J-S08043-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: A.M.M.F. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
:
:
APPEAL OF: S.F., NATURAL FATHER : No. 1512 WDA 2016
Appeal from the Decree September 9, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County
Orphans’ Court at No(s): No. 24 in Adoption 2016
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., and SOLANO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED FEBRUARY 13, 2017
Appellant, S.F. (“Father”), appeals from the decree entered in the Erie
County Court of Common Pleas Orphans’ Court, which involuntarily
terminated his parental rights to his minor child, A.M.M.F. (“Child”). Upon a
thorough review of the record, we affirm.
In its opinion, the Orphans’ court fully and correctly sets forth the
relevant facts and procedural history of this case. Therefore, we have no
reason to restate them.1 After Father’s counsel timely filed a notice of
appeal and statement of intent to file an Anders brief pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
1925(c)(4), counsel filed a petition for leave to withdraw in this Court on
November 21, 2016.
____________________________________________
1
Erie County Office of Children and Youth Services (“ECOCY”) filed the
termination of parental rights petition on May 13, 2016.
J-S08043-17
As a preliminary matter, appellate counsel seeks to withdraw
representation pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct.
1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967) and Commonwealth v. Santiago, 602 Pa.
159, 178-79, 978 A.2d 349, 361 (2009). Anders principles apply to appeals
involving termination of parental rights. See In re S.M.B., 856 A.2d 1235
(Pa.Super. 2004). Anders and Santiago require counsel to: 1) petition the
Court for leave to withdraw, certifying that after a thorough review of the
record, counsel has concluded the issues to be raised are wholly frivolous; 2)
file a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support
the appeal; and 3) furnish a copy of the brief to the appellant and advise
him of the right to obtain new counsel or file a pro se brief to raise any
additional points the appellant deems worthy of review. Santiago, supra at
173-79, 978 A.2d at 358-61; In re Adoption of V.G., 751 A.2d 1174, 1176
(Pa.Super. 2000). Substantial compliance with these requirements is
sufficient. Commonwealth v. Wrecks, 934 A.2d 1287, 1290 (Pa.Super.
2007). After establishing that counsel has met the antecedent requirements
to withdraw, this Court makes an independent review of the record to
confirm that the appeal is wholly frivolous. Commonwealth v. Palm, 903
A.2d 1244, 1246 (Pa.Super. 2006).
In Santiago, supra, our Supreme Court addressed the briefing
requirements where court-appointed counsel seeks to withdraw
representation on appeal:
-2-
J-S08043-17
Neither Anders nor McClendon[2] requires that counsel’s
brief provide an argument of any sort, let alone the type of
argument that counsel develops in a merits brief. To
repeat, what the brief must provide under Anders are
references to anything in the record that might arguably
support the appeal.
* * *
Under Anders, the right to counsel is vindicated by
counsel’s examination and assessment of the record and
counsel’s references to anything in the record that
arguably supports the appeal.
Santiago, supra at 176, 177, 978 A.2d at 359, 360. Thus, the Court held:
[I]n the Anders brief that accompanies court-appointed
counsel’s petition to withdraw, counsel must: (1) provide a
summary of the procedural history and facts, with citations
to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that
counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set
forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and
(4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal
is frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of
record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that
have led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.
Id. at 178-79, 978 A.2d at 361.
Instantly, Father’s counsel filed a petition to withdraw. The petition
states counsel conducted a conscientious review of the record and
determined the appeal is wholly frivolous. Counsel also supplied Father with
a copy of the brief and a letter explaining Father’s rights to retain new
counsel or to proceed pro se to raise any additional issues Father deems
worthy of this Court’s attention. (See Letter to Father, dated November 18,
____________________________________________
2
Commonwealth v. McClendon, 495 Pa. 467, 434 A.2d 1185 (1981).
-3-
J-S08043-17
2016, attached to Petition for Leave to Withdraw as Counsel). In the
amended Anders brief, counsel provides a summary of the facts and
procedural history of the case. Counsel’s argument refers to relevant law
that might arguably support Father’s issue. Counsel further states the
reasons for her conclusion that the appeal is wholly frivolous. Therefore,
counsel has substantially complied with the requirements of Anders and
Santiago.
Counsel raises the following issues on Father’s behalf:
WHETHER THE [ORPHANS’] COURT [COMMITTED] AN
ABUSE OF DISCRETION OR ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT
CONCLUDED THAT…ECOCY ESTABLISHED GROUNDS FOR
TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS UNDER 23 PA.C.S.A.
[§§ 2511(A)(1), (2), (5), AND (8)?]
WHETHER THE [ORPHANS’] COURT COMMITTED AN ABUSE
OF DISCRETION OR ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT CONCLUDED
THAT THE TERMINATION OF [FATHER’S] PARENTAL
RIGHTS WAS IN…CHILD’S BEST INTEREST [PURSUANT]
TO 23 PA.C.S.A. [§] 2511(B)[?]
(Anders Brief at 4).
The standard and scope of review applicable in a termination of
parental rights case is as follows:
When reviewing an appeal from a decree terminating
parental rights, we are limited to determining whether the
decision of the trial court is supported by competent
evidence. Absent an abuse of discretion, an error of law,
or insufficient evidentiary support for the trial court’s
decision, the decree must stand. Where a trial court has
granted a petition to involuntarily terminate parental
rights, this Court must accord the hearing judge’s decision
the same deference that it would give to a jury verdict.
We must employ a broad, comprehensive review of the
-4-
J-S08043-17
record in order to determine whether the trial court’s
decision is supported by competent evidence.
Furthermore, we note that the trial court, as the finder of
fact, is the sole determiner of the credibility of witnesses
and all conflicts in testimony are to be resolved by [the]
finder of fact. The burden of proof is on the party seeking
termination to establish by clear and convincing evidence
the existence of grounds for doing so.
The standard of clear and convincing evidence means
testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing
as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction,
without hesitation, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.
We may uphold a termination decision if any proper basis
exists for the result reached. If the trial court’s findings
are supported by competent evidence, we must affirm the
court’s decision, even if the record could support an
opposite result.
In re Adoption of K.J., 936 A.2d 1128, 1131-32 (Pa.Super. 2007), appeal
denied, 597 Pa. 718, 951 A.2d 1165 (2008) (internal citations omitted).
See also In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1003-04 (Pa.Super.
2008) (en banc).
CYS sought the involuntary termination of Father’s parental rights on
the following grounds:
§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination
(a) General Rule.―The rights of a parent in regard to a
child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the
following grounds:
(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of
at least six months immediately preceding the filing
of the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose
of relinquishing parental claim to a child or has
refused or failed to perform parental duties.
-5-
J-S08043-17
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child
to be without essential parental care, control or
subsistence necessary for his physical or mental
well-being and the conditions and causes of the
incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will
not be remedied by the parent.
* * *
(5) The child has been removed from the care of the
parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement
with an agency for a period of at least six months,
the conditions which led to the removal or placement
of the child continue to exist, the parent cannot or
will not remedy those conditions within a reasonable
period of time, the services or assistance reasonably
available to the parent are not likely to remedy the
conditions which led to the removal or placement of
the child within a reasonable period of time and
termination of the parental rights would best serve
the needs and welfare of the child.
* * *
(8) The child has been removed from the care of the
parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement
with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed
from the date of removal or placement, the
conditions which led to the removal or placement of
the child continue to exist and termination of
parental rights would best serve the needs and
welfare of the child.
* * *
(b) Other considerations.―The court in terminating
the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to
the developmental, physical and emotional needs and
welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be
terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors
such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing
and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the
parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to
-6-
J-S08043-17
subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider
any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions
described therein which are first initiated subsequent to
the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8); and (b).
“Parental rights may be involuntarily terminated where any one
subsection of Section 2511(a) is satisfied, along with consideration of the
subsection 2511(b) provisions.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1117
(Pa.Super. 2010).
Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The
party seeking termination must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the
statutory grounds for termination delineated in Section
2511(a). Only if the court determines that the parent’s
conduct warrants termination of his…parental rights does
the court engage in the second part of the analysis
pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the needs
and welfare of the child under the standard of best
interests of the child.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (internal citations omitted).
Termination under Section 2511(a)(1) involves the following:
To satisfy the requirements of [S]ection 2511(a)(1), the
moving party must produce clear and convincing evidence
of conduct, sustained for at least the six months prior to
the filing of the termination petition, which reveals a
settled intent to relinquish parental claim to a child or a
refusal or failure to perform parental duties. In addition,
Section 2511 does not require that the parent
demonstrate both a settled purpose of relinquishing
parental claim to a child and refusal or failure to
perform parental duties. Accordingly, parental rights
may be terminated pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1) if
the parent either demonstrates a settled purpose of
relinquishing parental claim to a child or fails to
-7-
J-S08043-17
perform parental duties.
Once the evidence establishes a failure to perform parental
duties or a settled purpose of relinquishing parental rights,
the court must engage in three lines of inquiry: (1) the
parent’s explanation for his…conduct; (2) the post-
abandonment contact between parent and child; and (3)
consideration of the effect of termination of parental rights
on the child pursuant to Section 2511(b).
In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 730 (Pa.Super. 2008) (internal citations
omitted). Regarding the six-month period prior to filing the termination
petition:
[T]he trial court must consider the whole history of a given
case and not mechanically apply the six-month statutory
provision. The court must examine the individual
circumstances of each case and consider all explanations
offered by the parent facing termination of his…parental
rights, to determine if the evidence, in light of the totality
of the circumstances, clearly warrants the involuntary
termination.
In re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa.Super. 2004), appeal denied, 582 Pa.
718, 872 A.2d 1200 (2005) (internal citations omitted).
The grounds for termination of parental rights under Section
2511(a)(2), due to parental incapacity that cannot be remedied, are not
limited to affirmative misconduct; to the contrary those grounds may include
acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental duties. In re
A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa.Super. 2002). “Parents are required to make
diligent efforts towards the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental
responsibilities.” Id. at 340. The fundamental test in termination of
parental rights under Section 2511(a)(2) was long ago stated in the case of
-8-
J-S08043-17
In re Geiger, 459 Pa. 636, 331 A.2d 172 (1975), where the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court announced that under what is now Section 2511(a)(2), “the
petitioner for involuntary termination must prove (1) repeated and continued
incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) that such incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal caused the child to be without essential parental care,
control or subsistence; and (3) that the causes of the incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied.” In Interest of Lilley,
719 A.2d 327, 330 (Pa.Super. 1998).
“Termination of parental rights under Section 2511(a)(5) requires
that: (1) the child has been removed from parental care for at least six
months; (2) the conditions which led to removal and placement of the child
continue to exist; and (3) termination of parental rights would best serve the
needs and welfare of the child.” In re Z.P., supra at 1118.
“[T]o terminate parental rights under Section 2511(a)(8), the following
factors must be demonstrated: (1) [t]he child has been removed from
parental care for [twelve] months or more from the date of removal; (2) the
conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to
exist; and (3) termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and
welfare of the child.” In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1275-76
(Pa.Super. 2003).
Under Section 2511(b), the court must consider whether termination
will meet the child’s needs and welfare. In re C.P., 901 A.2d 516, 520
-9-
J-S08043-17
(Pa.Super. 2006). “Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability
are involved when inquiring about the needs and welfare of the child. The
court must also discern the nature and status of the parent-child bond,
paying close attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing the
bond.” Id. Significantly:
In this context, the court must take into account whether a
bond exists between child and parent, and whether
termination would destroy an existing, necessary and
beneficial relationship. When conducting a bonding
analysis, the court is not required to use expert testimony.
Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as
well. Additionally, Section 2511(b) does not require a
formal bonding evaluation.
In re Z.P., supra at 1121 (internal citations omitted).
“The statute permitting the termination of parental rights outlines
certain irreducible minimum requirements of care that parents must provide
for their children, and a parent who cannot or will not meet the requirements
within a reasonable time following intervention by the state, may properly be
considered unfit and have his…[parental] rights terminated.” In re B.L.L.,
787 A.2d 1007, 1013 (Pa.Super. 2001). This Court has said:
There is no simple or easy definition of parental duties.
Parental duty is best understood in relation to the needs of
a child. A child needs love, protection, guidance, and
support. These needs, physical and emotional, cannot be
met by a merely passive interest in the development of the
child. Thus, this court has held that the parental obligation
is a positive duty which requires affirmative performance.
This affirmative duty encompasses more than a financial
obligation; it requires continuing interest in the child and a
genuine effort to maintain communication and association
- 10 -
J-S08043-17
with the child.
Because a child needs more than a benefactor, parental
duty requires that a parent exert himself to take and
maintain a place of importance in the child’s life.
Parental duty requires that the parent act affirmatively
with good faith interest and effort, and not yield to every
problem, in order to maintain the parent-child relationship
to the best of his…ability, even in difficult circumstances.
A parent must utilize all available resources to preserve
the parental relationship, and must exercise reasonable
firmness in resisting obstacles placed in the path of
maintaining the parent-child relationship. Parental rights
are not preserved by waiting for a more suitable or
convenient time to perform one’s parental responsibilities
while others provide the child with [the child’s] physical
and emotional needs.
In re B.,N.M., supra at 855 (internal citations omitted). “[A] parent’s basic
constitutional right to the custody and rearing of his…child is converted,
upon the failure to fulfill his…parental duties, to the child’s right to have
proper parenting and fulfillment of…her potential in a permanent, healthy,
safe environment.” Id. at 856.
Importantly, neither Section 2511(a) nor Section 2511(b) requires a
court to consider at the termination stage, whether an agency provided a
parent with reasonable efforts aimed at reunifying the parent with his
children prior to the agency petitioning for termination of parental rights. In
re D.C.D., 629 Pa. 325, 342, 105 A.3d 662, 672 (2014). An agency’s failure
to provide reasonable efforts to a parent does not prohibit the court from
granting a petition to terminate parental rights under Section 2511. Id. at
346, 105 A.3d at 675.
- 11 -
J-S08043-17
After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the
applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Robert A.
Sambroak, Jr., we conclude Father’s issues on appeal merit no relief. The
Orphans’ Court opinion comprehensively discusses and properly disposes of
the questions presented. (See Orphans’ Court Opinion, filed November 4,
2016, at 9-12) (finding: preservation of Father’s parental rights is not
acceptable option in this case; when court adjudicated Child dependent,
court informed Father that completion of his permanency plan goals was
necessary to obtain custody of Child; nevertheless, Father did little to
address any of his goals while Child was in placement; Father failed to
comply with his epilepsy treatment goal as demonstrated by Father’s failure
to take medication regularly, attend doctor’s visits, and submit to routine
bloodwork; in fact, Father’s noncompliance with doctor’s prescribed course
of action almost led to Father’s discharge from treatment; Father also failed
to comply with his housing goal, which required him to obtain safe and
suitable housing; Father lived in home without utilities from September 2015
to January 2016, and did not show any urgency to change his housing
situation; Father also continued to reside with unsuitable roommates, who
had lengthy criminal records; significantly, ECOCY’s attempts to address
housing with Father were further thwarted by Father’s decision to change
homes and phone numbers without updating ECOCY; additionally, no bond
exists between Father and Child; during visits, Father focused on his own
- 12 -
J-S08043-17
personal needs and failed to interact with Child; Father took interest in Child
only when Father believed Child would be adopted; Child’s pre-adoptive
home meets her needs and allows Child to reach her developmental
milestones; at this point, refusal to terminate Father’s parental rights will
leave Child in state of instability and confusion, which is not in her best
interest; thus, court properly terminated Father’s parental rights pursuant to
Sections 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b)). According, we affirm on the
basis of the trial court opinion and grant counsel’s petition to withdraw.
Decree affirmed; counsel’s petition to withdraw is granted.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/13/2017
- 13 -
Circulated 01/24/2017 10:28 AM
IN THE MATTER OF IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
THE ADOPTION OF OF ERIE COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
A,1'4,"'1, F. ORPHANS' COURT
DOCKET NO. 24 IN ADOPTION 2016
1925(a) OPINION
On September 8, 2016, a decree was entered terminating the parental rights of the natural
father, S~ F. ( 11FC\the, '') , to his minor child, I\• M, M · f'. He filed a
timely Notice of Appeal and a Statement oflntent to File Anders Brief. A review of the record
reflects there are no issues of merit and that the Agency met its burden in establishing grounds
for termination under 23 Pa. C.S.A. §251 l(a)(l), (a)(2), (a)(S), (a)(8), and (b) by clear and
convincing evidence. It is therefore respectfully requested the Superior Court affirm the decree.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTS
In March, 2015/'r,"4,M.f.was removed from the mother's care due to the mother's
significant cognitive limitations. At the time of the child's removal, .fa+her . was not the
primary caregiver for the child. Since her birth,. fal:1'ler .• had been only minimally involved in
the child's life. father has epilepsy, and, at the time of the child's removal, received no
regular medical care to treat his condition for at least one year. Court Summary, 1/25/16, p. 1.
On March 25, 2015, the child was adjudicated dependent. Each parent stipulated to the
facts underlying the basis for the adjudication, including 1 'f'at'ner 's minimal involvement
with the child, and untreated epileptic condition. Court Summary, 7/6115, p. 1.
A dispositional hearing took place on April 22, 2015.
A permanency review hearing followed on July 6, 2015. At the conclusion of this
hearing, the trial court ordered the child remain in foster care. Permanency Review Order,
7/8/15, p. 2. fC\+\iev- ,, though compliant with the treatment plan, had yet to obtain stable or
~I
1
-P. IJ. •1
F ILED
NOV 04 2016
Register of Wills
suitable housing. Domestic violence between his roommates was still an issue in his current
living arrangement. 'fo..\--her- was also not medically cleared by his neurologist to provide care
for his daughter unsupervised, though he was receiving medication to control his seizures. Court
Summary, 7/6/15, p. 6.
A second permanency review hearing took place on October 21, 2015. The trial court
was troubled by fut\ier .s new criminal charges, lack of suitable housing, and sporadic
participation with Healthy Families of America. Though' fa+-\rie( relocated in September,
2015, at the time of the October hearing, he had yet to connect utility services to the home.
Permanency Review Hearing Transcript, 10121/15, p. 12. See also Court Summary, 10/21/15, p.
5. On several occasions, when a caseworker went to , fu.\-\,er".s. . residence to determine its
suitability for visits, fa+~er ·~ roommates would not give the worker access to the home.
Permanency Review Hearing, 10121/15, p. 21. Due to fattier's living arrangements,
visitation was no longer permitted in the home by the Agency. Id. at 12.
Testimony from a caseworker established fa.the, was difficult to contact and that he
did not reach out for services. Permanency Review Hearing Transcript, 10/21/15, p. 10. He did
not have a reliable phone and switched phone numbers six times in as few as two months
preceding the review hearing. Permanency Review Hearing Transcript, 10/21/15, p. 19. See
also Court Summary, 10/21 /15, p. 7.
fart1er:.S neurological condition remained unaddressed. ra.tvier·.s , caseworker
accompanied him to his last neurological appointment in September, 2015. Staff informed the
worker that fa..\-her . was a "noncompliant patient" to the point where they were "thinking of
discharging him from the practice." Since April, 2015, the doctor's office ordered fc:n-\tlev : to
complete bloodwork on three separate occasions. Fa..\-h€r failed to follow through.
2
Permanency Review Hearing Transcript, 10/21/15, p. 11. The neurologist reported concerns
about f'a.+vie,·.s ability to successfully and safely parent and care for himself so long as his
neurological condition remained unaddressed. Court Summary, 10/21/15, p. 5.
Though concerned with Va..\-her's circumstances, lack of initiative and progress, the
Agency felt he required more time to remedy the issues, and expressed a desire to continue to
work with 'fi:H-her. Permanency Review Hearing Transcript, 10/21/15, p. 9-10. At the
conclusion of this hearing, reunification remained a goal though a concurrent goal of adoption
was added.
A third permanency review hearing took place on January 25, 2016. On this day,
ta\-h<2r was also arraigned on several minor misdemeanor criminal charges. The trial court
learned fctHer , continued to reside in the home he obtained in September, 2015 without utility
services. He then moved to a new residence with new roommates whose full names he did not
know. Permanency Review Hearing Transcript, 1/25/16, p. 41.
'fc;l\-\,er . also remained inconsistent with his neurological medication and treatment
recommendations, and failed to follow through with obtaining a blended case manager to help
him with his medical care. Permanency Review Hearing Transcript, 1/25/16, p. 17. His blood
work over the past year still indicated he had not consistently taken his medication.
At the time of the January hearing, rather only sporadically participated in treatment
with Healthy Families of America and still persisted in minimal follow-through. He missed at
least five scheduled visits. At least one of these misses occurred because he was "having
seizures and" was "out of it." Court Summary, 1125116, p. 7.
When fa.th.er appeared for scheduled visitation, his interactions and bond with the
child were minimal, until the visit prior to the January hearing, when 'fc:n·\,.er believed his
3
child was going to be put up for adoption. Court Summary, 1/25116, p. 8. See also Permanency
Review Hearing Transcript, 1/25116, p. 19.
Workers again testified it was often hard to reach 'fo.+ner because he did not have a
reliable phone or phone number. Permanency Review Hearing Transcript, 1125/16, p. 15.
After determining the Agency .made reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the need to
removel\.tvl.M.f .. from fu·H1.e, ., and that his circumstances remained unchanged, the Agency's
request to change the goal to adoption was granted. Services to ~i"her"' were terminated
and the child was placed in a pre-adoptive home. The Agency was directed to file a petition for a
termination hearing as soon as practicable.
Thereafter, 'f<.1-\-her appealed the change of goal. The Superior Court affirmed the trial
court's decision permitting the change of goal to adoption in a non-precedential decision filed on
August 22, 2016 at docket 340 WDA 2016.
The hearing to terminate fa\her·s parental rights was held on September 8, 2016.
f'a..\\-ler:.S noncompliance with his seizure medication, inability to emotionally connect with the
child and meet her needs, as well as his own, and inability to obtain or maintain stable housing
remained hallmarks of the Agency's case against Fo.\-her-
Testimony from caseworkers indicated fatner wasunable to maintain stable, safe, and
suitable housing. Brian Hillen, father 's caseworker for the Healthy Families America
Program, indicated he attempted to assist fa.tl