[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 09-10251 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JANUARY 14, 2010
Non-Argument Calendar
JOHN LEY
________________________
ACTING CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 08-01393-CV-JEO-S
JOE DANIEL HOLT, JR.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
MAC GLENN, Probation Officer,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
_________________________
(January 14, 2010)
Before TJOFLAT, WILSON and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Joe Daniel Holt, Jr. appeals the district court’s dismissal of his 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. For
the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
I.
In his pro se complaint, Holt asserted that, on July 18, 2005, he obtained an
order of probation sheet from his probation officer, Mac Glenn. The sheet
provided that Holt was to serve a term of three years’ probation. Holt contended
that, sometime after an August 15, 2005 hearing, Glenn altered the original order
of probation sheet to reflect that Holt was to serve a period of nine years’
probation. Holt noted that the state court revoked his probation on October 30,
2006 and sentenced him to 10 years’ imprisonment.
The magistrate issued a report and recommendation (“R&R”),
recommending dismissing Holt’s complaint sua sponte, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A, because the complaint was filed after the applicable two-year statute of
limitations had expired.
Holt filed objections to the R&R, arguing that he had filed his complaint
within the statutory period and asserting that Glenn “contributed to the false
imprisonment of the plaintiff through [his] perjured testimony . . . and the altered
government record.”
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The district court determined that it did not need to determine the statute of
limitations issue, because the facts set forth in Holt’s complaint failed to state a
cognizable claim under § 1983. It found that Holt failed to plead facts showing
that Glenn’s actions resulted in a violation of Holt’s constitutional rights, because
Glenn’s amendment of the probation report to reflect a different length of
probation would not have resulted in the revocation of Holt’s probation. The court
noted that Holt asserted for the first time in his objections to the R&R that Glenn
had offered perjured testimony, “presumably at the revocation hearing.” The court
determined that this allegation failed to state a claim under § 1983, because, under
§ 1983, “witnesses are granted absolute immunity for their testimony at trial.”
Based on these findings, the district court dismissed Holt’s complaint under 28
U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).
II.
Holt argues that Glenn should be held liable under § 1983, because he
altered the order of probation sheet on August 15, 2005, and this alteration led to
his imprisonment. He contends that Glenn’s action violated his Equal Protection
and Due Process rights and caused his false imprisonment. Holt also asserts that
Glenn’s actions caused him to be sentenced to cruel and unusual punishment, in
violation of the Eighth Amendment.
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We review de novo a district court’s decision to dismiss for failure to state a
claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), taking the allegations in the complaint as
true. Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 2006). Pursuant to
§ 1915A, a district court must dismiss the complaint of a prisoner if the complaint
“is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.”
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). A pro se complaint is held to a “less stringent standard
than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed.” See
Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998).
“To establish a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must prove (1) a
violation of a constitutional right, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed
by a person acting under color of state law.” Holmes v. Crosby, 418 F.3d 1256,
1258 (11th Cir. 2005). “The first inquiry in any § 1983 lawsuit . . . is whether the
plaintiff has been deprived of a right secured by the Constitution and laws.” Baker
v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 2692, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979)
(quotations omitted). The Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o State
shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.” U.S. C ONST., Amend. XIV § 1.
III.
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Holt’s complaint appears to allege that Glenn deprived Holt of a liberty
interest without due process of law. However, “section 1983 requires proof of an
affirmative causal connection between the official’s acts or omissions and the
alleged constitutional deprivation.” Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397, 401 (11th
Cir. 1986) (emphasis added). The district court correctly found that Holt’s
complaint failed to show a causal connection between Glenn’s act – the alleged
alteration of the order of probation – and the alleged deprivation of Holt’s liberty
interest – the revocation of his probation. In his complaint, Holt acknowledged
that his probation was revoked after an October 30, 2006 hearing. Thus, Holt was
provided with due process of law before he was deprived of his liberty interest.
Furthermore, Glenn’s act of amending the probation order to reflect a nine-year
period of probation rather than a three-year period did not result in the revocation
of the probation. Accordingly, because Glenn’s actions did not cause Holt to be
deprived of his liberty interest, Holt has failed to state a claim for relief.
In his objections to the R&R, Holt argues that Glenn deprived him of his
liberty interest by falsely testifying at his probation revocation hearing. However,
we have held that “parole officers enjoy [quasi-judicial] immunity for testimony
given during parole revocation hearings when they act within the scope of their
duties.” Holmes, 418 F.3d at 1258; see also United States v. Frazier, 26 F.3d 110,
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113 (11th Cir. 1994) (noting that “courts treat revocations the same whether they
involve probation, parole, or supervised release”). Thus, any claim arising from
Glenn’s testimony at Holt’s probation revocation hearing lacks merit, because
Glenn was entitled to immunity. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s
dismissal of Holt’s complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted.
AFFIRMED.
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