MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any FILED
court except for the purpose of establishing Feb 13 2017, 8:54 am
the defense of res judicata, collateral CLERK
estoppel, or the law of the case. Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Michael A. Wilkins Stephen P. Rothberg
Broyles Kight & Ricafort, P.C. Fort Wayne, Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Lori A. Spang, February 13, 2017
Appellant-Petitioner, Court of Appeals Case No.
02A03-1608-DR-1876
v. Appeal from the Allen Superior
Court
Timothy R. Spang, The Honorable Lori Morgan, Pro
Appellee-Respondent. Tem Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
02D07-1107-DR-549
Robb, Judge.
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Case Summary and Issues
[1] Lori Spang (“Mother”) filed a notice of intent to relocate from Fort Wayne to
Indianapolis with her twelve-year-old daughter, E.S. (“Child”). Timothy Spang
(“Father”) objected to the move and filed an objection to relocation and a
petition for modification of custody, which the trial court granted following an
evidentiary hearing. Mother now appeals and raises three issues for our review:
(1) whether the trial court abused its discretion in failing to consider a statutory
factor; (2) whether Father met his burden of proof to demonstrate the proposed
relocation was not in Child’s best interest; and (3) whether the trial court
abused its discretion by improperly considering Mother’s intention to relocate
in determining the best interests of Child. Concluding the trial court did not
abuse its discretion and Father met his burden of proof, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Mother and Father divorced in September 2012, and pursuant to the parties’
marital settlement agreement, they were each granted joint legal custody of
their two children.1 Mother and Father were also granted equal parenting time
with their children.
1
The parties’ oldest daughter, Sydney Spang, is now eighteen years old. Mother and Father’s custody
modification and relocation dispute is limited to Child.
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[3] At all times since their divorce, Mother and Father have lived in Allen County,
Indiana. Father resides in the parties’ former marital residence and Mother
owns a home about three miles away from Father’s home. Father is employed
as a business development manager for Precise Manufacturing and Mother is
employed with Southwest Allen County Schools. Mother and Father each
exercise equal parenting time with Father generally exercising parenting time
on Wednesdays, and every other Thursday and weekend.
[4] Both Mother and Father have extended family in Fort Wayne and the
surrounding area. Father’s mother, siblings, and cousins reside in North
Manchester, Indiana. Mother’s family owns a cottage at Lake George, and
Mother would often take her children to the lake during and after the parties’
marriage. Mother’s and Father’s extended family are involved in their
children’s lives on an almost weekly basis.
[5] In February 2012, Mother began a relationship with Eric Monesmith. Mr.
Monesmith is an orthopedic surgeon and lives in Indianapolis with his four
children. Mr. Monesmith also owns a cottage neighboring that of Mother’s
family’s cottage at Lake George. During the summer, Mr. Monesmith and his
family and Mother and her children often spend a considerable amount of time
at Lake George. In 2015, Mr. Monesmith and Mother became engaged.
Mother and Mr. Monesmith planned their wedding for July of 2016 to create
the least amount of disruption in their children’s lives as Sydney would
matriculate to Indiana University and Child would begin middle school in the
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fall. Following their wedding, Mother desired to move to Indianapolis with
Mr. Monesmith where she would be a homemaker.
[6] On November 12, 2015, Mother filed a verified notice of intent to relocate to
Indianapolis; in response, Father filed an objection to relocation and a petition
for modification of custody. On May 27, 2016, the trial court held an
evidentiary hearing at which Father, Mother, Mr. Monesmith, and Sydney
testified. On July 25, 2016, the trial court issued its findings of fact and
conclusions of law denying Mother’s petition to relocate with Child and
granting Father’s petition to modify custody of Child. The trial court found, in
relevant part, as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
***
9. Since the parties’ dissolution, both Mother and Father
have been equal participants in the care and supervision of
their children. It is undisputed that both children are
intelligent, excellent students, well-adjusted, well-behaved,
and deeply bonded to both their Mother and Father.
10. Both children enjoy a regular routine in the homes of their
Mother and their Father who happen to live in Fort
Wayne just minutes from one another.
***
13. [Child] is currently Twelve (12) years old and will be
graduating from Whispering Meadows Elementary, Fort
Wayne to Summit Middle School, Fort Wayne in August
2016. The parties do not dispute that the majority of
[Child’s] friend [sic] will be attending a different school if
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she would remain with Father. The Court finds that
should [Child] relocate to Indianapolis with Mother,
[Child] will also be attending a different school in a
different city with different friends.
14. [Child] has been involved in extracurricular activities
including lacrosse, volley ball [sic], and cheerleading
camps. Although the frequency in in [sic] dispute, the
Court finds that both parents have participated in their
children’s education and extracurricular activities.
15. The Court finds that both parents have largely cooperated
with respect to the children’s medical care, education, and
religious instruction. It is not disputed that Mother attends
church with the children more frequently than Father.
The biggest contrast between Mother and Father concerns
certain rules and boundaries to [sic] which the Court will
address further herein.
16. [T]he Court finds Father has been granted flexibility with
his work hours to accommodate getting children to and
from school.
17. The Court finds that at the time of the proceedings,
Mother was employed in the same Fort Wayne school
district as [Child]. However, Mother and [Mr.
Monesmith] plan for her to be a homemaker. Mother
plans on renting or selling her home in Fort Wayne when
she moves to Indianapolis.
18. The Court finds that Mother’[s] position at trial was
contrary to her sworn deposition testimony. During her
deposition, Mother testified that she would not relocate to
Indianapolis if the Court did not permit the relocation. At
trial, when confronted with the hypothetical of this Court
denying the relocation Mother testified that “That
hypothetical is so far beyond my comprehension I don’t
know how I can give a hypothetical answer to that.”
Further, the Court finds that Mother and [Mr. Monesmith]
were less than clear with each other as to how they would
handle the alternative of this Court denying the relocation.
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The Court finds Mother now intends to move to
Indianapolis regardless of the Court’s decision.
19. The Court finds that both Mother and Father have
extended family in Fort Wayne . . . .
20. At all times relevant to these proceedings, both Mother,
[Mr. Monesmith], and their children would spend most of
their summers at Lake George with Mother’s family and
[Mr. Monesmith’s] family. Lake George is approximately
Fifty-Nine (59) miles North of Father’s residence in Fort
Wayne. [Mr. Monesmith’s] home is One Hundred Eleven
(111) miles South of Father’s residence.
21. The Court finds that child has a relationship with
[F]ather’s family and spends time with them on at least a
monthly basis and sometimes weekly. Father’s mother
would often spend time with [Child] during Father’s
parenting time during the summer when Father was at
work.
22. The Court finds that Mother has researched three (3)
schools in Indianapolis of the same and similar quality to
Summit Middle School, Fort Wayne.
23. The Court finds that Mother and Father have different
parenting styles. Father is more regimented with
homework and bedtime routines and Mother is more
relaxed as far as implementing a routine and schedule for
the children.
24. The Court finds that . . . the Nineteen (19) year old son of
[Mr.] Monesmith, [sic] has been provided alcohol in the
presence of [Mother] and with the blessing of [Mr.
Monesmith]. The Court also finds that [Mr.] Monesmith
has provided alcohol to other under aged friends of [his
son]. It is not disputed that [his son] has recently been
arrested and convicted of operating while intoxicated.
***
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26. The Court finds that Mother and [Mr. Monesmith] have
knowingly and intentionally provided alcohol to minors,
including the parties’ child Sydney, in their home and at
the lake cottage. The Court finds that Mother and [Mr.
Monesmith] have endorsed the use of alcohol by minors,
including the parties’ Eighteen (18) year old daughter,
Sydney.
27. The Court finds that Father does not condone the
provision of or consumption of alcohol by minors.
28. The Court finds that [it] is not in the best interests of the
parties’ minor children to be offered alcohol or to consume
alcohol . . . .
***
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
***
33. Considering the parties [sic] stipulation, the Court
concludes that Mother’s relocation is made in good faith
and for a legitimate reason . . . .
34. Thus, the burden shifts to Father to show the relocation of
[Child] is not in her best interest.
***
43. The Court concludes the distance involved in the proposed
change of residence of [Child] would prevent Father from
exercising the current shared parenting plan.
44. The Court concludes that Mother has greater flexibility
considering that Father is a full time employee . . . and
Mother plans on being a homemaker. Mother has the
greater ability to travel for school events and
extracurricular activities given the fact she will not be
working.
45. The Court concludes that particularly during the school
year Father offers a regimented routine for homework and
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bedtimes. The Court concludes that given his influence,
the parties’ children have excelled in their academics. The
Court concludes that Father’s influence over [Child’s]
academics would be less significant.
46. The Court concludes that given the fact that Mother and
[Mr. Monesmith] are frequently at their lake cottage with
Mother’s family . . . the preservation of [Child’s]
relationship with her maternal family will not be impacted.
[Child] will likely see her maternal family no more or no
less should the child remain in the primary care of her
Father.
47. The Court concludes that [Child’s] relationships with
Father and her paternal family would be impacted should
the Court grant the relocation. Instead of [Child] being
involved with her extended paternal family on monthly if
not weekly basis, [Child] would become a part of Mother
and Mr. Monesmith’s daily life, only with the exception of
weekend and holiday parenting time with Father from
which [Child] has contact with her paternal family.
48. The Court concludes that the lax attitude about provision
of alcohol to minors is another factor that affects the best
interests of [Child]. Notwithstanding the fact that it is
against Indiana Law, the Court concludes that Mother and
Mr. Monesmith have failed to provide appropriate care
and supervision for the parties’ children while under their
care by either directly or indirectly exposing them to
minors consuming alcohol. The Court further concludes
that Mother is not credible with respect to her beliefs
concerning minors consuming.
49. The Court concludes that the proposed relocation of
[Child] and the resulting school of attendance provides no
advantage or disadvantage to [Child].
50. After considering all relevant factors, including the factors
listed at I.C. 31-17-2-8 and I.C. 31-17-2.2-1(b), the Court
finds that the relocation . . . is not in [Child’s] best
interests.
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51. [T]he Court finds that the modification [of] primary
physical custody to Father is in the best interests of the
minor child . . . .
Appellant’s Appendix at 13-21 (internal citations omitted). Mother now
appeals. Additional facts will be added as necessary.
Discussion and Decision
I. Standard of Review
[7] In this case, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 52(A), our court will “not set aside the findings
or judgment unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” D.C. v.
J.A.C., 977 N.E.2d 951, 953 (Ind. 2012). Considering only the evidence most
favorable to the trial court’s judgment and all reasonable inferences derived
therefrom, we will find clear error only if the evidence, either directly or by
inference, fails to support the findings, or if the findings fail to support the
judgment. Paternity of X.A.S. v. S.K., 928 N.E.2d 222, 224 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010),
trans. denied.
[8] In addition, we review custody modifications for an abuse of discretion with a
preference “for granting latitude and deference to our trial judges in family law
matters.” Wilson v. Myers, 997 N.E.2d 338, 340 (Ind. 2013) (citation omitted).
“[A]ppellate courts ‘are in a poor position to look at a cold transcript of the
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record, and conclude that the trial judge, who saw the witnesses, observed their
demeanor, and scrutinized their testimony as it came from the witness stand,
did not properly understand the significance of the evidence.’” D.C., 977
N.E.2d at 956-57 (citation omitted). Accordingly, “[o]n appeal it is not enough
that the evidence might support some other conclusion, but it must positively
require the conclusion contended for by appellant before there is a basis for
reversal.” Kirk v. Kirk, 770 N.E.2d 304, 307 (Ind. 2002).
II. Failure to Consider a Statutory Factor
[9] Mother claims the trial court abused its discretion in failing to evaluate the
proper statutory factors for a modification of custody when one party intends to
relocate. Specifically, Mother alleges the trial court failed to consider the effects
of a modification of custody on Child’s relationship with Mother and her soon-
to-be step-family in Indianapolis. We disagree.
[10] Indiana Code section 31-17-2.2-1(b) provides that when a party moves to
modify custody in response to the proposed relocation of the other parent, the
trial court must take these factors into consideration:
(1) The distance involved in the proposed change of residence.
(2) The hardship and expense involved for the nonrelocating
individual to exercise parenting time . . . .
(3) The feasibility of preserving the relationship between the
nonrelocating individual and the child through suitable
parenting time and grandparent visitation arrangements,
including consideration of the financial circumstances of the
parties.
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(4) Whether there is an established pattern of conduct by the
relocating individual, including actions by the relocating
individual to either promote or thwart a nonrelocating
individual’s contact with the child.
(5) The reasons provided by the:
(A) relocating individual for seeking relocation; and
(B) nonrelocating parent for opposing the relocation of the
child.
(6) Other factors affecting the best interest of the child.
“Other factors affecting the best interest of the child” include, among other
things, the factors listed in Indiana Code section 31-17-2-8. Baxendale v. Raich,
878 N.E.2d 1252, 1257 (Ind. 2008). These factors include the child’s age and
sex; the parents’ wishes; the child’s wishes, with the wishes of children fourteen
years or older being given more weight; the child’s relationship with parents,
siblings, and any other person affecting the child’s best interests; and the child’s
adjustment to home, school, and the community. Ind. Code § 31-17-2-8.
When one parent is relocating, it is not necessary for a court to find a
substantial change in one of these “other factors” before modifying custody. See
Baxendale, 878 N.E.2d at 1257.
[11] Mother contends the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider all of
the factors in Indiana Code section 31-17-2-8, as evidenced by the absence of a
finding of fact regarding the impact of a custody modification on Child’s
relationship with Mother and her new family. First, we note a trial court must
consider each statutory factor, but it is not required to make a finding on each
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factor. Wolljung v. Sidell, 891 N.E.2d 1109, 1113 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (noting
that “at a minimum, there must be evidence in the record on each of the factors
listed . . .”).
[12] Second, the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law were thorough
and detailed, leaving us convinced the trial court considered all relevant factors.
Regarding Mother’s contention the trial court failed to consider Child’s familial
relationships or the effect that custody modification would have on them, the
trial court specifically noted “[b]oth children are intelligent, excellent students,
well-adjusted, well-behaved, and deeply bonded to both their Mother and
Father.” Appellant’s App. at 2. The trial court further found both parents were
active participants in Child’s education and extracurricular activities, both
parents have extended family in the Fort Wayne area with whom Child has a
close bond, and Child and Mother’s new family often spend a considerable
amount of time at Lake George in the summer. Moreover, the trial court
concluded that Mother, given her stated intention of becoming a homemaker,
would have more opportunities to attend extracurricular activities and sporting
events in Fort Wayne than Father would in Indianapolis. Finally, the trial
court determined the impact of custody modification on the relationships would
be more adverse to Father and his extended family than to Mother and her
extended family given Mother’s frequent trips to Lake George in the summer
and greater amount of free time to travel to Fort Wayne.
[13] The record establishes the trial court heard evidence concerning Child’s familial
relationships and the trial court’s findings reflect those considerations.
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Although Mother may disagree with the amount of attention the trial court
gave to these matters in its order, it was within the sound discretion of the trial
court to place greater significance on certain evidence and statutory factors. We
are satisfied the trial court considered all relevant statutory factors.
III. Father’s Burden of Proof
[14] Mother also contends Father failed to meet his burden of proof. The parties
stipulated Mother’s proposed relocation was in good faith and for a legitimate
reason; therefore, the burden shifted to Father to prove the relocation was not
in Child’s best interest. See Ind. Code § 31-17-2.2-5(d). Here, Mother contends
the trial court abused its discretion in concluding Father met this burden.
However, given our standard of review and the facts and circumstances of the
present case, we cannot agree.
[15] Mother begins by attacking five of the trial court’s findings and asserting they
are insufficient to prove relocation was not in Child’s best interest. The findings
Mother takes issue with are:
9. Mother and Father have been equal participants in the
care and supervision of their children.
***
14. [T]he Court finds that both parents have participated in
their children’s education and extracurricular activities.
15. The Court finds that both parents have largely cooperated
and agreed with respect to the children’s . . . religious
instruction. It is not disputed Mother attends church with
the children more frequently than Father.
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16. [T]he Court finds that Father has been granted flexibility
with his work hours to accommodate getting children to
and from work.
***
45. The Court concludes that particularly during the school
year Father offers a regimented routine for homework and
bedtimes. The Court concludes that given his influence,
the parties’ children have excelled in their academics.
Appellant’s App. at 14 -15, 20. Mother does not contest whether the evidence
supports the findings, and largely agrees that it does; instead, Mother argues
these findings “had little, if anything, to do with [Child’s] best interest or were
actually contrary to her best interest.” Brief of Appellant at 18.
[16] First, we note much of Mother’s argument surrounding Father’s burden of
proof is a request for us to reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. We are
constrained to determine whether the evidence supports the findings and
whether the findings support the judgment of the trial court. Paternity of X.A.S.,
928 N.E.2d at 224. Second, Mother has cherry-picked certain findings with
which she disagrees and asserts that, taken alone, they are insufficient to
support the trial court’s determination that relocation is not in Child’s best
interest. However, we believe the trial court has made sufficient findings to
support its conclusion that Father met his burden of proof.
[17] The evidence favorable to the trial court’s decision supports its conclusion that
remaining in Fort Wayne with Father was in Child’s best interest. In addition
to the five findings stated above, there was no evidence Child had performed
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poorly in school; in fact, the evidence and findings demonstrate Child excelled
academically in Fort Wayne. Regardless of whether Child would attend a new
school whether she stayed in Fort Wayne or relocated to Indianapolis, the trial
court found Child excelled in her current setting, and that Father’s influence
and regimented routine was a large part of that success. Further, there was
evidence that Child was heavily involved in extracurricular activities and
athletics in Fort Wayne such as lacrosse, volleyball, and cheerleading. In
addition to Child’s education and extracurricular activities, the trial court found
Father’s and Mother’s extended family live in or near Fort Wayne and are
closely bonded with Child. Father’s mother, siblings, and cousins live near Fort
Wayne, mostly in North Manchester, with Father’s mother often providing
some care for Child during the summer. Mother’s family also frequently spends
time at their cottage at Lake George during the summer. With Mother’s
proposed relocation to Indianapolis, the trial court found Child’s ability to
maintain a close relationship with Father and his extended family would be
negatively impacted. Given the facts and circumstances of the present case, the
trial court could reasonably determine that Mother’s proposed relocation was
not in Child’s best interest. See Baxendale, 878 N.E.2d at 1258 (child’s school
performance, proximity to his family members who provided temporary care,
and established athletic and extra-curricular activities all supported trial court’s
decision to change custody to allow child to remain in Indiana with father
when mother relocated to Minnesota); Swadner v. Swadner, 897 N.E.2d 966, 977
(Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (noting that although mother presented evidence that
could have supported a decision that relocation would be in the children’s best
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interest, where father presented evidence that supported the opposite
conclusion, the trial court’s decision in favor of father was not an abuse of
discretion).
[18] In addition to these findings, the trial court also found Mother and Mr.
Monesmith knowingly and intentionally provided alcohol to minor children.
The parties’ eighteen-year-old daughter, Sydney, testified Mother and Mr.
Monesmith have both offered her alcohol on more than one occasion. Mr.
Monesmith oldest son has also offered her alcohol and she has witnessed Mr.
Monesmith’s fifteen-year-old son consuming alcohol as well. By contrast,
Father testified he does not permit underage drinking in his household. Mother
argues that whether she and Mr. Monesmith’s older children were allowed “to
drink small amounts of alcohol on limited occasions under controlled
circumstances” has no relevance to her ability to parent Child, and that this
finding could not possibly outweigh the other evidence in Mother’s favor. Br.
of Appellant at 25.
[19] First, there is no indication from the trial court’s findings of fact or conclusions
of how heavily it weighed this evidence, or that it somehow, taken alone,
outweighed all evidence favorable to Mother. Second, the finding is relevant to
Child’s best interest and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in making
this finding. See Baxendale, 878 N.E.2d at 1258 (noting evidence of a parent’s
drug or alcohol use can be relevant to a child’s best interest). Here, the
evidence demonstrates Mother and Mr. Monesmith have a lax attitude towards
minors consuming alcohol. Regardless of whether Child has actually been
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offered or consumed alcohol, the trial court could make the reasonable
inference Mother’s lax attitude toward alcohol consumption with Sydney and
Mr. Monesmith’s children would continue with Child, and that underage
consumption of alcohol is not in Child’s best interest.
[20] Finally, Mother argues a modification in custody resulting in Child remaining
in Fort Wayne would cause far more disruption in Child’s life than permitting
her to relocate to Indianapolis with Mother. The evidence recited by Mother in
favor of her argument was presented to the trial court, which was entitled to
evaluate and weigh it. Mother essentially requests that we reevaluate this
evidence and give it greater significance and weight, which we cannot do.
Paternity of X.A.S., 928 N.E.2d at 224.
[21] The trial court heard the parties’ testimony and examined the evidence,
ultimately finding that a relocation would be contrary to the Child’s best
interests. The trial court’s findings support this judgment; therefore, it did not
fail to hold Father to his burden of proof.
IV. Mother’s Intention to Move to Indianapolis
[22] Finally, Mother argues the trial court abused its discretion by improperly
considering Mother’s intention to move to Indianapolis, regardless of the
outcome of the relocation determination. The trial court’s findings of fact state,
18. The Court finds that Mother’s position at trial was
contrary to her sworn deposition testimony. During her
deposition, Mother testified that she would not relocate to
Indianapolis if the Court did not permit the relocation. At
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trial, when confronted with the hypothetical of this Court
denying the relocation Mother testified that “That
hypothetical is so far beyond my comprehension I don’t
know how I can give a hypothetical answer to that.”
Further, the Court finds that Mother and [Mr. Monesmith]
were less than clear with each other as to how they would
handle the alternative of this Court denying the relocation.
The Court finds Mother now intends to move to
Indianapolis regardless of the Court’s decision.
Appellant’s App. at 15. Mother disputes whether the evidence supports this
finding and whether it was proper for the trial court to consider Mother’s
intention.
[23] At a deposition, Father’s counsel asked Mother about her intention to move
even if the trial court rendered an unfavorable decision and Child remained in
Fort Wayne. The colloquy went as follows:
[Counsel]: [W]hat do you plan to do if the decision is made
that [Child] needs to stay in Allen County[,] what
are your plans?
[Mother]: I’ll do whatever I have to do to be with my
daughter.
[Counsel]: You need to tell me what that means, that you’re
going to live up here?
[Mother]: If I have to . . . if there is a choice presented to me
that if . . . I moved to Indianapolis I don’t get to
take [Child] then I won’t move to Indianapolis.
Transcript at 209. At trial, Mother’s answer changed.
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[Counsel]: [H]ow do you respond to the hypothetical what if
Magistrate Hartzler does not allow [Child] to
relocate on a permanent basis to Indianapolis?
[Mother]: That hypothetical is um so far beyond my
comprehension I don’t know how I could give a
hypothetical answer to that.
[Counsel]: Something you thought about?
[Mother]: Of course.
***
[Counsel]: If Magistrate Hartzler says you can go to
Indianapolis but [Child] stays here what do you
think you’re going to do?
[Mother]: I don’t know how to answer that until it happens if
it happens. I I [sic] don’t know how I can be the
best mother to [Child], the best stepmother to the
other children and [Child] and Syd and I know this
is about [Child], best wife to [Mr. Monesmith] and
do that from a different city.
***
[Counsel]: You never agreed to that?
[Mother]: [A]t deposition I said that I would stay in Fort
Wayne. I had four months of extremely
excruciating thought process about that and . . . I’ve
changed my mind.
[24] Tr. at 200-01, 214. Mother asserts the trial court’s inference that she was
moving to Indianapolis is not supported by the evidence. We disagree, as
Mother clearly stated she “changed her mind” about staying in Fort Wayne in
the four months since her deposition, id. at 214, and that she did not know how
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she could be the best mother or wife “from a different city.” Id. at 201. A
reasonable inference from these statements is that Mother intended to move to
Indianapolis.
[25] Mother also asserts, without citation to any authority, that it was improper for
the trial court to consider Mother’s intent because “[t]here is nothing in the
relocation statute that makes a parent’s intention to relocate or stay in her
present residence if the court refuses to allow the relocation without a change of
custody a relevant factor . . . .” Br. of Appellant at 15. Assuming for the
purposes of Mother’s argument this finding was in error, we conclude the
remaining findings still support the trial court’s determination that relocation
was not in Child’s best interest. See J.M. v. N.M., 844 N.E.2d 590, 599 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2006) (noting that “[t]o the extent that the judgment is based on erroneous
findings, those findings are superfluous and are not fatal to the judgment if the
remaining valid findings and conclusions support the judgment.”) (quoting
Lasater v. Lasater, 809 N.E.2d 380, 397 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004)), trans. denied. As
stated above, the trial court thoroughly noted all relevant statutory factors listed
in Indiana Code sections 31-17-2.2-1(b) and 31-17-2-8. The trial court
considered, among other things, Child’s education, extracurricular activities,
the distance involved in relocation, familial relationships, the feasibility of
preserving Father’s relationship with Child, hardship and expense for Father to
exercise parenting time, and Child’s adjustment to her school and Fort Wayne
community. These findings, as noted in Section III, support the trial court’s
determination relocation was not in Child’s best interest.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A03-1608-DR-1876 | February 13, 2017 Page 20 of 21
Conclusion
[26] We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion, as it properly
considered all relevant statutory factors. Further, the trial court did not fail to
hold Father to his burden of proof and its judgment that relocation was not in
Child’s best interest is supported by the findings. Accordingly, we affirm.
[27] Affirmed.
Kirsch, J., and Barnes, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A03-1608-DR-1876 | February 13, 2017 Page 21 of 21
Lori A. Spang v. Timothy R. Spang (mem. dec.)
Combined Opinion