16-1289
Prashad v. City of Hartford
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A
SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007 IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY
FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1.
WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY
MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE
NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A
COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at
2 the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
3 on the 16th day of February, two thousand seventeen.
4
5 PRESENT:
6 PIERRE N. LEVAL,
7 GUIDO CALABRESI,
8 SUSAN L. CARNEY,
9 Circuit Judges.
10 _________________________________________
11
12 HERMAN PRASHAD,
13 Plaintiff-Appellant,
14
15 v. No. 16-1289
16
17 CITY OF HARTFORD,
18 Defendant-Appellee.
19 _________________________________________
20
21 FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: JOHN R. WILLIAMS, New Haven, CT.
22
23 FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE: MELINDA B. KAUFMANN, Pullman &
24 Comley, LLC, Hartford, CT.
25
26 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the District of
27 Connecticut (Covello, J.).
1 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
2 ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the District Court entered April 18,
3 2016, is AFFIRMED.
4 Plaintiff-appellant Herman Prashad alleges that between 2011 and 2013, he suffered
5 workplace harassment on the basis of his ancestry and national origin while employed as a
6 certified science teacher in the Hartford public school system. He complained about the
7 harassment and was ultimately terminated from his teaching position on December 20, 2013.
8 Proceeding pro se, Prashad filed a lawsuit in Connecticut Superior Court against defendant
9 “Hartford Public Schools/City of Hartford” (“the City”), alleging that the City discriminated
10 and retaliated against him. The case was removed to federal court, and Prashad retained
11 counsel. Summary judgment was entered in the City’s favor on April 18, 2016. We assume
12 the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and the procedural history of the case, to
13 which we refer only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.
14 Prashad’s sole argument on appeal is that the District Court lacked subject-matter
15 jurisdiction over his case.1 He argues that, because his complaint, brought in state court,
16 explicitly cited a Connecticut statute and never mentioned federal antidiscrimination law, it
17 did not present a federal question and did not come within the jurisdiction of the federal
18 courts over federal questions under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
19 We reject Prashad’s jurisdictional argument. His complaint was ambiguous as to the
20 law invoked, notwithstanding its reference to a Connecticut statute, and it recited facts
21 sufficient to support a claim under federal antidiscrimination laws. Prashad never objected to
22 federal jurisdiction until this appeal. Even when counselled, he never told the District Court
23 that it was his intention to plead only a state claim, nor did he ever move for remand to the
24 state court. What is more, he repeatedly argued to the District Court that he should prevail
25 under the pertinent federal statute. Prashad is correct that the parties may not, by mere
26 consent, create federal jurisdiction where it is otherwise lacking. But his complaint was
27 ambiguous as to the source of law, and his conduct in the District Court constituted
1
During oral argument, Prashad expressly abandoned any challenge to the merits of the
District Court’s grant of summary judgment. We therefore have no occasion to address whether the
District Court’s reasons for granting summary judgment were sound.
2
1 acquiescence in resolving that ambiguity in favor of federal jurisdiction. See Vitarroz Corp. v.
2 Borden, Inc., 644 F.2d 960, 964-65 (2d Cir. 1981).
3 The District Court therefore properly exercised jurisdiction over the case.
4 ***
5 Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the District Court.
6
7 FOR THE COURT:
8 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
3