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[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 14-10981
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 5:12-cv-00026-WLS-CHW
LESTER J. SMITH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
BRIAN OWENS,
COMMISSIONER, GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
in his official and individual capacities,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia
________________________
(February 17, 2017)
Before WILSON and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges, and BUCKLEW, * District
Judge.
*
Honorable Susan C. Bucklew, United States District Judge for the Middle District of
Florida, sitting by designation.
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BUCKLEW, District Judge:
Lester Smith, a Georgia state prisoner, alleges the grooming policy enforced
in Georgia state prisons violates the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) 1 by substantially burdening his exercise of a sincerely
held religious belief that Islam requires him to grow an uncut beard. The district
court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, Brian Owens,
Commissioner of Georgia’s Department of Corrections (“GDOC”). Smith appeals,
contending that Holt v. Hobbs,2 a Supreme Court opinion issued after the district
court’s order, renders the district court’s analysis inadequate. After review, and
with the benefit of oral argument, we vacate and remand.
I. BACKGROUND
Smith filed a pro se action against Owens, arguing that he had been denied
his constitutional right to practice Islam by operation of a GDOC grooming policy
that forced him to shave his beard. He stated his belief that “cutting of the beard is
against a command from God in al-islam,” Doc. 1 at 4, No. 5:12-cv-00026-WLS-
CHW, and he sought nominal damages and injunctive relief for violations of
RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the First Amendment, and the Georgia constitution.
1
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq.
2
574 U.S. ——, 135 S. Ct. 853, 190 L. Ed. 2d 747 (2015).
2
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Owens filed a motion to dismiss, which the district court (by adoption of the
magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation) granted as to every claim except
Smith’s RLUIPA claim for injunctive relief against Owens in his official capacity.
While the motion to dismiss was pending, Smith filed a motion for summary
judgment, which the district court denied.
Owens then filed his own motion for summary judgment. He argued Smith
could not establish a prima facie case under RLUIPA. Owens explained that
though the GDOC’s grooming policy generally prohibited growing beards, Smith
qualified for a medical-condition exception that allowed him to grow a beard of ⅛
inch; consequently, Smith’s religious exercise was not substantially burdened. 3
Owens argued in the alternative that, even if the grooming policy substantially
burdened Smith’s religious exercise, it furthered compelling governmental interests
in security, discipline, hygiene, and safety by the least restrictive means.
Responding in opposition, Smith noted the inconsistency between allowing a
medical exception to the grooming policy but refusing religious accommodation.
He argued such an inconsistency demonstrated the GDOC was not employing the
least restrictive means of furthering its interests. In support, he identified an
alternative, less restrictive option:
3
Owens did not challenge the sincerity of Smith’s religious beliefs, nor did he challenge
Smith’s belief that growing a beard is central to his religious exercise. Doc. 114-2 at 4 n.1; Doc.
124 at 5.
3
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An alternative for both parties would be to revise the
G.D.O.C. grooming policy to allow not only muslims,
but all inmates to grow a beard no longer than ¼ . . . inch,
with respect to all other religions who are required to
wear a beard. This would be an absolute less restrictive
means that addresses and resolves the State’s underlying
interests, security, safety, and health concerns.
Doc. 117-1 at 3. He reiterated this alternative in what he styled as a “settlement
offer.” Doc. 122 at 2.
The magistrate judge recommended granting Owens’ motion for summary
judgment. In his Report and Recommendation, the magistrate judge reasoned that
Smith failed to present specific evidence of a substantial burden because Smith
was able to grow a ⅛-inch beard in accordance with the grooming policy’s medical
exception. Doc. 124 at 6. The magistrate judge also concluded Owens
demonstrated that the grooming policy furthered several compelling governmental
interests—security, discipline, hygiene, sanitation, and safety—by the least
restrictive means. Doc. 124 at 7–9. The district court adopted the Report and
Recommendation and entered judgment in favor of Owens. Doc. 125.
Smith appealed pro se. While Smith’s appeal was pending, the Supreme
Court held in Holt v. Hobbs that the Arkansas Department of Corrections’
grooming policy violated RLUIPA insofar as it prevented the plaintiff from
growing a ½-inch beard in accordance with his religious beliefs. 574 U.S. ——, —
4
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—, 135 S. Ct. 853, 867, 190 L. Ed. 2d 747 (2015). The GDOC then revised its
grooming policy to allow all inmates to grow a beard of up to ½ inch.
Smith grew a ½-inch beard after the policy revision, and Owens moved to
dismiss Smith’s appeal as moot, arguing Smith had received the relief he sought.
We denied Owens’ motion to dismiss, appointed Smith counsel, and ordered new
briefing. 4
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Mootness is a question of law that we consider de novo. Troiano v.
Supervisor of Elections, 382 F.3d 1276, 1282 (11th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).
We review a district court’s decision on summary judgment de novo and
apply the same legal standard used by the district court, drawing all inferences in
the light most favorable to the non-moving party and recognizing that summary
judgment is appropriate only where there are no genuine issues of material fact.
Rich v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 716 F.3d 525, 530 (11th Cir. 2013) (citation
omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
A. This Case Is Not Moot.
A federal court does not have authority to decide moot questions or declare
principles or rules of law that cannot impact the parties in the case before it. Id. at
4
Smith appeals only the district court’s summary judgment order on his RLUIPA claim
against Owens in his official capacity.
5
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531 (citation omitted). “‘[I]f, pending an appeal, events transpire that make it
impossible for this court to provide meaningful relief, the matter is no longer
justiciable.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Beta Upsilon Chi Upsilon Chapter
at the Univ. of Fla. v. Machen, 586 F.3d 908, 916 (11th Cir. 2009)).
Throughout the course of this litigation, Smith consistently expressed his
belief that cutting his beard (without qualification as to length) contravenes the
teachings of Islam. Although Smith articulated an alternative policy that would
allow all inmates to grow a ¼-inch beard, he expressed that alternative more than a
year and a half into litigation in response to Owens’ summary judgment motion.
And regardless of whether Smith intended that alternative as a compromise or as
an example of a less restrictive means of furthering the GDOC’s interests, it does
not alter the relief that he sought beforehand and afterward, once compromise was
off the table.5
The GDOC’s revised grooming policy does not permit Smith to grow an
uncut beard. Because we may still provide meaningful relief, this case is not moot.
5
“An unaccepted settlement offer—like any unaccepted contract offer—is a legal nullity,
with no operative effect. . . . [T]he recipient’s rejection of an offer leaves the matter as if no offer
had ever been made.” Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U.S. ——, ——, 133 S. Ct.
1523, 1533, 185 L. Ed. 2d 636 (2013) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted); see also Stein v. Buccaneers Ltd. P’ship, 772 F.3d 698, 703 (11th Cir. 2014)
(quoting Symczyk, for this proposition, with approval).
Furthermore, “[p]ro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings
drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed.” Tannenbaum v. United States,
148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (citation omitted).
6
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B. Holt v. Hobbs Requires the District Court to Focus Its Summary
Judgment Analysis on Application of the GDOC’s Grooming
Policy to Smith.
RLUIPA provides, in pertinent part:
No government shall impose a substantial burden on the
religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to
an institution . . . even if the burden results from a rule of
general applicability, unless the government
demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that
person—
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental
interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling governmental interest.
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). “The term ‘religious exercise’ includes any exercise of
religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.”
Id. § 2000cc-5(7)(A). To establish a prima facie case under RLUIPA, the plaintiff
must demonstrate that his engagement in religious exercise was substantially
burdened by the law, regulation, or practice he challenges. Knight v. Thompson,
797 F.3d 934, 943 (11th Cir. 2015) (“Knight II”). If he makes this prima facie
showing, the burden then shifts to the defendant to prove the challenged regulation
is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest. Id.
(citations omitted).
The Supreme Court clarified the analysis demanded by RLUIPA in Holt v.
Hobbs, in which the Court considered the Arkansas Department of Corrections’
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(“Department”) grooming policy and concluded that policy violated RLUIPA
insofar as it prohibited the petitioner from growing a ½-inch beard in accordance
with his religious beliefs. 574 U.S. at ——, 135 S. Ct. at 867. There was no dispute
as to the sincerity of the petitioner’s beliefs, and the Court concluded the petitioner
“easily satisfied” his obligation of demonstrating the grooming policy substantially
burdened his religious exercise. The Court explained:
The Department’s grooming policy requires petitioner to
shave his beard and thus to “engage in conduct that
seriously violates [his] religious beliefs.” If petitioner
contravenes that policy and grows his beard, he will face
serious disciplinary action. Because the grooming policy
puts petitioner to this choice, it substantially burdens his
religious exercise.
Id. at ——, 135 S. Ct. at 862 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. ——, ——, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2775,
189 L. Ed. 2d 675 (2014)).
The Court then addressed the Department’s burden of proving its grooming
policy was the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental
interest. The Department argued the grooming policy represented the least
restrictive means of furthering the “broadly formulated” and compelling interest in
prison safety and security, but the Court explained:
RLUIPA . . . contemplates a “more focused” inquiry and
“requires the Government to demonstrate that the
compelling interest test is satisfied through application of
the challenged law ‘to the person’—the particular
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claimant whose sincere exercise of religion is being
substantially burdened.” RLUIPA requires us to
“scrutiniz[e] the asserted harm of granting specific
exemptions to particular religious claimants” and “to
look to the marginal interest in enforcing” the challenged
government action in that particular context. In this case,
that means the enforcement of the Department’s policy to
prevent petitioner from growing a ½-inch beard.
Id. at ——, 135 S. Ct. at 863 (alteration in original) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at ——, 134 S. Ct. at
2779).
In its analysis, the Court reproved the district and circuit courts for their
“unquestioning deference” to the Department, and it explained that the test
Congress set forth in RLUIPA “requires the Department not merely to explain why
it denied the exemption but to prove that denying the exemption is the least
restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest.” Id. at ——,
135 S. Ct. at 864. The Court further explained: “‘The least-restrictive-means
standard is exceptionally demanding,’ and it requires the government to ‘sho[w]
that it lacks other means of achieving its desired goal without imposing a
substantial burden on the exercise of religion by the objecting part[y].’” Id.
(alterations in original) (quoting Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at ——, 134 S. Ct. at
2780). Moreover, “[i]f a less restrictive means is available for the Government to
achieve its goals, the Government must use it.” Id. (quoting United States v.
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Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 815, 120 S. Ct. 1878, 146 L. Ed. 2d 865
(2000)).
Finally, the Court discussed the Department’s failure to provide adequate
responses to two additional arguments implicated by the RLUIPA analysis. First,
the Department did not rationalize the substantial underinclusiveness of its
grooming policy, evidenced both by the policy’s exception for beards grown for
medical reasons and also by the fact that other more plausible vehicles for hiding
contraband (such as unshaved heads, shoes, and clothes) were permitted. Id. at
865–66. Second, the Department failed to demonstrate why it could not permit
inmates to grow ½-inch beards, while the vast majority of States and the federal
government permitted inmates to grow ½-inch beards for religious reasons or for
any reason at all. Id. at 866.
Following Holt, the Supreme Court granted the petition for writ of certiorari
in Knight v. Thompson, 723 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2013) (“Knight I”), vacated
judgment, and remanded for further consideration.6 In Knight I, Native American
inmates in the custody of the Alabama Department of Corrections (“ADOC”)
brought a RLUIPA claim challenging the ADOC’s hair-length policy. The
plaintiffs sought an exemption from the policy because it prohibited them from
wearing long hair, which was a central tenet of their religious faith. Id. at 1277. In
6
Knight v. Thompson, —— U.S. ——, 135 S. Ct. 1173, 191 L. Ed. 2d 130 (2015).
10
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Knight I, we affirmed the district court’s conclusion that the ADOC’s hair-length
policy did not violate RLUIPA, id. at 1287, and we reinstated that affirmance with
modifications in Knight II, 797 F.3d at 948. We concluded the district court’s
focused inquiry, factual findings, and extensive record distinguished that case from
Holt.7
But the focused inquiry, factual findings, and extensive record that
supported our affirmance in Knight II are not present in this case. And because the
Supreme Court’s guidance as to the proper RLUIPA analysis was not available to
the district court when it ruled on Owens’ summary judgment motion, additional
consideration is warranted.
First, in its analysis of whether Smith has established the GDOC’s grooming
policy substantially burdens his religious exercise, Holt requires the district court
to consider the choice that the grooming policy imposes on Smith: either to engage
in conduct that violates his sincerely held religious beliefs, or to face disciplinary
action. Second, Holt demands a more particularized, less deferential analysis as to
those issues for which the GDOC bears the burden, namely, whether the grooming
policy is the least restrictive means of furthering compelling governmental
interests. Specifically, Holt calls for an individualized, context-specific inquiry that
requires the GDOC to demonstrate that application of the grooming policy to Smith
7
Knight v. Thompson, 796 F.3d 1289, 1291–93 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam).
11
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furthers its compelling interests. It requires the GDOC to consider the “marginal
interest in enforcing” the grooming policy in Smith’s case.
IV. CONCLUSION
The district court in this case did not have the benefit of Holt v. Hobbs when
it considered Owens’ motion for summary judgment, and this case lacks the
evidentiary record that supported affirmance in Knight II. Because Smith’s case
was never analyzed in a manner consistent with Holt v. Hobbs—with respect to
substantial burden, compelling interests, or least restrictive means—and because
the GDOC has revised its grooming policy since the district court rendered its
decision, the district court’s order granting Owens’ motion for summary judgment
is vacated, and the case is remanded for further consideration. On remand, the
district court is instructed to analyze Smith’s RLUIPA claim as it relates to the
GDOC’s revised grooming policy in a manner consistent with Holt v. Hobbs.
VACATED AND REMANDED.
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