Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion

The Attorney General of Texas JIM MAlTOX , llarch24, 1986 AttorneyGeneral Supreme Cowl Building Mr. James Ken Newman Opinion No. ~~-457 P. 0. BOX 12548 Chairman Austin. TX. 78711. 2548 5121475-2501 Texas State Board of Registration Re: Validity of proposed dis- Telex 91olB74.1387 for Professioni: Engineers ciplinary rule of the Board of Telecopier 512I475-0266 P. 0. Drawer 1832') Registration for Professional Austin, Texas 7:3760 Engineers 714 Jackson. Suite 700 Dallas. TX. 75202-4506 Dear Mr. Newman: 214il428944 You wish to !mow whether a proposed amendment to the Board of Registration for Professional Engineers Rule 131.151, revising 4B24 Alberta Ave.. Suite 180 El Paso, TX. 799052793 Disciplinary Rule 5.4, is within the authority of the board to 9154533.3484 promulgate. We conclude that it is not. Disciplinary :Rule5.4 presently reads as follows: 1001 Texas, Suite 700 Houston, TX. 77002-3111 (iv) DR 5.4.. It shall be a violation of the 713/223-5888 Texas Engineering Practice Act for a registrant to submit or request a competitive bid to perform 806 Broadway, Suite 312 engineering services for any state agency, poli- Lubbock. TX. 79401.3479 tical stibdivision,county, municipality, district, 806/747-5238 authority, or publicly owned utility of the State of Texas, or for any agency of dther entity of the 4309 N. Tenth. Suite B federal government, when the procurement of such McAllan, TX. 78501-1685 professional services is in violation of the 5121882.4547 state's Professional Services Procurement -Act or the Federal Property and Administrative Services 200 Main Plaza. Suite 400 Act of 1949, as amended, respectively. San Antonio. TX. 78205-2797 51212254191 (I) For purposes of this disciplinary rule, the board has adopted the Supreme Court of Texas' definition of competitive bidding, which in part An Equal Opportunity/ Affirmative Action Employer is as follows: Compe,titive bidding . . . contemplates a bidiiing on the same undertaking upon each of the same material items covered by the con- tract.;upon the same thing. It requires that all bidders be placed upon the same plane of equality and that they each bid upon the same terns and conditions involved in all the items and parts of the contract, and that the p. 2082 Mr. James Ken Nwman - Pa& 2 (J&457)'* ) proposal specify as to all bids the same, or substantially s.imilarspecifications. (Texas Eighway C~~wission v. Texas Association of Steel Importers: Inc., 372 S.W.2D 525, Texas 1963); however, * (II) the engineer shall not be considered in violation of the Act in cases where his engineering serr:lces may legally be offered, furnished, or plxformed as an integral part of research and development programs, construction projects, manuflxtured products, processes, or devices, which are to be offered, performed, supplied, or obts:Lnedon the basis of competitive bids. The proposed amendment reads as follows: (iv) DR 5.4. As public policy, competitive bidding for professional engineering services for public works is ,prohibited by state and federal law, and particip~ationin such bidding activities by any engineer registered in this state shall be considered a.vi~~:lationof the Texas Engineering Practice Act. I. Where there is a competitive situation in the procurement of professional engineering services by aqy state agency. political sub- division, coulty, municipality, district, authority, or publicly owned utility of the State of Texas, or by any agency or other entity of the federal govermect, all registered engineers involved will sseure that such professional contracts are awarded in conformance with the .approprlate procurement laws; that selection of the best engineer for the contract is sought and made on the bas.ls of demonstrated competence and overall qualifications, subject to negotiation of a fair and reescoable fee; that only after selec- tion by the pub:.icagency on the basis of demon- strated compete& and overall qualifications will the engineer pr&de proposed or estimnted costs for that project-and enter into negotiations with the public agene; concerning a fair and reasonable fee for the eng$eering services to be rendered; and that if an zpeement cannot be reached on the amount of a fair and reasonable fee, the engineer shall terminate-negotiations and withdraw from consideration, ;Ild the next best engineer max p. 2083 Mr. James Ken Newman - Page :3 (JM-457) iwarded. (Emphasis added). Essentially the proposed amendment to Disciplinary Rule 5.4 would require a bifurcated process whenever a professional engineer is to be selected to work on a publLc project. The first stage of the process involves selection of an er.gineerby the public agency on the.basis of "demonstrated skill and overall qualifications"; only after selection may the engineer provide ir.formationas to proposed or estimated costs and then enter into negotlr.tionswith the public agency. The process set forth in the proposed amendment substantially tracks the process set f#orth in the federal statutes governing selection by federal agemies of architects and engineers. See 40 U.S.C. 55541 et seq. IO 1:h.e first stage of the federal processeach agency head requests data from architectural and engineering firms and, for each proposed pro:e:ct,evaluates such data, together with any such information submitted by other firms. After discussions with no less than three firms, ani, on the basis of established and published criteria, the agency selecta no less than three firms deemed to be the most highly qualified to provide the services required. In the second stage of the process, the agency head then enters into negotiation with the firm selected a3 the most qualified. If the agency head cannot negotiate a satisfactory contract with the first firm selected, he shall enter into negotj.ationswith the second firm chosen, and so on with the third. Generally, the power:3 of an administrative agency are derived entirely from legislative enactment. Corzelius v. Railroad Commis- sion, 182 S.W.2d 412, 415 (Tax. Civ. App. - Austin 1944, no writ); broad Commission v. Fact Worth & Denver City Railway Co., 161 S.W.2d 560. 561 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1942, writ ref'd w.o.m.). An agency has only such powers as are expressly conferred on it by statute, Stauffer v. City Iof San Antonio, 344 S.W.2d 158. 160 (Tex. 1961); Railroad Commissior~v. Fort Worth h Denver City Railway Co., s, together with those powers necessarily implied from powers and duties expressly given or imposed. City of Sherman V. Public Utility Commission~of Texas, 643 S.W.2d 681, 686 (Tex. 1983); Brown v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 83 S.W.2d 935, 941 (Tex. 1935). If the statutes do not grant an agency thtspower fo do a thing, then it has no such power. Nueces County Water Control and Improvement District v. Texas Water Rights Commission, 4gl S.W.2d 924, 929 (Tex. Civ. App. -Austin 1972. writ ref'd n.r.e.). You contend that the board is conferred authority to promulgate. the rule you propose by section 8(b) of article 3271a. V.T.C.S.. the Texas Engineering Practice Act, which contains the following in pertinent part: "The [bloard may p. 2084 Mr. James Ken N-n - Page 4 (m-457) , promulgate rules restricting competitive bidding." We conclude for two reasons that the above sentence confers no such authority. First, without specif>%ng the contours which eny rule promulgated by the board to restrict c,ompetitivebidding may take, we conclude that any rule so promnlgllted cannot reach a situation in which a political subdivision of the state seeks to procure the profrssional services of an engineer. The procedure by which political subdivisions of this state are governed with respect to l:heprocurement of professional services is article 664-4, V.T.C.S., which provides the following: Section 1. Th!isAct shall be known and may be cited as the 'Irofessioaal Services Procurement Act.' Sec. 2. For 'purposes of this Act the term 'professional services' shall mean those within the scope of the practice of accounting, architec- ture , optometry, medicine or professional engi- neering as defined by the laws of the State of Texas or those performed by any licensed archi- tect, optometrist, physician, surgeon, certified public accountant or professional engineer in connection with his professional employment or practice. No state agence, political subdivision, Sec. 3. -- county, municipality, district, authority or publicly-owned utility of the State of Texas shall make any contract for, or engage the profess- services of.~any-licensed physician, optometrist, surgeon, archite&, certified public accountsnt z registered engio&, or any group or association thereof, selectezx the basis of competitive bids submitted for su+ contract or for such services to be performed!-but shall select and award such contracts and enE:agesuch services on the basis of demonstrated competence and qualifications for the type of professIona services to be performed and at fair and rearznable prices, as long as profes- sional fees are-consistent with and ndt higher than the publi&:d recommended practices and fees of the various ~%pplicable professional associa-. tions and do nc; exceed the maximum provided by any state law. Sec. 4. Any and all such contracts, agreements or arrangements for professional services nego- tiated, made or entered into, directly or p. 2085 Mr. James Ken N-n - Page 5 (JM-457) indirectly, by any agency or department of the State of Texas, county, municipality, political subdivision, district, authority or publicly-owned utility in any wily in violation of the provisions of this Act or any part thereof are hereby declared to be void as contrary to the public policy of this State and shall not be given effect or enforced by any Court of this State or by any of its public of:ficers or employees. (Emphasis added). Section 8 of Acts 1971, Sixty-second Legislature, chapter 38. page 73, the emergency provision of the Act, contains the following language detailing the public policy considerations prompting the passage of the Act: The fact thatf:he selection of certified public accountants, architects, physicians, optometrists, surgeons and professional engineers on the basis of the lowest bitiplaces a premium on incompetence and is the most l&sly procedure for selecting the least able or qt;lified and the most incompetent practitioner fo:; the performance of services vitally affecting the health, welfare and safety of the public .uld that; in spite of repeated expressions of the legislature excepting such professional serrices from statutes providing for competitive bii,ding procedures, some public officers contints to apply competitive bidding procedures to the selection of such professional personnel, creates an emergency of the greatest public importan~x to the health, safety and welfare of the people of Texas. . . . (Emphasis added).. BY whatever phrase the means by which political subdivisions procure professional serxlces is called, it is manifestly not .. "competitive bidding." The legislature has unequivocally declared its intent that political subdivisions of this state not procure profes- sional services through the process commonly known as "competitive bidding." Any statute which confers to a licensing agency the authority to restrict the competitive btdding practices of its licensees could not reach itsituation in which a political subdivision seeks the professional se,rvlces of an engineer because political subdivisions cannot procure professional services by competitive bidding. Section 8(b) can logically only reach those situations in which the practice of competitive bidding is not otherwise forbidden by law or is affirmatively permitted or required; such a rule could z reach a situation in which competitive bldding is affirmatively prohibited. p. 2086 Ur. James Ken Newman - Page 6 m-4571 There is a second, ev~1 mar+ compelling, reason. Even if we were to assume arguendo that se:lclon8(b) somehow provides authority 'for the board to promulgate the amendment whfch you propose, we would have to declare that the rule is in violation of Texas statutory law, specifically article 664-4, V.T.C.S. The rulemaking power of adminis- trative agencies does not permit the promulgation of rules which are inconsistent with the expression of the legislature's intent ic statutes other than those under which the rules are promulgated. Thus, when the legtslature acts with respect to a particular matter, the administrative agency myy not so act with respect to the marter as to nullify the legislature's actions, even though the matter is within the agency's regulatory f:Leld. State v. Jackson, 376 S.W.2d 341, 344-45 (Tex. 1964); -- Hartjnez v. Texas Employment Commission, 570 S.W.2d 28, 31 (Tex. Civ. QI. - Corpus Christ1 1978, no writ). In a brief submitted to this ofMce in support of your proposed amendment, It is suggested that thaz proposed rule governs the conduct of registrants of your board only, that it in no way regulates the procedures to be employed by the political subdivisions themselves. This suggestion is disingaluous at best. The amendment which you propose would effectively tislpose on state and local governments the same procedures which the United States Congress has imposed on the federal government. The proposed rule vio:latasthe Professional Services Procurement Act in at least two ways. First, article 664-4, V.T.C.S.. does not contemplate a bifurcated Iprocess; rather, the act requires that political subdivisions musl: award contracts for professional services in a one-step process to a professional who is selected on the basis of demonstrated competence and quali- fications for thlrtype of professional services to be performed and at fair and reasonable prices, as long 8s professiolaalfees are consistent with and not higher than t,h,e published recommended practices and fees of th various applicable professional associations and d,onot exceed the maximum provided by any state law. V.T.C.S. art. 664-4, 53. If the Texas Legislature had intended that state agencies and local governments amploy a two-step procedure similar to that set forth in the federal act when procuring profes- sional services, it could have done so. But it clearly did not. Second, the proposed ruk, would effectively eviscerate the clear statutory requirement tha: fees be considered as a factor in the awarding of such contracts for professional services. As we stated in Attorney General Opinion JN-155 (1984). The clear terns of the Act itself do not merely p+rmit the consideration by the agency of the fees charged for certain professional services, but require it. Whi:lethe Act expressly prohibits the p. 2087 Hr. James Ken Newman - Page 7 (Jl'f-452) awarding of contracts for certain professional services on the ‘basis of competitive bids, it clearly requires an agency to award such contracts 'on the basis oE demonstrated competence and quallflcatlons for the type of professional services to be plarformed and at fair and reason- able prices.' V.T.C.S. art. 664-4, 03 (emphasis added). Section 3 goes on to require that such professional fees be 'consistent with and not higher than the 'published recommended practices and fees for the various applicable professional associations ani. do not exceed, the maximum provided by any state law.' Therefore, the imposition of fees must be one factor considered by any agency in awardingacontract for such professional services; however, it cannot be the a factor to be cousidered. Accordingly, we conclude that the proposed amendment to Disciplinary Rule 5.4 by the board is not authorized by the Texas Engineering Practice Act. S U-M M ARY The Board of Registration for Professional Engineers is not (conferredauthority by the Texas Engineering Pra,:tices Act to promulgate its proposed amendment to board Rule 131.151 revising Disciplinary Rule 5.4. JIM HATTOX Attorney General of Texas JACK HIGETOWFR First Assistant Attorney Goneral MART KZLLBR Executive Assistant Attormy General ROBERT GRAY Special Assistant Attorney General RICK GILPIN Chairman. Opinion Committe~z Prepared by Jim Moellinger Assistant Attorney General p. 2088