Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion

December 28, 1970 Honorable Thomas W. Brown Opinion No. M- 765 Texas Board of Private Detectives, Private Investigators, Private Re: Application of Article 4413 (29bb), latrolmen, A-ivate Guards and Vernon’s Civil Statutes, to alarm Managers agencies and armored car ser- R 0. Box 12577, Capitol Station vices, further licensing of alarm Austin, Texas 78711 agencies by cities for purposes other than those set out in Article 4413 (29bb) Dear Mr. Brown: You request our opinion on the following questions: (1) Are alarm agencies which install and maintain alarm systems and which meet underwriters laboratories specifications as approved by the State Board of Insurance exempted from the regulatory and licensing provisions of Article 4413 (29bb), Vernon’s Civil Statutes, by Section 14(a)(8) thereof? (2) Does Article 4413 (29bb) require licensing of alarm agencies other than those specifically exempted in Section 14(a)(8)? (3) Does the licensing of alarm agencies, if required under Article 4413 (29bb), prohibit further licensing by a municipal corporation for the purpose of regulating silent alarms that are keyed to telephone trunklines of municipal police and fire departments? (4) Is an armored car service included within the class of indivi- duals and companies regulated by Article 4413 (29bb)? -3735- Hon. Thomas W. Brown, page 2 (M- 765) 1. In answer to your questions (1) and (2), Article 4413 (29bb), Section 14(a)(8) provides that an alarm agency which is approved by the State Board of Insur- ance is exempted from the licensing requirements of Article 4413 (29bb); all other alarm agencies are subject to these licensing requirements. In our prior Opinion No. M-664 (1970) we held that those alarm agencies approved by the State Board of Insurance which perform normal and customary activities of alarm agencies, as therein stated, were exempted by Section 14(a)(8) from the license provisions of Article 4413 (29bb). 2. We answer your question (3) ‘No”. Municipal corporations have the right, under their police power, to protect the health, safety, morals, and general welfare of their citizens by regulations that are reasonable and necessary for the purpose. Cannon v. City of Dallas, 263 S. W. 2d 288 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953, error ref. n. r. e. ); Fisher v. City of Irving, 345 S. W. 2d 547 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961, no writ). In the exercise of this police power, a municipal corporation may enact reasonable regulations of various occupations and businesses. For example, see: Reed v. City of Waco, 223 S. W. 2d 247 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949, error ref.) (taxi cabs); Trewitt v. City of Dallas, 242 S. W. 1073 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922, no writ)(plumbing); Hanzal v. City of San Antonio, 221 S. W. 237 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920, error ref. )(barbers); Gregg v. State, 376 S. W. 2d 763 (Tex. Crim. 1964)(massage parlors). Therefore, we are of the opinion that Section 14(b) of Article 4413 (29bb) was not intended to prevent, and should not be construed to prevent, a municipal corporation within the exercise of its police power from imposing reasonable licensing regulations to regulate alarm agencies for the specific purpose of regulating silent alarms keyed to telephone trunklines of munici- pal police and fire departments. 3. The answer to your question (4) is “No”. An armored car service is not included within the class of individuals and companies regulated by this Act. The Act specifically applies to those classes of persons who primarily function as guards or patrolmen. An armored car service performs services primarily in the nature of transportation rather than that of guarding or patroling as designated in the Act. “Patroling” involves the idea of walking -3736- Hon. Thomas W. Brown, page 3 (M-765) to and fro as a guard. Ex Parte Heffron, 162 S. W. 652 (Ct. of App. MO., 1914, no writ). “Transport” or “transportation” is the moving of goods or persons from one place to another by a carrier. Beaver Reclamation Oil Company v. Railroad Commission of Texas, 112 S. W. 2d 765, 768 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936 rev. on other grounds, 117 S. W. 2d 53); Bell v. State, 179 S. W. 2d 550, <51 (Tex. Crim. 1944); Neas v. Home Fire and Marine Insurance Company, 135 F. Supp. 205,207 (N. D. Tex. 1955). SUMMARY All alarm agencies are subject to the licensing pro- visions of Article 4413 (29bb), V. C. S., except those specifically exempted by Section 14(a) which perform the normal and customary activities of alarm agencies. Under Article 4413 (29bb), Section 14(b), V. C. S., the licensing provisions regarding alarm agencies do not prohibit further reasonable licensing by a municipal corporation for the purpose of regulating silent alarms keyed to telephone trunklines of muni- cipal police and fire departments. An armored car service is not included within the class of individuals and companies regulated by Article 4413 (29bb), V. C. S. Ve PB truly yours, General of Texas Prepared by E. L. Hamilton Assistant Attorney General APPROVED: OPINION COMMITTEE Kerns Taylor, Chairman W. E. Allen, Co-Chairman -3737- Hon. Thomas W. Brown,, page 4 (M- 765) Scott Garrison Steve Hollahan Harriet Burke Jack Goodman MEADE F. GRIFFIN Staff Legal Assistant ALFRED WALKER Executive Assistant NOLA WHITE First Assistant -3738-