J-A18024-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
SUSAN J. COSGROVE AND HOWARD G. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
ESHLEMAN, AS CO-EXECUTORS OF THE PENNSYLVANIA
ESTATE OF IRENE M. ESHLEMAN
Appellees
v.
MANORCARE OF LANCASTER PA, LLC
D/B/A MANORCARE HEALTH SERVICES
LANCASTER, AND HCR MANORCARE,
INC., AND MANORCARE, INC.
Appellants No. 761 MDA 2014
Appeal from the Order Entered April 4, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County
Civil Division at No: 12-11713
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., STABILE, and MUSMANNO, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 13, 2017
This case returns to this Court following a remand from our Supreme
Court. On November 15, 2016, the Court granted the petition for allowance
of appeal filed by Appellants (collectively ManorCare), vacated our previous
order affirming the overruling of preliminary objections to compel arbitration
of claims brought under the Wrongful Death and Survival Acts, 1 and
remanded the case to us for further proceedings consistent with Taylor v.
Extendicare Health Facilities, Inc., ___A.3d___, 2016 WL 5630669 (Pa.
Sept. 28, 2016). Upon review, we reverse and remand.
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1
Respectively, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 8301 and 8302.
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Briefly, the claims arise from the death of Irene M. Eshleman, after she
was a resident at a nursing home operated by ManorCare.
We previously noted that wrongful death claims are not subject to
arbitration, because a decedent’s agreement to arbitrate is not enforceable
against the decedent’s wrongful death beneficiaries. Pisano v.
Extendicare Homes, Inc., 77 A.3d 651, 661 (Pa. Super. 2013). In our
previous decision, we relied exclusively on this court’s decision in Taylor v.
Extendicare Homes, Inc., 113 A.3d 317, 320 (Pa. Super. 2015), rev’d,
____A.3d _____, 2016 WL 5630669 (Pa. Sept. 28, 2016). We held that
Pa.R.C.P. No. 213(e), requires compulsive joinder of Survival Act claims and
wrongful death claims and such joinder does not violate the Federal
Arbitration Act.2 Unpublished Memorandum, 6/18/2015, at 2. Following
reversal in Taylor, it is clear that Pa.R.C.P. No. 213(e) does violate the
Federal Arbitration Act, and therefore is preempted. Taylor, 2016 WL
563069 at 16. This preemption requires that Appellants’ preliminary
objections to compel arbitration be sustained, and the wrongful death and
Survival Act claims be severed.
“The only exception to a state’s obligation to enforce an arbitration
agreement is provided by the savings clause, which permits the application
of generally applicable state contract law defenses such as fraud, duress, or
____________________________________________
2
9 U.S.C. § 2.
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unconscionability, to determine whether a valid contract exists.” Taylor,
2016 WL 5630069 at 14 (citations omitted). Appellees also argued that the
arbitration agreement is not enforceable because the designated arbitration
forum (the NAF) never was in a position to administer arbitration, and
further that the arbitration agreement is procedurally and substantively
unconscionable. Since the trial court did not address these issues, we
remand in accord with Taylor and further, to permit the trial court to
address these contract based defenses.
Order reversed. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/13/2017
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