Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion

TEE ATTO~EYGE~RAL OF TEXAS May 4, 1949 Hon. William J. Murray, Jr., Chairman Rallroad Commission of Texas Austin 11, Texas Opinion NO.V-823 Re: Time of vesting of limita- tion title with reference to subdivisionunder Rule 37. Dear Sir: The question for opinion is contained in your letter from which we quote as follows: "As has previously been stated, it is a Commission policy to grant a first well on any~separatefee tract which ex- isted prior to the discovery of oil In the East Texas Field, but that any sub- division of property subsequent to the discovery of oil which is in violation of Rule 37 does not entitle the owner of the subdivided property to separate de- velopment. Consequently,the date -upon which a person acquired title to a tract of land is as Important In some cases for the determinationof his right to a well as is the question of his legal title to the land. "Therefore,we wish to ask the ques- tion as to the date of the acquisition of title of a tract of land in which title has matured to the present owner by virtue of adverse possession. Specifically,we have Rule 37 case ~0.38,031 pending, in which the J.K. Hughes Oil Company, lessee of a 0.64 acre Pomp Mitchell Heirs tract in the J. g. Caruthers and Mary Van Winkle Surveys, East Texas Field, Is requesting . Hon. William J. Murray, Jr. - Page 2 - v-823 a permit for a first well on this tract. It is our understandingthat the courts have awarded title to the Pomp Mitchell heirs on this tract by virtue of ten years adverse possession. It is a disputed ques- tion of fact as to the date that the ad- verse possession first began, but for the purpose of this request, we will assume that the adverse possessionbegan in 1929. "If legal title became vested in the Pomp Mitchell heirs In 1929, then this tract was subdividedprior to the discovery of oil in the East Texas Field, and under our understandingof the law and our es- tablishedpolicy, this tract would possibly be entitled to a first well. If, however, legal title did not mature by virtue of ad- verse possessionuntil the conclusion of the ten year period, which under our as- sumption would be 1939, the tract was then subdivided after the discovery of oil in the East Texas Field and Is not entitled to separate development to prevent confis- cation of property since it 3-sa subdlvi- sion in violation of Rule 37. “We, therefore,ask the question, when does title mature as a result of adverse possesalon;and if different conditions of adverse possession could affect the opinion as to the date of the maturity,,then we re-~ quest an opinion as to the specific clrcum- stances involved In the J.K. Hughes case." You have also furnishedus with your entire file on the application, including the briefs of ap- plicant and protestant. Fro-1these and the file, it appears that the question of subdivisionis only one of several grounds upon which the application is be- ing contested. In view of this, we wish to make it plain that this opinion is concerned only with the abstract legal question stated in your request for opinion. As your request for opinion indicates, the time when possession began is a controvertedquestion of fact which we make no attempt to solve. As sug- , Hon. William J. Murray, Jr., Page 3 - v-823 gested by you, we merely assume without deciding that the possession which finally culminated in the limitation title began prior to discovery of oil in the East Texas Field. Although a limitation title does not ma- ture, ripen, or vest until the llmltationperiod is completed (1 Am.Jur.p.797;2 c.J.s.P.~~~),never- theless, once the period Is completed, the title re- lates back to the date possession began. The doc- trine of relation back is discussed by Judge Hutche- son in Counce v. Yount-Lee 011 Co., @' F.2d 572 (CCA.5th, 1937, cert. den.302 U.S.bg3) from which we quote as follows: 11 . The answer is to be more broad- . . ly sought and found. It Is to be, it is found in the self-evidentproposition,that it is a contradictionin terms to say, as the Texas Statutes and most other statutes of limitation do, that the effect of the bar of adverse possession is to give the poss- essor full title precluding all claims, and to say at the same time, that the possessor shall be liable In damages for his acts of possession done while his Inchoate title was being perfected. .It is to.be found, not only In the terms of the Texas Statutes but in the general theory which underlies prescription, the theory of relation by presumption,the theory that once matured, the title relates back to the beginning of the prescriptive period. Under that theory It is presumed that the origin of the title was rightful, not wrongful, that the possession which has matured it was in support, not in deroga- tion of the rightful title, and that he, who by a possession perfect in the law has ma- tured a title, has in theory of law been the owner of the title from the beginning. There is no place In the theory of prescriptionor limitation for the contention appellants put forward, that after the title has matured, the former owner of the land can call the limitation owner to account, for any of his actions done, on or to the land, in the course of the unchallengedpossession, that has ri- pened his right and title to it. The princl- . . Hon. William J. Murray - Page 4 - v-823 ~pleof relation Is a comprehensiveand fa- miliar one in the law of real property. It treats one ousted from possessionwho has made re-entry, as by relation in con- tinuous possession. Alliance Trust Co. v. Nettleton Hardwood Co., 74 Miss. 584, 21 So. 396, 36 L. R.A. 155, 60 Am. St. Rep. 531. It gives the owner of an Inchoate title when his title has ripened, title as from the beginning. Gilbert v. McDonald, ;&Minn. 289, 102 N.W.712, 110 Am. St.Rep. The principle has pecular applica- tlon to prescriptionand titles by llmi- tatlon. It has precise and compelling'force in matters of limitation. This is horn book law. 1 R.C.L.p.690;1 Am. Jurisprudence p.797; 2 C.J. 251. 5 In 'Thompsonon Real Property',@ 2516 (quoted in Stolfa v. Gaines, 140 Ok1.292,.283~.563,567) the principle is thus stated; 'Adversepossession for sufficient time to bar an action to recover real estate confers title, against any ti- tle whatsoever,as effectivelyas if the original owner had made a formal conveyance to the possessor. The title is as full and complete as if the possessor had always held the undisputed title of record. The rule rests upon the theory that;.whenposs- ession and use are long continued, they create a presumptionof lawful origin; that is, they are founded upon such instru- ments and proceedingsas in law would pass the right to the possession and use of the property. 11 . . . "The rule has peculiar force in Texas. The effect of its statutes ,isto raise an lrrebuttablepresumption that the person, whose action is barred, has been divested, from the beginning of the adverse possession, of every attrlbute and incident of title to the land. His title, right, and interest in it have been obliterated,the person whose possession has barred him has taken his place, and holds title by the same chain he held It by direct from the sovereigntyof Hon. William J. Murray, Jr. - Page 5 -V-823 the soil. Texas Jurisprudence,~01.2, pp. 14 to 18, inclusive. Particular cases ll- lustrating the point are: Burton's Heirs v. Carroll, 96 Tex. 320 72 S.W. 581; Eckert v. Wendel, 120 Tex. 618, 40 S.W.2d 796, 76 A.L.R. 855; MacGregor v. Thompson, 7 Tex. civ. A p; 32 26 S.W. 649; Qoldfrank v. Young, 6f:Tex.432; First Nat'1 Bk. of Alvarado v. Lane (Tex.Clv.App.)265 S.W. 763; Campbell v. Halt, 115 u. S. 620, 6 S. Ct. 209, 29 L. Ed. 483; Marshburn v. Stewart (Tex.Clv.App.)295 S.W. 679; Grigsby v. Peak, 57 Tex. 142, 143." See Comment on Counce v. Yount-Lee Oil Co. (supra) In 51 Harvard Law Review 160 (1937). See generally on the vesting and effect of limitation title; Ballantine, Title by Adverse Possession (1918), 32 Harvard Law Review 135 142. and Blngham, The Nature and Bnportance of Legal P&se&ion (1915), 13 Michigan Law Review, f 561, 563 and 627 to 630. The briefs call attention to a line of cases dealing with the question of determining the character of property interest, viz. whether separate, community, or common, finally acquired by the occupant In adverse possession at the end of the limitation Representativeof these cases are: Hutto v. %?di39 Tex 571 164 S W 2d 513 (1942); Sauva e v &&p, -h:,; 143 S:W. 259 (Tex: tiv. App.1912, error O’Meara v. Williams, 137 S.W.2d 66 (Tex.Civ.App. -1940; error d&sm., Jud car.); Brown v.~~FosterLum- ber Co., 178 S.W. 787 $"' Tex.Civ.App.1915,error ref.[. At first glance, these cases seem to deny the doctrine of relation back ~inasmuchas they look to the end rather than the beginning of the period to determine the type of property interest acquired by the adverse possessor. However, the problem involved in each is determining in whom and In what capacity the lI.mltatlon title has matured and the cases neither affirm nor deny the doctrine that once matured or vested the title relates back to the time possession began. Privity of possession,through successive adverse claimants permits, under our limitation statutes, (Article 5516, V.C.S.) the occupant inpossession at the end of the period to be vested with the whole title and necessarl- ly the marital or other facts which relate to that . Hon. William J. Murray, Jr. - Page 6 -V-823 particularadverse claimant must be looked to in order to determinewhether the title 80 acquired by him is separate or community, or in common with others. See Hutto v. Cook (supra).The determina- tion of this question is made ir.dependentlyof the doctrine of relation back. Having determinedby looking to the end of the period that "A" has ma- tured the title as his seaprate property does not mean that "A's" title will not relate back to the date of the possesslotyhich resulted in conferring the whole title upon A . It is our opinion that the doctrine of re- lation back is one of general applic tlon to llml- tatlon titles and that it applies folit the purpose of determining the effective date of subdivisionun- der the rules of the Commission. We believe that this holding Is in keeping with the spirit of the rules laid down by the Com- mission in connectionwith our:onservationstatutes. The exceptions to Rule 37 were for the purpose of per- mitting recovery of 011 and gas, either to prevent waste or confiscation,and were designed to permit rather than impede such recovery. Brown v. Humble Oil 126 Tex 296 %&olia Pet:Co. 5th, 1936, cert. Should we deny the application of the doctrine of re- lation back to your SubdivisionRule,'then necessarily all titles acquired by limitation but matured, whether 'oneday or nine years, after discovery of oil within the area would fall within the SubdivisionRule and as a matter of law such tracts would be unable to ob- tain exceptions to Rule 37. The title finally acquired by limitation is in legal contemplationa rightful and valid title (Counce v. Yount-Lee Oil Co., supra, and cases therein cited‘)and when initated prior to the discovery of oil within an area cannot be said to fall within the vice intended to be remedied by the Subdi- vision Rule. Such Rule was designed to prevent cir- cumventionof the conservationlaws by persons volun- tarily acting or conniving to create subdivisionsfor the purpose of applying for exceptions under Rule 37. Gulf Land Co. v. Atlantic Refining Co., 134 Tex.59, 131 S W 2d 73 (1939). 31A Tex.Jur.708and cases therein'clted. As a'general proposition we think it evident that the ordinary li,mitationclaimant prior to discovery of oil within the area had no such inten- . - Hon. William J. Murray, Jr. - Page 7 - v-823 tlon. In addition, in order to mature the llmi- tatlon title the land concerned must be carved away from the adjacent land and so visibly and openly held under a claim of right as to give notice of the claim. Article 5515, V.C.S. As a condition precedent to per- fecting the title, a physical segregation or subdl- vision of the tract from the land adjacent thereto must occur at the inception rather than the conclusion of the possession. For all of these reasons, we are of the opinion that a title acquired by adverse possession relates back to the commencementof possesslon. The date on which the adverse possession begins la the date to be held in determiningwhether there has been a voluntary subdlvlslon in Rule 37 aaaes before the Railroad Commlsslon. A title acquired by adverse possession vests at the end of the statutory oeriod but having vested relates back to the iommence- ment of possession. Counce v, Yount-Lee Oil co., 87F.2d52 CCA 5th 19r cart.bsn. 302 U.S.ri93 I.' &?lisdogtrine' applies for-the purpose of'determlnlngthe effeotlve date of subdivisionunder the Rules of the Railroad Commlsslon. Yours very truly ATTORNEY QENERAL OF TEXAS By a& H. D. Prue& ;r Assistant' HDPrbt APPROVED ATTORREYQERRRAL