The Attorney General of Texas
September 11, 1980
MARK WHITE
Attorney General Honorable Hamp Atkinson, Chairman Opinion No. MW-239
Committee on Pllblic Education
House of Representatives Re: Length of school term as the
Austin, Texas term is used in section 21.301,
Education Code
Dear ChairmanAtkinson:
You have requested our opinion regarding the meaning of “current
term” as used in section 2L3Olfa) of the Education Code. That statute
provides:
The beard of trustees of eny school district may
suspend from the privileges of the schools any pupil
found guilty of incorrigible conduct, but such
suspension shall mt extend beyond the current term
of the schooL
The State Board of Education has defined “school term” for accounting
purposes as:
that period of time a school district is scheduled
to be in operation includw inservice trainii and
classroom instruction. The period begins with the
first day of scheduled inservice training as indicated
in the school calendar and ends with the beginning of
the sllbsequentschool term.
On August 7,1978, the Commissioner of Education rendered a decision which
supports the application of the State Board’s definition to section 2L30l(a).
In that case, Abbey v. Hardin-Jefferson Independent School Dist., Docket
No. 77-R124, State Commissioner of Education, Algust 7, 1978, a student
had~been suspended in October, 1977, for the remainder of the school year.
The student contended, inter alia, that such a suspension contravened the
Education Code. The Commissioner, while holding that the particular
suspensionwas improper, nevertheless stated:
The ordinary and usual interpretation by this
agency of the word “term”, in section 2L301, Texas
Eucation Code, is school year. The word “term” does
not refer to either a semester cr a quarter in that
context. 3 at 4.
p. 758
Honorable Hamp Atkinson - Page Two (HIV-239)
Aacordirgly, the Commissioner held that, under section 21.301,a school district was
entitled to suspenda student “for the remainder of the school year.” g at 4.
It is well established that an administrative construction of sn ambiguousstatute
should be followed tmleas it is clearly unreasonable. Calvert v. Kadane, 427 S.W. 2d
605 (Tex. 1968); Thompson v. Calvert, 301 S.W. 2d 496 ‘(Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1957,no
writ). Although the 66th Legislature, which convened five months subsequent to the
Commissioner’s decision in Abbey, extensively amended section 21.301,it did not alter
the Commissioner~sconstructton of “current term.” As a result, we must conclude
that, for purposes of section 21.301(a)of the Education Code, “current term” means the
period beginning with the first day of scheduled inserviae training and ending with the
first day of scheduled inservice training the following year.
SUMMARY
For purposes of section 2L3Ol(a) of the E&cation Code,
“current term” means the period beginning with the first day of
scheduled inserviaa trainii and ending with the fit day of
scheduled inservice training the following year.
2*
MARK WHITE
Attorney General of Texas
JOHN W. FAINTER,JR.
First Assistant Attorney General
Prapared by Rick Gilpin
Assistant Attorney General
APPROVED:
OPINIONCGMMHTEE
C. Robert Heath, Chairman
Jon Bible
SusanGarrison
Rick Gilpin
Iris Jones
Bruce Youngblood
p. 759