barnes, J., concur.

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