Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion

Honorable William A. Harrison Opinion No. WW-459 Commissionerof Insurance State Board of Insurance Re: What constitutesan under- Austin, Texas writing transactionpro- hibited by Article 3.39, Section 2 of the Texas Dear Sir: InsuranceCode? In your amended opinion request you ask whether several types of transactionsare prohibitedby various pro- visions of the Insurance Code among which is Article 3.39, Section 2, which reads as follows: "No such~companyshall subscribeto, or patitlci- pate in, any underwritingof the purchase or sale of securitiesor property or enter Into any such trans- action for such purpose, or sell on account of such company jointly with any other person, firm or corpora- tion; nor shall any such company enter into any agree- ment to withhold from sale any of Its property, but the dispositionof Its property shall be at all times within the control of Its Board of Directors; . . ." The first two of the factual transactionsthat you are concernedwith are summarizedfrom our correspondenceas follows: 1. A contract between a life insurance company and a subdivisiondevelopmentcompany provides as follows: "Whereas, It Is contemplatedand agreed that the XYZ Life Insuran‘ceCompany and the B Investment Company will build or cause to have built for sale both In Odessa, Texas, and a number of~.*resldences Irving, Texas, to be jointly owned by both corpora- tions, and that the title to the property shall be carried in the name of the B InvestmentCompany for convenienceonly. "Now, therefore, be It resolved that the XYZ Life Insurance Company shall furnish all of the money through loans or provide the necessary credit-to the B InvestmentCompany for the purchase of the building sites, materials, labor and.all building construction Hon. Wllllen~A. Harrison, page 2 (W-459) costs; that the B Investment Company will furnish all of the supervision,let all contracts for building on a basis satisfactoryto the XTZ In- surance Company and will supervise the sale of said houses. When the houses are sold all the profits, after deductingthe entire cost of lots and bulld- lng plus any coumlsslonspaid for sale of property or any expensesof.any nature Incurred in the bulld- ing of said houses, shall be divided as follows: "85s to the XYZ Life Insurance Company. "15% to the B Investment Company. “In arriving at the cost it Is understood that the interestpaid on the money borrowed shall be a part of the costs determiningthe profit." 2. A developmentcorporation under a trust 'ogrocment deeds fee title to real estate for subdivisionto a Trustee under an escrow arrangementwhereby a life Insurance company loans the Trustee large sums of money secured by a first lien upon the real estate contributedby the developmentcorporation. These funds held by the Trustee are advanced from time to time to the developmentcorporationto build and develop the sub- division. As the subdlvlslonIs developed and sold to the public, the entire proceeds are deposited with the Trustee. The Trustee In turn uses a percentage of these total proceeds (agreedto in the trust instrument)to pay off:the indebtedness to the life Insurancecompany. After the loan plus interestIs paid off to the Insurance company, the Trustee then distributes the profits between the Insurance company and the development corporationaccordingto a formula agreed to in the trust ln- strum&t. An "underwritingof the purchase or sale of . . . property"would consist of a promise by the insurance company that if property were not sold for a certain price It would guaranteethat the insurancecompany would buy It for that price. Or conversely,unless property could be acquired at a certain price the Insurancecompany would acquire the property for the guaranteedprice whatever the market price might be. (See 43 Words and Phrases,p. 124, et seq.) Thus, It is evident that neither of the two above questioned transactionsresemblesa prohibitedunderwritingtransaction. It Is our o@lnlon, however, that both of these trans- actions are prohibitedon other grounds. The above quoted portion of Section 2 which contains the restrictionson underwritingand :;~U!Ilam:.A. Hon..- Darrlson, page 3 (W-459) joint accounts was not.ln the Texas law until 1909. The hls- torlc AmIWtrOng Committee reported on February .. 22, - to __ 1906, . the New York State Legislatureconcerningtne wlae scale atmses by the management of I@v York Insurance companies. The Committee found that the large companies had furnished their support to numerous speculativefinancial ventures through participating In the underwrltlngsof syndicates. In this manner, purchases had been made, not for Investment,but for resale. See %aml- nation of Insurance Companies,Volume 2, b the New Yorkme InsuranceDepartment,New York, 1953, p. 2L , et seq. Often .companiesfurnished all the money required for the speculative venture while officers of the company and members of the finance committeewould be parties&to a joint account and share In Its profits. In order to eliminate these wide scale abuses the fifth recommendationof the Armstrong Committee was as follows: "The statute should also forbid all syndicate participations,transactionsfor purchases and sales on joint account, and the making of any agreement pro- viding the company shall withhold from the sale at sny time, or subject to the discretionof others, any securl- ties which it may own or acquire." This recommendationwas adopted by the Legislatureof New York on April 27, 1906, as a part of Section 100, Laws of New York, ch. 326, p. 798 (1906). This section Is almost ldentl- cal word for word wlth the above quoted Texas provision originally enacted In 1909 and brought unchanged Into the Texas Insurance Code as Article 3?39, Section 2. From this statutoryhistory, It Is clear that the quoted phrase of Article 3.39, Section 2, establishesthree distinct and separate restrictionson all types of Investments: First, prohibitingunderwriting;second, prohibiting sales on joint accounts and, third, prohibiting the placing of the insurance com- pany's property beyond the control of Its Board of Directors. The evil sought to be remedied by the prohibitionof selling on joint accounts was transactionsof the nature of partnership or joint ventures for a speculationIn property by which others than the Insurance company would share some control or the profit or loss of such an "Investment". The profit sharing features of the first transaction outlined above are clearly within this prohibition. Both the first and second.transactlonsare essentiallysales of property on joint account with another person, firm or corporation,In which the insurance companyputs up the money In a joint account to finance the developmentand resale of property. In both :lnstancesthe Insurance company Is to receive not only the loan ‘> * Q;” Hon. William A. Harrison, page 4 (WW-439) money back with Interest but then it will also share in the profits with the developer. The profit sharing feature as a bonus Is prohibited. Such a transactionIs characteristic of.some form of joint venture rather than an ordinary loan upon first liens upon real estate. The first transactionIs further defective for the reason that title to the real estate Is In the Insurance company and thus would be forbidden by Article 3.40. The statute Itself nrovldes that: "A life insurance company organized . . . may Invest In or loan upon the following securities,and none others, viz: . . ." (Bnphaslsours) In this connection It should be noted that these transactionsInvolve property acquired for speculativeresale rather than loans or Investmentsthat are held for their yield In the form of Interest or dividends. The acquisitionof such property for speculative resale is not authorizedby Article 3.39 and therefore ultra vlres. The third factual situationon which you request an opinion as to whether or not It is a prohibited transactionis stated by you as follows: 3. A "life Insurance company . . . issued shares of its steak to a subsidiaryunderwritingcorporation with an agreement that the underwritingcorporation would sell the shares of stock to the public, and that all profits over and above 30s of the realized gross profit on the sale of the stock would be contributed by the underwriterscorporationto the life Insurance company as ~urplus.~ This third transactionby which a corporationacts as an underwriterupon shares Issued to It by an insurance company is somewhat anomalous. For a small considerationthe under- writing corporationonly commits itself to use Its best efforts to market the insurance company88 securities. The Insurance company-isnot Itself acting as an underwriter. Certainly, however, If the Insurance company were to participate in such an arrangementconcerning stocks other than that of Its own issue, It would be participatingin an underwritingtransaction which would be clearly forbidden. However, taken in context, the statutoryunderwritingprohibition applies only to lnvest- ments by life Insurance companies. In the instant case there is no'lnvestmentby the insurance company In any sense when the insurancecompany attempts to market its own securitiesanymore than when it attempts to sell Its own policies. For this reason we do not feel that the above quoted restrictionsof ArtlcXe 3.39, Section 2, apply to this transaction. We have assumed under the facts of this transactionthat the underwritingcorporation waaactlng as a disinterestedunderwriterIn an arms length Hon. William A. Harrison,.page5.(WW-459) transaction. However, if the Board should ascertain that the directors in the Insurance company are "pecuniarilylnter- ested In" the underwritingsubsidiarycorporation,then It Is the Board's duty to subject to the strictest scrutiny the under- writing contract with the subsidiarycorporation. From the legislativehlstory'as stressed lh the Armstrong Committee Report, It Is abundantlyclear that any self deallng'on the partof the directors is prohibited. Insurance Code, Article 3.67, Article 1.15 (formerlyArticles 4727 and 469) were cohstrued in Attorney General Opinion O-1889 to~allow the Board to revoke or modify any certificateof,authorltyissued If a suspect transactionfalls to meet the test of fairness, fiduciary relationship,and the standardsof soundestmorality. It should be noted In this regard that the retention of a thirty (30%) percent commlsslonby the underwritingcorporationmay well be a violation of The SecuritiesAct which limits the. total expenses of marketing securitiesIncluding commission. The commlsslon retained by the underwrltln subsidiarycorpora- tion may exceed the maximum of twenty (20%7 percent of the price at which the stock was sold to the public If the 'pr$ce" paid by the underwritingcorporationto the lnsurance~company were nominal. In summary, both the first and second transactions are sales of property on the account of the insurance company jointly with another person, firm or corporationand are clearly prohibited by Article 3.39, Section 2, as well as other sections of the Insurance Code. The third transaction,although it Is not a prohibited underwritingtransaction,may be a suspect on other grounds. A transactionby which an insurance company advances capital for real estate development In return for a share of the profits is prohibited by Article 3.39, Section 2, Texas Insurancb Code. An insurance company may utilize an underwriterin order to market Its own securitiesunless the Insurance com- pany directors are so "pecuniarilyinterested" Hon. Wil1iarp.A. Harrisbn;page 6 (WW-459) lh the transactionas to violate Article 3.67’ of the Insurance Code. Yours very truly, WILL WILSON Attorney General of Texas Mao0 Stewart MS:ph Assistant APPROVED: OPiNION COMMITTEE: &xi. P. Biackbirn, Chairman LeoxiardPassmore Wayland C. Rivers, Jr. H&ry (1.Braswell REVIEWEDFORTHBATTORNEYGENERAL .B!t: W. V. Geppert.