[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 09-14266 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JANUARY 19, 2010
Non-Argument Calendar
JOHN LEY
________________________
ACTING CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 07-00058-CV-WSD-3
RUFUS PRATER,
CAMELLIA RENEE PRATER,
Defendants-Appellees,
versus
ALLSTATE PROPERTY & CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
_________________________
(January 19, 2010)
Before DUBINA, Chief Judge, PRYOR and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Allstate Property & Casualty Insurance Company (“Allstate”)
appeals the district court’s order denying its post-trial motions for judgment as a
matter of law, or, in the alternative, a new trial. After reviewing the record, and
reading the parties briefs, we conclude that the district court correctly denied both
motions and affirm its order and the judgment entered on the jury’s verdict.
I. BACKGROUND
This appeal stems from a breach of contract action brought by Appellees
Camellia and Rufus Prater against Appellant Allstate. Allstate provided the Praters
with homeowner’s insurance coverage during a period that included June 3, 2006,
the day on which fire damaged a structure covered by the policy. After receiving
no definitive answer about the status of their claim, the Praters sued Allstate on
May 31, 2007, to adjudicate its liability on the insurance policy.
At trial, Allstate contested the accuracy of the inventory list submitted by the
Praters that sought to itemize household items destroyed by the fire. Allstate
alleged that the Praters breached the insurance contract by making material
misstatements in their claim of loss. Additionally, Allstate alleged that the Praters
breached the insurance contract by withholding from Allstate access to an off-site
storage facility where Rufus Prater stored household items after the fire. Allstate
claimed that the Praters’ refusal to grant access violated their duty of cooperation
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under the policy and thwarted Allstate’s attempts to properly adjust the claim of
loss. A jury rejected Allstate’s arguments and awarded the Praters recovery under
the policy for damages to the structure and its contents.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review the denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law de novo.
Chaney v. City of Orlando, 483 F.3d 1221, 1227 (11th Cir. 2007). We review the
denial of a motion for a new trial for an abuse of discretion. McWhorter v. City of
Birmingham, 906 F.2d 674, 677 (11th Cir. 1990).
III. DISCUSSION
Our review of motions made under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50 “is squarely and
narrowly focused on the sufficiency of the evidence.” Chaney, 483 F.3d at 1227.
Allstate contends that it presented overwhelming evidence from which no
reasonable jury could conclude that the Praters had fulfilled their contractual
obligations or met their burden of production at trial. Specifically, Allstate claims
that the Praters materially misrepresented their damages in their proof of loss form,
that they failed to cooperate with Allstate it its adjustment of their claim, and that
the Praters failed to produce evidence from which a jury could award damages
without undue speculation. All parties agree that Georgia law governs this contract
dispute.
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After our thorough and independent review of the record, we conclude that
the district court correctly denied Allstate’s motion for judgment as a matter of
law, and, consequently, did not abuse its discretion in denying Allstate’s motion
for a new trial. First, the evidence presented at trial showed a legitimate factual
dispute about the existence and materiality of the Praters’ alleged
misrepresentations. Under Georgia law, it is generally “a jury question as to
whether a misrepresentation may have actually affected the action of the insurer
with respect to settling or adjusting a claim.” Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Richardson, 457 S.E.2d 181, 184 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995). Although the Praters
admitted that some of the items included in their proof of loss form were not
actually damaged by the fire, it was up to the jury to decide whether those
particular items–most notably a set of wall clocks and neon lights–were material
with respect to the Praters’ overall claim, in excess of $200,000.
Second, the Praters’ compliance with the contract’s cooperation requirement
was a factual question appropriately reserved for the jury. Under Georgia law, a
“total failure” to cooperate under the policy’s terms may preclude recovery as a
matter of law, but if “the insured cooperates to some degree or provides an
explanation for its noncompliance, a fact question is presented for resolution by a
jury.” Diamonds & Denims, Inc. v. First of Ga. Ins. Co., 417 S.E.2d 440, 441-42
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(Ga. Ct. App. 1992). Here, Mr. Prater’s single refusal to allow Allstate to inspect
the storage facility, when considered in context with his decision to move the
contents of the facility back to the damaged property before Allstate’s inspection
and his other acts of cooperation during the adjustment period, does not amount to
a “total failure” of cooperation that precludes recovery under the policy as a matter
of law.
Finally, the damage estimates presented to the jury allowed it to arrive at its
verdict with the “reasonable certainty” required by Georgia law. See Crankshaw v.
Stanley Homes, Inc., 207 S.E.2d 241, 243 (Ga. Ct. App. 1974). Testimony about
the amount of damages by the party claiming loss is sufficient evidence from
which to calculate an award. See id. at 243-44. Here, the amount of damage to the
Praters’ structure is undisputed, and the Praters’ testimony about the contents of
the inventory list and value of those items was sufficient evidence from which the
jury could make an award with reasonable certainty.
IV. CONCLUSION
The district court correctly denied Allstate’s motions made under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 50. The district court properly submitted to the jury questions about the
materiality of the errors on the Praters’ proof of loss form and the sufficiency of
their cooperation with Allstate under the policy’s terms. Finally, it was permissible
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for the jury to credit the Praters’ testimony about their damages in calculating the
damage award. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order and its judgment
entered on the jury’s verdict.
AFFIRMED.
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