Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion

I , %-HE .iiTl?ORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS Honorable C. D. Simmons Comptroller, University of Texas Austtn, Texas Dear SLr: Opinion No. O-5393 Re: Interpreta'cIonof S.B. 287, Acts 1943, Regular Session, Fortg- eighth Legislature. We are in receipt of your opinion request reading in part as follows: "The Board of Regents of the University of Texas has directed me to request of you an opinion as to your interpretation of Senate Bill No. 287, Acts Regular Session, 48th. Legislature. "The board of Regents particularly desires your interpretation of the effect and meaning of the language of the Bill which reads as follows: "'The Board of Regents of the Unlverslty and the Commissioner of the General Land Office, In considering an application for an extension or re- newal of any such lease above described, shall take into consideration in establishing the consldera- tion for such lease the diligence with which the lessee has followed his duties under the existing lease, the present value of the land upon which an extenslon or renewal of the lease Is sought, and all other good business practices.'" S. B. 287, Acts 1943, Regular Session, 48th. Legls- lature, which now appears as Article 53416 of Vernon's An- notated Civil Statutes, reads as follows: "Section 1. In the case of any nonproducing oil, gas or mineral lease on University land, if one hundred twenty (120) days before expiration of the primary term there be In effect any restrictions issued by a Federal war agency prohlblt1ng the drill- ing or completion of a well thereon, the holder of such lease shall have the right to negotiate an ex- tension or renewal of such lease for a perlod of not Hon. C. D. Simmons, page 2 o-5393 longer then two (2) years with the Board of Regents of the Unlverslty of Texas and the Commlssloner of the Qeneral Land Office. “The Board of Regents of the %lversltg of Texas and the Commlssloner of the Qeneral Land Of- flee, in 0onslderUg an appllcatlon for an exten- sion or renewal of any suoh lease above desorlbed, shell take lnto oondlderatton ln establishing the oonslderatlon for suah lease the dlllgenoe with which the lessee has followed his duties under the existing lease, the present value of the lend upon which an extension or renewal of the lease Is sought, and all other good business practloes. The lessee In presentlng his applloatlon for extenslon or re- newal of such lease or leases shall present evidence ’ to the Board of Regents of the University of Texas and to the Commlssloner of the ffeneral Land Office showlng it was lmposslble for hlm or any of his oo- owners to comply with the restrlctlons whloh he claims prohlblted the drilling or oompletlon of the well on said tract. “If the lessee should claim es grounds for an extenslon or renewal of any such lease that there Is fnsuffiolent acreage wlthln the tract under lease by him to comply with the Federal reatrlotlon then no extension or renewal shall be granted unless said leases also show that there la no adjacent and ad- joining acreage to sald traot whereln said eppllcant is a party in lntereat that could have been combined wtth the tract upon whloh the applloatlon for ex- tenslon or renewal Is made ln order to oomplg wlth the Feclerel restriction. “Sec. 2. The Commlssloner of the General Land Office 1s hereby euthorieed to Issue to the lease owner such instrument In writing in the nature of an extension or renewal of such lease as may be neces- sary or proper to carry into effect the foregoing / provlsion of this Aot. “Sec. 3. The provlslons of this Act are and shall be held and oonstrued to be oumuletlve of all General Laws of thls state on the subject treated of and embraced ln thls Act when not ln oonfllot here- wlth, but ln oane of oonfllot, ln whole or In part, this Aot shell control. "960. 4. If any seotlon, subdlvlslon, para- Hon. C. D. Simmons, page 3 o-5393 graph, sentence, or clause of this Act be held to be unconstitutional, the remaining portions of same shall nevertheless be held valid and binding "Sec. 5. The fact that certain leases on University lands are of such size or shape as to create the probability that they cannot be devel- oped under governmental restrictions on 011 devel- opments, creates an emergency and Imperative public necessity demanding the suspenslon of the Rule re- qulring bills to be read on three several days, and sa1d Rule is hereby suspended, and this Act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage, and it is so enacted." It is our opinion that 3. B. 287 gives to a lessee of University land, who brings himself wIthin Its terms, the right to a refusal of an extension or renewal of his lease for such term as the Regents and the Land Commissioner may fix (not to exceed two years) and upon a consideration to be determined by them. The word "shall" is used in the first paragraph of S. B, 287 ln connection with the granting of a benefit or a right. Under such circumstances the meaning is held to be mandatory rather than permissive. 39 Tex. Jur. 37. In other words the Regents and the Land Comm%ssloner may make an extension or renewal with present lessees of Univer- sity lands, who come within the terms of the Act, wIthout the necessity of a public sale and competitive bidding as provided for by Article 2603a, Vernon's Annotated Civil Statutes. The Act gives the Board of Regents and the Land Com- missioner broad discretion in the matter of fixing a consid- eration. The Act makes no provision for an appeal from the action of the Regents and the Land Commissioner. Their action in fixing a consideration would be, in our opinion, final un- less an interested party were able to show a clear case of an abuse of discretion on their part. Securities State Bank of San Juan v. State, 169 S. W. 2nd. 554, refused for want of merit. However, the Regents and the Land Commissioner would not be authorized to discriminate between lessees similarly situated, either in regard to the consideration or the period of their extension or revewal. Railroad Commission v. Shell, 139 Tex. 66, 161 S. W. (2) 1022. The next question is whether or not Section 5, Arti- cle 2603a, Vernon's Annotated Civil Statutes, which provides for a bonus, a royalty of l/8 of gross production and a delay rental of lO# per acre per year, applies to an extension or renewal under S. B. 287. Article 2603a by its terms applies to a sale at public auctton on competitive bids. The sale Hon. C. D. Simmons, page 4 o-5393 must be held by the Board for Lease of University Lands, which Board consists of two members of the Board of Regents and~the Land Commissioner. Article 26C3a, Sec. 1, Vernon's Annotated Civil Statutes. Senate Bill 287, on the other hand, author- izes the entlre Board of Regents and the Land Commissioner to grant an extension or renewal to present lessees for a limlt- ed period without competitive bids. The provlslon In Art. 26C3a, Sec. 5 for assessing the highest bidder a special fee of one (1%) percent of the total sum bid to pay the expenses of the sale, including the fee of the auctioneer crying the sale, would clearly not apply to an extension or renewal under 3. B. 287. The fact that the lessee's right to invoke the provisions of 3. B. 287 is condltioned on a showing that he has been unable because of Federal restrictions to enjoy the drilling rights which his lease confers, lndfcates to our mind an intention to give such a lessee a further opportunity for enjoying such rights without penalty. We take the view that 3. B. 287 was intended to stand In place of performance for a maximum period of two years, Lf the Board of Regents and the Land Commissioner should, in their good judgment, de- termine that a lessee of University land Is entitled to in- voke Its provisions and is deserving of its benefits. The common law recognizes a doctrine of implled in- tention by which certain klnas of contracts ar,esuspended be- cause of temporary impossibility of performance artsing after the date of execution and without fault of the partles. The general rule is epitomized in the Restatement on Contracts, Sec. 462, as follows: "Temporary imposslbillty of such character that if permanent it would discharge a promiser's entire contractural duty, has that operation if rendering performance after the impossibility ceases would Impose a burden on the promisor sub- stantially greater than would have been imposed upon him had there been no impossibility; but other- wise such temporary impossibility suspends the duty of the promlsor to render the p;rformance promised only while the impossibility exists. See, also Vol. 6, Williston on Contracts (Rev. Ed. 19383 Sec. 1957; 17 C.J.S. 954, 956. We do not here hold that such rule obtains in Texas, as we do not think that such a determination is necessary in order to answer your question. However, we do belleve that the Legislature in enacting 3. B. 287 had In mind the equitable claims arising from the plight of a lessee who is unable to Hon. C. D. Simmons, page 5 o-5393 reap the fruits of his lease because of a Federal ruling and these are the same considerations that underlie the common law doctrine just mentioned. Upon a consideration of the special circumstances under whleh 3. B. 287 becomes operative and in view of the objects of the Act, we are of the opinion that the Act is complete within itself and that the provi- sions of Article 2603a, requiring a minimum consideration for leases let at public auction do not apply. We do not think that your question involves a ae- termination of the rights of lessees of University land under Sec. 7, Title III of the Second War Powers Act, approved March 27, 1942. That section provides: “(7) No person shall be held liable for damages or penalties for any default under any con- tract or order which shall result directly or ln- directly from compliance with this subsection (a) or any rule, regulation, or order issued there- under, notwithstanding that any such rule, regula- tion or order shall thereafter be declared by ju- dicial or other competent authority to be invalid." U. 3. Cong. Service Code (1942) 247; Tit. 50, U.S.C.A. APP. Sec. 633 (7). Subsection (a) which is referred to in the above quotation is the section conferring priority powers on the President. This section is the present source of authority for Conservation Order No. M-68 as amended (8 F.R. 104) and . Preference Rating Order No. P-98, as amended (7 F.R. 2719). These orders, by prescribing conditions under which priority directives on strategic materials are held not to apply, ~111 have the effect of rendering temporarily Impossible the per- formance by some lessees of the drilling provisions under existing University leases. It is expressly provided In Sec. 1501, Title XV of the Second War Powers Act, 1942 (U.S. Cong. Service Code, 253; Tit. 50 U.S.C.A. App. Sec. 645) that Title III of that Act, which -includesSec. 7, above quoted, "shall remain in force only until December 31, 1944, or until such earlier time as Congress by concurrent resolution, or the President, may des- ignate." We are familiar with the rule which gives Federal legislation precedence over other State statutes where Congress has legislated in regard to a subject which is within i,tscon- stitutional control and over which it has the right to assume exclusive jurisdiction and has manifested its intentionto deal therewith in full. 11 Am. Jur. 307; 17 R.C.L. 694; , . Hon. C. D. Simmons, page 6 o-5393 Neville v. G. C. & 3. F. Ry. Co. (Corn.App.) 252 S.W. 483. Rbw ever, in our opinion, Sec. 7 of Title III of the Second War Powers Act, 1942, Is by Its terms operative only to the extent of absolving a lessee from liability "for damages or penalties for any default." Such Fs the general rule with reference to contracts under which performance is rendered illegal or impossible because of conditions occurring sub- sequent to the date of their execution. Cinquegrano v. T.A. Clarke Motors(R.D.) 30 A(2d) 859; Scanti v. American Auto Supply co., 36 N. Y. 3. (2d) 747; 20 Texas Law Review, 710. The contrary rule seems to have been adopted ln Texas where the impossibility in performance resulted from the adoptlon of prohibltlon under the Local Option Statute. Houston Ice & Brewing Co. v. Keenan (1905) 99 Tex. 79, 88 S.W. 197. The right to a suspension of contracts during the period of tem- porary impossibility does not deem to be covered by the Fea- era1 Act above quoted. The Federal Act merely says that "no person shall be held liable for damages or penalties for any default under any contract" etc. After the expiration of the primary term in a standard 011 and gas lease, if the de- lay rentals have been paid and no well has been drilled, the obllgatlons of the lessee are ordinarily at an end. Failure to drill during the primary term is not a "default" unless the absolute form of drillfng clause Is employed. 31 Tex. Jur. 740. This Is not the form of lease which the statute (Art. 2603a, Sec. 5, Vernon's Ann. Clv. St.) authorizes the Board for Lease of University Lands to make, nor the lease provided for in your Form No. 4. See our Opinion No. O-493, issued on March 15, 1939, to Mr. Leo C. Haynes, Secretary of the Board of Regents. We are not here concerned with whether lessees of University lands have common law rights indepen- dent of the Federal statute to a suspension of their lease agreements for such period as the enjoyment of the drilling rights thereunder may have been rendered illegal or impossible as a result of compliance with a rule, regulation or order of a Federal War Agency. Our holding is that S.B. 287 is not rendered inoperative, either by reason of the Federal statute or by reason of the lessee's common law rights. It clearly gives a lessee of University lands, who comes within its terms, a right to something he did not have before, viz. the refusal on a present extension or renewal for a fIxed period beyond the primary term of his lease. Trusting that the foregoIng sufflclently answers your inquiry, we are , . Hon. C. D. Simmons, page 7 0 -5393 Yours very truly ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS By sbagan Dickson Fagan DLckbon Assistant FD:BT:wc APPROVED JUNE 24, 1943 s/Grover Sellers FIRST ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL Approved Opinion Committee By s/BWB Chairman