NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted February 13, 2017
Decided February 15, 2017
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge
DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge
No. 16‐2468
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appeal from the United States District
Plaintiff‐Appellee, Court for the Central District of Illinois.
v. No. 12‐cr‐40031‐006
QUBID M. COLEMAN, Sara Darrow,
Defendant‐Appellant. Judge.
O R D E R
Qubid Coleman pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C.
§§ 846, 841(a)(1), and was sentenced in 2014 to 324 months’ imprisonment and 10 years
of supervised release. Coleman appealed, and we affirmed his conviction but remanded
for resentencing after the government conceded error concerning his conditions of
supervised release. See United States v. Coleman, 806 F.3d 941 (7th Cir. 2015). On remand
the district court resentenced Coleman to the same periods of imprisonment and
supervised release.
Coleman again filed a notice of appeal, but his appointed counsel asserts that the
appeal is frivolous and moves to withdraw under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
We invited Coleman to reply to counsel’s motion, but he has not responded. See 7TH CIR.
No. 16‐2468 Page 2
R. 51(b). Counsel’s supporting brief explains the nature of the case and addresses issues
that an appeal of this kind might be expected to involve, and because the analysis
appears to be thorough, we limit our review to the subjects that counsel discusses.
See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Wagner, 103 F.3d
551, 553 (7th Cir. 1996).
Counsel first discusses whether the appeal waiver that Coleman accepted as part
of his plea agreement makes this appeal frivolous. Counsel concludes that it does, but
we are less certain. In Coleman’s previous appeal, the government waived reliance on
his appeal waiver, and because we have not asked the government for its views about
counsel’s Anders motion, we hesitate to presume that this time the government would
seek to enforce the waiver to prevent consideration of appellate claims arising from the
resentencing.
We need not resolve the waiver issue since we agree with counsel that the only
possible appellate claims are frivolous. Because of the amount of crack (at least
280 grams) and his prior drug convictions, Coleman faced statutory minimums of life
imprisonment and 10 years of supervised release. The district court was authorized to
impose terms below those minimums only because the government had filed a motion
under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) and U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 to reward Coleman’s substantial
assistance in the prosecution of another suspect. And in exercising authority under
§ 3553(e), a district court cannot deviate from a statutory minimum except for reasons
related to the defendant’s cooperation. United States v. Spann, 682 F.3d 565, 566 (7th Cir.
2012); United States v. Johnson, 580 F.3d 666, 672–73 (7th Cir. 2009). Thus we would not
have appellate jurisdiction to review a contention that the sentencing court should have
been more generous in rewarding Coleman’s substantial assistance. Spann, 682 F.3d at
566. Moreover, as relates to the conditions of supervised release that prompted
Coleman’s resentencing, Coleman, 806 F.3d at 946, the district judge adequately justified
the revised conditions under the pertinent sentencing factors. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(d),
3553(a). The revised conditions had been disclosed to Coleman in advance of sentencing,
and as counsel recognizes, Coleman waived any appellate challenge by not objecting to
them. See United States v. Gabriel, 831 F.3d 811, 814 (7th Cir. 2016). And none of the
conditions imposed at resentencing are phrased in language we have criticized.
See, e.g., United States v. Kappes, 782 F.3d 828, 848–51 (7th Cir. 2015); United States v.
Thompson, 777 F.3d 368, 376–80 (7th Cir. 2015).
The motion to withdraw is GRANTED, and the appeal is DISMISSED.