Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion

Ron. J. W. Edgar Opinidn NO. M- 1236 Commiaaioner of Education Texas Education Agency Re: Whether the interest 201 East 11th Street of trustees of an Austin, Texas .78701 independent school district in certain contracts with the district renders said Dear Dr. Edgar.: contracta.void Your recent letter requesting the opinion of this office concerning the referenced matter poaea the following questions: "1. School district trustee A (of the district) currently is an administrative employee (not an officer) of X-oil company. Like other such employees, he purchases from his salary stock in the company. As compared to total shares outstanding, his stock ownership is inapprectiable. "Y-company is a franchise distributor.of gaso- line and lubrication products purchased from X-oil company. Assuming, where applicable, compliance with Sections 21.901(a) and (d), Texas Education Code (1971) V.T.C.S.-- “Query 1:’ Legally, may a school district pur- chase from Y-company gasoline and/or lubr$cat+on products; viz., from a local diatkibutor for X-oil company in which a trustee of the diatrict'owna shares of stock? “2 . Another trustee, B, is a stockholder in W-company. Presently he owns 100 shares of a total -6053- . - ‘non. ‘J. w,. Edycw,. I’aqc 2, (M-1Lj6) 3.000 outstanding. When a contemplated reorgan- ization is completed, he will own 620 shares out of 6,480. "Query 2: Legally, may the school ~diatricc purchase products and/or services from W-company-- in which trustee'B is a stockholder? "3. The same school district owns 12 acres of land which, when bought,.waa acquired for school construction purposes. Now. the land because of commercial development in the area is not regarded to be serviceable as a school site. Recently, W-company -{inwhich,truatee B holds stock) offered to buy the land. An option to purchase the tract .waa approved by the school board.. "Assuming compliance with Arti,cle 542lc-12; V.T.C.S., and Section,23.30, Texas-Education Code (1971)-V.T.C.S., "Query' 3! Legally, may the achbol district board sell and convey the land to W-company--be it determined the successful bidder--, where trustee B is a ~atockholder in W-company?" We believe your three queations pose, in essence, but one issue to be resolved: May the board of trustee3 of an independent school district legally contract with a, company In which one of itatrusteea is a stockholder? For purposes of this Opinion, we assume, as stated in your l.etter, that Sections 21.901 and 23:30, Texas Education Code, and/or Article 5421c-12, where' applicable, have been complied with. While Texas has a penal statute (Article 373, Vernon's Penal Code) and a civil sta!ute (Article 2340, Vernon's Civil Statutes) prohibiting contractual conflicts of interest between -6054- city and county officials and the entities such officials repreaent, there is no statutory prohibition in the Texas tducation Code applicable to contractual conflicts of interest of school board trustees. However, conflicts of interest of school board trustees have long been held viola- tive of the common law of this State, and.contracts involving such conflict have'been held void and ,againstpublic policy. 47 Tex.Jur.2d 160, Public Officers, Sec. 121; Edinburq. v. Ellis, 50 S.W.Zd 99 (Tex.Comm.App. 1933); Cornutt v. Clay County!, 75 S.W.2d 299 (Tex.Civ.App. 1934, no writ); Bexar County v. Wentworth, 37B.S.W.2d 126 (Tex.Civ.App. 19Grror ref., n.r.e.1.; and Delta Electric Const. Co. v. Citv of San Antonio, 473 S.W.2d 602 (Tex.Civ.App. 1969, error ref., n-r-e.). gas long ago sta.tedin the leading case of Meyers v. Walker, 276 S.W. 305 (Tex.Civ.App. 1925; no writ), II . .'. If a public official directly -or indirectly has a pecuniary interest in a con- tract, no matter howhonest he may be, and al- though he may not be infiuenced by the .interest, such a contract so made is violative of the spirit. and'letter,of our law,,and is against public policy."' 276 S,W. at 307 (emphaeisadded.) Moreover, "It iS the general.rule that municipal contract: in.which officers or employees of the city have a personal pecuniary interest are void-~.. . . The fore- going rule rests upon sound public policy. Its object is to insure to the city strict fidelity upon the part of those who represent it and man~agc its affairs. The rule nrohibitinq public officer6 from beinq intcr- ested in public contracts should be scrupulously =nforced." Edinburq v. Ellis, OP. cit:supra., at 100. (PITIphaSi6 added.) -6055- an. J. W. Edyar, p&qe 4, (M-1236) Furthermore, this office ha6 many times held void contract6 entered into by school board trustees, or other public officers, where such'.officere,either directly or indirectly, have a pecuniary interest in the contracts. Attorney General's Opinion6 Nos. G-878 (1939), G-1014 (1939). O-1589 (1939), G-2306 (1940).,G-2758 (1940), G-4000 (1941). O-4590 (1942), .C-6280 (1944); C-6876 (1946), WW-1362 (1962), M-340 (1969), and M-751 (1970). inter alia; contra, V-663 (1948): Cf. Attorney General's Opinions Nos. M-625 (1970). and M-987 (1971). Where the pecuniary interest of a public officer in 6 remote, transaction.is as where the officer owns but a minis- cule percentage of stock 'in a corporation, or where he is but a mere employee, rather than an officer or director, of such corporation, his interest is not one of such a degree that will render invalid the.transaction in which his interest is involved. State v. Robinson,,2 N.W.Zd 183 (N.D.Sup. 1942); State v. MCAlliS- ter, 365 S.W.2d 696 (Tex.Civ.App. 1963, no writ): Callowav v. Borouoh of Wildwood‘Crest,.176 A.2d 41 (N.J.App.,Div. 1961); Voelcket v. Schnell, 166 N.Y.S.;420 (N.Y.App.Div:l917): and 10 McQuillin on Municipal Corporations 473 (3rd Ed. 1966). The foregbing statement of the law is in consonance with the reasoning of Attorney General'6 Opinion No. M-625 (1970). construing Section'18 of Article III of the Constitution of Texas, which provides be I, nor shall any member of the Legislature . ..‘,. interested, either directly or indirectly, in any contract with the State . . . authorized by any .law passed during the term for which~ he was elected." That Opinion stated as follows: "The general rule would prohibit a.corporation in which a legislator is,a stockholder from ,con- tracting with the State. . i . -6056- ; . ‘mn,‘J. W. hgar, paqi 5, (M-1236) "In our 'opinion,however, it is neceisary in each case presented to ‘examine a number~of relevant factors in order to determine whether the legislator actually.owns dn, interest of the kind within ,the prohibition of the Constitution. It is essential to determine,whether the legislator is an officer or director of the corporation, whether he is influ- ential in the management of the corporatiosthrough any o~ther cirtiumstance,, whether he owns in his own name’or beneficially a substantial interest in a closely held corporation,,or whether his interest is,in fact a minor interest ina corporati,onwith many shares widely distributed so that his'owner- ship entitles him to no substantial share in the ,management or earnings of. the corporation. ” .~. i . "To construe.the coristitutional-provision so strictly that it would apply where a legislator owned;an insubstantial interest in a.large corpor- ation with many shares widely distributed, and where he had no control or meaniligful influence in 'the mandgement of the corporation .would probably bring into question many State and county Contracts entered into in good faith with suppliers of goods .and services essen~tialto.the operation of the State and county'qovernments." Our answer to your first question is that the school district may lawfully purchase from company Y. .Trustee A is not employed by company Y at all. His only connection seems to be with company X, who sells to company Y. Trustee A is zot of X company, and his shareholdings ih that company an off,ic.er are inappreciable in relation to‘the number of.shares outstand- inq. Under the facts companies X and Y are separate legal entities. Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Davis, 14O.Tex. 398, 168 S.W.Zd 216 (1943); State v. Humble Oil & Refininq Co.,, 263 S-w. 319, 325 (Tex.Civ.App. 1924 error ref.). These facts -6057- . . non’.‘J. w. uiyrrr.~ f&J“ 6, (M-1ZW and authorities are distinguished from those in Attorney General Opinion No. WW-1362 (1962) relating to a consignee. In reply to.your second question, it is our opinion that the district may not purchase products or services from 'W company. Trustee B's interest there after the reorganiza- tion will be nearly 10%: in legal contemplation, a substantial interest in the company. In reply to your third question, our opinion is that the board of trustees.may notcomplete the sale of the land to W company, because pf the conflict of interest between trustee B and W company, in which trustee,B is,a rtockh,older.,The prior opinion of this office, No. O-878 (1939). held that a : similar type of proposed,trhnsaction was illegal even though a trustee of a stihool,districttook no part in letting the contract, which,was let on competitive bid. SUMHA,RY' ------- Where a school trustee owns an inappreciable part of the shares of X company, and X company supplies Y company, the school district may law- fully contract with~Y company- Where a. school tr,ustee owns, or’ fol~lowinga reorganization will own, nearly 10% of the shares of W company, the,'schooldistrict may not 1,awfuliy purchase supplies or services from W.'&ompany. Where a school district owns land it may,not sell the land to a company in which a-school trustee is interested. Y tpy' I RD C. MARTIN -6050- Prepared~by Austin C. Bray, Jr. Assistant Attorney General APPROVED: OPINION COMMIWEE Kerns Taylor, -airman W. B. Allen, Co-Chairman John Reeves Jack Goodman Rex White Houghton Brownlee SAMJRL D. .HCDARIEL Staff Legal Assistant ALFRED WAIXER Executive Assistant NOLA WHITE First Assistant -bo59-