FILED
Feb 15 2017, 10:26 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Steven E. Runyan James R. Williams
Justin Leverton Matthew L. Kelsey
Kroger, Gardis & Regas, LLP Defur Voran LLP
Indianapolis, Indiana Muncie, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Mint Management, LLC, and February 15, 2017
J&MW Holdings, LLC, Court of Appeals Case No.
89A01-1603-PL-496
Appellants-Plaintiffs.
Appeal from the Wayne Superior
v. Court
The Honorable Charles K. Todd,
City of Richmond, Indiana, Jr., Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
Appellee-Defendant.
89D01-1310-PL-44
Pyle, Judge.
Statement of the Case
[1] Appellants/Plaintiffs, Mint Management, LLC and J&MW Holdings, LLC
(collectively, “Property Owners”), appeal the trial court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of Appellee/Defendant, the City of Richmond, Indiana (“the
City”), on the Property Owners’ declaratory judgment claim. The Property
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Owners filed a claim for a declaratory judgment on the issue of whether they
were required to pay the City’s fee (“Stormwater Fee”) for financing its
stormwater system. The City filed a motion for summary judgment, and the
trial court granted the motion. It reasoned that all owners of real estate parcels
in Richmond were required to pay the Stormwater Fee pursuant to the language
of the City’s stormwater ordinance.
[2] On appeal, the Property Owners argue that we should interpret the City’s
stormwater ordinance as exempting their properties from the Stormwater Fee
because the stormwater runoff from their properties does not enter the City’s
stormwater system. Because we conclude that the language of the ordinance as
a whole requires all property owners in Richmond to pay the Stormwater Fee,
we conclude that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in
favor of the City.
[3] We affirm.
Issue
Whether the trial court erred when it granted summary judgment
in favor of the City.
Facts
[4] On April 16, 2007, the City adopted Ordinance No. 47-2006 (“the Ordinance”),
which created a Stormwater Management District in Richmond (“Stormwater
District”). The Stormwater District was created “for the purpose of managing
the stormwater collection and conveyance systems and activities in the [C]ity,
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establishing rates and charges for the users of the stormwater system of the
[C]ity[,] and other related matters.” (App. 234). In order to finance the
Stormwater District, Section 59.06 of the Ordinance, the “Stormwater Service
Charge” section, provided that:
A [Stormwater Fee] shall be imposed on each and every lot and
parcel of land within the City which directly or indirectly contributes
to the storm water system of the City, which charge shall be
assessed against the property owner thereof, who shall be
considered the user for the purposes of this chapter.
(App. 240) (emphasis added).
[5] The Property Owners, collectively, own four parcels of real estate (“the
Properties”) in Richmond. They retained a registered land surveyor who
investigated the drainage patterns of the Properties and determined that
stormwater runoff from the Properties did not drain directly or indirectly into
the City’s stormwater system. Based on these surveys, the Property Owners
filed separate claims against the City requesting a declaration that they were not
required to pay Stormwater Fees under the Ordinance since the Properties did
not “contribute to” the City’s stormwater system. (App. 240). They also
requested recovery of the Stormwater Fees they had already paid. The trial
court consolidated the claims, and the City moved for summary judgment
against the Property Owners on all claims on January 21, 2015.
[6] In its motion for summary judgment, the City argued that the Ordinance
imposed the Stormwater Fee against all real property within the City’s
boundaries, not just properties whose stormwater runoff drained into, or
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“contribute[d] to,” the City’s stormwater system. Accordingly, the City argued
that it was entitled to summary judgment on the Property Owners’ declaratory
judgment and recovery claims. In support of this argument, the City cited to
Ordinance Section 59.05, the “Definitions” section, and Ordinance Section
59.07, the “Stormwater Service Rate Establishment Procedures” section. Both
of those sections indicated that the Stormwater Fee was meant to apply to all
“user[s]” of the stormwater system. (App. 240). In Section 59.05, the
Ordinance defined “user[s] as all “property owner[s] benefitting from the
stormwater system.” (App. 44). The City then cited to language in INDIANA
CODE § 8-1.5-5-5, a section of the Ordinance’s enabling statute, that indicated
that all property owners were to be considered to benefit from the stormwater
system. Based upon this language, the City argued that the Ordinance as a
whole specified that all property owners in the City were required to pay the
Stormwater Fee because all property owners benefitted from the stormwater
system. The City also designated an affidavit from the District Engineer of the
Richmond Sanitary District in which the District Engineer averred that: “In
my professional opinion, the City of Richmond and its systems benefit[] all
parcels within the City, specifically including the parcels owned by the Plaintiffs
in this cause of action.” (App. 256).
[7] The Property Owners responded to the City’s motion for summary judgment
and argued that, per the language of Section 59.06 of the Ordinance, only
owners of those parcels “‘which directly or indirectly contribute[d] to the storm
water system of the City’” were required to pay the Stormwater Fee. (Property
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Owners’ Br. 8) (quoting App. 240). Because water on the Properties did not
flow into the City’s stormwater system, they argued that the Properties did not
“contribute to” the system and, therefore, they should not have to pay a
Stormwater Fee. (App. 240). The Property Owners did not, however, address
the other Ordinance sections regarding the definition of “user” and the intent of
the Ordinance to charge all property owners that benefitted from the
stormwater system.
[8] The trial court held a hearing on the City’s motion for summary judgment on
April 21, 2015. It then granted the City’s motion, agreeing with the City’s
arguments regarding the interpretation of the Ordinance and concluding that
the Ordinance imposed the Stormwater Fee against all real property within the
City’s boundaries regardless of any specific property’s contribution to the storm
water system. The Property Owners now appeal.
Decision
[9] On appeal, the Property Owners argue that the trial court erred in granting
summary judgment in favor of the City on their claims that they are not subject
to the Stormwater Fee provision of the Ordinance and that they may recover
their past Stormwater Fee payments. They argue that the City did not prove
that there were no genuine issues of material fact about whether they were
subject to the Ordinance.
[10] When reviewing the grant of a summary judgment motion, we apply the same
standard applicable to the trial court. Wagner v. Yates, 912 N.E.2d 805, 808
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(Ind. 2009). Summary judgment is proper only when there is a genuine issue as
to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Id. The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of making a
prima facie showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Goodwin v. Yeakle’s Sports Bar & Grill,
Inc., 62 N.E.3d 384, 386 (Ind. 2016). Once these two requirements are met by
the moving party, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to show the
existence of a genuine issue by setting forth specifically designated facts. Id.
Any doubt as to any facts or inferences to be drawn therefrom must be resolved
in favor of the non-moving party. Id.
[11] Here, the Property Owners’ claim was a request for declaratory judgment. The
Indiana Declaratory Judgment Act provides that:
Any person interested under a deed, will, written contract, or
other writings constituting a contract, or whose rights, status, or
other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal
ordinance, contract, or franchise, may have determined any
question of construction or validity arising under the instrument,
statute, ordinance, contract, or franchise and obtain a declaration
of rights, status, or other legal relations thereunder.
I.C. § 34-14-1-2.
[12] In support of their argument that the trial court erred when determining that
they were subject to the Ordinance’s Stormwater Fee provisions, the Property
Owners note that Section 59.06 of the Ordinance provides that:
A [Stormwater Fee] shall be imposed on each and every lot and
parcel of land within the City which directly or indirectly contributes
to the storm water system of the City, which charge shall be
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assessed against the property owner thereof, who shall be
considered the user for the purposes of this chapter.
(App. 240) (emphasis added). They contend that the language “directly or
indirectly contributes” authorizes the imposition of a Stormwater Fee for only
those property owners whose parcels add stormwater to the City’s stormwater
system. (App. 240).
[13] In response, the City points to the definition of “user” and the language in the
enabling statute and Ordinance indicating that the Ordinance applies to all
property owners within the boundaries of the City regardless of their
stormwater runoff. It argues that the Property Owners’ selective reading of the
four words of Section 59.06 of the Ordinance leads to an irrational and
disharmonizing interpretation of the Ordinance as a whole.1 We agree.
[14] Because the parties quote seemingly conflicting provisions of the Ordinance, we
must interpret the language of the Ordinance to determine whether real estate
property is subject to a Stormwater Fee even if it does not contribute
stormwater runoff to the stormwater system. We have previously described our
standard for interpreting ordinances as follows:
Interpretation of an ordinance is subject to the same rules that
govern the construction of a state statute. Words are to be given
their plain, ordinary, and usual meaning, unless a contrary
purpose is shown by the statute or ordinance itself. Where
possible, every word must be given effect and meaning, and no
1
Notably, the City does not challenge the results of the Property Owners’ property surveys demonstrating
that the stormwater runoff from the Properties does not drain into the City’s stormwater system.
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part is to be held meaningless if it can be reconciled with the rest
of the statute. The goal in statutory construction is to determine
and effect legislative intent. Courts must give deference to such
intent whenever possible. Thus, courts must consider the goals
of the statute, and the reasons and policy underlying the statute’s
enactment. If the legislative intent is clear from the language of
the statute, the language prevails and will be given effect.
Rollett Family Farms, LLC v. Area Plan Comm’n of Evansville-Vanderburgh Cty., 994
N.E.2d 734, 738 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). In addition, we “‘avoid interpretations
that depend on selective reading of individual words that lead to irrational or
disharmonizing results.’” ESPN, Inc. v. Univ. of Notre Dame Police Dep’t, 62
N.E.3d 1192, 1195 (Ind. 2016) (quoting West v. Office of Ind. Sec’y of State, 54
N.E.3d 349, 355 (Ind. 2016)).
[15] The Ordinance’s enabling statute is INDIANA CODE § 8-1.5-5, et seq (“the
Stormwater Act”), which allows a municipality to create a “special taxing
district for the purpose of providing for the collection and disposal of storm
water of the district . . . and for the purpose of levying special benefit taxes for
purposes of storm water collection and disposal.”2 I.C. § 8-1.5-5-5. The
Stormwater Act provides that the Board of a stormwater management district
“may assess and collect user fees from all of the property of the storm water district
for the operation and maintenance of the storm water system.” I.C. § 8-1.5-5-7
(emphasis added). In other words, this provision of the enabling statute
2
Section 59.01 of the Ordinance concerning the adoption of state law provides that the Ordinance adopts
“the provisions of [INDIANA CODE] § 8-1.5-5-1, [et seq], including any amendments or substitutions therein.”
(App. 235).
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authorizes city ordinances to assess a fee against all real estate parcels in the
city, without distinctions or exceptions. Other language in the Stormwater Act
is similarly broad and inclusive. Specifically, INDIANA CODE § 8-1.5-5-5
provides that “[a]ll territory in the district and all territory added to the district is
considered to have received a special benefit from the storm water collection
and disposal facilities of the district.” (Emphasis added).
[16] Like its enabling statute, the Ordinance includes language encompassing all
property owners within the City’s boundaries. Through this language, the
Ordinance clarifies that the Stormwater Fee is meant for all property owners
that benefit from the stormwater system and that all property owners benefit
from the system. Specifically, the Ordinance defines “Stormwater Service
Charge” as “[a] charge imposed on users of the stormwater system.” (App.
240). Then, the Ordinance specifies that “Customer (or User): Shall mean a
property owner benefiting from the stormwater system.” 3 (App. 237). These
definitions, in combination with the Stormwater Act’s language that “[a]ll
territory in the district and all territory added to the district is considered to have
3
The Property Owners argue that “the Ordinance overwrote the definition of ‘user’ and instead imposed a
more restrictive definition” when it provided that the Stormwater Fee “shall be imposed on each and every
lot and parcel of land within the City which directly or indirectly contributes to the stormwater system of the
City, which charge shall be assessed against the property owner thereof, who shall be considered the user for
the purposes of this chapter.” (Property Owners’ Br. 16; App. 213). The Property Owners claim that this
“definition” is more restrictive and, therefore, prevails over the definition in Section 59.05, the “Definition”
section of the statute. However, the case that the Property Owners cite in favor of this argument concerns
two conflicting statutes, not two provisions within one statute. We instead find that the Ordinance’s
definition of a “user” as “a property owner benefiting from the stormwater system” governs as it is in the
Ordinance’s “Definition” section. That section provides that “[f]or the purposes of this chapter, the
following definitions shall apply unless the context clearly indicates or requires a different meaning.” (App.
209). The context here does not require a different meaning.
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received a special benefit from the storm water collection and disposal facilities
of the district,” imply that all people who benefit from the stormwater system
must be charged a Stormwater Fee and that all property owners benefit from
the stormwater system. I.C. § 8-1.5-5-5. These provisions do not distinguish
properties based on the amount of stormwater they add to the system. Notably,
the City also designated an affidavit from the District Engineer of the
Richmond Sanitary District in which the District Engineer averred that: “In
my professional opinion, the City of Richmond and its systems benefit[] all
parcels within the City, specifically including the parcels owned by the Plaintiffs
in this cause of action.” (App. 256).
[17] In addition, it is clear that, even under the Property Owners’ interpretation of
the phrase “contribute to,” a property owner may “contribute to” the sewer
system even if stormwater runoff from his or her property does not drain into
the system. Specifically, the Ordinance’s definition of “stormwater system” in
Section 59.05 also includes City infrastructure relating to sanitary sewer
management. (App. 240). Specifically, it includes “combined sewers,” which
are defined as “[p]ipe[s] or conduit[s] primarily used to convey sanitary sewage
and secondarily intended to convey stormwater.” (App. 237, 240).
Accordingly, it appears that the system benefits everyone who utilizes any
sanitary sewer infrastructure, in addition to stormwater management
infrastructure. By extension, under the “indirectly or directly contributes”
language of Section 59.06 of the Ordinance, we interpret that a property owner
could also “indirectly or directly contribute[]” to the stormwater system if his or
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her sanitary sewage contributed to the stormwater system. (App. 240). Thus,
Section 50.06 does not implicate just stormwater runoff, as the Property
Owners suggest. There is no evidence in the record regarding the Property
Owners’ use of the sanitary sewer system, so that issue is not dispositive.
Nevertheless, the Ordinance’s inclusion of sanitary sewage usage as a basis for
its Stormwater Fee supports the interpretation that the Stormwater Fee was not
intended to be based solely on whether a property’s stormwater runoff drains
into the system.
[18] In light of the Ordinance’s language indicating that the Stormwater Fee was
intended to apply to all property owners in the City because all property owners
benefit from the stormwater system, we agree with the City that selectively
interpreting “directly or indirectly contributes to” to exclude properties such as
the Properties would create a disharmonious result with the remainder of the
Ordinance and its enabling statute. Accordingly, we conclude that all property
within a stormwater district “contributes to” that district even if its stormwater
does not drain into the stormwater district’s sewer system. Therefore, the
Ordinance’s Stormwater Fee provision did apply to the Property Owners, and
the trial court did not err when it granted summary judgment in favor of the
City. See ESPN, Inc., 62 N.E.3d at 1195 (quoting West, 54 N.E.3d at 355)
(explaining that we “‘avoid interpretations that depend on selective reading of
individual words that lead to irrational or disharmonizing results’”).
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[19] Affirmed.
Bradford, J., and Altice, J., concur.
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