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December 18, 1970
Hon. Tommy V. Smith Opinion No. M-750
Commissioner
Bureau of Labor Statistics Re: Whether the maximum fee
Capitol Station schedule promulgated by the
Austin, Texas 78711 Texas Private Employment
Agency Regulatory Board,
pursuant to Article 5221-a6
(15)(a), Vernon's Civil
Statutes, applies to fees
charged employers by an em-
ployment agency.
Dear Commissioner Smith:
Your recent letter requesting the opinion of this office
concerning the referenced matter states, in part, as follows:
"Under the provisions of Article 5221a-6,
V.C.S., as amended, Section 15(a) authorizes the
Texas Private Employment Agency Regulatory Board
to establish and promulgate a schedule of maximum
fees to be charged applicants.
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.. ..
"Our question is whether the Board approved
maximum fee schedule is the maximum fee that can
be charged by an employment agency from employers
in payment for any services."
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Hon. Tommy V. Smith, page 2 (M-750)
Section 1 of Article 5221a-6, Vernon's Civil Statutes, as
amended (Acts 61st Leg. R.S. 1969, ch. 871, p. 2625). provides,
in part, as follows:
"(b) 'Fee' means anythinq of value including
money or other valuable consideration or services
or the promise of any of the foregoing received bv
an employment agency from any person seeking employ-
ment or employers in payment for any service, either
directly or indirectly.
"(c) 'Employer' means any person employing
or seeking to employ any employee.
"(d) 'Applicant' means any person enqaginq
the services of a private employment aqency for,,
the purpose of securinq employment or any person
placed by a private employment agency with an
employer." (Emphasis added.)
Section 15(a) of Article 5221a-6 provides:
"The board is authorized to establish and
promulgate a schedule of permissible maximum fees
allowed to be charged to applicants by private
employment agencies in the performance of their
services." (Emphasis added.)
A reading of the foregoing statutes indicates that, while the
term "fee" is defined as including consideration received by
employment agencies from employers, the maximum fee schedule set
forth in Section 15(a), supra, applies only to fees allowed to be
charged to "applicants". The term "applicant", as defined in
Section l(b), supra, applies only to employees seeking employment,
and not to employers utilizing the services of an employment
agency.
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I
Hon. Tommy V. Smith, page 3 (M-750)
It is apposite to note that that portion of the predecessor
to Article 5221a-6 (which was Acts 48th Leg. R. S. 1943, ch. 67,
p. 86) dealing with maximum fees permitted to be charged by
employment agencies, as construed by this office, was held not to
apply to fees charged by employment agencies to employers. Attorney
General's Opinions No. O-7299 (1946) and No. V-430 (1947).
We are of the opinion that the purpose of Article 5221a-6
is the same today as it was when construed by Attorney General's
Opinion No. V-430, supra, which held, in part:
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.. .There can be no doubt that the underlying
purpose of the statute is to protect those seeking
employment from exploitation by an employment agency
that might be tempted to take advantage of the vul-
nerability of the employment seeker. This considera-
tion does not obtain where the employers are seeking
competent employees, and are willing to pay a fee
to an employment agency that proposes to furnish
such employees."
In view of the foregoing, you are advised that your question
is answered in the negative.
SUMMARY
Pursuant to Article 5221a-6(15)(a), Vernon's
Civil Statutes, the maximum fee schedule authorized to be
promulgated by the Texas Private Employment Agency
Regulatory Board does not apply to fees charged by
an employment agency to employers: the maximum fee
schedule applies only to fees charged by employment
agencies to employees seeking positions.
Very ,truly yours,
Prepared by Austin C. Bray, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
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Hon. Tommy V. Smith, page 4 (M-750)
APPROVED:
OPINION COMMITTEE
Kerns Taylor, Chairman
W. E. Allen, Co-Chairman
Ronald Luna
R. D. Green
Fisher Tyler
Malcolm Smith
MEADE F. GRIFFIN
Staff Legal Assistant
ALFRED WALKER
Executive Assistant
NOLA WHITE
First Assistant
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Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion
Combined Opinion