THE A~TORXEY GENERAL
OF TEXAS
September 18, 1990
Honorable Ernestive V. Glossbrenner Opinion No. ~~-1225
Chairperson
House Public Education Committee Re: Use of a "paging
P. 0. Box 2910 device" on school prop-
Capitol Bldg., Room 302D erty or at a school
Austin, Texas 78768-2910 function (RQ-1942)
Dear Representative Glossbrenner:
You ask whether a car telephone is a "paging device"
for purposes of section 21.309 of the Education Code, which
provides as follows:
(a) A student in a public school may not
possess a paging device while on school pro-
perty or while attending a school-sponsored
or school-related activity on or off school
property, unless the student is in attendance
in the capacity of an active member of a
volunteer firefighting organization or a
volunteer emergency medical services
0rganLzation.
(b) The board of trustees of each school
district shall include the prohibition in
Subsection (a) of this section in the
district's written standards of student
conduct. A student who violates the
prohibition is subject to discipline as
provided by board policy, consistent with
this subchapter.
(c) A person who discovers a student in
possession of a paging device in violation of
this section shall report the violation to
the appropriate school administrator,
determined by school policy, who shall ordEE
a peace officer or appropriate school
employee to confiscate the device, which is
forfeited to the school district.
p. 6503
Honorable Ernestive V. Glossbrenner - Page 2 (JM-1225)
(d) In this section, 'naaina device' means
a telecommunications device that emits an
audible sianal. vibrates. disDlavs a messaaec
or otherwise summons or delivers a
communication to the oossessor.
The components of the definition of "paging device" are
(1) that it be a telecommunications device and (2) that it,
by some means, summon or deliver a communication to the
possessor. A car telephone is a telecommunications device.
See Webster's Ninth Collegiate Dictionary (1984) (defining
"telecommunication*' as "communication at a distance as by
telephone or television"). The remaining question is
whether a car telephone summons or delivers a communication
"to the possessor.11
We note that the requirement is that the device
actually summon or deliver a communication to its possessor,
not merely that it have the capacity to do so. A car
telephone would be able to summon its possessor only if its
possessor were able to hear or otherwise perceive its
signal. Consequently, a student who parked on school
property would be on school property and subject to the
summons of a car phone upon arrival at and departure from
school or a school activity.1 Although that would be
sufficient to bring the student within the literal language
of the prohibition set out in section 21.309, the
legislative history indicates that the legislature did not
intend that the prohibition be applied so broadly.2
The bill analysis prepared in regard to section 21.309
of the Education Code sets out the following background
information:
1. We assume that a student would "possess" a car
telephone for purposes of section 21.309 if it were in his
custody during the school day or during a school activity.
See ae nerallv ValCarCel v. State, 710 S.W.2d 368, 372 (Tex.
APP. - Amarillo 1986, no pet.) (defining llpossession'* for
purposes of crime of possession of contraband).
2. If the definition of "paging device" is taken
absolutely literally, it would prohibit students from
possessing car radios on school property since car radios
are telecommunications devices that emit an audible signal
and deliver a message to their possessor.
P. 6504
Honorable Ernestive V. Glossbrenner - page 3 (JM-1225)
,-
The presence of paging devices on the
campuses of the large, urban districts is
increasing. Teachers and administrators
report that this presence is disruptive to
the educational process when these devices
are activated in an educational setting. In
addition, there is concern that these devices
are being used to facilitate the dealing of
illegal drugs.
Bill Analysis, S.B. 424, 71st Leg. (1989). Unless students
attending classes or school activities could perceive the
signal emitted by a car telephone, it seems unlikely that a
car telephone would be disruptive to the educational
process. Also, if access'to car telephones is limited to
time of arrival and time of departure, car phones would do
no more to .facilitate drug transactions than any other
telephone in the vicinity of the school.
If a particular school district finds that car
telephones are in fact disruptive, it has the authority to
adopt reasonable rules regulating their presence on school
property. See Texarkana Inden. School Dist. v. Lewis, 470
.- S.W.2d 727 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1971, no writ); Educ.
Code §§ 23.26, 21.301.
SUMMARY
Section 21.301 of the Education Code
does not prohibit the presence of car
telephones in cars parked on school property.
Individual school districts have authority to
adopt disciplinary rules regarding car
telephones.
ruly
very
s A
Y ,
A
JIM MATTOX
Attorney General of Texas
WARY KELLER
First Assistant Attorney General
LOU MCCREARY
Executive Assistant Attorney General
Pm 6505
Honorable Ernestive V. Glossbrenner - Page 4 (JM-1225)
JUDGE ZOLLIE STKAKLEY
Special Assistant Attorney General
RENEA HICKS
Special Assistant Attorney General
RICK GILPIN
Chairman, Opinion Committee
Prepared by Sarah Woelk
Assistant Attorney General
-.
p. 6506