Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion

THE August 28, 191 Hon. Coke R. Stevenson, Jr. Opinion No. v-1259 Administrator Texas Liquor Control Board Ret Is person owning in- Auqtin, Texas terest in business holding beer distrlb- utor'0 license ellgi- ble'~for employment by Texas Liquor Control Dear SIP: Board. Your request for an opinion ask8 whether a person who owna an interest in a beer distributing buSine88 con- ducted under a license issued by the Texas Liquor Control Board is eligible for employment by the Board. Article 666-5, V.P.C., in so far as pertinent to your inquiry, provides that: "No person shall be eligible for appoint- ment nor Shall hold the office of member of the Board, nor be appointed by the Board, nor hold any office or position under the Board, who has any connection with any association, firm, person, or corporation engaged in or conducting any alco- h2 OP who holds 8tOCkS or bond8 therein, or who ha8 pecuniary in- terest there& nor shall any such person receive any commission or profit whatsoever from or have any interest whatsoever in any purchase or Sale8 of any alcoholic liquors. D . e "The Board or Administrator shall appoint all necessary clerks, stenographers, inSpeCtOr8, and Chemists, and other employees to properly enforce the provisions of this Act. 'No person shall be eligible for any ap- pointment who has any financial connection what- ever with any person engaged in or conducting any liquor business of any kind, or who holds stock OP bonds therein, or who has any pecuniary interest therein, nor shall any such person re- ceive any commission or profit whatever from, or Hon. Coke R. Stevenson, Jr,, page 2 (v-l%g) have any interest whatsoever In, the pur- chases or sales made by pers~ons authorized by this Act to manufacture, purchase, aelj;, or otherwise deal in the llcuor business, (&UphaSiS Supplied throughout opinion.) your question turns on whether a beer bUSine88 18 a liquor business within the meaning of Article 666-5. That question arises by reason of the deflnitiod of "liquor" contained in Article 666-se, V,P.C., that: "liquor' shall mean any alcoholic bev- erage containing alcohol in excess of four (4) per centum bx weight, unless otherwa indicated. . o o "Any definition contained herein shall apply to the same word in any form. The definition of 'beer" contained in Article 667-1, V,P,C,, is: "The term 'beer' means a malt beverage containing one-half of l$ or more of alcohol by volume and not more than 4% of alcohol by weight, and shall not be inclusive of any beverage designated by late1 or otherwise by any other name than beer. "ALcohollc'Beverage" is defined in Article 666-3a to mean alcohol and any beverage containing i&k ihan one-half of one per cent (& of .W of alcohol by volume which is capable of use for beverage purposes, either alone or WheU diluted." If these definitions control and apply to the word llauor, as used in Article 666-5, then a strictly bm bU8ineSS would not be a liauor business within the provision8 Of this Article and a person owning an interest in a beer business would not by reason of Article 666-5 be ineligi- ble for employment by the Board, We are of the opinion that the word 'liquor,n as used in the quoted portion of Article 666-5, 18 not limited to the technical definition as containe$i In Article 666-3a, but Is used as generally descriptive of those businesses dealing in alcoholic beverage8 which . Han, Coke R. Stevenson, Jr., page 3 (V-1259) the Texas Liquor Control Act subject8 to regulations by the Texas Liquor Control Board. The eligibility provisions in Article 666-5 were contained In the first comprehensive regulatory act adopted In 1935. H. B. 77, Acts 44th~ Leg., 2nd C.S. 1935, ch. 467, pa 1795. While substantially the same technical definitions of "li$uor" and nbeer' were therein also contained, the word liquor" was used at times in the technical sense of the definition and at other times in a general sense meaning beverageS eon- taining lesser amounts of alcohol. Subsequent amend- ments have substituted the broader term "alcoholic bevePagesn for the word 'liquor" In many provisions of the Act, but there is no indication that the meaning of the word "1Iquor" in Article 666-5, where It remains, has been changed. The meaning Is to be determined from the context in which it Is used, and where the context indicate8 the broader significance the meaning, to use the language of the definition Is, "OthePwise Indicated." Examination of the 1935 Act illustrates the original significance of the term "liquor business of any kind" as contained therein to include a beer business, which meaning we conclude is the same today. The conclusion indicated is borne out in the caption of the 1935 Act, That dct regulated all kinds of alcoholic beverages including beer, yet the caption described it as "regulating the traffic in alcoholic liquors," as creating a "Liquor Control Board," a8 pro- viding for local option elections a8 to the sale of ."intoxicating liquors having various alcoholic contents,"' and as providing for permits $0 engage "in the various phases of the liquor traffic. Nowhere in the caption is 'beer" mentioned, yet elaborete regulation of beer traf- fic is established in the Act. It was obviously consid- ered by the Legislature as one of the "kinds" Of "liquor" buSines8, The phrase "liquor b&Sine88 of any kind" bears close resemblance to the phrases used in the caption to indicate regulation of the "various phases of the liquor traffic" and sale of "liquors having various alcoholic contents," which obviously included 'beer". Again, in the emergency clause, traffic in beer was certainly contemplated by the general Statement8 of the need for early effectiveness of the Act. It refers to the adoption of the constitutional amendment legalizing the sale of "liquor" in wet areas and recites the fact that traffic In "liquor" was then unregulated. Both statement8 Hon. Coke El. Stevenson, Jr., page 4 (v-1259) applied in fact to beer sales and traffic. The word "liquor" was used exclusively through- out Section 6 of Article I of the original Act, which enUm8rated the general duties and responsibilities of the Board, SOme of which applied to the beer business. Sec- tion 23 of Article I defining "wet" and "dry" at-east spoke of "liquor" only but obviously applied to areas where "beer" sales were permitted or prohibited. The section8 dealing with local option elections and particularly with ballots used the word "liquor" in the sense of an alcoholic beverage and left its applica- tion to b88r to depend on the designated alcoholic content. These Illustrations suffice to evidence the fact that the word 'liquor," especially when used in the provi- sions of more general application, USUally carried the generic connotations of the phrase "alcoholic beverages" and was quite often qualified by a statement of the partlc- ular alcoholic content to which th8 particular provision applied. Finally, and quite significantly, the original Act was scrupulously specific in prescribing absolute in- dependence of the regulatory agency and the industry over which It had jurisdiction. Not only was the eligibility provision repeated in Section 5 of Article 1 but Section 21a of Article II of the original Act made the following specific provisions designed to guarantee that the Board and Its employees would not participate in pOlItiCa el8C- tions. "Sec. 21a o It shall be unawful big for any person paid a salary or per diem or receiv- ing any compensation out of the appropriation made or tax88 collected under the term8 Of this Act to engage in or take part in any pOlitiCa campaign. By engaging in a political campaign or taking part in a political Campaign i8 meant and shall include distributing circulars, hand- bills, posting pictures, handing out cards, making Speech88 or soliciting support for or opposing the election of any candidate for any public office. Any such employee engaging in such inhibited and unlawful conduct shall be subject to removal from his pOSitiOn and re- straint from reemplogment in such department for a period of one (1) year by a judgment in the Hon. Coke R. Stevenson, Jr., page 5 (V-1259) district court of the county wherein Such unlawful activity occurred, either In whole or in part. Any ten (10) or more qualified resident voter8 of such county shall have authority t0 institute a Suit in a district court of such county praying for the removal of such employee Prom such department, citing such employee and any member of the Board, and, upon final hearing, the allegations of the petition being sustained, the judgment Shall be to discharge the employee and to re- strain the department from re-employing such employee for a period of one (1) year from the date of the judgment. "In like manner, any member of the Board who shall violate this section or who shall solicit, ask or suggest to any employee, either directly or through any other person, that such employee violate such section, then and In that event such Board member may be removed by quo warrant0 proceedings in the district court upon the relation of any ten (10) qualified voter8 of the county in which such violation occurred. The writing of a letter into any county where- in such letter violates or Suggests, asks or solicits a violation of this law shall consti- tute snfficient grounds for removal in any county through which such letter paSSed or in- to which such letter passed." This section was obviously designed to aSSUre lm- partial administration and activity by the regulatory body and its personnel. The whole scheme for setting up the Liquor Control Board was to create an Independent agency whose actions would not be Influenced by a financial lnter- est in the industry over which it exercised jUrlSdiOtiOn, and who would be expressly prohibited from exerting politi- cal influence in furtherance of or opposition to the inter- ests of such industry. The principle promulgated in Article 666-5 is not novel to Texas administrative law. See Article 4681, V.C.S., declaring that no person who Is directly or indirectly in- terested in any Insurance company may be a member of the Board of Insurance Commissioners or a clerk in the Insurance Department. Hon. Coke R. Stevenson, Jr., page 6 (V-1259) ,. We are constrained to attribute to the Legis- lature a consistent policy In regard to such eligibility provisions, where such con8i8tency~finds support in the law e You are, therefore, advisedzthat one who owns an interest in a licensed beer distPlbuting business 18 in- eligible for employment by the Texas Liquor Control Board. One who owns an interest in a licensed beer distributing business is ineligible for emplo nt by the Texas Liquor Control Board. Art. r 66-5, V.P.C. APPROVED: Yours very truly Ned McDaniel PRICE DAIUEL~ State Affairs Division Attorney General Everett Hutchinson Executive Assistant Charles D. Mathews First Assistant